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IN MEMORIAM
The Honorable William D. Murray
November 20, 1908-October 3, 1994
In March of 1972, as a senior at the University of Montana
School of Law, I decided to take a stab at an interview for a
clerkship with Montana's most senior federal District Judge,
W.D. Murray-a man whom I knew by reputation but had never
met. It was a most fortunate trip for me. I landed the clerkship
and spent two most enjoyable years law clerking.
At the time, Judge Murray was 64 years old and had been
on the federal bench for 23 years-having been appointed by
President Truman in 1949 when he (Judge Murray) was 41 years
old. Judge Murray received his B.S. from Georgetown University
in 1932, and his LL.B. from the University of Montana in 1938.
He was awarded an honorary LL.D from the University of Mon-
tana in 1961.
I knew that the Judge had a reputation for being very strict,
perhaps even irascible, in the courtroom-particularly if his back
were hurting and he was having to stand behind the bench dur-
ing the proceeding. From my new perch in the clerk's corner I
soon discovered, however, that any attorney who came to court
prepared and who followed the rules of procedure, was treated in
a courteous and professional manner by a conscientious and
compassionate judge. Those who did not come so prepared,
wished they had. If court were set for 2:00 p.m., Judge Murray
would be waiting in the anteroom. As soon as the clock struck
two, he would walk through the courtroom door ready to com-
mence. If an attorney were late, he or she would be fined. In the
interests of consistency, there were a few occasions when he even
fined himself for being late to court.
Prior to assuming the bench, Judge Murray had spent some
time as a prosecutor for the U.S. Attorney's office in Butte. As a
judge, he was unbending in his conviction to protect the pre-
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sumption of innocence. God help the marshal who made the
mistake of parading a defendant before a jury in prison attire or
the prosecutor who conveniently left a weapon sitting on the
counsel table in view of the jury before it had been admitted into
evidence.
Judge Murray assumed senior status in 1965. During his
years of semi-retirement, the Judge's excellent reputation for
running a tight ship and keeping a current docket put him in
great demand to serve as a visiting judge in other federal district
courts where dockets had backlogged. With the advice of his wife
and traveling companion Lu, he would review the ever growing
list of trouble spots and would decide where he might do the
most good and enjoy doing it-New England in the fall, New
Orleans during Mardi gras. In the two short years that I clerked
for him, he accepted assignments stretching from Phoenix to
Boston and San Juan, Puerto Rico to Seattle. In between these
district court assignments, he would, once or twice a year, also
sit as a visiting appellate judge on the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. When he completed an assignment, the local docket
would be current and his perspective on people and the law
would be that much broader. Judge Murray was a valued asset
to the federal courts throughout the country, as well as to his
native State of Montana.
The geographic diversity of these assignments required him
to quickly adapt to the customs and peculiarities of the local
bar-not always an easy task. I recall one of our first days in
court in Boston when two ivy leaguers were arguing a breach of
contract issue. After listening to one attorney expound for ten
minutes about the "paddy of the first pat" Judge Murray beck-
oned me to the bench and said "I'm not going to be able to re-
solve this issue until I understand the legal terminology, what's
a paddy?" I said, "Judge, in Montana, I think we'd call it the
'party of the first part'."
In addition to his long and valued service to the State and
the country as a jurist, Judge Murray, or "Dub" as he was called
by his friends (not his law clerks), always found time for service
to the community-particularly the educational community.
During World War II, he served the country as a Lieutenant in
the U.S. Navy from 1942-45. He served as Chairman of the
Board of Visitors at The University of Montana School of Law,
and was a Member of the Board of Regents at Gonzaga Universi-
ty. He was the recipient of the Borromeo Award from Carroll
College (1960), and the De Smet Medal from Gonzaga University
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(1967).
Judge Murray died in October of 1994 in Butte-where he
had been born 86 years earlier. He spent over half his life as a
Federal Judge-one of the longest tenures on the federal bench
of any judge in the country. To those of us who were honored to
have worked with him as clerks or attorneys, he will be missed
as a fine jurist and mentor. To Lu, Bill, Gael, and Tim he will be
remembered as a beloved mate and father.
-W. William Leaphart, Justice, Montana Supreme Court
3
Leaphart: The Honorable William D. Murray
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1995
4Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/1
TRIBUTE
A TRIBUTE TO DEAN RODNEY K. SMITH
As a Trustee of the University of Montana Foundation and a
member of the Bar of the State of Montana, I would like to ex-
tend my heartfelt thanks to Dean Rodney K. Smith for the two
years of service that he has given us as the Dean of the Univer-
sity of Montana School of Law. While Dean Smith's tenure may
not have been as long as we would have wished, the benefits we
received from his service have been considerable.
I first met Dean Smith two years ago when I was the Presi-
dent of the University of Montana Foundation. The Foundation
had just launched an ambitious $40,000,000 capital campaign to
try to meet some existing needs at the University. This was a far
greater task than the Foundation had ever undertaken and one
that required tremendous effort by many people. As part of the
campaign, significant funds were expected to be raised for the
benefit of the school of law. To say the least, I was apprehensive
about the ability of a new dean, who had no connection with our
State, to help the Foundation accomplish this task. What I found
was a tireless advocate for the School of Law and the legal pro-
fession, as well as an effective fundraiser.
Dean Smith immediately made it a priority to travel
throughout both the State of Montana and the United States to
introduce himself to University of Montana School of Law gradu-
ates and sing the praises of the school of law. Dean Smith has
always felt that he was the beneficiary of the significant contri-
butions of the deans that had preceded him and that the School
of Law was doing an excellent job in producing practicing attor-
neys. Dean Smith's experience as a small-town lawyer, as well as
a professor and administrator, allowed him to relate to and un-
derstand the concerns of practicing lawyers and their thoughts
about the effectiveness of the school.
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Dean Smith's vision of the law school, however, has not been
limited to the State of Montana. He was convinced that it was
necessary for the law school to develop a solid financial basis
that would allow the hiring of the most capable professors avail-
able within the country, to recruit outstanding students from
both within and outside the State of Montana, and to attract
outstanding visiting professors and lecturers such as United
States Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O'Connor and Robert
Bennett. As a result of the persistent effort of Dean Smith, many
lawyers are sharing this vision and sharing their resources with
the school of law. I have been particularly impressed by Dean
Smith's commitment to long-range goals in allocating private
funding to the establishment of endowments for the benefit of
the faculty and the students. The recent law school banquet
disclosed the growth of endowed scholarships and faculty
awards.
Generations of law students and faculty will benefit from the
efforts of Dean Smith to improve the educational opportunities
for law school students. And, he has established relationships
between the school of law and the practicing bar that are neces-
sary for the practicing bar to become more involved in providing
funds for the education of future lawyers. This, in turn, will help
the practicing bar by allowing the school of law to produce well-
educated and effective graduates.
Again, I would like to thank Dean Smith for the significant
contributions that he has made not only to the University of
Montana School of Law, but also to the practicing Bar of the
State of Montana. We do appreciate all that he has done, and I,
along with many other lawyers in Montana, will miss his friend-
ship and his counsel. Thomas Boone
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Rodney Smith has been the consummate colleague. Rod's
greatest joy in being a dean has been facilitating the productivity
of faculty at The University of Montana School of Law. He has
delighted in making possible and fully supporting any and all
faculty endeavors. Whenever a faculty member needed a quick
read of a manuscript and sound advice, Rod reviewed and exten-
sively commented on a document overnight. If faculty wanted to
create a new course or to devise innovative teaching techniques,
Rod was fully supportive. When faculty members needed to at-
tend a conference to stay current in their specific fields or to
recruit diverse students, Rod found a way to make those things
happen.
When Rod saw the detrimental effect of having the lowest-
paid law school faculty in the nation, he immediately devised a
creative pay plan, secured faculty, presidential and regential
approval, and began implementing the plan. Realizing that en-
hanced income must entail greater responsibility and account-
ability, Rod carefully linked salary raises to increased faculty
productivity.
Rod has attempted to improve the School of Law in numer-
ous other ways. He assembled the finest scholars in the nation
for a conference on religious freedom at the school in September
1994. The papers which those scholars delivered at the confer-
ence which appear in issue one of this volume probably comprise
the best edition of the Montana Law Review that students have
ever published.
Rod has fostered dialogue and diversity among faculty, stu-
dents and staff, with the remainder of the University, and in the
community, state, nation, and world. Rod has promoted racial,
gender, and ethnic diversity as well as diversity of ideas. Rod
has strongly supported interdisciplinary efforts, one of which
culminated in the establishment of a joint degree program in law
and environmental studies.
We wish Rod the best as he departs The University of Mon-
tana School of Law to return to Capital University. Rod will
rejoin the faculty there, actively participating in teaching, service
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STUDENT TRIBUTE
As co-editors-in-chief of the Montana Law Review, we are
extremely grateful for Dean Smith's many contributions to the
law school. Throughout his two years as dean, he provided tre-
mendous support to the law review. His vision, enthusiasm and
leadership enabled us to improve our journal and, in turn, the
national reputation of our law school.
Dean Smith worked very closely with the board-of-editors to
organize the first annual James R. Browning Symposium, which
focused on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Initially,
Dean Smith secured the funding necessary to establish the sym-
posium series through a generous donation from Jack Hursh, an
alumnus of the law school. Then, Dean Smith volunteered to
contact scholars from around the country and helped us to secure
their articles and participation in the symposium. As prepara-
tions proceeded, he continued to promote the event by encourag-
ing the attendance of the Bench and Bar of Montana. During the
symposium, he acted as a wonderful host and presented his own
article on Native American religious freedom. Beyond any doubt,
we would not have enjoyed such a successful symposium without
his involvement and support.
Afterwards, symposium participants responded that their
weekend in Montana was the best symposium that they had ever
attended. Not only did they enjoy the intellectual events, but
Dean Smith and the Law Review also organized dinners and
activities such as fly-fishing and a football game for the partici-
pants. Professor Ira C. Lupu from George Washington University
said, "Your students were more than up to the task of running
this symposium. They were extremely well-organized and well-
prepared on every front. Throw in their Montana pride and good
nature and the combination was almost overwhelming." Profes-
sor William P. Marshall from Case Western Reserve University
commented, "It was the perfect mix of intellectual and social
interaction. I was also greatly impressed by the University of
Montana students. Their enthusiasm was terrific and contagious,
and in my opinion the success of the program was a direct result
of their participation."
After publication of the symposium issue, Dean Smith sent
copies to all judges on the Ninth Circuit, to the justices of the
United States Supreme Court, and to the deans of other law
schools. As a result of the timeliness of the debate on the consti-
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tutionality of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act and the
stellar contributing scholars, we have received two to three out-
of-state requests per week for the symposium issue. This issue
has significantly elevated the scholarly reputation of the Mon-
tana Law Review and, therefore, the University of Montana
School of Law as a whole.
Although the Montana Law Review's closest work with Dean
Smith involved the symposium, he supported the law review in
many other ways as well. Last summer, Dean Smith encouraged
the law review's transition to a more modern publishing system.
He secured the finances necessary for our conversion to "desktop
publishing" through a generous gift from Sherman Lohn, an
alumnus and long-time supporter of the University of Montana.
The conversion to our own publishing system updated our pro-
cess to the level of other law schools and enabled us to save both
money and time.
Dean Smith not only receives our gratitude and admiration
as members of the Montana Law Review, but as students in
general. Dean Smith was extremely active in fund-raising and
the promotion of scholarships and aid for students. He initiated
the first Awards Banquet, which recognized scholarship donors
and recipients and allowed them to meet each other. Similarly,
Dean Smith always made time to encourage the post-graduation
pursuits of his students. He was more than enthusiastic about
writing a letter of recommendation, acting as a reference, or
offering advice to the students that sought his help. Dean
Smith's. opinion of and vision for the University of Montana Law
School is limitless, and he encouraged many students to pursue
and achieve positions that they would not have otherwise
thought possible.
Throughout Montana, people were impressed by the speaker
at our law school commencement-Sandra Day O'Connor. All in
attendance at graduation felt moved and inspired by Justice
O'Connors' wisdom and love for the law. Dean Smith was entire-
ly responsible for the procurement of her attendance at the grad-
uation ceremony. He said that he simply wrote her a letter invit-
ing her to speak and she accepted. Surprisingly, it turned out to
be one of his easiest accomplishments-requiring only the will-
ingness to believe and make the effort.
As a person, Dean Smith has been an example of a hard-
working, open-hearted, and scholarly attorney. We are extremely
grateful for his dedication to the improvement of the law review
and his contribution to other scholarly attributes of the Universi-
1995] 357
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ty of Montana School of Law. His enthusiasm and commitment
to the law school remained constant and did not wane toward
the end of his tenure in Montana. Current and future genera-
tions of Montana attorneys will benefit from the enhanced schol-
arly reputation of the Montana School of Law as a direct result
of Dean Smith's endeavors. As students, we greatly appreciate
his leadership and willingness to give of himself. We would like
to thank Dean Smith for his generous support and for the inspi-
ration he offers on a daily basis. We extend our best wishes to
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Montana Legislature adopted more than 170
pounds of laws,2 an estimated 784,000 words,' during 42 days
in 1895.4 With little attention to the details of its actions,5 the
2. The enrolled versions of the Codes were reported as weighing: Code of Civil
Procedure, 37 pounds, The House, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 13, 1895, at 1; It
Was All Spent, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 14, 1895, at 5; Civil Code, 50
pounds, The State Legislature, DAILY INTERMOUNTAIN (Butte), Feb. 19, 1895, at 1;
and Political Code, 50 pounds, The State Legislature, DAILY INTERMOUNTAIN (Butte),
Feb. 19, 1895, at 1. Based on these estimates and the relative sizes of the printed
Codes, I estimated a weight of 33 pounds for the Penal Code, which the newspapers
appear to have forgotten to weigh. The description of the Codes in the popular press
in pounds indicates both the vastness of their provisions and the novelty of such
massive legal measures.
A brief note on sources is necessary: Because surviving nineteenth century
Montana legislative records are sparse at best, I have taken most of the details of
the various bills, amendments, and discussion in the legislature from newspapers'
accounts. I relied most heavily on the two Helena papers, the Democratic Daily Inde-
pendent and the Republican Helena Daily Herald since these papers covered the
legislature and Bar Association activities in the most detail. In general, I used the
daily editions of these papers rather than their weekly editions, which appear to
consist of reprints from various dailies. Other papers from the period comprehensive-
ly reviewed include the Anaconda Standard, the Butte Daily Intermountain, and the
Missoulian. For each of the relevant periods (the 1893, 1895, and 1897 sessions of
the legislature and several weeks preceding and following each session) I read every
story connected to the legislature, the Montana Bar Association, or the Governor in
these papers. The style of reporting for the period often led to information regarding
the Codes being buried in interior paragraphs of stories whose headlines suggested
totally different topics.
Finally, a stylistic note: legislators and others often referred to the Codes in
the singular. Except where directly quoting such a reference or referring to an indi-
vidual Code, I have used the plural to refer to the Codes as a group.
3. General Baggs' Army, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 2, 1895, at 1.
4. This encompasses the time from introduction of the four Codes to the
Governor's signature on the last Code.
5. The adoption of the Civil Code certainly has attracted little attention from
historians other than Robert Natelson. See infra note 14. Standard works on Mon-
tana like K Ross TOOLE, MONTANA: AN UNCOMMON LAND (1959), do not mention the
Code at all, and none of the major twentieth century Montana history sources men-
tions the Codes other than to note their passage. See, e.g., MERRILL G. BURLINGAME
& K ROSS TOOLE, A HISTORY OF MONTANA (1957); BANCROFT, infra note 94. The
otherwise exhaustive JAMES M. HAMILTON, FROM WILDERNESS TO STATEHOOD: A His-
TORY OF MONTANA, 1805-1900 (1957), tells us only that Wade's codification work "has
been the model for code commissions." Id. at 329.
Standard legal histories also give little attention to the Western codifiers in
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legislature changed Montana's criminal law, civil law, procedural
rules, and government structure, and revolutionized the state's
infant legal system. While legislators debated patronage jobs and
the selection of school textbooks with great fervor, no significant
debate occurred on the massive changes in the substance and
structure of Montana's laws.6
The story of codification in Montana is more than an amus-
ing tale of frontier corruption and political ineptitude. Montana's
codification experience provides important lessons for those en-
gaged in attempts to revolutionize legal systems today. From the
former Soviet Union and Soviet bloc countries to Latin America,
political change has led to a demand for dramatic legal change.
As these countries turn to the West for examples of laws,
Montana's experience with the legal reforms created for New
York in the 1860s and California in the 1870s suggests that
reformers should approach the substance of "foreign" western
law with caution. Adoption of laws without creation of the appro-
priate legal culture and without sensitivity to the laws' suitabili-
ty to local conditions is a recipe for the distortion of substance. It
undermines the rule of law by creating a dissonance between the
written law and the law as applied by the courts. Moreover, the
legal reforms in the former Soviet and Soviet Bloc countries have
again raised the issue of whether reform is best accomplished
through centralized, top-down efforts similar to the Montana
Codes (the Codes), or through decentralized institutions such as
the common law.7 This Article describes the history of the Codes
general, and even less to Montana. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF
AMERICAN LAW 351-54 (1973) (mentioning Dakota, California and Montana and at-
tributes the Codes' success in the West to those states being "sparsely settled;" no
discussion of Montana codification); KERMrr L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN
AMERICAN HISTORY 126-27 (1989) (noting only the code of procedure and concluding
"W[the common law ... was undisturbed"); MORTON HORwrrz, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960 117-18 (1992) (not mentioning Montana's adoption
although listing Dakota Territory, California, and Georgia).
6. These changes were embodied in four Codes: a Civil Code, a Penal Code, a
Political Code, and a Code of Civil Procedure. The Montana codifiers derived the
Codes from drafts produced in New York between 1848 and 1865 by David Dudley
Field and others. See infra part II.A. They also drew on California's experience with
the Codes, where David's brother Stephen helped shepherd them to adoption in 1872,
and the experience of the Dakota Territory, which had adopted Codes based on Da-
vid Dudley Field's drafts in 1866.
7. Compare Paul H. Rubin, Growing a Legal System in the Post-Communist
Economies, 27 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 1 (1994) (advocating common law system) with
Rudiger Dornbusch, Strategies and Priorities for Reform in 1 THE TRANSITION TO A
MARKET ECONOMY: THE BROAD ISSUES (Paul Marer & Salvatore Zecchini eds., 1991)
(advocating wholesale adoption of existing foreign commercial codes).
361
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in an attempt to show the pitfalls of the top-down approach to
law reform.
The Codes' adoption signalled a failure of the young state's
governance mechanisms. Rather than considering the substance
of these bills, the legislature deferred to the small group of attor-
neys who vigorously pushed for codification. Legislators waived
the safeguards that might have avoided unintended consequenc-
es, such as the political code's restructuring of municipal govern-
ment salaries and offices.8 At the same time, they slavishly fol-
lowed procedures, like hand enrollment,9 which served no pur--
pose and yet were expensive. In doing so, the legislature abdi-
cated its responsibility to govern. Inevitably, after passage, when
people began to read the Codes, a multitude of problems sur-
faced.
Perhaps more surprising than the simple adoption of such
massive changes in the legal system was the adoption of these
changes based on "foreign""0 law. Dating back to territorial
days, Montana had a long history of opposition to outsiders'
involvement in the local legal system.1' Despite the significant
differences between Montana's economy and society in the 1890s
and those of the source states, the Fourth Legislature swallowed
a massive dose of "foreign" law. Why?
Montana's advocates of codification succeeded for several
reasons. First, many saw codification as an antidote to the chaos
of the state's statutes. Thirty years of politics and carelessness
produced a jumble of sometimes conflicting provisions, causing
great uncertainty regarding the law's content. Although these
conditions existed since the 1860s, by the 1890s the chaos
reached epic proportions. Second, important elements of the
bench and bar united behind the codification effort because it
promised to make their lives easier by producing a single, readily
available source of law. Unlike the New York Bar, which pro-
8. See infra notes 208-17 and accompanying text.
9. Enrolling bills required copying the final versions by hand. In the case of
the Codes, this took weeks of work by a small army of clerks. See infra part II.D.3.
10. The Codes derived directly from David Dudley Field's attempts at codifi-
cation in New York and Dakota's and California's adoption of modified versions of
Field's drafts. See infra part II.A.
11. For an example of Montana's grievances against outsiders and their involve-
ment in territorial government and law, see the speech of Congressional Delegate J.
K Toole to Congress on the subject in The Territories' Rulers, DAILY INDEPENDENT
(Helena), Jan. 22, 1889, at 3 (a representative quote: "In short, Mr. Speaker, it [Con-
gress] has made the territories the dumping-ground for all the experimental legisla-
tion which the whims and caprices of congress can invent.").
362 [Vol. 56
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duced vigorous opposition to that state's codification, the Mon-
tana Bar was not yet a mature profession with strong interests
in maintaining the legal status quo against the Codes' changes.
Third, a public choice12 analysis suggests that the Codes provid-
ed an opportune moment for legislators to create demand for
their services. By passing such a comprehensive set of laws, the
Fourth Legislature created both the need for amendments to
"fix" problem areas and the opportunity to provide such services.
Additionally, amendments to the Codes were far more difficult
for outsiders to decipher than laws written from scratch. Amend-
ments required possession of the Codes to determine what was
being amended because the titles to amendments typically pro-
vided no information regarding their contents. Finally, Montan-
ans saw the Codes as a chance for Montana to take its rightful
place in the nation as a progressive, modern state. Denied state-
hood for years by national politics, and often chafing under the
federal territorial appointees who dominated the executive and
judicial branches, the Codes' image as a rational, forward-looking
set of principles gave Montana a chance to leap to the forefront
of legal reform.
The Codes also physically overwhelmed the Montana Legis-
lature. Their sheer size and hurried passage meant that the
usual mechanisms for review of legislation failed completely. An
embarrassing legislative patronage scandal over clerical employ-
ees contributed to the disregard for the legislators' responsibility
to review legislation; the passage of the Codes ended discussion
of overstaffing. Indeed, rather than reducing patronage employ-
ees, the Codes created the need to expand the ranks of the pa-
tronage clerks to enroll the Codes by hand.13
The Codes' adoption had less impact on Montana's legal
system than the codifiers hoped. Since adoption, the Montana
courts have routinely ignored the Codes' provisions. With respect
to employment law, for example, the Code provisions governing
interpretation of indefinite employment contracts (discussed in
Part IV, infra) proved ineffective in forestalling development of
expansive common law remedies for wrongful discharge. Despite
these remedies' clear conflict with the Civil Code, Montana's
courts paid little attention to the Code's provisions. Because the
Montana courts failed to follow the Civil Code, they created a
dissonance between the written Codes and the common law,
12. Public choice is essentially the economic analysis of politics.
13. See infra part II.D.3.
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which defeated the codifiers' attempt to create certain and easily
known law. By failing to accommodate the common law changes
to the clear text of the rule, the Montana courts undermined the
Codes. Even worse, as Professor Robert Natelson has shown
elsewhere, 4 when Montana courts did follow the Codes, the
inappropriateness of the Codes' provisions sometimes distorted
the development of law appropriate to Montana's conditions.
More importantly, examination of the development of wrong-
ful discharge law in Montana illustrates a different sort of prob-
lem from the general problems associated with codification dis-
cussed above. In the Montana jurisprudence of wrongful dis-
charge law, the Civil Code provisions provided an alternative to
the Montana Supreme Court's misinterpretation of them. Be-
cause of its misinterpretation, the Montana Supreme Court dis-
torted Montana's common law in a manner likely to harm
Montana's economy. Had the court carefully followed the Code
provisions in this area, it could have both avoided the harshness
of the common law at-will rule and the excesses of the court-
created remedies.
Part II of this Article briefly sketches the codification move-
ment in the United States and the conditions in Montana in the
1890s. The remainder of Part II tells the story of Montana's
adoption of the Civil, Criminal, Political, and Civil Procedure
Codes of 1895. Part III examines in detail the subsequent treat-
ment of some of the employment law sections of the Civil Code.
Part IV draws lessons from codification and the Codes' applica-
tion for future legal reform efforts.
II. ADOPTION OF THE MONTANA CODES
Montana's adoption of the Codes was the final success of a
major nineteenth century intellectual movement. Codification
was debated across the country' 5 and took root in four states in
the West and one in the South (besides Louisiana). 6 The origi-
nal source of the Montana Codes was four draft codes prepared
for New York in the 1850s and 1860s; although New York never
adopted a large portion of them. California and Dakota Territory
14. Robert G. Natelson, Running with the Land in Montana, 51 MONT. L. REV.
17, 40-41 (1990).
15. See CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A STUDY
OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM (1981).
16. The Western Code states were California (1872), Montana (1895), North
Dakota (1866) and South Dakota (1866) (while both were part of the Dakota Territo-
ry). Georgia codified its laws in 1860.
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adopted versions of all four New York Codes before they were
adopted in Montana.
A. Codification in the United States
Codification movements came and went throughout nine-
teenth century America. 7 As Roscoe Pound put it, "The French
Civil Code had fascinated many in America as it had almost
everyone abroad." 8 Jeremy Bentham'9 began the first system-
atic attempt to convince Americans of the virtues of codes over
the common law, writing to President James Madison in 1811 to
volunteer to produce a complete American code.2 ° Upon receipt
of a letter "importing approbation of this my humble Proposal,"
Bentham said he would commence drawing up:
[A] complete body of proposed law, in the form of Statute law,
say in one word a Pannomion-including a succedaneum to that
mass of foreign law, the yoke of which in the wordless, as well
as boundless, and shapeless shape of common, alias unwritten
law, remains still about your necks-a complete body or such
parts of it as the life and health of a man, whose age wants
little of four and sixty, may allow of.2'
Madison's reply, delayed by the War of 1812, refused to give
Bentham the encouragement he sought to begin such a pro-
ject.22 While waiting for Madison to respond, however, Bentham
became convinced that the states were the appropriate forum for
his efforts." He wrote to each of the states' governors to offer
17. Codification was an important intellectual movement in Europe as well as
in the United States. In England, Jeremy Bentham, for example, was a major propo-
nent of codification. France's adoption of the Code Napoldon in the early part of the
nineteenth century launched a codification movement across much of Europe. The
Code Napoleon's influence spread with Napoleon's military accomplishments but did
not recede with his defeats. Austria, Switzerland, Spain, Portugal, and several of the
German and Italian states all adopted at least partial civil codes during the nine-
teenth century, as did Japan, Ottoman Turkey, and British India.
18. Roscoe Pound, David Dudley Field: An Appraisal, in DAVID DUDLEY FIELD
CENTENARY ESSAYS CELEBRATING ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LEGAL REFORM 3, 8-9
(Alison Reppy ed., 1949) [hereinafter CENTENARY ESSAYS].
19. Bentham coined the word "codify." Natelson, supra note 14, at 36.
20. COOK, supra note 15, at 97-98.
21. Letter to James Madison (Oct. 30, 1811), in 8 THE CORRESPONDENCE OF
JEREMY BENTHAM 182 (Timothy L.S. Sprigge, ed., 1988) (emphasis in original) [here-
inafter BENTHAM].
22. Letter from James Madison (May 8, 1816), in BENTHAM, supra note 21, at
521-22.
23. COOK, supra note 15, at 98-99.
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his services.2 Only New Hampshire's governor showed much
enthusiasm for the project, an enthusiasm the New Hampshire
legislature did not share.25 Although unsuccessful in his efforts,
Bentham succeeded in promoting the idea of codification in the
United States as a rationalization and modernization of the com-
mon law.
1. The New York Codes - "Is it right? Is it just?" s
That a codification of the law is in itself desirable should seem
hardly to admit of question. It is desirable alike for the judge,
the lawyer, and the citizen, . . . above all to the citizen, because
it shows him the laws by which he is to guide his daily conduct.
Strange indeed does it seem that any unprejudiced person
should imagine that the laws of the land should not, if possible,
be written down for the people of the land. 7
David Dudley Field
In New York, the explosive growth of commercial activity in
the first decades of the nineteenth century matched an equally
impressive growth in legislative activity. New York's annual
session law pamphlets "were rarely less than three hundred
pages in length, with some exceeding five hundred pages during
the first three decades of the nineteenth century." 8 Despite reg-
ular revisions, the growth in statutes combined with the rise in
reported decisions made the law increasingly difficult to deter-
mine for lawyer and citizen alike.29 As a result, throughout the
first half of the century New York engaged in a prolonged debate
over the comparative virtues of codification and revision. 0
Two commissions drafted the New York Codes and reported
them between 1848 (Civil Procedure) and 1865 (Civil Code).3
24. COOK, supra note 15, at 100-01.
25. COOK, supra note 15, at 101-02.
26. The phrase is Henry Field's (David Dudley Field's brother and biographer).
HENRY FIELD, THE LIFE OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 77 (1898).
27. David Dudley Field, Codification in the United States, 1 JURID. REV. 18, 23-
24 (1889) [hereinafter Field, Codification].
28. COOK, supra note 15, at 131-32 (citation omitted).
29. COOK, supra note 15, at 132.
30. See generally COOK, supra note 15, at 121-200 (providing a detailed discus-
sion of codification efforts in New York through 1860).
31. The New York Commissioners on Practice and Pleadings reported the Code
of Civil Procedure on February 29, 1848 and it was enacted "with very little change"
in April 1848. Mildred V. Coe & Lewis W. Morse, Chronology of the Development of
the David Dudley Field Code, 27 CORNELL L.Q. 238, 241-42 (1942). A separate body,
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Largely through the efforts of David Dudley Field,32 codification
the New York Code Commissioners, had also been appointed to draft political, penal,
and civil codes. Id. at 243. Not until 1857, with the appointment of Field, Noyes,
and Bradford, however, did this body begin to accomplish its task. The commission
reported the first draft of the Political Code on March 10, 1859 and the final draft
on April 10, 1860. Id. The first draft of the Penal Code was reported on April 2,
1864 and the final draft on February 13, 1865. Id. at 245. The Penal Code was
adopted in 1881. Alison Reppy, The Field Codification Concept, in CENTENARY Es-
SAYS, supra note 18, at 17, 48. The Code Commissioners reported the first draft of
the Field Civil Code on April 5, 1862. Coe & Morse, supra, at 245. The reported
draft was the result of more than the labors of the commissioners and their assis-
tants. Field claimed that "[a]s fast as my part of the Draft was prepared it was to
be distributed among the Judges and others for examination, and afterwards to be
re-examined, with the suggestions made." FIELD, supra note 26, at 78. Field distrib-
uted the 1862 draft to "judges and others" for review and the Code Commissioners
"re-examined these two Codes [the Civil and Penal] and considered such suggestions
as had been made" and "finally revised and agreed upon them." NINTH REPORT OF
THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE CODE (Feb. 13, 1865), in the 1865 Draft, at iv. In light
of these responses, the Code Commission revised the 1862 drafts, after circulating
them to judges and members of the bar. The Commission issued an extensively mod-
ified final draft of the Civil Code on February 13, 1865, Field's sixtieth birthday.
"The revision of the Civil Code involved as much labor as its original draft." Coe &
Morse, supra, at 245; FIELD, supra note 26, at 81.
32. Field was a well-connected lawyer, often identified with the interests of the
powerful New York street railway corporations. Field's reputation as a lawyer was
blemished by his actions on behalf of Jim Fisk and Jay Gould in the Erie wars over
control of the Albany and Susquehanna Railroad and in Gould's attempts to corner
the gold market. DAUN VAN EE, DAVID DUDLEY FIELD AND THE RECONSTRUCTION OF
THE LAw 238-80 (1986). In addition to the attacks on Field's professional ethics in
connection with his actions in those cases, Field also defended William "Boss" Tweed
against corruption charges, further sullying Field's reputation among both the profes-
sion and the general public. Id. at 293-310.
Despite these connections and his own wealth (Field earned at least $75,000 a
year in 1869 and 1870, for example, putting him at the top of the profession in
income, see id. at 251-52), Field offered an image of himself as a protector of the
middle class, prompting his brother and biographer Henry to label him "the Reform-
er:"
Justice, in the eye of the Reformer, was the rock, the corner-stone, on
which to build the structure of human society. I never knew a man who
had a stronger sense of justice. In framing a law it never occurred to him
to modify it in the interest of this or that individual or of this or that
class. The first question that he asked-and the only question-was, 'Is it
right? Is it just?'
FIELD, supra note 26, at 77.
What Field thought was right and just was almost certainly influenced by his
political views. Field began his involvement in politics as a Jacksonian Democrat and
codification was a Jacksonian program. HORWITZ, supra note 5, at 9. He continued as
a follower of Van Buren in the radical wing of the New York Democratic party,
which sought strict limits on government power. VAN EE, supra, at 114-45. As party
lines began to reform around slavery, Field, in 1856, reluctantly joined "with the
friends of freedom" in the new Republican party. VAN EE, supra, at 131 (quoting
FIELD, supra note 26, at 119 (quoting a letter to the ALBANY ATLAS)). Once a Repub-
lican, Field became part of the radical wing of the Republican party in the late
1850s. VAN EE, supra, at 132. Disgusted with Republican corruption after the Civil
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of the common law in New York finally took on concrete form
when Field and two others33 were appointed in 1857' as a
commission to codify the common law. Other than the Civil Pro-
cedure Code, the commissioners' work was largely ignored in
New York in the 1860s, however, and Field turned his efforts to
drafting an international code of laws. 5
Although all four Codes contained innovations, the Civil
Code was the most revolutionary. Field intended the Civil Code
to displace the common law entirely. 36 In crafting his substitute
for the common law, Field drew on a wide range of sources for
the Civil Code's provisions: New York decisions; citations to
reporters from both the United States and Britain; New York
statutes; British statutes; the works of Coke, Blackstone, Kent,
Story, and Lewin; and numerous other reference works.3 7 Field
aspired not simply to codify the existing law, but to improve
upon it.3" One of Field's major objectives, and an objective of the
War, he returned to the Democratic fold. VAN EE, supra, at 204.
33. The Commissioners were David Dudley Field, who had primary responsi-
bility for the Civil Code, William Curtiss Noyes, and Alexander W. Bradford. The
Commissioners did not work alone, of course. Field had assistants, and his brother
and biographer, Henry Field, reports:
[H]e preferred young men to old men. They might not be so learned in the
law, but that was in one view a qualification, as they were more free from
the paralyzing influence of old traditions; more alert in mind as well as in
body;, more quick to receive new ideas; and last, but not least, had more
power of continued labor.
FIELD, supra note 26, at 79. Thomas Shearman and Austin Abbott assisted Field
with the Civil Code. FIELD, supra note 26, at 80.
34. COOK, supra note 15, at 196.
35. VAN EE, supra note 32, at 322-29. Field had no more success there where
his international code was "for the most part regarded as a curiosity." VAN EE, supra
note 32, at 328 (quoting MERLE CURTI, PEACE OR WAR: THE AMERICAN STRUGGLE,
1636-1936, at 100 (1959)).
36. Natelson, supra note 14, at 37-40; NEW YORK CIVIL CODE § 6 (1865)
("There is no common law in any case where the law is declared by the Five
Codes.").
37. Rodolfo Batista, Sources of the Field Civil Code: The Civil Law Influences
on a Common Law Code, 60 TUL. L. REV. 799, 804 (1986). Batista is discussing the
final 1865 draft, but inspection suggests that the sources generally remained the
same between drafts.
38. In the final report of the Code Commission in 1865, the Commission
summed up its work:
In all this immense range of subjects, while it has been the general pur-
pose of the Commissioners to give the law as it now exists, they have kept
in mind the injunction of the Constitution to 'specify such alterations and
amendments therein as they shall deem proper.' In obedience to this com-
mand of the organic law, they have specified various alterations and
amendments which they consider proper to be adopted.
Final Report of the Code Commission (Feb. 13, 1865) in 1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS,
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codification movement generally, was to make the law accessible
to the individual layman.39
Renewed efforts to pass the other Field Codes in New York
occurred in the 1880s and included numerous revisions of the
proposed Codes." A law revision commission's success in exten-
sively revising Field's earlier Code of Civil Procedure in 1876
spurred the revival of interest in the Civil, Penal, and Political
Codes. Field, for whatever reason, opposed the revisions of the
Procedure Code, attempted to arrange their repeal, and delayed
passage of the final revisions. To persuade Field to drop his
opposition, the supporters of the civil procedure revision offered
a compromise: They would enact the Civil, Political, and Penal
Codes if Field would cease his opposition to the procedure revi-
sions. Field accepted.41 The New York Legislature adopted the
Penal Code in 1881 and portions of the Political Code throughout
the 1880s. Despite the Civil Code's passage through one or both
houses of the New York Legislature on several occasions,42 it
AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 320 (A.P. Sprague ed., 1884).
This progressive orientation undoubtedly contributed to the preservation of the
basic structure of Field's work in Montana's codification in 1895; how else can one
explain the acceptance of the basics of a set of laws that originated thirty years and
thousands of miles away? See infra note 254.
39. See, e.g., Alexander Martin, Codification, in MISSOURI BAR ASSOCIATION RE-
PORTS, 3D ANNUAL MEETING 152 (1883) ("As it now stands the law is like a sealed
book to the citizen."); David Dudley Field, Remarks Before the American Bar Associa-
tion (Aug. 20, 1886), in SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DA-
VID DUDLEY FIELD 233 (T. Coan ed., 1890) ("The question is, whether the laws made
for the people are to be understood by the people.").
40. See Coe & Morse, supra note 31.
41. VAN EE, supra note 32, at 329-31.
42. How carefully legislatures examined the Field Codes is difficult to assess.
Even in New York, where the debate was the longest and most heated, evidence sug-
gests that the examination by the legislature was less than thorough. For example,
the committee appointed by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York to
oppose codification reported that after the Civil Code had passed the state assembly
by a vote of 83-3 in 1881, "the result of many inquiries was an inability to find any
member of the Assembly who was willing to acknowledge that he had read [the
proposed Code], although one member did admit that he himself had voted for it, in
order to rid the Assembly of its presence as an element of disturbance." ASSOCIATION
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, [FIRST ANNUAL] REPORT OF THE SPECIAL
COMMITTEE TO "URGE THE REJECTION OF THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE," APPOINTED
MAR. 15TH, 1881 (1881). Even discounting for exaggeration because of its source, it
seems likely that few legislators troubled to read the more than two thousand sec-
tions which made up the Code. A similar lack of interest was reported among the
bar. See ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FIFTH ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITEE TO "URGE THE REJECTION OF THE PROPOSED CIVIL
CODE," REAPPOINTED OCT. 14, 1984, at 9 (1885). Only 28 of 309 members responded
to a New York State Bar Association survey on the Code and Field himself got only
50 responses to a question put to 700 members of the American Bar Association.
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never became law. Each time one house passed it, the other
house blocked it or the Governor vetoed it.
Among at least part of the public, Field's effort had certainly
earned a reputation as a significant modern legal reform. That
reputation may have attracted the interest of westerners seeking
reform. At the same time, Field's codification efforts (and his
tactics in representing clients like Jay Gould and Boss Tweed)
had given portions of the New York legal community reason to
dislike both Field and his Codes.' By the 1890s, New York had
seen over thirty years of heated disputes concerning Field's
Codes, and even a casual observer could not have failed to notice
the criticisms of the Codes. Yet the Montana codification debate
contained almost no mention of these controversies.
The debate in New York over Field's proposed Civil Code
was lengthy and often acrimonious. Field's chief opponent was
James C. Carter. In addition to attacking many of the particu-
lars of Field's drafts," Carter dismissed the claimed benefits of
codification. He asserted that: the Codes would not enable people
to know the law because many would be unable to read or com-
prehend the Codes; among those who could both read and under-
stand the Codes, many would neglect to read them;" the in-
creased number of law books was not an evil but the result of
progress as in "all other sciences;"" nonlawyers charged with
administering law, such as Justices of the Peace, would find the
"precise formulas" of the Codes less comprehensible than "the
simple principles of justice" and so would not be helped by the
VAN EE, supra note 32, at 333.
43. The first modern bar association, the Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, was created in response to Field's activities in the Erie litigation. See
supra note 32. Although Field was invited to participate, which may have been due
to a mistake, there was a distinct anti-Field flavor to much of the Association's ac-
tivities. "[Ilt fought his attempts at codification in the 1870s and 1880s with a ven-
geance that seemed as personal as it was political." Michael Schudson, Private, Pub-
lic, and Professional Lives: The Correspondence of David Dudley Field and Samuel
Bowles, 21 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 191, 203-04 (1977). Schudson gives a thorough exami-
nation of the conflict over ethics surrounding Field's activities in the Erie litigation.
44. For examples of the specific criticisms, see infra note 329.
45. JAMES C. CARTER, THE PROVINCES OF THE WRITTEN AND THE UNWRITTEN
LAW 19-20 (1889). Carter wrote widely on codification. I have relied here on an 1889
speech to the Virginia State Bar Association, published as a pamphlet, in which
Carter summarized his views. Morton Horwitz takes a different view of Carter's
objections, seeing them as unified by social Darwinism. HoRwrrz, supra note 5, at
119-21. While there are certainly elements of social Darwinism in Carter's thought, I
think Horwitz' view shortchanges the power of Carter's analysis of the adaptability of
the common law.
46. Carter, supra note 45, at 21.
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Codes;47 and students and new lawyers would learn little from
even "an age employed in the reading of dull statutes" compared
to the knowledge gained from "a single year's intelligent study of
the actual cases in which we find the law discussed, reasoned
out and applied to the real transactions of men."
Carter argued complete codification was impossible because
no one could anticipate the facts of all future transactions. With-
out knowing the facts, the codifier could not frame the correct
rule. "So far, therefore, as future transactions are concerned,
codification is not simply morally impracticable, but philosophi-
cally impossible."49 Even if legislators could write down a com-
plete set of rules, Carter objected that such a code would freeze
the development of the law and lose the evolutionary advantage
of the common law:
[The common law] takes the transactions of the past, and, by
classifying them, makes its rules; but it makes them provision-
ally only. It declares that they are binding on the courts only so
far as respects transactions substantially like those from the
examination of which the rules have been framed. In respect to
future cases which may wear different aspects, it suspends
judgment. It leaves these to be examined and classified as they
arise, when and when only, their features can be subjected to
examination. But written law affirms that it has made an abso-
lute classification of all possible transactions; and its rules are
not subject to change or modification however ill-adapted they
may prove to be to the business of the future to which they are
to be applied. It refuses to proceed any further with the scien-
tific method of examining and classifying transactions accord-
ing to their actual features. It insists that however useful that
process may have been in the past, it shall now cease.'
Carter's objections applied most strongly to Field's drafts,
which sought to replace the common law as much as possible.5
These objections also applied, however, to the less radical ap-
proaches to codification implemented in Montana and elsewhere
in the West. Comprehensive codes, to the extent the courts paid
47. Carter, supra note 45, at 20-21.
48. Carter, supra note 45, at 21.
49. Carter, supra note 45, at 29-30.
50. Carter, supra note 45, at 29-30.
51. CIVIL CODE § 6 (1865); Assembly Bill No. 182 § 6 (1880); Assembly Bill No.
62, § 6 (1881); Assembly Bill No. 215, § 6 (1882). The versions of the Civil Code
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attention to them, inevitably crowded out the common law in
some areas and distorted its development in others. Successful
codification would thus reduce the flexibility of the common law
and hinder its development. Surprisingly, the western states'
debates ignored many of the issues raised by Carter, as dis-
cussed in Part II, infra. Indeed, the Codes failed in Montana
largely due to many of the problems raised by Carter.
2. The Field Codes In the West: 1866-1872
Despite Field's failure to persuade New York to adopt his
Codes, the Dakota Territory and California enacted modified
versions of all four of his Codes. Dakota's and particularly
California's enacted versions provided the basis for much of the
Montana codifiers' work.
a) Dakota Territory
Field's efforts at codification52 first took hold far from New
52. Georgia was the first state to successfully codify its common law. Marion
Smith, The First Codification of the Substantive Common Law, 4 TUL. L. REV. 178
(1930). Georgia did so in a Code adopted in December 1860, effective 1861. The
Georgia codifiers' main goal was to collect and organize Georgia's existing law, a
more limited mission than Field's or the western codifiers':
The prominent and leading power of change exercised in construction and
revision, has been to cut and unravel Gordian knots, resulting from conflict-
ing decisions of the [c]ourts, to reconcile actual and apparently discordant
legislation, harmonizing all conflicts to what seemed to be settled and fa-
vored public policy; to remedy existing defects by wise and harmonious pro-
visions, and to supply omissions which the practice and experience of the
[clourts had discovered and made manifest in existing legislation. In short,
the great end and aim has been to reconcile, harmonize, render consistent
the body of the Law, so as to give shape and order, system and efficiency,
to the sometimes crude, and ill expressed, sovereign will of the State.
R. H. Clark et al., Report of the Committee, Preface to THE CODE OF THE STATE OF
GEORGIA at viii (1861). Changes proposed were limited to resolving contradictions in
the existing law. Although not aware of the Georgia Code at the time he was draft-
ing his proposals for New York, "owing, it is supposed, to the breaking out of the
Civil War," Field later complimented the Georgia Code as "drawn up with care and
precision." Field, Codification, supra note 27, at 19.
As the first Georgia Code had been adopted shortly after secession, the Code
was heavily modified after the war. As David Irwin, of the original codification com-
mittee, put it in his revised edition of 1867, The late war and its results, having
produced so many radical changes in the Constitution and Laws of Georgia, a revi-
sion of the Code of the State became a matter of necessity." Preface to the Revised
Edition of THE CODE OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA at xi (David Irwin ed., Atlanta,
Franklin Steam Printing House 1867). Further changes to the Georgia constitution
and statutes required additional revision and a new edition was issued in 1873. THE
CODE OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA (David Irwin et al. eds., 2d ed., J. W. Burke & Co.
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York in the Dakota Territory. 3 After a copy of the Field Civil
Code "came into the possession of the Supreme Court of the
Territory,"5 4  and with a haste that surpassed even
1873) (1867). This edition added annotations and legislative enactments. A fourth edi-
tion in 1882 (the first without Irwin's participation) added more extensive annota-
tions as well as updating the intervening legislative enactments. By 1895 a fifth
revision was necessary. THE CODE OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA (John L. Hopkins et al.
eds., 1896) (1867).
53. Dakota's accomplishment in this respect has long been overshadowed by
California's adoption of the Field Codes in 1872, and despite the efforts of Dakota's
partisans, even the North Dakota Supreme Court erroneously attributes the at-will
provision of that state's code to the California Codes. See Wadeson v. American Fam-
ily Mut. Ins. Co., 343 N.W.2d 367, 370 (N.D. 1984) ("The Cleary court did not apply
the 'independent consideration rule' in construing California Labor Code § 2922 (for-
merly Cal. Civ. Code § 1999, from which our § 34-03-01, N.D.C.C., was derived).").
Section 34-03-01 actually derived directly from § 1029 of the 1865 Field draft code.
Kingsbury's 1915 statement that "owing to the prominence of that state, the codes
became popularly known as the California codes" but that "[t]his error ...was later
corrected, and Dakota gave the tribute of authorship where it of right belonged," has
proven overly optimistic. GEORGE W. KINGSBURY, I HISTORY OF THE DAKOTA TERRITO-
RY 430 (1915).
54. Kingsbury's 1915 history of Dakota gives this account:
[A] printed copy of the report of the commission containing the civil and
penal codes, and also the maritime code, came into the possession of the
Supreme Court of the Territory of Dakota, then composed of Ara Bartlett,
chief justice; Jefferson P. Kidder and William E. Gleason, associate justices;
all good lawyers, and all favorably impressed by the codes prepared by Mr.
Field. The codes adopted by the Dakota Legislature in March at the first
session, in 1862, had not proved satisfactory in every respect, and the
bench and bar of the territory united upon recommending that they be
repealed and the Field Codes substituted in their stead. This was done at
this session, the Legislature of Dakota being the first legislative body to
enact and put in operation these excellent laws.
KINGSBURY, supra note 53, at 430. Showing an unusual degree of common sense, the
Dakota Territory Legislature refrained from adopting the maritime code. Achieving
unanimity of the bench and bar of the territory would not have been difficult as
there appear to have been only 17 practicing lawyers and judges in the Dakota Ter-
ritory in 1866. KINGSBURY, supra note 53, at 447-48. The 1862 Codes mentioned
procedure and criminal laws, but did not address civil law as a whole. See George H.
Hand, Preface to THE REVISED CODES OF THE TERRITORY OF DAKOTA at iv-v (1877)
[hereinafter 1877 Code].
Dakota legal history being understandably sparse in this period, little else is
known about either how the Field Codes "came into the possession of the Supreme
Court of the Territory" or the particulars of the problems with the previously enacted
1862 Codes. Kingsbury, for example, has little more than the passage quoted on the
Codes, while other Dakota histories contain only brief mentions of the enactment of
the code or nothing at all. See, e.g., HERBERT S. SCHELL, DAKOTA TERRITORY DURING
THE EIGHTEEN SIXTIES (University of South Dakota, Governmental Research Bureau
Report No. 30, 1954); DOANE ROBINSON, SOUTH DAKOTA, SuI GENERIS (1930); HER-
BERT S. SCHELL, HISTORY OF SOUTH DAKOTA 96 (3d ed. rev. 1975). All that is certain
is that the early Dakota legislatures showed a keen interest in codification, passing
codes of civil procedure in 1862 and 1868, codes of criminal procedure in 1862 and
1869, penal codes in 1862 and 1865, justice codes in 1863 and 1866, and a probate
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Montana's,5 the Dakota Territorial Legislature adopted the
Field Civil Code in 1866. Field's 1865 draft was adopted "almost
verbatim."5 A code of civil procedure, presumably Field's, failed
to pass during the 1866-67 session.7 The adoption of the pro-
posed New York Codes without significant changes "naturally
left in the laws many repugnant provisions."58
Once adopted, the maintenance of a code as an organized
code,59 rather than as a mere collection of laws, required contin-
ued effort. In December 1870, Territorial Governor John
Burbank called for a code commission in his first message to the
legislature, saying "[Rievision and codification has [sic] become a
matter of greatest importance, and the difficulty and uncertainty
growing out of the present want of systematic arrangement is
well known to all who have occasion to refer to [the statutes].6 0
His call went unanswered, and was repeated in 1872.1 The
1873 legislature appointed an individual to "prepare a complete
revision," but did not accept the resulting proposal.62 Not until
1875 did the territorial legislature create a Code Commission to
code in 1865. Horace G. Tilton, History of the Dakota Codes, 1 MONTHLY S. DAKOTAN
90, 90-91 (1898). The primary sources of information on the Dakota Codes are Wil-
liam B. Fisch, Civil Code: Notes for an Uncelebrated Centennial, 43 N.D. L. REV. 485
(1967) and William B. Fisch, The Dakota Civil Code: More Notes for an Uncelebrated
Centennial, 45 N.D. L. REV. 17 (1968) [hereinafter Fisch, More Notes].
55. The degree of consideration which the Civil Code received is evident in the
Yankton Union and Dakotaian's editorial calling for its passage: "Our civil code is, to
say the least, very defective, and needs altering and amending in many particulars.
It might save time and trouble by adopting a new one entire." In the next sentence,
the Union and Dakotaian went on to call for a new fence law, hardly a comparable
goal. The Legislature, UNION AND DAKOTAIAN (Yankton), Nov. 25, 1865, at 2. The
Union and Dakotaian recommended adoption, noting the Code "has been carefully
prepared by some of the ablest legal merits in the state of New York, and will be a
great improvement to the Dakota laws." Legislative, UNION AND DAKOTAIAN
(Yankton), Dec. 30, 1865, at 2.
56. Fisch, More Notes, supra note 54, at 37.
57. The Code of Civil Procedure passed the Council but died in the lower house
due to the objections of a few members to its "glaring faults." Its failure to pass was
the subject of an uncharacteristic debate in the normally quiet pages of the Union
and Dakotaian. The Adjournment, UNION AND DAKOTAIAN (Yankton), Jan. 19, 1867,
at 2; C.H. McCarthy, Reply to Dakotaian's Comment, UNION AND DAKOTAIAN
(Yankton), Jan. 26, 1867, at 2.
58. Tilton, supra note 54, at 91.
59. The Dakota Legislature sought federal financing for their code maintenance
efforts in the session after the Civil Code was passed. Legislative Proceedings, UNION
AND DAKOTAIAN (Yankton), Dec. 15, 1866, at 1, 3 (discussing memorial to congress
for authorization to use funds saved out of appropriations "for the purpose of codify-
ing the laws of Dakota").
60. KINGSBURY, supra note 53, at 560.
61. KINGSBURY, supra note 53, at 678.
62. Tilton, supra note 54, at 91.
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handle the matter systematically.
The Commission, consisting of two territorial supreme court
justices and a distinguished lawyer, 3 reported to the legislature
a set of Codes, adopted in 1877,"4 "which gave to Dakota a code
of laws and a system of jurisprudence not surpassed for excel-
lence and completeness by any state or territory of the Union."65
The 1877 Codes incorporated the two Field Codes not adopted in
1866. The completeness did not last for long, however, and by
1889 the governor had again submitted a new revision of the
statutes and Codes to the legislature.6
For two reasons, Dakota's experience with the Codes should
have provided important lessons for Montana's subsequent codi-
fication efforts. First, Dakota's haste in adoption and the subse-
quent difficulties from provisions "repugnant" to Dakota's condi-
tions should have alerted Montanans to the need for careful re-
vision of the proposed Codes. Second, Dakota's repeated prob-
lems in maintaining its Codes as codes provided clear evidence
that adoption of Codes did not answer the problem of confused
statutes that the Montana codifiers sought to resolve. Despite
Dakota's geographical and socio-economic proximity, Montanans
did not learn from their neighbors' experience.
63. Fisch, More Notes, supra note 54, at 37.
64. Adoption was no doubt hastened, and debate shortened, by the fact that the
Code Commission's secretary was also the chairman of the Judiciary Committee of
the territorial House of Representatives. Hand, supra note 54, at vi. The Codes were
apparently the reason for his election to the legislature as well. Kingsbury, the
Dakota's most thorough historian, reports that "General Beadle [the secretary] had
been elected a member of the House from Yankton County mainly because of his fa-
miliarity with the new code, which had been quite largely his handiwork as secretary
of the code commission." KINGSBURY, supra note 53, at 1024. A twentieth-century
historian describes Beadle as "pompous, verbose, and inclined to take a self-righteous
stand upon all public issues, but Beadle's ability was so great that he came to be a
major beneficent and reforming influence in the Republican party of territorial Dako-
ta." HOWARD R. LAMAR, DAKOTA TERRITORY, 1861-1889, at 119 (1956).
65. KINGSBURY, supra note 53, at 1024.
66. KINGSBURY, supra note 53, at 1558. Even before then, market demand for
updated versions had prompted a private publisher in 1884 to add more recent stat-
utes to the Codes and to publish an unofficial edition entitled the Revised Codes of
Dakota Territory. Tilton, supra note 54, at 91-92. In 1887 another committee was ap-
pointed but given no power to make substantive changes; the revision was to take
effect after a gubernatorial proclamation, but no proclamation was issued. The 1889
legislature passed an act making the compilation official. Tilton, supra note 54, at
92. No further revisions to the Codes were made until this century in either North
or South Dakota.
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b) California
This state has acted the part of a very young state in attaining
codification.67
Charles Lindley
The first California State Legislature adopted the common
law as the basis for its legal system, rejecting a suggestion by
Governor Peter Burnett that it adopt a mixture of the common
law and Louisiana systems." The second legislative session
adopted versions of the Field Procedure Code.69 The passage of
legislation by subsequent legislatures led to confusion and disor-
der in the statutes, problems that "grew worse with each session
of the legislature thereafter."70 The California Legislature de-
feated repeated attempts at codification, however, and undertook
less ambitious revisions instead.71 Finally in 1868, a commis-
sion was appointed "to revise and compile the laws of the state
into a comprehensive and concise system."72 This commission
did not complete its work in the time allotted, however, and a
new commission was appointed.7" Apparently the impetus for
codification was that "those required to use the statutes of Cali-
fornia were compelled to make their way among the eighteen
volumes of session laws or rely upon Hittell's General Laws
(through the 1863-64 session), together with the succeeding three
volumes of session laws."74
Although the 1870 Commission received a broad mandate to
correct errors and suggest improvements, "[t]he Commission...
went a little beyond what was contemplated by the Governor
when he made the appointments."7" Instead of simply correcting
the existing laws, the Commission created a new system based
on Field's draft New York Codes.
67. CHARLES LINDLEY, CALIFORNIA CODE COMMENTARIES App. at v (1874) (open
letter from Charles Lindley to the Hon. H. H. Haight, Ex-Governor of California).
68. Ralph N. Kleps, The Revision and Codification of California Statutes 1849-
1953, 42 CAL. L. REV. 766, 766 (1954); Arvo van Alstyne, The California Civil Code,
in 6 CALIFORNIA CODE 2-3 (1982).
69. Kleps, supra note 68, at 767.
70. Kleps, supra note 68, at 767.
71. Kleps, supra note 68, at 768-70.
72. Statutes of 1867-68, ch. 365 quoted in Kleps, supra note 68, at 770.
73. Kleps, supra note 68, at 770-72.
74. Kleps, supra note 68, at 771.
75. LINDLEY, supra note 67, app. at ii.
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In 1871 the Commission published drafts for comments.76
"An intensive critical examination of the proposed Code[s] then
began."77 An Advisory Committee was appointed to examine the
proposed Codes and recommended a number of changes.78 In
1872, the Commission recommended, and California adopted,
Civil, Political, Civil Procedure, and Penal Codes based on the
New York Field drafts.7' After passage, the governor appointed
a commission, which included David's brother Stephen Field, to
review the Codes. °
Foreshadowing some of the difficulties Montana would expe-
rience in physically incorporating such massive amounts of new
law, the California Codes were not published as part of the stat-
utes of 1871-72, and indeed were not published at all until
March 31, 1873.81 Moreover, the volume listing the prior stat-
utes that would continue in force was not completed until No-
vember 1873.82 In addition, the legislature failed to pass the
statute designed to repeal those provisions of existing law that
conflicted with the Codes." Even after codification, a commis-
sion was necessary to keep the Codes up to date and modify
76. Van Alstyne, supra note 68, at 7-8.
77. Van Alstyne, supra note 68, at 7.
78. Van Alstyne, supra note 68, at 7-8.
79. Rosamond Parma, The History of the Adoption of the Codes of California, 22
LAw LmR. J. 8, 15 (1929). The California press gave scant attention to the Codes'
progress through the legislature. The Sacramento Reporter, for example, barely men-
tioned them. See, e.g., California Legislature, SACRAMENTO REP., Jan. 7, 1872, at 3
("A message from the Governor was received transmitting the resolutions passed by
the Revision Commission, to the effect that the Penal and Civil Procedure Code [sic]
were now completed, and that the work on the Political Code was so far advanced
that a committee from the Legislature could proceed to examine it."). The lengthiest
report on the Codes in that paper was little more than a summary of the Revision
Commission's reports. The Revised Statutes-Political and Penal Code, SACRAMENTO
REP., Feb. 6, 1872, at 2. The passage of the Codes did not even warrant mention in
the Reporter's summary of the legislative session. Vale!, SACRAMENTO REP., Apr. 2,
1872, at 2.
80. Oscar T. Shuck, The California Code of Laws, in HISTORY OF BENCH AND
BAR OF CALIFORNIA 193 (Oscar T. Shuck ed., 1901).
California's adoption of the New York Codes was partly due to the efforts of
David Dudley Field's brother Stephen Field. Natelson, supra note 14, at 40-41; Van
Alstyne, supra note 68, at 6. Stephen Field was a member of the California Supreme
Court from 1857 to 1863 and a member of the United States Supreme Court from
1863 to 1899. In 1872, Stephen Field was a member of the commission appointed to
review the codes prepared by the Code Commission, which commission gave the Civil
Code its "unqualified approval and endorsement." Shuck, supra note 80, at 193.
81. Kleps, supra note 68, at 774, 776.
82. Kleps, supra note 68, at 776-77 & n.38.
83. Kleps, supra note 68, at 775-76.
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them to conform to the 1879 Constitution.8 By 1895, when
Montana adopted its Codes, California had demonstrated the
difficulties of incorporating new statutes into the Codes while
maintaining the Codes' integrity. 5
The California codifiers made several important modifica-
tions to Field's original drafts.86 Most significantly, California
rejected Field's "displacement" approach to codification, where
the Code supplanted the common law. Instead, the California
codifiers specified liberal construction and treatment of Code
provisions as continuations of common law rules and statutes
similar to the Code provisions.87 They also heavily modified the
Political Code provisions. California provided direct evidence for
the Montana codifiers of how well the Codes could solve prob-
lems of confused statutory schemes; it also demonstrated the
extensive effort needed to adapt such laws to local conditions. As
discussed below, Montana's codification advocates failed to exam-
ine that evidence.
B. "Montana, in the morning of its jurisprudence. .
The statutes of Montana have always been imperfect, confused
and incomplete. 9
Decius Wade
From the beginning, the Montana Territory's laws were in a
state of confusion. When the Idaho Territory (present day Idaho,
Montana, and part of Wyoming) was organized out of the Wash-
ington Territory, no copies of the Washington statutes were
found in what is now Montana. ° Things improved slightly in
1864 when Montana was created out of the Idaho Territory,
since a single copy of the Idaho Territorial Statutes was present
84. Kleps, supra note 68, at 779.
85. Kleps, supra note 68, at 779-81.
86. Without a detailed comparison of Field's drafts and the various California
drafts, it is hard to pinpoint the source of innovations. Horwitz notes that the enact-
ed version of the California Civil Code "was perhaps more radical." HORWITZ, supra
note 5, at 118.
87. Natelson, supra note 14, at 40-41; CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4-5 (1872).
88. Decius Wade, The Bench and Bar 1880-1894, in JOAQUIN MILLER, AN
ILLUSTRATED HISTORY OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 634, 669 (1894) [hereinafter Wade,
1880-1894].
89. Id. at 661.
90. W.F. Sanders, Early Judiciary of Montana, undated typescript, Montana
Historical Society, Sanders File, Box 3, Folder 3, at 1.
378 [Vol. 56
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in what became Montana. The Montana Territorial Supreme
Court and the Territory's lawyers decided these would apply
until the new Territory's legislature could produce a local substi-
tute."1 Little improvement in the condition of Montana's stat-
utes occurred afterwards.
The First Territorial Legislature adjourned without passing
a redistricting plan for future legislatures, as required by the
Organic Act establishing the Montana Territory. 2 Montana
held elections for the Second and Third Legislatures using the
original districts.9 3 In 1867, 9' the Republican-controlled Con-
gress abrogated the statutes passed by the overwhelmingly Dem-
ocratic Second and Third Territorial Legislatures, 5 leaving in
91. Jesse B. Roote, The Courts and Lawyers of Montana, in 1 HELEN F. SAND-
ERS, A HISTORY OF MONTANA 579, 582 (1913).
92. The First Territorial Legislature did establish a Code Commission, chaired
by Wilbur F. Sanders, who became a prominent codification advocate in the 1890s.
III MONTANA, ITS STORY AND BIOGRAPHY 957 (Tom Stout ed., 1921); Dave Walter,
Wilbur Fisk Sanders, 63 MONTANA MAG. 58, 59 (1984). All records of this commis-
sion, except a file of receipts for its expenses, appear to have been lost. The 1865
commission spent over $8,800, including $3,500 for a clerk ($500 per month) and
over $700 in rent for a house in which to meet. Record Series 146, File 1-1, Code
Commission Territorial, Montana Historical Society.
93. These events were further confused by the absence of Governor Sidney
Edgerton, who had gone to Washington to seek funds, since he had been personally
paying for many of the territory's expenses. MERRILL G. BURLINGAME, THE MONTANA
FRONTIER 158-59 (1942). In his absence, the governor's duties were exercised by
Thomas Francis Meagher, who within a few months had switched from supporting
the territorial Republicans to working closely with the local Democrats. The switch
was caused in part by "his increasing animosity toward the vigorous Republican
leaders, headed by Wilbur F. Sanders." Id. at 159-60. As Acting Governor, Meagher
initially rejected the Democrats' claim that he had the authority to call a legislative
session to solve the districting problem. Along with his changed political convictions
came a new view of his authority, and Meagher soon called a new election. Two
strongly Republican Territorial Supreme Court judges promptly struck the laws
passed at this session as unconstitutional. The legislature responded by redistricting
the two to "the eastern part of the Territory, where Indians and buffalo were the
chief inhabitants, with the added provision that the judges must reside in their dis-
tricts." Id. at 162. Sanders was dispatched to Congress to seek legislative relief
against Meagher and the Democratic Legislatures. Id. at 163. See also Samuel Word,
History of the Democratic Party in Montana, in MILLER, supra note 88, 592 at 597-
600; Robert E. Albright, The Relations of Montana With The Federal Government,
1864-1889, 71-81 (1933) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford University).
94. HUBERT H. BANCROFT, HISTORY OF WASHINGTON, IDAHO, AND MONTANA,
1845-1889, at 667 (1890).
95. Decius S. Wade, Speech to the Montana Bar Association (Apr. 5, 1894), in
MONT. B. ASSN PRoC., 1885-1902 (Edward C. Russel ed.) [hereinafter Wade, Speech]
at 290; Miller, supra note 88, at 317. The districting controversy resulted from a
squabble between the First Legislature and the territorial governor over the legisla-
ture's attempt to increase its size. Acting Governor Thomas Meagher threw his influ-
ence behind the local Democrats while the Governor was out of the territory, and
called additional sessions of the legislature. See BANCROFT, supra note 94.
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effect a hodgepodge of laws passed by the First and the Fourth
Legislatures."
To repair the confusing state of the statutes, the 1869 legis-
lative assembly appointed the Territorial Supreme Court judges
as a commission to codify and arrange the territorial statutes.97
The court gathered all the laws, repealed and in effect, into a
single collection, together with notes explaining what remained
in effect. The cure proved worse than the disease:
The work of this commission came before the legislative assem-
bly of 1871-2. At that period the sessions were but forty days in
length, including Sundays. The judiciary committee of the two
houses changed, or attempted to change, the system of Judge
Symes, by striking from his codification all of the repealed Acts,
or parts of Acts, which it contained. But the shortness of the
session and other duties prevented thoroughness in this work,
and here is the source and beginning of the confusion and con-
tradictions of our statutes. Acts that had been long since re-
pealed were re-enacted, together with those that had been sub-
stituted for them.9"
The unavailability of statutory materials worsened the legal
uncertainty.99 Despite compilations of statutes made in 1879
and 1887, things did not improve thereafter.1"
96. The confusion is best illustrated by the hypothetical of a law passed by the
First Territorial Legislature and amended by the Second and Third Legislatures and
again in the Fourth Territorial Legislature. The amendments from the Second and
Third Territorial Legislatures would have been removed by the congressional action,
while the amendments to the amendments passed by the Fourth Territorial Legisla-
ture remained. Even without addressing the substance of the law created by such a
process, chances were small that it could be read coherently.
97. Roote, supra note 91, at 592.
98. Wade, Speech, supra note 95, at 291. Wade gives a similar account in his
contribution to Joaquin Miller's history. Miller, supra note 88, at 380-81.
99. For example, in 1874, the omnipresent Wilbur F. Sanders, who (in addition
to his other roles) was a prominent attorney, received a letter plaintively stating, "It
is reported here that the mining law passed at the extra session limits the width of
a quartz claim to 25 feet. If that is the fact it is terribly distressing to miners who
have located since the last session as the law as published repealed all local laws on
the subject of the width of claims. Please let me know how the statute stands on
this subject." Letter from Jeff Lowry to Wilbur F. Sanders (Feb. 6, 1874) (Sanders
File, Montana Historical Society, Box 2, Folder 2-21).
Those materials which were available were not of high physical quality. In
1889 the Montana Bar Association Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform re-
ported that the binding of the compiled laws was "worthiess" and that "after a book
was handled a few times the cover is generally completely torn off or worn out."
Legal Luminaries, DAiLY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 10, 1889, at 4.
100. Wade, 1880 to 1894, supra note 88, at 657. Indeed, the compilations intro-
duced new errors. Wade describes how the 1879 revision left out an 1876 statute
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By 1889, concern regarding the condition of the statutes
prompted the last Territorial Legislature to put aside both its
partisan bickering and the final push for statehood to address
the issue. Governor Preston H. Leslie, in his address to the Six-
teenth Territorial Legislature, called for codification.'' He was
joined by the Montana Bar Association, which petitioned the
legislature to codify the political, civil, and criminal law and the
rules of practice.1 2 However, the press did not view the cre-
ation of a code commission as an important issue'° 3-it limited
reports on the progress of the code commission bill to brief notes
within discussion of other legislative activity.'" The only argu-
ments advanced for codification were based on the "chaotic condi-
tion" of the statutes.10 5
The governor appointed to the Commission Judge N.W.
McConnell, a recently resigned'" Democratic member of the
Territorial Supreme Court; former Republican Governor B. Platt
Carpenter; 7 and F.W. Cole, a Democrat and prominent Butte
attorney,'os and the upper house confirmed them."° Both the
giving widows dower rights, authorizing election under the husband's will, and abol-
ishing tenancy by courtesy. The problem was not cured by subsequent legislative
sessions or by the 1887 compilation. Wade, 1880 to 1894, supra note 88, at 662.
101. Leslie's primary argument was the confusing state of the law and the dif-
ficulty for individuals to know the rules they were to obey. Sixteenth Legislature,
HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 16, 1889, at 8; Leslie's Message, DAILY INDEPENDENT
(Helena), Jan. 16, 1889, at 1, 2.
102. Sixteenth Legislature, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 21, 1889, at 1; Bar Asso-
ciation, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 16, 1889, at 4.
103. One newspaper went so far as to call for the legislature to "finish up a
registration law, drop everything else and adjourn" in view of imminence of statehood
later that year, forgetting the code commission. See, e.g., Sixteenth Legislature, HELE-
NA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 27, 1889, at 8; Sixteenth Legislature, HELENA DAILY HERALD,
Feb. 28, 1889, at 8; and Forty-Sixth Day, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Mar. 2, 1889, at 2.
104. Untitled Editorial, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 21, 1889, at 4. The only
discussion reported in the papers was about the money appropriated to pay for the
commission: sponsors started with $5,000, a cut to $2,500 was proposed, and a com-
promise on $4,000 reached. Forty-Sixth Day, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Mar. 2, 1889, at
2.
105. The Legislature, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 2, 1889, at 4. Interest-
ingly Lee Mantle, one of Colonel Sanders' prime Republican opponents, spoke in
favor of the commission. Id. Mantle later became Mayor of Butte and defeated Sand-
ers for a United States Senate seat in 1893. Rickards Will Appoint, DAILY INDEPEN-
DENT (Helena), Mar. 3, 1893, at 8.
106. McConnell reportedly resigned from the Territorial Supreme Court in 1889
partly to protest the admission of women to the bar in Montana. The Montana
Solons, WEEKLY MIsSOULIAN, Feb. 13, 1889, at 2.
107. Carpenter practiced law and served as a judge in New York. Wade, 1880-
1894, supra note 88, at 657.
108. Cole both studied and practiced law in New York and practiced in Califor-
nia, as well as served as a trial court judge in Nevada before coming to Montana.
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Republican and Democratic press approved of the appointments.
The Republican Helena Daily Herald called the commissioners
"as fully competent to do their task as any who could be found"
and noted that their unfamiliarity with past legislation was
"more of a benefit than a disadvantage" because the Codes were
"for the future and not for the past."110 The Democratic Helena
Daily Independent editorialized that "[bletter selections could
scarcely have been made.""' Former Territorial Supreme Court
Chief Justice Decius Wade"' replaced McConnell in 1890.1"
The Commission reported draft Codes two and a half years
later."' Although the Code Commission's records unfortunately
appear to be lost,"' it modelled the Montana Codes after the
California versions of the Field Codes, and Commissioner Decius
Wade reported that the Montana codifiers used their provisions
"so far as the same was applicable.., to our State and constitu-
tion."" '6  Leading codification proponent Colonel Wilbur F.
Sanders later wrote to Field's brother Henry: "I consider the
Montana Codes substantially the legislation prepared by [David
Dudley Field].""7 The Commission filed the Codes with the
Wade, 1880-1894, supra note 88, at 657; H. R. Whitehill, Frederick W. Cole, MONT.
B. ASS'N PROC. 391 (1902).
109. The Close, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Mar. 15, 1889, at 2.
110. Untitled Editorial, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Mar. 15, 1889, at 4.
111. Untitled Editorial, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 15, 1889, at 2.
112. Wade's 1894 speech in favor of codification is cited as a major factor in
obtaining their passage. Wade, Speech, supra note 95, at 296; see ROBERT G.
RAYMER, MONTANA: THE LAND AND THE PEOPLE 383 (1930); Roote, supra note 91, at
602.
113. Roote, supra note 91, at 605.
114. Montana's admission as a state disrupted the Code Commission's work.
When created in 1889, the legislature instructed the commission to report to the
next session of the legislature, which would have been in 1891 but for statehood. A
special session was called after admission, however, and the Codes were not done.
The Civil Code had been completed, although it appears from the Code Commission's
report to the Governor that they planned additional work upon it. See Joseph Toole,
Untitled Typescript, (File LR-1, Folder 1-10, Montana State Archives, First Montana
Legislative Assembly, 1889-1890, December 17, 1889, containing quotations from Code
Commission report, at 15-16).
115. I was unable to locate any records in the Montana State Historical Society
Library under either the Code Commission or under the names of its members.
116. Wade, Speech, supra note 95, at 293.
117. Field, supra note 26, at 92 (Letter to Henry Field (Jan. 24, 1896)). On the
other hand, Sanders also had claimed that "the Montana Code Commission not whol-
ly borrowing from any State, and modifying provisions in immaterial matters from
them all, selected from Colorado, South Dakota, California, Missouri, Ohio, New York
and other states, portions of their laws," so it is difficult to judge the weight to be
given to his letter to Henry Field. Col. Wilbur F. Sanders, undated, unpublished
manuscript 6 (Sanders File, Folder 4-3, Montana Historical Society Library).
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State Auditor on February 4, 1892.
Montana codification proponents advanced arguments simi-
lar to some of those made by Field and the New York codification
advocates. Both argued that the volume of common law court
reports overwhelmed lawyers and courts."' Both argued that
codification would eliminate inconsistencies and contradictions in
the law." Both argued that codification would put the law
within the reach of the common man.2 °
Despite these similarities, Wade at least, was ambivalent
about the Codes' eclipse of the common law. In an unpublished,
undated manuscript entitled "The Common Law," Wade tried to
reconcile a deep appreciation for the common law with his enthu-
siasm for codification. 21 Beginning with a description of the
common law as "one of the marvels of human history,"' Wade
attempted to link it to Roman codification. The imposition of
Roman law in Britain, Wade claimed, was the key to the devel-
opment of English common law."
Besides the common law's Roman heritage, Wade claimed
that the common law's codifiers shared with the Roman codifiers
a mission and opponents. The Roman codifiers' attempts to "res-
cue the Roman law from the uncertainty and obscurity of tradi-
tional decrees, decisions, usages and customs" were opposed by
"some of the Roman lawyers and judges, upon pretty much the
same grounds as codification of the English common law is op-
posed."'
118. Current Topics, ALBANY LAW JOURNAL, Dec. 26, 1885, at 502 ("Shall our
laws be written in one volume or in five thousand?"); Wade, 1880-1894, supra note
88, at 670 (-If the unlimited publication of the reports and law books manufactured
therefrom continues, each year will contribute to the uncertainty and obscuration of
the law until the condition becomes hopeless.").
119. Current Topics, supra note 118 ("Shall [our laws] be fixed, consistent and
certain, or changing, contradictory and uncertain."); Wade, 1880-1894, supra note 88,
at 664 ("The people of Montana are entitled to a complete system of statutes free
from contradictions or inconsistencies .... ).
120. Current Topics, supra note 118 ("Shall [our laws] be within the reasonable
reach and capacity of the public, or shall they require the searching and construction
of an expert, high-priced and over-influential body of interpreters?"); Wade, 1880-
1894, supra note 88, at 664 ("[S]tatutes might be made so simple and plain as to be
their own interpreters, without the aid of courts and lawyers, and by the same
means systems of statutes or codes might be made so clear and certain as to require
no revelation or rules of interpretation to understand them.").
121. Decius S. Wade, The Common Law (undated longhand manuscript, Wade
File, Box 2, Folder 2-4, Montana Historical Society).
122. Id. at 1.
123. Id. at 16-18.
124. Id. at 2-3.
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Despite this admiration for the Roman codes, Wade argued
that precedent was the key to "[p]rogressive jurisprudence. " "
Wade concluded by linking the future of the common law and the
"English-speaking race":
The English-speaking race is in the infancy of its achievement,
but whatever peaceful victories and conquests are before it, and
to whatever heights it may attain, the kindly spirit of the com-
mon law, with its enlightened reason and justice, will hover
near, to share in its triumphs. 2 '
Even in his 1894 article on Montana's legal history, which re-
flected Wade's frustration at the 1893 legislature's failure to
adopt the Codes, Wade found more beauty and strength in the
common law than Field ever did: "These principles would not
lose any of their grandeur, strength or beauty or any of their
vigor in regulating the affairs of men by being so reduced to the
form of statutes."'27 Wade resolved the contradiction between
his admiration of the common law and his desire for codification
by his conclusion that "[i]n this age of the world the discovery of
new principles of law is rare, but there is a constant application
of old principles to new facts and conditions."28
C. The Third Legislature:
'Without breaking much of the furniture"2g
Republican Governor John E. Rickards submitted the Codes
to the legislature in January 1893. The four Codes were intro-
duced as separate bills and were referred to the Judiciary Com-
mittees of both houses.13 The Montana Bar Association en-
dorsed action on them.13" ' No action was taken in the 1893 ses-
sion other than appropriations to pay the Code Commission
clerks.'32 The Codes drew some opposition from attorneys out-
side Helena" and from mayors," 4 but the failure to pass
125. Id. at 3.
126. Id. at 56.
127. Wade, 1880-1894, supra note 88, at 670.
128. Wade, 1880-1894, supra note 88, at 670.
129. After Sixty Long Days, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 3, 1893, at 5
(assessing the work of the Third Legislature).
130. The Merry War, WEEKLY MISSOULIAN, Jan. 18, 1893, at 2; Sable-Hued Eye,
WEEKLY MISSOULIAN, Jan. 18, 1893, at 8.
131. The Bar Association, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 5, 1893, at 8.
132. Two New Counties, WEEKLY MIssoULIAN, Feb. 8, 1893, at 6; Blood, Iago,
Blood, WEEKLY MISsouLIAN, Feb. 15, 1893, at 6.
133. Local Mention, WEEKLY MISSOULIAN, Feb. 22, 1893, at 7 (reporting forma-
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them does not seem to have been caused by the opposition. Rath-
er, the Codes were apparently simply lost in the mass of "spe-
cial"" legislation demanding attention from the legisla-
ture, 3 1 in the daily, unsuccessful attempts to choose a United
States Senator, 137  and in the constant partisan bickering
caused by the lack of an effective majority in the Montana House
of Representatives (the House).'38 The press made little men-
tion of the Codes, focusing instead on the daily excitement of the
senatorial contest.3 9 Governor Rickards declined to call a spe-
tion of Missoula bar committee to oppose codes).
134. Montana Mayors Meet, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 9, 1893, at 1.
135. But Four Days Remain, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 26, 1893, at 5.
136. Republicans thought there was more than the usual degree of Democratic
incompetence at work in the House in 1893: "[Tlhe house as a body was a disgrace
to the state. Ignorance was at a premium and inexperience ranked as a virtue. The
speaker, elected by a combination of democrats and populists as a matter of expedi-
ency, was an ass when he took his seat, and had not changed his skin when he
stepped down and out. The employes [sic] of the house as a general rule were
chumps, fit associates for the hodge podge which made up the collection." Make It A
Grave, WEEKLY MISSOULIAN, Mar. 8, 1893, at 2.
Certainly the House was slow to consider legislation. With only nine working
days left in the session, for example, it still had a hundred bills to be considered by
the Committee of the Whole. But Nine Working Days, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena),
Feb. 19, 1893, at 5. The House Judiciary Committee, to which the Codes had been
referred, finally reported out many of the bills it had been sent without recommenda-
tion because so many of its members were on other committees that it had difficulty
mustering a quorum. He Caused A Sensation, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 21,
1893, at 5. No overwhelming public demand for the Codes appears to have been
noted by the press. See, e.g., But Four Days Remain, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena)
Feb. 26, 1893, at 5 ("The current belief is now that there is very little urgent de-
mand for any general legislation" other than election law reforms; no mention of
Codes.).
137. Rickards Will Appoint, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 3, 1893, at 8. Al-
though Democrats had a plurality in the joint legislature, they were unable to unite
behind a single candidate even though their failure to do so meant that the Republi-
can governor would appoint a Republican. See, e.g., But Four Days Remain, DAILY
INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 26, 1893, at 5 (describing determination of Democratic
factions to prevent others from succeeding). Rickards' appointment of Lee Mantle was
frustrated by the refusal of the federal Senate to seat Mantle. The Daily Missoulian
claimed this was due to Mantle's "silver leaning." Just A Few of 'Em, DAILY
MISSOULAN, Jan. 3, 1895, at 1. See also Adelphus B. Keith, History of the Republi-
can Party, in Roote, supra note 91, at 589-91.
138. There were twenty-six Democrats, twenty-six Republicans, and three Popu-
lists in the House. Keith, supra note 137, at 588. The Speaker was a Populist, cho-
sen in part because hostility between the Populists and Code proponent Colonel
Sanders led the Populists to side with the Democrats in organizing the House. The
House Organized, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 4, 1893, at 8. The partisan
maneuvering started the first day, with the Republicans unsuccessfully attempting to
gain control of the House by taking advantage of a dispute over the credentials of
one Democratic member and the Democrats and one Populist walking out. Same Old
Game, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 3, 1893, at 8.
139. See, e.g., Governor's Message, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 6, 1893, at
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cial session of the legislature to pass the Codes due to the ex-
pense and because he thought the Codes' length made a full ses-
sion necessary for their thorough consideration. "
D. "Work of the Wise Men" '1
The deal by which the codes were rushed through the legisla-
ture is beginning to bear fruit. Members who were led into
voting for the measure under the promise that amendments
they might suggest would be favorably acted on are having
their eyes opened. The bulky codes have been enrolled and will
be signed by the governor, and the bushel or two of amend-
ments that have been offered are occupying snug pigeon holes
in the several committee rooms. No one member of the house
knew what he was voting for when he answered the roll call on
the code, but now all are beginning to find out that they have
made serious mistakes and will make efforts to rectify
them.142
Great Falls Daily Tribune
Montana Republicans scored major victories in the 1894
elections, due in part to the unpopularity in Montana of Demo-
cratic President Grover Cleveland and his opposition to bimet-
allism." Republicans took control of both legislative houses by
wide margins.' When the Fourth Legislature convened, the
Codes were an important part of its agenda,1" although they
5, 6 (omitting section on Codes as one of "minor importance"). The Governor's Mes-
sage, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 6, 1893, at 4 (explaining omissions).
140. Not an Extra Session, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 8, 1893, at 5. The
Governor's estimate of the time which would be devoted to the Codes was, of course,
wildly over-optimistic.
141. Work of the Wise Men, ANACONDA STANDARD, Jan. 29, 1895, at 1 (headline).
142. A Code Mistake, GREAT FALLS DAILY TRIBUNE, Feb. 14, 1895, at 2.
143. On Cleveland's unpopularity, see The Mantle Hog, HELENA DAILY HERALD,
Jan. 8, 1895, at 1 (quoting an observer that "Grover Cleveland won the last cam-
paign for the Republicans, and a wooden man could have been chairman of the state
committee and won the election.") Bimetallism was the plan to introduce silver as a
basis for the United States currency along with gold.
144. Senator Makers, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Nov. 21, 1894, at 5. There were
thirteen Republicans, six Democrats, and two Populists in the Senate and forty-four
Republicans, two Democrats, thirteen Populists, and two "Democrats and Populists"
in the House. Id.
145. The most important issue before the legislature was, of course, the selection
of two United States Senators, and codification was not addressed until that matter
was resolved. Both Senators having, been chosen by the Republican caucus by Janu-
ary 12, For Senator, Thomas H. Carter, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 12, 1895, at 1,
5, the legislature was ready to turn to legislation.
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had not received widespread public notice.'" Governor
Rickards called for the Codes' adoption as a whole "in order that
its [sic] harmony not be destroyed" with later revisions to be
made as the legislature saw fit.'47 Representative Rudolph Von
Tobel, a Republican from Valley and Fergus Counties and a
member of the House Code Committee, introduced the Codes as
four bills on January 15th."4
1. The House: "To take a pig in a bag"49
The House addressed the Codes first. The issue from the
start was not whether but rather how to adopt the massive
Codes. It avoided the problem of overwhelming the Judiciary
Committee by appointing a special committee to handle the
Codes."5 The Committee first set out to determine what the
House could physically do with the massive bills. Research deter-
mined that the bills could be read by title only on the first as
well as the second reading, and the House proceeded to do
SO. 151
146. It Is Indifference, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 14, 1895, at 5 (report-
ing the President of Montana Bar Association's lament that "[n]o practical effort has
been made to familiarize the public with [the Codes'] . . . contents").
147. The Message, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 8, 1895, at 2. The remainder of
the message concerning the Codes was praise for the abilities of the Code Commis-
sioners as "a guarantee that nearly every requirement within its field of labor will
be satisfactorily met." Id.
The Codes were only the fifth subject raised in the hour-and-twenty-minute
speech, so most members probably heard Rickards' advice. Read His Message, DAILY
INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 6, 1895, at 1.
148. More New Bills, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 16, 1895, at 3; Roster of Bills,
HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 16, 1895, at 6. Von Tobel was also a member of the
three man committee appointed by the Montana Bar Association to recommend a
means to physically pass the Codes. Lawyers In Session, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Hele-
na), Jan. 9, 1895, at 5.
149. Code Bills Passed, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 26, 1895, at 5
(quoting Representative Alderson's description of the adoption of the Codes).
150. The House Code Committee consisted of Representatives Booth (R-Silver
Bow) (Chair), Von Tobel (R-Valley and Fergus), Rodgers (R-Deer Lodge and
Missoula); Hershey (R-Missoula), Meyer (R-Park), Bennett (R-Granite), Cooper (D-
Gallatin), Corbett (P-Lewis and Clark), and Spriggs (D-P-Meagher). The Committees,
DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 12, 1895, at 7; The Next Assembly, DAILY INDE-
PENDENT (Helena), Jan. 3, 1895, at 5 (party and county identifications). Other than
Booth and Von Tobel, the members did not figure significantly in the public debate.
Interestingly, the committee was drawn entirely from southwestern Montana, as was
the Senate Judiciary Committee; see infra note 177.
151. This Was A Threat, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 18, 1895, at 5, 7.
The House refused to make this general policy, requiring other bills to be read in
full on the first reading. They Must Be Read, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 19,
1895, at 5.
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The next question was whether to pass the Codes and fix
them later or to attempt to correct problems before passage. The
Montana Bar Association and leading lawyers argued for adop-
tion first, revision later.'52 In doing so, they often portrayed the
Codes as merely a reorganization of existing Montana law. For
example, the Helena Daily Herald reported that a panel of law-
yers told a joint meeting of the Montana Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee and the House Code Committee that the Codes were
"made up, with the exception of about one hundred sections, of
the present Montana laws. The only difference is that in the new
code the laws, instead of being scattered broadcast throughout
the volume, have been put in their proper divisions under their
proper heads."'53 It is difficult to imagine anyone familiar with
the Codes' provisions believing such a statement.
Commissioner Wade addressed another potential concern,
arguing:
[T]here was a good deal of misunderstanding about the codes,
even in the legal profession. It had been assumed that the code
commission had formulated something purely original, some-
thing out of its own inner consciousness. On the contrary, there
was scarcely a section or a line which had not been taken from
the statutes of some other state, tried and approved statutes,
upon which constructions had been placed by the supreme
courts of the respective states concerned.' 5'
Wade was technically correct, since the Code Commission had
begun with the California version of the Field Codes. Whether
wholesale importation of California law would be reasonable for
Montana is another question. The lawyers testifying before the
joint committee were confused at best: many of the provisions of
the four Codes were new to Montana.
Some opposition to the "off-hand manner" proposed for adop-
tion of the Codes was reported, although not identified, by the
Anaconda Standard,55 prompting the Code Committee
chairman to send a survey to prominent members of the legal
profession regarding the best method to proceed. The responses
generally endorsed both adoption and the process of adopting
152. The Bar Association, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 15, 1895, at 2.
153. The New Code, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 19, 1895, at 1.
154. Over in Helena, ANACONDA STANDARD, Jan. 22, 1895, at 2 (emphasis added).
The quote is the Anaconda Standard's. Although the Standard's story does not claim
the language as a direct quote but presents it as a paraphrase of Wade's, the lan-
guage reads as a direct quote.
155. Id. at 2.
[Vol.'56388
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first and revising later.15 The only other opposition in the
House concerned the provisions of the Political Code concerning
livestock marks and brands.'57 Even with this minimal opposi-
tion, the Helena Daily Independent predicted on January 20th
that "the consideration of these codes will occupy the time of the
house and the committee of the whole for several weeks.""
Work on passage began in earnest during the Montana Bar
Association's meeting in Helena on January 21st. The Associa-
tion endorsed the report of a special committee (Colonel Sanders,
Judge Wade, and former Code Commissioner N.W. McConnell),
which had itself endorsed the Codes. The Bar Association com-
mittee, continuing to misrepresent the scope of the changes,
stated that "the changes are few and necessary" and argued for
adoption based on the confusion that would result from further
delay.
159
Despite what one paper characterized as "a regular chewing
match" on January 22nd by the House Code Committee and the
Senate Judiciary Committee, the committees' only changes were
156. Although the actual survey responses appear to have been lost, the Helena
Daily Herald reported a sampling: Attorney General Haskell: the Codes should be
adopted now and amendments should be done by a joint Senate-House committee
now before adoption; Judge McHatton of Second Judicial District: adopt and adopt as
a whole; Judge Benton of Eighth Judicial District: "I favor the adoption of the codes.
The compiled statutes is a contradictory mass of legislation, much of it difficult of
interpretation by bench and bar."; Judge Brantley of Third Judicial District: adopt as
stands, then amend this session if practical; County Attorney Freeman of Cascade
County: "heartily in favor" of codes, adopt as a whole; attorney Frank P. Sterling:
"by no means" adopt as a whole; Judge Woody of Fourth Judicial District: adopt as a
whole then amend, "I do not believe that our laws would be in any worse condition
if the codes were adopted."; Durfee and Brown, Philipsburg attorneys: adopt "as
quickly as possible" and adopt as a whole; Judge Marshall of Missoula: "I am in
favor of the general idea of codification. Very many of the features embraced in the
report of the commission are wise and prudential."; Goddard, President of Montana
Bar Association: adopt as a whole; Luce & Luce, Bozeman attorneys: adopt without
amendments "except for defects, if any, that may be patent"; Stanton & Stanton,
Great Falls attorneys: "by all means" adopt as a whole; W.T. Hartman, Representa-
tive Hartman's brother: "I would say emphatically 'yes.-; F.C. Webster: adopt as a
whole; James R. Goss, Billings attorney: adopt and then amend later. Adopt It First,
HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 22, 1895, at 1.
157. In particular, the transfer of the office of Recorder of Marks and Brands to
the Secretary of State from the Livestock Commission caused the livestock commis-
sioners distress. The livestock commissioners argued that they required the marks
and brand books daily and the transfer would prevent them from being able to per-
form their work. 11th District, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 19, 1895, at 1; They
Must Be Read, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 19, 1895, at 5. Other portions of
the Code the commission found objectionable could be easily cured by amendment.
Id.
158. They're After Him, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 20, 1895, at 8.
159. They Want The Codes, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 22, 1895, at 6.
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to delete the mercantile corporations section and the ban on
gambling. The two committees then agreed to work for passage
without further amendment.'"
In a rare dissent from the push for adoption, the Democratic
Great Falls Daily Tribune editorialized that the Codes were an
extreme remedy for the problem of confusion in the statutes:
"[W]hy should this mon[s]ter code be adopted without any con-
sideration? Has not our experience taught us that we have too
much law and too little justice? Would it not be a practical thing
to simplify rather than add to the written law?"'6' No one else
publicly asked or discussed these questions, and the Tribune
went unanswered.
By January 24, the House Code Committee had issued a
favorable report emphasizing the need to clarify the state's laws,
which the House adopted'62 with little debate."6 The House
160. They Chewed It All Up, ANACONDA STANDARD, Jan. 23, 1895, at 1. At least
one member of the House seems to have shared these views. Republican Representa-
tive Dr. 0. Leiser introduced a bill on January 23, 1895 to revise and compile the
statutes, an unnecessary step if the Codes passed. Without Any Rules, DAILY INDE-
PENDENT (Helena), Jan. 23, 1895, at 5, 6. Leiser continued to have qualms about the
Codes, unsuccessfully seeking to have the 26 page Code Committee report printed
before adoption by the full House. Ordered Engrossed, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena),
Jan. 25, 1895, at 5, 7. He did vote for the Codes on final passage, however. Code
Bills Passed, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 25, 1895, at 5, 7.
161. The New Code, GREAT FALLS DAILY TRIBUNE, Jan. 23, 1895, at 2.
162. The Committee Report stated:
Your committee are of the opinion that the present condition of the laws of
this state are such that the proposed codes should be adopted by the legis-
lative assembly at the earliest day possible. Our present laws are incoher-
ent, in many instances, contradictory, in some cases, unconstitutional so
that the interpretation of them on many points is practically impossible ei-
ther by the judiciary or the bar of the state. This being true, a great ma-
jority of the people of the state are unable to arrive at a definite conclusion
of what the laws are under which they live. This condition of affairs has
arisen from a series of laws enacted by different legislatures, each acting as
an independent body, and in many cases paying no attention whatever to
the laws existing at the time of the enactment of certain statutes. Your
committee are of the opinion that it is unnecessary in this report to add
further reasons for the adoption of the proposed codes but would earnestly
request that each member of the house give careful consideration to an ad-
dress by the Hon. Decius S. Wade entitled: 'Necessities for Codification.'"
Mr. Booth's Plan, ANACONDA STANDARD, Jan. 25, 1895, at 1.
163. The discussion consisted of a question whether the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee had been consulted and a motion to print the Code Committee report before
adoption, which lost. As Representative Knippenberg put it, the House "took the
word of the lawyers for it." Ordered Engrossed, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan.
25, 1895, at 5, 7. As Knippenberg was one of the more independent Republicans (he
termed it a limit to the number of times he would say "cuckoo" for the caucus, King
Caucus Rules, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 1, 1895, at 5), the lawyers truly
had convinced the most skeptical members to take their word for it.
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Code Committee recommended only five sets of amendments to
the Commission drafts: (1) to preserve existing corporations; (2)
to ensure that laws passed at the Third and Fourth Legislatures
were maintained, in particular a series of acts establishing coun-
ty boundaries and creating various state and local offices; (3) to
delete the ban on gambling and retain the present law;"6 (4) to
remove a section of the Penal Code that prohibited railroads
from giving passes to office holders; and (5) to strike a provision
giving the State Board of Education, rather than the legislature,
the authority to select the state's school textbooks.1" The
House amendments thus aimed primarily at preserving the
legislature's privileges and ability to satisfy special interests.
Selecting school textbooks, for example, was a rich source of leg-
islative "boodle,"" and the receipt of a free rail pass was a ma-
164. Interestingly, the same legislature later passed a broad ban on gambling. It
Is Gone Forever, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 1, 1895, at 8. The Daily Inde-
pendent noted that the gambling interests "didn't seem to care a nickel one way or
the other" about the gambling ban and were simply avoiding political extortion by
the legislature. In The Altogether, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 9, 1895, at 5.
The Daily Missoulian also noted the lack of opposition to the bill, which meant a
loss of $30,000 to $40,000 a year in license revenues. Tis the Old Tale, DAILY
MIssoumAN, Feb. 24, 1895, at 1. Even the bill's advocates did not argue the bill
would stop gambling, but argued that state licensure "had a bad effect on those who
are thinking of taking up their residence in the state." Badly Jumbled Up, DAILY
MISSOULLAN, Feb. 17, 1895, at 2. The law was eventually declared unconstitutional.
RAYMER, supra note 112, at 382-83.
165. The Proposed Codes, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 25, 1895, at 2; The
New Codes, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 24, 1895, at 1. The legislature was unable
to come to any final agreement on the school book issue and ended up leaving dis-
tricts free to choose their own books, repealing all existing school text book laws. A
Thing of the Past, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 8, 1895, at 1. The Daily
Missoulian reported that "[tihe so-called textbook question is attracting more atten-
tion than any question since the senatorial fight was made." Talked Out Loud, DAILY
MISSOuLIAN, Feb. 15, 1895, at 1.
The issue, of course, surfaced at the next legislature. See Is Left to Districts,
DAILY MIssOULIAN, Jan. 22, 1897, at 1. Then the Daily Missoulian advocated legisla-
tive book choice on the grounds that it would be more expensive to buy a majority
of the legislature than to buy a text book commission and so, presumably, less likely
to occur. As To Textbooks, DAILY MISSOULIAN, Feb. 18, 1897, at 2.
166. The Daily Missoulian described the textbook issue this way:
The champions and friends of the American Book Company are working
hard to have the old contract renewed and the old line of books retained,
while the representatives of the houses outside the trust, some of whom are
in the employ of the state, or at least in the offices of state officers, want a
fair field and no favor. There are rumors of boodle galore, and the active
interest taken in the matter by men who never knew until a week ago
what books were used, would seem to indicate that all the enthusiasm
aroused is not due entirely to patriotism.
Present Outlook, DAILY MissOULAN, Jan. 27, 1895, at 1. School texts continued to
inspire visions of "fat batches of good dough" in the Fifth Legislature. Committees
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jor benefit of a legislative seat."7 Special laws concerning cor-
porations were a similar source of favors.
Noticeably lacking from these changes were adjustments to
adapt the Codes' provisions to Montana's circumstances. The
flood of amendments that appeared later suggests that the Codes
were far from perfectly suited to Montana.' The limited range
of amendments made in the House evidences a failure to closely
examine the substance of the four Codes.
The Codes were sent to the engrossing committee with the
proposed amendments, where their size presented a problem. To
engross them in the normal fashion would have required "four
times as many clerks as are now employed by the house, and
more time than the legislature has left in its session. ""' To re-
solve this problem, the House decided to make up the engrossed
versions from the printed versions, 70 presumably by cutting
and pasting in the five changed areas. By suspending the first
and third readings, together with the usual practice of reading
by title alone on the second reading, the House then could "bolt
the codes like a dose of castor oil"'7' and pass the four bills the
same day.'72 The House took only ten days from introduction to
passage of the Codes, a time during which other matters primar-
ily occupied the House.
Passage through the House was thus accomplished with
little examination of the bills. As the skeptical Great Falls Tr-
Named, DAILY MISSOULIAN, Jan. 9, 1897, at 1.
167. The desire for rail passes was a feature common to many of Montana's leg-
islatures. Commenting on the rejection of legislation to prohibit passes in 1897, the
Daily Missoulian noted that "[t]he house has placed itself squarely on record as be-
ing in favor of free transportation on railroads and plenty of it." State Legislature,
DAILY MISSOULAN, Jan. 18, 1897, at 1.
168. The changes to municipal government structure, for example, were inappro-
priate to Montana's existing structures.
169. Ordered Engrossed, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 25, 1895, at 5.
170. Id.
171. Code Bills Passed, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), January 26, 1895 at 5.
172. A smattering of opposition surfaced to the dispensing of the third reading,
and the motion to do so with respect to the Civil Procedure Code passed by 45-11.
When a similar objection was raised for the other three, the Code Committee Chair-
man again repeated his characterization of the Codes as "not new laws but simply
the old ones compiled and codified with some necessary amendments and laws of
late legislative assemblies." Codes by the Cord, ANACONDA STANDARD, Jan. 26, 1895,
at 1. At least some of the opposition seems to have come from legislators who object-
ed to the provisions concerning the cattle industry. The First Law, HELENA DAILY
HERALD, Jan. 26, 1895, at 5. It certainly was not based on partisan lines; eight of 44
Republicans and three of 13 Populists opposed the motion. See Id. at 5 (listing oppo-
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bune editorialized, upon passage of the Codes Montana would be
able to "boast of a volume of law which for quantity is unsur-
passed by any state, no matter what may be said of its quality.
No one can vouch for that, for no one in the state has read the
code[s] in [their] entirety."' This was more than editorial hy-
perbole-given the rapid passage through the lower house, it is
doubtful that anyone had tackled the task of reading the entire
body of Codes. The Code Commission, the Code Committee and,
perhaps, the Montana Bar Association committee had considered
them en masse, but it is doubtful whether any one individual
from any of those bodies had read and considered all 170 pounds
of laws.
2. The Senate: 'Warm Friends of the Codes"174
In the Montana Senate (the Senate) the primary obstacle175
to prompt passage was a determined effort by the State School
Superintendent to incorporate some school law changes into the
new Codes.'76 The same argument used against the livestock
industry amendments in the House blocked these changes: to
change any provision would open the floodgates of amendments
and doom passage. Although this argument succeeded in block-
ing the school law changes, it did not stop the livestock interests
in the Senate.
When the Codes reached the Senate Judiciary Commit-
tee "'77 on January 28th,7 ' all but one of the members joined
173. GREAT FALLS DAILY TRIBUNE, Jan. 25, 1895, at 2. Similar claims were
made in New York by opponents of the Codes. See, e.g., ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK: FIRST ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 42.
174. Gambling and the Like, ANACONDA STANDARD, Jan. 27, 1895, at 1.
175. Some opposition was also forecast in the Senate because of the House's
action in eliminating the ban on gambling, primarily because some senators objected
to the appearance of special treatment of gambling interests. "The only thing that
will prevent a fight and probably a successful one being made on this matter is that
the senators who hold these views are warm friends of the codes and fear to endan-
ger the action of the house yesterday by making changes." Id.
176. A Busy Week, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 28, 1895, at 1. Steere sought a
state board of education "selected from the most progressive educators in the state."
He wanted this board to have not only authority over textbook selection but also
"authority to make what changes they deem best in the management . . . of schools
throughout the state." Teachers Adjourn, HELENA WEEKLY INDEPENDENT, Jan. 3,
1895, at 8; see also The School Book Law, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 11,
1895, at 5.
177. The Judiciary Committee consisted of Senators Leonard (R-Silver Bow)
.(Chair), Greene (R-Jefferson), Metzel (R-Madison), Eggleston (D-Deer Lodge), and
Brosnan (P-Cascade). See The Committees, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 12,
1895, at 7 (committee assignments); The Next Assembly, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Hele-
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in a majority report urging their adoption in the form passed by
the House. Republican Senator Alex Metzel of Madison County
offered a minority report on the Penal Code'79 and the Political
Code with some amendments favored by the livestock indus-
try.180 In a tribute to the influence of the cattle and sheep in-
dustries, the minority report on the Penal Code was adopted
with only six dissenting votes.18' Senate Judiciary Committee
Chairman Charles Leonard then withdrew the majority report on
the Political Code and, "probably to show that he was not unal-
terably opposed to the amendments, passed another
[amendment] to Senator Metzel and that gentleman presented it
as a portion of his report." Leonard's amendment resolved the
school book question, eliminating a Political Code section that
gave the State Board of Education authority over school textbook
selection. "Not one member out of ten know just what section
was being eliminated.""2 The Senate then unanimously passed
the Codes." The Penal and Political Codes returned to the
House, which concurred in the Senate amendments."84
3. Enrollment Clerks: "General Baggs' Army"1 5
Go it, 'General,' work, ye slaves. The House has said it must
have the Codes enrolled and in a hurry, so make your pens fly,
na), Jan. 3, 1895, at 5 (party and county identification).
178. General Assembly, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 29, 1895, at 5.
179. Metzel sought changes in the Penal Code to require the display of hides for
10 days and to include unrecorded brands that are infringements on recorded brands
within a section on unlawful brands. The Codes Pass, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan.
30, 1895, at 1. The changes are also summarized in Metzel Made it Stick, ANACONDA
STANDARD, Jan. 31, 1895, at 1.
180. All Done By Hand, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 31, 1895, at 5; Rap
at the Codes, DAILY MISSOULiAN, Jan. 31, 1895, at 1.
181. Rap at the Codes, DAILY MISSOULAN, Jan. 31, 1895, at 5.
182. Id. at 1. The House had previously eliminated one such section; the Senate
eliminated a second one. All Done By Hand, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 31,
1895, at 5 (discussing elimination of Political Code § 1,301 in the Senate); They Must
Be Read, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 19, 1895, at 5 (discussing elimination of
Political Code § 935(4) in the House).
183. All Done By Hand, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 31, 1895, at 5.
184. The Codes Pass, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 30, 1895, at 1; The House,
HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 31, 1895, at 3.
185. General Baggs' Army, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 2, 1895, at 1.
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trim de ink, and when your labors are at last completed a four-
horse truck will come around and cart the results of your labors
to the office of His Excellency for approval."
Helena Daily Herald
The usual procedure for House bills that passed both houses
was enrollment by the House Committee on Enrollment. The
Committee created a clean copy of each bill including all amend-
ments. Although lack of amendments meant that there were few
changes from the original printed bills to incorporate, the size of
the Codes meant this was a formidable undertaking. Code Com-
mittee Chairman Booth offered a resolution giving the Commit-
tee on Enrollment authority over all the House clerks and to en-
gage ten additional clerks as needed.'87 The day before, howev-
er, the House had appointed a special committee to investigate
charges that the House had been "extravagant" in its hiring of
clerks, who were patronage employees.'88 That committee was
ready to present its report, and its Chairman, Republican Repre-
sentative Henry Knippenberg of Beaverhead County, opposed
Booth's resolution.189 The matter was postponed to allow the
Republican caucus to consider the question that night.90
Despite the lawyer members' advice that enrollment by hand
was not legally required, the caucus decided to proceed with
186. Id.
187. My account of the enrollment controversy is based on the accounts in a
series of Montana newspapers at the time: All Done by Hand, DAILY INDEPENDENT
(Helena), Jan. 31, 1895, at 5; Code Clerks, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 31, 1895, at
1; Much Ado About Little, DAILY INTERMOUNTAIN (Butte), Feb. 1, 1895, at 1; King
Caucus Rules, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 1, 1895, at 5; Rough on Clerks,
GREAT FALLS DAILY TRIBUNE, Feb. 2, 1895, at 1; Smead's Big Bill, DAILY
MISsOULIAN, Feb. 2, 1895, at 1; Ruled by Caucus, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb.
2, 1895, at 5.
188. The method of selecting clerks had caused a "little row" earlier in the ses-
sion in the House, when an unsuccessful attempt was made to give committee chairs
the sole authority to pick clerks. General Assembly, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena),
Jan. 12, 1895, at 5. Further disputes arose later when one member expressed annoy-
ance at the lack of jobs for Union veterans compared with the large number of fe-
male clerks. This Was A Threat, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 18, 1895, at 5.
189. Knippenberg, who appears to have been something of a stuffed shirt as well
as a regular thorn in the Republican leadership's side, later resigned from the legis-
lature without explanation and left town to spend the winter in Florida. How It Is
Viewed, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 19, 1895, at 2. His resignation was attributed
by some to the criticism he had received in connection with his efforts in the House.
Id. Knippenberg's major legislative efforts had been an attempt to ban display of any
flag other than the United States' and to reduce the number of House clerks. See
Flag Field Day, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 8, 1895, at 1, 5; No Hope From Them,
DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 28, 1895, at 5 (printing text of bill).
190. King Caucus Rules, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 1, 1895, at 5.
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hand enrollment.'91 The caucus estimated that doing so would
require at least a week's work by thirty-five to forty clerks at five
dollars each per day.'92 As with other estimates concerning the
Codes, this proved wildly optimistic; clerks labored for almost
four weeks to enroll the Codes. The Knippenberg committee's
report, which had recommended the discharge of eleven of the
twenty-six existing committee clerks on grounds of incompetence,
was tabled.9 3 The Caucus did not acknowledge the Senate's
offer to loan the House the Senate's clerks.' The Caucus ig-
nored the governor's assurance that he would accept the Codes
without enrollment.'95 Instead, the House hired more and more
clerks, and although a number proved less than competent, few
were discharged.'96
On February 13th, almost two weeks after enrollment began,
the Code of Civil Procedure was finished and sent to the gover-
nor for his signature.'97 Six days later, the Penal Code and Civ-
191. The enrollment of the Codes was justified by the Republican Helena Daily
Herald on the grounds that the legislatures' printed versions of the code
commissioners' handwritten work were not properly proofed. These errors were par-
tially corrected by Code Commissioners Wade and Cole, who added various pencil
notations to the printed versions. The Enrollment of the Codes, HELENA DAILY HER-
ALD, Feb. 5, 1895, at 4. Even the Herald admitted, however, that the manner of
enrollment was "an outrage." Id.
192. Salaries from Now It Has Rules, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 24,
1895, at 5.
193. Ruled by Caucus, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 2, 1895, at 5.
194. The Enrollment of the Codes, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 5, 1895, at 4.
The "code clerks" also caused controversy concerning their employment on Sundays.
Some apparently objected to working Sundays for religious reasons, and the House
eventually decided to allow those clerks not to attend, but prevented them from
claiming compensation for Sundays. In The House, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 9,
1895, at 1; Thrown Wide Open, DAILY MissOLuuAN, Feb. 10, 1895, at 1.
195. The Governor's Position, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 1, 1895, at 3; see also
Much Ado About Little, DAILY INTERMOUNTAIN (Butte), Feb. 1, 1895, at 1.
196. General Assembly, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 5, 1895, at 5. Chair-
man Baggs attributed the number of incompetents to the rapid hiring of so many
clerks (although fewer than hired at the start of the session) and claimed he did
discharge incompetent clerks once their lack of ability, became clear. Very Little
Show, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 7, 1895, at 5, 6. A review after the end of
the session disclosed that eighty-eight clerks were employed by both houses, at an
expense of more than $10,000. What It Costs To Make Laws, DAILY INDEPENDENT
(Helena), Nov. 25, 1896, at 8.
197. It Was All Spent, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 14, 1895, at 5; The
Work of Our Law Makers Begins to Produce Results, RIVER PRESS (Fort Benton), Feb.
20, 1895, at 5. The arrival of the enrolled code was a momentous occasion in the
House: "While the speaker was signing the bill, Tallant, Gordon and other prominent
Republicans crowded around and viewed the work." The House, HELENA DAILY HER-
ALD, Feb. 13, 1895, at 1.
396 [Vol. 56
48
Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/1
1995] ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF CODIFICATION 397
il Code were completed.'98 The governor signed them on Febru-
ary 20th.'9 The Political Code was finally enrolled on February
25th2" and signed the next day.2"' The first consequence of
the Codes' passage was thus the perpetuation of the bloated
legislative patronage staff and a waste of considerable public re-
sources.
20 2
4. Amendments: "make the people wish the legislature had left
the codes alone" °
After passage, people began to read the Codes.2°" Changes
the Helena Daily Herald characterized as "radical" 20 5  in
placer 2° and quartz mining law were discovered.0 7 All cities
198. Two More Codes, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 19, 1895, at 1.
199. The House, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 20, 1895, at 1.
200. It Came To Life, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 25, 1895, at 1, 5.
201. Anti-Gambling, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 26, 1895, at 1.
202. The Fourth Legislature's expenditures became an object lesson for the Fifth.
Newly elected Governor Robert Smith cited the cost of $61,474.96 in his message to
the Fifth. Governor Smith Now, DAILY MISSOULIAN, Jan. 4, 1897, at 1. To put that
in perspective, total state revenues in 1896 were about $437,000. The Message, DAILY
MISSOULIAN, Jan. 4, 1897, at 2.
Before the additional code clerks were hired, the legislature's staff had a pay-
roll of $330 per day, of which $155 per day was for clerks. The Senate, a smaller
body, survived with only five committee clerks. Now It Has Rules, DAILY INDEPEN-
DENT (Helena), Jan. 24, 1895, at 5. The total cost of the Codes was estimated to be
$2,000 or about three percent of the legislature's budget. A Junketing Party, DAILY
INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 10, 1895, at 6.
203. In the Altogether, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 9, 1895, at 5.
204. They did not necessarily read them right away. It was not until late 1896
that anyone appears to have noticed a Political Code section requiring county trea-
surers to furnish "indemnifying bonds" from banks in which they deposited public
funds. Those Codes Again, DAILY MIsSOuLIAN, Dec. 23, 1896, at 1 (recounting how
few counties had complied with the law and a recent opinion by the Attorney Gener-
al that required compliance); see also Failed to Comply, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena),
Dec. 22, 1896, at 8. Similarly, it took time for school officials to discover that
"through a clerical error" there was no explicit provision authorizing school taxes,
something remedied at the next legislature and handled in the interim by a court
decision of "questionable" legality authorizing county commissioners to make a levy.
State Legislature, DAILY MIssOuLIAN, Mar. 3, 1897, at 1.
205. On a lighter note, a correspondent pointed out in a letter printed in the
Helena Daily Herald that a provision requiring veterinarians to burn or bury de-
ceased diseased animals was unartfully drafted and appeared to require the burning
or burying of the animals' owners. The New Codes, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Mar. 5,
1895, at 8 (letter to the editor). A correspondent to the Daily Independent pointed
out that the Code Commission draft had also included provisions which stated that a
husband's adultery would have no effect on the legitimacy of the children of his wife
and which made it illegal for a public official to make change for a taxpayer. Again
The Codes, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 1, 1895, at 6 (letter).
206. Placer mining is the method of mining that uses water to extract gold from
deposits of sand and gravel.
207. New Mining Law, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Mar. 15, 1895, at 2. The changes
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except Helena underwent major changes in their governmental
organizations, with salaries and fees for city officials cut dramat-
ically."°' Residence requirements for voting doubled from three
to six months in the city,2" the frequency of elections in-
creased, 1 ' offices changed from appointed to elected,2 '
unnaturalized residents were exempted from poll taxes
(threatening a quarter of revenue from that source)," cities
were made liable for damage from mobs and riots," 3 and police
judges' jurisdiction greatly expanded." 4 Even the powerful live-
made Montana's laws similar to Colorado's, South Dakota's, and Wyoming's. The new
law extended the time for recording claims to ninety days from twenty, required
shafts of ten feet be dug before recording, and required an additional 10 feet be dug
for relocation of claims based on old discovery. Id.
208. The New Code, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 16, 1895, at 8. Helena had a
special charter and so was unaffected by the changes in the general law. Id. As an
example of the changes in salaries, Butte's mayor went from $2,000 annually to
$600; aldermen's salaries were cut from $300 to $100. Fees were a major source of
income for many officials; the new code abolished most of them. These changes were
not a complete surprise because a group of mayors objected to them in 1893. Mon-
tana Mayors Meet, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 9, 1893, at 1. The legislature
restored the salary levels. MONT. REV. CODE § 3240 (1907) (derived from act of
March 3, 1895). The mayors specifically objected to the reduction of mayoral salaries,
taxation provisions for special assessments, making police magistrates ex officio jus-
tices of the peace, and provisions requiring cash on hand before warrants could be
issued. Montana Mayors Meet, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 9, 1893, at 1.
209. Id. Ward residency requirements were also increased from 10 to 30 days.
Id.
210. Id. Elections were changed from biennial to annual.
211. Id. The city marshal was made an elected official. This caused the Great
Falls Daily Tribune particular annoyance:
Of all the city officials the marshal should of all others be appointive and
subject to removal in the event of misbehavior. To make him elective, and
every year, will be to place the position virtually at the disposal of an
element that to say the least should not have any say in the selection of
such an official. Reference is of course made to the element that exists in
all large communities with which the marshal has the most business. If the
office be made elective these people would see to it that a man who was
satisfactory to them was nominated and elected, and in the slang of the
street would "stand in with them. This is to be avoided, if possible, and the
legislature should not adjourn without amending the code in this important
particular. Even if the office be made elective the term of one year is too
short, for it requires that length of time for a man to get acquainted with
the duties of his office. As a matter of fact the city marshal and all the
members of the police force should be selected on account of their fitness
and the tenure of their office should be during good behavior. This is the
great feature of the metropolitan system and is the feature that can be
followed with profit in Montana cities.
A Code Mistake, GREAT FALLS DAILY TRIBUNE, Feb. 14, 1895, at 2.
212. Should Be Amended, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 25, 1895, at 8.
213. Id.
214. The New Code, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 16, 1895, at 8. For additional
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stock interests were not immune from surprises: the Codes re-
pealed the 1891 law making railroads liable for damage to live-
stock.215 The road laws were changed to contain "serious obsta-
cles to county commissioners" that could "in some instances
bankrupt a county."216 Important changes in the certification
system surprised teachers. 7
Amendments reversed some of these changes before the end
of the session. In particular, after complaints by mayors, the
legislature retreated from some of the more radical changes in
municipal government."' Fixing the mistakes required many
bills, and the legislature passed more than one hundred amend-
ments to the four Codes." 9 Enough amendments remained
unacted upon at the end of the session, however, that some pre-
dicted a special session would be necessary.220
The Codes' impact was felt indirectly as well. One necessary
amendment, concerning construction of the Codes in relation to
acts of previous legislatures, enabled the Senate to force the
House to retain a contract system for the state prisons,221 de-
spite its previous refusals to do So.21 Other matters were de-
discussion of the dissatisfaction of the mayors with the various code provisions, see
Important Changes, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 26, 1895, at 1.
215. All Fled But One, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 22, 1895, at 5, 6. The
railroads and ranchers were engaged in a continual struggle over the railroads' liabil-
ity for animals killed by trains. See Is A Quiet Session, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena),
Jan. 11, 1897, at 8 (describing attempts to both extend the six month statute of
limitations for claims against railroads for cattle killed by trains and change the law
to force railroads to exhibit hides of animals killed at more central locations in each
county).
216. Montana Road Laws, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 4, 1895, at 5.
217. Makes New Rules, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 27, 1897, at 8 (de-
scribing Codes' changes in certification process).
218. Mayors Meet, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 25, 1895, at 8; Amendments
Pending, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 25, 1895, at 5; City Attorneys and Mayors,
HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 26, 1895, at 8 (Booth promised to introduce a bill con-
taining changes sought by mayors.).
219. Extra Session, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Mar. 14, 1895, at 8; In Retrospect,
HELENA DAILY HERALD, Mar. 9, 1895, at 5 (suggesting that Chairman Booth of the
Code Committee had managed to get all but "one or two" of the required amend-
ments to the Codes through the legislature).
220. Extra Session, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Mar. 14, 1895, at 8. More than 130
bills had been introduced by the fourth week of the legislative session, and one pa-
per forecast over 500 for the session. A Busy Week, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 28,
1895, at 1.
221. The "contract system" presumably refers to the practice of contracting out
prison labor.
222. Sine Die, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Mar. 8, 1895, at 1. Von Tobel specifically
argued that the bill was absolutely necessary to the Codes and so should be passed
despite his opposition to the contract system.
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layed or stopped altogether due to possible conflicts with the
Codes.2" A new law governing the militia required extensive
revision due to the Codes' provisions on the same subject.22 4 A
bill pertaining to altering and defacing brands also required
reworking to fit the Codes.2" 5 Knippenberg's bill relating to fees
and compensation was indefinitely postponed because of the
Codes' provisions on the same subject.22 Conflict with the
Codes also led to at least one veto.227 Errors in the Codes also
affected state revenues. In 1897, the Secretary of State estimated
that a loophole created by the Political Code provisions on filing
fees for articles of incorporation cost the state $20,000 a
year.
228
Perhaps more importantly, the Code Committee was given
jurisdiction over "[aill bills relating to any subject already cov-
ered by the Codes" to avoid damage to the "symmetry of the new
laws '-a far reaching mandate in light of the Codes' sweep-
ing scope. The sheer press of business also had an effect. In one
day the House disposed of 181 bills.230 On another day, the
House dealt with thirty bills, each receiving between three and
five minutes.231 These factors combined to give the Code Com-
mittee an unusual degree of centralized control over the Fourth
Legislature's business.
223. A Senate bill defining the rights of married women was postponed because
the subject was dealt with in the Codes and the committee was unsure of the Code
provisions. The State Solons, DAILY MIssouLIAN, Feb. 5, 1895, at 1. A bill regulating
the medical profession was held up in the Senate because the effects of the Codes on
the subject were unknown. Did All The Work, DAILY MISSOULIAN, Feb. 3, 1895, at 1.
The Codes appear to have influenced the development of the law even before they
took effect; the Montana Supreme Court cited the Civil Code's provision that a ripar-
ian land owner's property went to the low-water mark, rather than the high-water
mark, in choosing the low-water rule in a February 26, 1895 decision. Gibson v.
Kelly, 15 Mont. 417, 423, 39 P. 517, 519 (1895). I would like to thank Roy Andes
for referring me to this case.
224. Doing Business, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 22, 1895, at 8.
225. Two More Codes, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 19, 1895, at 1, 5.
226. Id.
227. It Was Veto Day, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 21, 1895, at 5 (de-
scribing veto of a bill because it caused a problem when read in conjunction with
code sections).
228. To Build A Capitol, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 26, 1897, at 5, 6
(The loophole allowed firms to file articles of incorporation for a small amount of
capital, then amend them. This permitted them to take advantage of the flat rate for
amendments to avoid payment of a higher fee for the initial filing, which was based
on the amount of capital stock.)
229. King Caucus Rules, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 1, 1895, at 5.
230. Broke All Records, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 24, 1895, at 8.
231. Draw Poker Barred, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 26, 1895, at 5.
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The Fourth Legislature's final procedural concern was to
provide for the incorporation of the many amendments to the
Codes as well as the other acts of the Fourth Legislature. If the
Codes were to end the confusion in Montana's statutory law,
they must be maintained as codes. Decius Wade was appointed
commissioner to incorporate the acts of the Fourth and Fifth
Legislatures into the Codes, prepare them for printing, and pre-
pare indices.232 Moreover, because of the haste in adoption, no
time remained in the session to consider conflicts between legis-
lation adopted in the current session and the Codes, leading to
confusion over what law governed.2"
As they reported these events, second thoughts crept into
newspapers' coverage. The Helena Daily Independent called
passage of the Codes "[t]he most important work of the legis-
lature" but cautioned that "[w]hether it was the wisest piece of
work remains to be seen."' After passage the Daily Indepen-
dent discovered that the:
[N]ew codes were prepared some years ago, and in many of
their provisions were not applicable to existing laws or to pres-
ent conditions. Yet it seemed to be absolutely necessary to have
232. The Butte Intermountain won the more than $8,000 contract to print the
completed Codes. Mantle's Paper, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 27, 1895, at 1. This
might have been due to the influence of Silver Bow county legislators on the various
Code committees since the Intermountain's bid was significantly higher than two of
the three other bids. Got A Cinch On It, DAILY MISSOULIAN, Feb. 28, 1895, at 1.
Sanders opposed the Intermountain's edition, which included annotations by Fletcher
Maddox consisting largely of California cases and which was published in two vol-
umes, in what appears to be a beginning for a speech: "The Vampire of the Pacific
Coast and the stormy petrel of the Rocky Mountains, - one or both of them, thinking
they had a monopoly on publishing the laws of Montana" and attacked the circula-
tion of a protest against the Montana Bar Association's one volume, unannotated edi-
tion (prepared by Sanders) (Sanders File, (undated), Box 4, Folder 4-3, Montana
Historical Society). Sanders represented one of the losing bidders in an unsuccessful
attempt to overturn the award to the Intermountain. It Is A Hot Fight, DAILY INDE-
PENDENT (Helena), Apr. 26, 1895, at 6; Winked at Witness, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Hele-
na), Apr. 27, 1895, at 8; The Board Upheld, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), May 7,
1895, at 3.
233. The members of the next legislature learned this lesson the hard way. The
Codes had provided for mileage of $0.20 per mile each way for members to attend
sessions; the Fourth Legislature had cut this to $0.10. By the time the members of
the Fifth Legislature discovered they were entitled to only half the traditional
amount, they had already collected the full sum from the state treasury and faced
difficulties in paying it back. As the Daily Independent pointed out, -[if the law
makers had been familiar with the laws, it would never have happened-perhaps."
Too Much Mileage, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 4, 1897, at 1; see also Was
Close Enough, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 5, 1897, at 1. See note 297 infra
for additional discussion of this issue.
234. In the Altogether, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 9, 1895, at 5.
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the codes, so the legislature adopted them with a lot of provi-
sions that were not wanted, and then set to work to amend
them so as to get what was wanted. A great part of the legisla-
tion, or, rather, a large number of the bills acted on, related to
provisions of the codes which were round to be unsatisfactory,
and which the legislature sought to amend. In this proceeding
there were doubtless some changes crept in which should not
have been passed, and they will develop from time to time, and
make the people wish the legislature had let the codes alone
after passing them."5
The process by which the legislature considered the Code bills
overwhelmed the legislature's mechanisms for debate and re-
view, centralized power in the hands of a few members, and
disenfranchised all but the most powerful interests.
5. Looking Back
After the session ended, the Helena Daily Herald summed
up the legislature's work by calling the Codes a "radical move-
ment" to solve the "momentous problem" of having "only frag-
mentary legislation,""' a sharp contrast from the paper's re-
porting before passage that the Codes were mere collections of
existing law.23 In many respects, the paper was correct-a rad-
ical change had taken place in Montana's legal system, and the
problem was no longer "fragmentary" legislation but an over-
whelming mass of legislation. No longer would the confusion in
Montana's laws arise from political battles left over from Territo-
rial days. Now it would result from the hasty adoption of mea-
sures designed for New York and Dakota in the 1860s and Cali-
fornia in the 1870s, and their mixture with clerical errors,2"
235. Id.
236. The Legislative Assembly, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Mar. 8, 1895, at 4.
237. See, e.g., The New Code, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 19, 1895, at 1.
238. For example, an enrolling clerk's error in a bill correcting various provisions
of the Political Code resulted in the wrong section being repealed. A Wrong Section,
DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 14, 1895, at 5. Another oversight came from the
omission of a section of the Code of Civil Procedure through an error by the Code
Commission. When the problem was discovered, former Code Commissioner B.P.
Carpenter offered this explanation: "Title 3, 'Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors,'
of civil code, section 4510, et seq., was largely taken from California, but partly from
the New York [sic]. The procedure for accounting, being insufficient in California,
was taken from the New York statute, which I now supply you. It was prepared for
insertion into the code of civil procedure, but through an oversight was never insert-
ed .... The omission of strict and ample provisions for presentation and proof of
claims and an accounting by assignees is one of the very worst defects in the code of
civil procedure." Work Well In Hand, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 30, 1897, at
[Vol. 56402
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conflicting amendments, and the quirks of the Fourth
Legislature's "bolting" of the Codes.239
Perhaps the most puzzling question is how Montana came to
adopt the Field Codes in 1895 without any reference to the heat-
ed debates over codification that occurred in New York through-
out the 1880s.2" News from around the world filled Montana's
newspapers; there was clearly no lack of interest in develop-
ments elsewhere. Despite more than nine revisions of the Field
Codes in New York during the 1880s, the formation of the first
modern bar association to fight the Codes there, and the exten-
sive coverage of the codification debate in the New York press,
no one seems to have mentioned that New York had repeatedly
rejected the Civil Code.241 The legislature willingly surveyed
attorneys around the state, but apparently could not contact
even a single attorney in New York.
The skeptical Great Falls Daily Tribune noted:
"In the passage of this code all the safeguards against hasty
8. A more basic error was the Political Code's description of Cascade and Lewis and
Clark Counties as overlapping. Food Will Be Pure, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb.
17, 1897, at 5.
239. Ordered Engrossed, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 25, 1895, at 5. In a
February 26, 1895 opinion, the Montana Supreme Court suggested that the legisla-
ture and Code Commission had paid careful attention to the underpinnings of the
various Code sections: "The code commission and the legislature had before them
the legal literature and learning to which we have above referred, and as a result
they have adopted the rule [in question]." Gibson v. Kelly, 15 Mont. 417, 422, 39 P.
517, 519 (1895).
240. The New York debates were vigorous, if fought primarily among a few
hundred lawyers. See GEORGE MARTIN, CAUSES AND CONFLICTs: THE CENTENNIAL
HISTORY OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK 1870-1970
142-57 (1970) (describing battles of the 1880s). The debate was heated. The Associa-
tion, for example, referred to changes in the proposed Civil Code as having "Vicious
character" and congratulated the Association "upon yet another escape from the
dreaded results of the proposed innovation . . . and the consequent upheaval of the
foundations of the settled jurisprudence of this State." ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT at 6-7 (1883). Field's allies, particu-
larly those writing in the Albany Law Journal, used equally strong language. See,
e.g., Current Topics, ALBANY L. J., Apr. 25, 1885 at 322 (responding to a critic's
mention of the Statute of Frauds as "the stock argument of duller wits"). From 1870
to 1889 the Albany Law Journal published numerous articles advocating codification.
Codification was also frequently discussed in the Nation, Evening Post, Tribune,
American Law Review, and other periodicals.
241. In calling for the code commission in 1889, Governor Leslie did note that
three of the codes had not been adopted in New York, but he attributed this, incor-
rectly, to the New York Legislature being "too much occupied by special legislation to
give the necessary time for their consideration[.]" Leslie's Message, DAILY INDEPEN-
DENT (Helena), Jan. 16, 1889, at 1, 2. The author was unable to find any other men-
tion of this important fact in the reported discussion of the codes through 1897.
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legislation have been ignored, the rules for government of the
legislature have been summarily set aside, and the spirit if not
the letter of the constitution infringed. It is beyond question
that no member of either branch of the assembly has read or
given any consideration to these codes. They are to them as a
sealed book."242
The legislature might as well go home after final passage, the
Tribune continued,
[i]f they attempt any of the general legislation indicated by the
several hundred bills already introduced many of them will
conflict with the codes and the gentlemen will follow the exam-
ple of the Indian chief who, upon opening a council, announced:
'The law we made yesterday we repeal today.' That will be
about the size of it.'
The Tribune's skepticism is notable primarily because it was so
unusual. As a Democratic paper, the Tribune may simply have
been skeptical of a Republican legislature's accomplishments; its
comments never went beyond questioning the haste in adoption
to address the merits of codification. Compared with the level of
debate in New York, the Tribune's comments appear almost
timid. No evidence can be found in Montana's public record of
New York's heated debates concerning the merits of codification
compared with the common law.
Equally puzzling is why the Montana codification advocates
ignored the evidence from California and the Dakotas that codifi-
cation would not end statutory confusion. California had wres-
tled with its Codes for over twenty years by 1895 and both Dako-
tas had almost thirty years experience with their Codes. The
frequent need for revisions in those states should have alerted
Montanans that considerably more than codification was re-
quired to enable Montana to escape the confusion of uncollected
session laws.
Montana also ignored the intensive process that California
underwent in adapting the Codes. Not only had multiple bodies
been appointed to examine and change the Codes there, but the
1870 Code Commission Chairman Charles Lindley, a strong
advocate of codification, had resigned over the failure of the
commission to adequately examine and complete the Codes.
Lindley also wrote the California Code Commentaries, a work




Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/1
1995] ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF CODIFICATION
the Montana Commissioners surely examined. He published a
letter in it explaining his resignation and decrying the state of
the California Codes as proposed to the California Legisla-
ture.2' " Indeed, one of Lindley's primary criticisms of his own
commission's product was the haste in adoption.2" Despite this
abundance of evidence regarding the level of effort needed to
adapt the Codes to local conditions, the Montana codifiers made
little effort to modify them.
Although the debate in Montana focused exclusively on local
issues, some evidence exists that David Dudley Field himself
was involved in the Montana Codes' passage. In November 1895,
David Dudley's brother Stephen, then associate justice of the
United States Supreme Court and once a leader of California's
codification effort, replied to a letter from Wilbur F. Sanders,
that:
You say my brother took such an abiding interest in the adop-
tion of the Codes, prepared substantially by him, and in his
own conversation, addresses and letters had so much to do with
their final passage in Montana, that you feel an irresistible
impulse, now that he is dead, to send to me a volume of those
laws. You also state that up to within a few weeks of his death
his interest in your legislative action was intense, and that he
was as active in procuring it as he could have been were he
fifty years younger than he was.'
In addition in 1885 in New York, Sanders had heard David
Dudley Field speak on codification (and probably met him) at
least one American Bar Association meeting that discussed codi-
fication.24 v Although Field was no longer a Republican by the
244. Lindley, supra note 67, App. at v.
245. Lindley, supra note 67, App. at v.
246. Letter from Stephen Field to Wilbur F. Sanders, Nov. 8, 1895, Sanders File,
Montana Historical Society, Box 2, Folder 2-15. Unfortunately the author has been
unable to locate Sanders' letter. Sanders and Stephen Field corresponded again in
1897 when Justice Field wrote Sanders asking him for a copy of his account of
Sanders' time as a vigilante, mentioning how much he had enjoyed visiting with
Sanders when Sanders called upon him. Letter from Stephen Field to Wilbur F.
Sanders, Jan. 19, 1897, (Sanders File, Montana Historical Society, Box 2, Folder 2-
15). Sanders and Stephen Field had had previous contacts, including in 1892 when
Sanders, then a United States Senator, repudiated charges made by his fellow Mon-
tana Republican and the other Senator from Montana, T.C. Power, that Justice Field
was a lobbyist for the Union Pacific Railroad. Power had cited Sanders as authority
for the charges, apparently without Sanders' knowledge. Power, Field and Sanders,
WEEKLY MISsOULIAN, Feb. 3, 1892, at 2 (A misprint on the masthead incorrectly
identifies the issue as that of Jan. 20, 1892, at 2.).
247. 8 REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, at 81 (1885) (noting a corn-
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1890s, he played an active role in Republican politics in the
1860s and 1870s, as did Wade2" and Sanders.
Although the Codes' proponents claimed Field's authorship
as an advantage,249 no trace of David Dudley Field's "abiding
interest" or activity on behalf of the Montana Codes appears in
any of the Montana press accounts, in Decius Wade's account, or
in either Wade's or Sanders' surviving papers." Sanders' com-
ments to Stephen may have simply been idle compliments for the
recently deceased David, but I believe they indicate that Sand-
ers, and by association with him, the other Montana Code advo-
cates, knew of the extensive opposition to the Codes in New
York. David was undeniably frustrated by New York's failure to
adopt his work;2"' for him to have failed to comment on his
frustration to anyone with whom he discussed codification during
the 1880s and 1890s would have been unlikely. That the Mon-
tana codifiers never mentioned the New York opponents' argu-
ments, even to rebut them, suggests an unwillingness to confront
the reasons why codification might have been less beneficial
than they portrayed it.
The almost complete lack of opposition,252  and the
legislature's tripartisan support for the Codes, suggest that all of
the state's interests, from mining to livestock, and from corpora-
tions to labor, either supported the Codes or at least were indif-
ferent to their passage. Such unanimity was rare in Montana
ment by Sanders on a report on codification by a committee composed of Field and
John F. Dillon). A typescript of this report is also in the Sanders file at the Mon-
tana Historical Society. (Sanders file, Box 4, Folder 4-1, Montana Historical Society).
248. Wade had strong family ties to the Republican party (ties that probably
contributed significantly to his rise from probate judge in Ashtabula, Ohio to Ter-
ritorial Supreme Court Chief Justice in Montana). His uncle Benjamin Franklin
Wade was a Whig and then Republican Senator from Ohio between 1851 and 1869.
Another relative, Edward Wade, was a Republican Congressman from Ohio from 1853
to 1861. OmIo BIOGRAPHICAL DIcTIONARY 329-30 (1986).
249. See, e.g., They Want The Codes, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 22,
1895, at 6 and Leslie's Message, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), January 16, 1889 at
1, 2 ("David Dudley Field, whose able and persistent efforts were begun in 1839, is
entitled to the credit for [creating the codes] .... ).
250. In addition to the Wade and Sanders papers in the Montana Historical
Society library, I also examined the Wade family papers in the Western Reserve
Historical Society Library in Cleveland, Ohio, where some of Wade's family papers
are archived. (Wade was originally from Ashtabula, Ohio and returned there in the
1890s).
251. FIELD, supra note 26, at 332 (quoting David Dudley Field: "It is a hard
thing to bear, after all I have done.").
252. The occasional complaint of the Great Falls Daily Tribune was made ex-
ceptional by the absence of any other voices joined with it.
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politics,253 and is all the more startling due to the sweeping na-
ture of the changes. One of the surprising features of the Codes'
adoption in Montana was how little it took to accomplish such
changes. A small group that found codification attractive pushed
it through with almost no public debate.
The reasons Montana adopted the Codes are complex. The
vision of a modern legal system that the Codes offered undoubt-
edly seduced some members as a chance for Montana to sweep to
the forefront of legal reform and claim her rightful place as a
modern state.25 Appeals to state pride (combined with assur-
ances that the Codes simply rationalized existing law) probably
persuaded the majority of Montanans (and legislators) unaware
of the Codes' actual provisions at a time when Montana was
literally putting itself on the map. Others, particularly the law-
yers, may have been determined to end the confusion caused by
the scattered statutes. Montana's Bar had far less interest in
maintaining the legal status quo than did the elements of the
New York Bar that opposed codification. Not only were
253. See, e.g., Word, supra note 93; Keith, supra note 137.
254. Contemporaries often referred to the Codes in these terms. See, e.g., C.P.
Connolly, Three Lawyers of Montana, 14 MAG. OF W. HIST. 59, 61 (1891) (When
Codes are done they "will be pronounced equal to that of any State in the Union.");
The Bar Association, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 5, 1893 at 8 (passage of the
Codes would be a "crowning glory" to members of the association who had worked
for passage); Leslie's Message, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 16, 1889, at 1, 2
(governor calls for codification because statute law "is not up to the standard of
progress which characterizes the policy and jurisprudence of the most advanced and
enlightened states[.]); Decius S. Wade, 1880-1894, supra note 88, at 671:
If Montana would rescue the benign common law from the chaos of the
reports and the oblivion and obscurity of too many books, and extract there-
from all of the principles which a thousand years has developed and
brought to light, reduce them to form and classify and arrange them with-
out repetition, contradiction and confusion, then our noble commonwealth
will have accomplished something for American jurisprudence and the ratio-
nal administration of human justice.
There is some indication that a general feeling that civil law systems were more
modern than common law systems was present in Montana as well. An editorial in
the Daily Independent, for example, labelled common law water rights systems as
"burdened at the very outset by the influence of feudal prejudices and privileges"
while calling the civil law water rights system "promulgated by the greatest minds of
ancient times." Water Rights, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 14, 1895, at 4. Al-
though the codes had lost much of the civil law character Field had attempted to
give them, notably their sections displacing the common law, such subtleties probably
escaped the average lay person. The president of the Montana Bar Association in his
address on codification in January 1895 asserted, quite erroneously, that codification
of the common law "is the tendency" in the United States, implying the forces of
history would eventually bring about codification. It Is Indifference, DAILY INDEPEN-
DENT (Helena), Jan. 14, 1895, at 5.
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Montana's statutes and laws in worse shape than New York's,
but Montana lawyers had invested far less time and effort in
mastering the existing law than their New York counterparts.
The Republicans also may have wanted to accomplish some-
thing to demonstrate that their control of the Montana's govern-
ment benefitted the state.255 Certainly the new Republican
members of the legislature had little stake in preserving the law
created by the largely Democratic legislatures of the past, and
thus less reason to worry whether the Codes' proponents' assur-
ances that the Codes preserved prior law were true.
Another explanation, inspired by public choice analyses of
the 1986 Federal tax reform,25 might be the opportunity the
Codes offered the legislators to provide services to their
constituents' interests. Not only did the massive, simultaneous
adoption of the laws offer opportunities for slipping in unnoticed
changes in the law, as Senator Leonard did,257 but the creation
of such an enormous body of law also produced an endless need
for amendments and future changes. By enacting a comprehen-
sive framework of rules, even if the particular rules were incor-
rect, the Fourth Legislature created demand for the services of
future legislatures.
255. The Codes proved an ineffective barrier to the "white" (pro-silver) tidal wave
of 1896 which swept many of the Republicans from office, however. See infra notes
259-62 and accompanying text.
256. See Milton Friedman, Tax Reform Lets Politicians Look for New Donors,
WALL ST. J., July 7, 1986:
[The pre-19861 tax space was overcrowded with loopholes. There was no
room to add any more without destroying the tax base altogether. In a last-
ditch effort to preserve tax reform, Senator Bob Packwood made his now
famous radical proposal--cut tax rates drastically and simultaneously elimi-
nate most tax shelters. The rest is history. Whether he realized it or not,
Senator Packwood's approach was an ingenious solution to the potential
collapse of tax reform as a source of campaign funds. His bill disappoints
almost all the lobbyists in one fell swoop, but it also wipes the slate clean,
thereby providing space for the tax reform cycle to start over again.
WILIAM C. MITcHELL & RANDY T. SIMMONS, BEYOND PoLITIcs at 58 (1994):
Congressional politicians have in effect wiped the slate clean so that they
may once more "auction" off tax exemptions and other privileges. The mar-
ginal value of the thousands of exemptions and loopholes had decreased
enormously over the years; with fewer loopholes, their value increases
sharply to the advantage of members of Congress, especially those on the
tax committees. At the same time, the worth of tax lobbyists has also in-
creased since they are the experts in obtaining a renewal of old loopholes:
See also Richard L. Doernburg & Fred S. McChesney, On the Accelerating Rate and
Decreasing Durability of Tax Reform, 71 MINN. L. REv. 913 (1987) (describing cre-
ation of demand for congressional services in tax legislation).
257. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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Amending the Codes also created more immediate opportuni-
ties for providing services. Because the format of bills amending
the Codes made for obscure titles ("An act amending section XXX
of the Political Code"),258 public scrutiny of legislative activity
became more difficult. Together with the sheer number of bills,
this reduced scrutiny from the public and the press.
259
Regardless of the motivation, the implementation of the
reforms left a great deal to be desired. Enacted without public
debate or adequate legislative consideration, the Codes made far
reaching and often ill-considered changes in Montana's legal
system.
E. The Fifth Legislature: "we are governed too much "
But the end came at last and Montana's legislative body passed
out of existence unwept and unmourned and the people of the
258. Consider, for example, a bill introduced in the 1897 legislature, the notice
for which stated "To amend part three, title 10, chapter 13, article two of the politi-
cal code, relating to licenses, by adding a section to be known as and numbered sec-
tion 4084." Called Down Hard, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 26, 1897, at 5.
Just what this bill contained would be unknowable to all but those able to procure
both the Political Code and the bill itself. Even worse, consider a bill offered by
Senator Stanton of Cascade, the notice for which read: "To amend sections 4733,
4740, 4741, 4743, 4748, 4752, 4754, 4756, 4762, 4768, 4780, 4781, 4784, 4786, 4789,
4816, 4911, 4912 and 4913 of the political code, relating to municipal elections; also
to amend sections 4805, 4807, 4808, 4809, 4811, 4812, 4813, 4865, 4874 and 4900 of
the political code, relating to ordinance and municipal affairs." Had One Test Vote,
DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 28, 1897, at 5, 6.
259. My review of the major newspapers between 1889 and 1897 convinces me
that Montana's press was hardly a vigorous watch dog. It did, however, regularly
print the text of important bills and there was extensive debate over some issues. A
typical report of Code amendments in the Fourth Legislature was this one from the
Helena Daily Independent: "A number of other bills amendatory of the codes were
also favorably acted upon." Must Come In Now, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar.
7, 1895, at 5.
The effect of such reporting did not go unnoticed in the Legislature. Rep.
Monteath complained about the number of bills which simply referred to the Codes,
making them unintelligible to the vast majority of Montanans who were without
copies of the Codes. Its Seventh Week, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 18, 1895,
at 5. Review of subsequent reports of bills introduced suggested the practice contin-
ued despite Monteath's complaints. The passage of the Codes themselves drew little
attention in some papers. The Daily Missoulian, for example, limited its coverage of
passage in the house to a single sentence. The State Solons, DAILY MISSOULIAN, Jan.
25, 1895, at 1.
260. The quote is from Governor Smith's annual message. Governor Smith to
Montana Law-Makers, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 5, 1897, at 7.
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state breath a sigh of relief that [the legislature] had done no
worse than pass necessary appropriation bills with numerous
measures amendatory of the codes.2"'
Helena Daily Herald
The Codes' passage was insufficient to enable the Montana
Republicans to retain control of the governor's office or legisla-
ture in the 1896 "white tide" of silver politics.262 A Democratic-
Populist "fusion" candidate won the governorship in 1896 with
an unprecedented 21,000 vote majority.2 63  Republicans lost
thirty-six seats in the House and two in the Senate26' as well
as the governorship; they were saved from greater losses in the
Senate only by the limited number of upper house seats up for
election in 1896.2" The new House contained only three mem-
bers with any legislative experience and none from the previous
session."
New Governor Robert B. Smith's first annual message coun-
seled restraint with respect to fixing the Codes:
I am disposed to advocate that policy which will as far as
possible maintain the permanency and stability of our law; I
believe the great trouble with the world is a tendency to change
and alter the laws too rapidly. Instead of not being governed
enough I fear we are governed too much; therefore where the
261. In Retrospect, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Mar. 6, 1897, at 8.
262. Montana's Resources Ably Pictured, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 13, 1897,
at 2. ("Like all the silver states, Montana went 'white' with a vengeance last Novem-
ber.") "White" signified silver as opposed to gold. See also RAYMER, supra note 112,
at 386-87.
263. Montana's Resources Ably Pictured, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 13, 1897,
at 2.
264. Figures for the Fourth Legislative Assembly from Senator Makers, HELENA
DAILY HERALD, Nov. 21, 1894, at 5. The Fifth Legislature had forty-four Democrats,
sixteen Populists, and eight Republicans in the House and nine Democrats, three
Populists, and eleven Republicans in the Senate. Montana's Resources Ably Pictured,
HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 13, 1897, at 2.
265. Montana's Resources Ably Pictured, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 13, 1897,
at 2.
266. Work of the Week, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 11, 1897, at 5; Above
Average Age, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 15, 1897, at 1. (One House member
from the Fourth Legislature was elected as a member of the Senate in the Fifth).
The new legislature was also a quieter group than the Fourth Legislature. Is A Qui-
et Session, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 11, 1897 at 8 ("The members are se-
date and economical in their own affairs. The hotel bar rooms do not know them as
they did of yore. They retire earlier to their homes, and, all in all, behave more like
a man would in the city where he was born and brought up and where his reputa-
tion was worth a few dollars to him .... The last session would have been a shock
to the community if it had met in Butte.").
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laws in the codes are not too conflicting or erroneous, leave
them. We would better endure some inconvenience in the law
and have it fixed and certain than to be in ignorance of the law
by reason of its manifold changes and uncertainties."7
The Governor explicitly called for six changes: reform of the
fellow servant rule,2" amendment of the attachment law, re-
peal of the probate provisions allowing the living to testify con-
cerning contracts and conversations with the deceased, revision
of the municipal incorporation provisions, changes in the school
tax collection law, and clarification of rules governing corpora-
tions.269 Other groups sought changes as well, including the
Bar Association,270 city officials,271 and livestock interests.272
The Helena Daily Independent greeted the election results with
the note that "[m]any amendments to the codes are wanted, to
repair omissions and defects, some clerical and some
otherwise."273
Despite the predictions at the end of the Fourth Legislature
that many provisions would require amendment,27' the Fifth
Legislature accomplished few major changes in the Codes. The
only major changes to the Codes were gambling prohibition,275
267. Governor Smith to Montana Law-Makers, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 5,
1897, at 7.
268. This change was required by a court decision striking the previous law
rather than because of a flaw in the Codes. For Railway Employees, DAILY INDEPEN-
DENT (Helena), Feb. 9, 1897, at 6.
269. Id.
270. See Montana Lawyers Meet, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 11, 1897, at
6 (an important issue at meeting was proper form for amendments); Lawyers Meet
To-day, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 12, 1897, at 5 (invitation to members to
suggest "amendments and corrections to the codes"); People Make Laws, DAILY INDE-
PENDENT (Helena), Jan. 12, 1897, at 5 (describing bills introduced which "lawyers
have contended for during some time past"); Many Lawyers Came, DAILY INDEPEN-
DENT (Helena), Jan. 13, 1897, at 1 (describing problems identified by the Bar Associ-
ation meeting); and Poor Lo's Honesty, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 2, 1897, at
5 (describing bills introduced at the request of the Bar Association).
271. From Nine Towns, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 12, 1897, at 6 (de-
scribing meeting to correct "many defects" found in Codes); Powers of Cities, DAILY
INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 18, 1897, at 8 (describing bills introduced to correct
problems identified by cities.)
272. See Is A Quiet Session, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 11, 1897, at 8
(describing bills sought to benefit stockmen whose animals were killed by trains.)
273. Work for the New Legislature, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Nov. 24, 1896,
at 2. Not everyone thought the legislature would be busy. The Daily Independent
reported that a "Helena correspondent of a Butte paper Tuesday wrote that there
was very little business to engage the attention of the legislature at its coming ses-
sion." Will Be A Busy One, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Dec. 25, 1896, at 5.
274. See Extra Session, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Mar. 14, 1895, at 8.
275. The discussion of the anti-gambling measure took up a great deal of time
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fish and game law revision,"' increased penalties for livestock
and horse theft,277  correction of some errors regarding
cities,27 ' and restoration of prior law concerning some aspects
of mining.279
and energy. See Pass the Bill, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Mar. 4, 1897, at 8. Some
claims were made that at least one member had been bribed in connection with the
bill. That Gambling Bill, DAILY MISSOULIAN, Feb. 27, 1897, at 2 (editorial). No inves-
tigation occurred and the issue received little press attention. In an example of the
lack of care with which legislation was drafted, the sponsor of the anti-gambling bill
admitted he did not know what one of the games the bill banned was. He had mere-
ly copied the bill from a law in Missouri and so when asked "How do you play it?"
he replied "Now you've got me[.] I don't know anything about it. But if it is unlaw-
ful to play it in Missouri it ought to be made unlawful here." Has Plenty to Do,
DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 25, 1897, at 8.
276. A complete replacement of the code sections on fish and game was pro-
posed, with the sponsor arguing "[tihe fish and game laws of the codes as they stand
now are so mixed that no one but a lawyer can tell which one is in force and ef-
fect." Fish and Game, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 22, 1897, at 8. Among the chang-
es made were increases in the size of mesh required for fishing nets and restrictions
on dynamiting fish. Id. An example of problems with the Code sections on this was
the requirement that fish screens be in place between September and March on all
irrigation ditches, a time when Montana weather prevented significant irrigation. The
new bill changed the requirement to March to August. New Game Law, HELENA
DAILY HERALD, Jan. 26, 1897, at 2. The agricultural lobby succeeded in having the
requirement stricken entirely. State Legislature, DAILY MISSOULIAN, Feb. 20, 1897, at
1. See also Scrap About Scrip, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 20, 1897, at 5
(describing agricultural interests' opposition to screen requirement.)
The confusion in the fish and game laws stemmed from the manner in which
the Codes were adapted to the acts of prior Legislatures. A general rule that the
laws of the assemblies which had met since the Codes were drafted took precedence
over the Code provisions, except where the Code provisions were amended during the
Fourth Legislature. This led to the combination of some Code provisions and an 1893
fish and game law, with other Code provisions dropped. See As the Law Stands,
DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 25, 1895, at 6.
A similar argument that the Codes were confused and contradictory was made
concerning the Code provisions on the selling of timber from state lands, prompting
a bill to amend those sections. Important Bills, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 3, 1897,
at 5.
277. The Codes had made horse and cattle theft petit larceny by restricting
grand larceny to cases where property was taken from the person of another or ex-
ceed $50 in value. 1895 Penal Code §§ 883-884. Horse and cattle theft had previ-
ously been grand larceny and punishable by fines of $100 to $500 and imprisonment
for one to fourteen years. REVISED STATUTES OF MONTANA (1879), 4th Division, § 72.
The bill introduced made thefts of various listed animals grand larceny, thus re-
turning the punishments to the prior ranges. For Cattle Stealing, HELENA DAILY
HERALD, Jan. 9, 1897, at 8. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1907), Penal Code § 8645.
278. Reform of § 4800 of the Political Code governing licenses was a major goal
of Montana city officials. From Nine Towns, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 12,
1897, at 6.
279. Excited Members, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 17, 1897, at 8 (In offering a
bill, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported "the substitute offered is an exact copy
of the law previous to the adoption of the codes and had been the law of Montana
since January 14, 1872, and seems to have been operated satisfactorily. The Code
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The Fifth Legislature was too distracted by the opportunities
for Democratic and Populist patronage2 s0 (earlier vows to re-
form the government notwithstanding8 1 ), women's suf-
frage,282 a Populist attempt to institute an initiative and refer-
endum law,2" the endless series of county division bills,"' an
law on this subject has been fruitful of law suits and has certainly been far from
satisfactory to a large number of people interested in mines and mining."). The provi-
sion was eventually fixed in 1899. REvISED CODES OF MONTANA (1907), Code of Civil
Procedure, § 6499.
280. See, e.g., Majority Rules, HELENA ,DAILY HERALD, Jan. 8, 1897, at 8 (dis-
cussion of appointment of clerks for committees by committee majority rather than
by chair); No More Economy, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 12, 1897, at 5 ($57,000
appropriation for legislative pay and expenses passed without proper procedures); No
More Pages, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 21, 1897, at 5 (hiring of two additional
pages narrowly defeated); Two More Clerks, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 30, 1897, at
1 (House "kicks over the traces of the retrenchment policy" and hires more staff);
and Inconsistency, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 27, 1897, at 5 (describing attempts to
raise salaries of allies of various parties); The Fifth Assembly, DAILY MISSOULIAN,
Mar. 5, 1897, at 2 (recounting declining enthusiasm for salary reduction and office
elimination as session wore on). The Fifth Legislature was not without problems with
clerks, although it seems to have been more prompt at discharging those who did
nothing. It Was Ladies' Day, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 10, 1897, at 1, 6 (re-
counting discharge of clerk for doing nothing).
281. The opening days of the session found numerous cries for reduction of sala-
ries for legislative employees and state and county officials. See, e.g., To Cut Sala-
ries, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 6, 1897, at 5. Enthusiasm for these measures de-
clined during the session. The Fifth Assembly, DAILY MISSOULIAN, Mar. 5, 1897, at 2.
The salary bill which had passed both houses was apparently "lost" and so never
signed. Where Is That Bill?, DAILY MISSOULIAN, Mar. 8, 1897, at 1.
282. See, e.g., Woman's Day, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 10, 1897, at 5. The
bill fell five votes short of the two-thirds majority required in the House. How It
Died, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 11, 1897, at 5.
283. Elliot's I & R Bill, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 13, 1897, at 3; A Populistic
Measure, DAILY MISsouLAN, Jan. 16, 1897, at 1 (printing text of bill). Debate over
the bill took three days of legislative time in the House. Looking Both Ways, DAILY
INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 1, 1897, at 5. Although the initiative and referendum
amendment failed in this session, With a Vim, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 28,
1897, at 5, Montana eventually adopted provisions similar to it. 1899 MONT. CONST.
art. V, § 1 (amended 1905). Ironically, one of the arguments against the initiative
and referendum measure in 1897 was that Montana should wait for other states to
experiment with such legislation. Debate Was Warm, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena),
Jan. 27, 1897, at 5.
284. County division seems to have been a state sport in late nineteenth century
Montana. The Fifth Legislature considered bills to enlarge Cascade County (out of
Meagher and Choteau counties), Cascade County, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 16,
1897, at 8, establish Rosebud County (out of Custer county), New County Bills, HEL-
ENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 9, 1897, at 5, enlarge Lewis and Clark County (out of
Meagher and Jefferson counties), Penwell's Bill, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 19,
1897, at 2, create Broadwater County (out of Deer Lodge county), New County Bills,
HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 9, 1897, at 5, create Powell County (out of Deer Lodge
county), Powell County, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 22, 1897 at 8. The Broadwater
County bill had been previously introduced in 1885, 1891, 1893, and 1895. Twelve
Years Old, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 1, 1897, at 8.
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eight-hour law for workers on state buildings,2m attempts to
restrict Native Americans to their reservations, 2"6 and scandals
involving bribery in the House"7 and the commission charged
with constructing the state capitol building" to contemplate
extensive revision of the Codes. Although a host of amendments
to the Codes were among the 464 bills introduced in the Senate
and House, 9 most ended the session in the clerk's pigeonhole
for unfinished business. 20 As the Helena Daily Independent
Although often cloaked in language about relative distances between county
seats, road quality, and natural patterns of trade, political motives also played a role
as well. See, e.g., Lo, Poor Indian, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 30, 1897, at 1 (Popu-
list member arguing creating new county is means to increase anti-worker represen-
tation in the legislature in connection with Broadwater county bill); A Big Political
Deal, DAILY MISSOULJAN, Feb. 9, 1897, at 1, 4 (alleging deal between Populists and
Democrats to give Populists the Butte mayoralty in exchange for votes on Powell
county bill). The Weekly Missoulian had joked about the number of county division
bills in the 1893 legislature, claiming that the "144th" county division bill had been
introduced to create Missoula County out of all territory not appropriated to other
counties. Dillon's Demand, WEEKLY MISSOULIAN, Feb. 15, 1893, at 6.
285. Eight Hour Law, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 20, 1897, at 5; A Legal Day's
Work, DAILY MISSOULIAN, Jan. 14, 1897, at 1 (printing text of bill).
286. Livestock interests sought the restrictions, enforceable by criminal penalties,
arguing that the Native Americans killed livestock, set fires to the range, killed
cowboys, and stole when off the reservations. Lo, Poor Indian, HELENA DAILY HER-
ALD, Jan. 30, 1897, at 1. To their credit some members of the Legislature opposed
the bill as an infringement of freedom. See, e.g., Id., (Populist member argues mea-
sure would lead to similar measures against working people) and The Indian Bill,
HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 2, 1897, at 3 (Democratic member arguing Native
Americans have as much right on public range as the white man and Populist ar-
gues for Constitutional right of all to go where they please). The bill died in the
Senate.
287. See Most Sensational, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Mar. 5, 1897, at 3, 6, 7; Ex-
pelled Him, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Mar. 5, 1897, at 8. In sworn testimony, Repre-
sentative Martin Buckley claimed he had found, on numerous occasions, cash in his
room, left for him to give "to the boys to spend." Most Sensational, supra, at 1. Al-
though he later claimed to have been drunk during his testimony and attempting to
"Josh" the investigating committee, Buckley was expelled. Expelled Him, supra, at 8.
288. See Bad Management and Rank Fraud, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 23,
1897, at 1, 4, 5; What They Said, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 24, 1897, at 1, 3;
One Man's Report, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 24, 1897, at 8; The End Not Yet,
HELENA DAILY HERALD, Mar. 4, 1897, at 3, 7; Whiteside Again, HELENA DAILY HER-
ALD, Mar. 5, 1897 at 5. The scandal involved charges by Rep. Whiteside that $50,000
of state money was committed to pay an unqualified individual for incomplete plans.
Whiteside's charges were made in a minority report of an investigating committee
and caused an uproar. When Whiteside had difficulty in proving his claims of bribery
and misdeeds, he claimed that he had been offered bribes to suppress his report.
Whiteside Again, supra. Ultimately, no action was taken by the Legislature on the
matter.
289. In Retrospect, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Mar. 6, 1897, at 8 (334 bills were
introduced in the House and 130 were introduced in the Senate). By comparison, in
the Third Legislature in 1893, there were 292 bills, 223 in the House and 69 in the
Senate. After Sixty Long Days, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 3, 1893, at 5.
290. This was undoubtedly a good thing in some cases--one member was report-
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noted at the end of the session, the codes were "not altogether
straight yet."
291
Many of those amendments cast doubt on the thoroughness
of the initial code commission's work. For example, a bill to
adopt a California law governing sheep grazing was intro-
duced,292 somewhat surprisingly in light of the Codes' Califor-
nia roots. A tax on livestock funded bounties for wolves and coy-
otes,293 suggesting inadequate consideration during codification
for an area critical to livestock interests. Similarly, bills were
introduced to restore pre-code law on penal labor' and mining
law,295 again suggesting a lack of thoroughness in adapting the
Codes to Montana's existing legal system. The same carelessness
was apparent in the list of problems the Bar Association sought
to remedy: "the lack of necessity for a reply; no limitations on life
of judgments; inability to take depositions where the defendant
had not appeared; absence of inhibition against a party testifying
against the representative of a deceased party; lack of provisions
to enforce collection of rents by execution purchases and many
others."'
Legislators also introduced a bevy of technical amendments.
For example, a clerical error in 1895 was blamed for raising the
ed to have paid a stenographer $5 to "draft any old thing that is a bill, so I can get
my name up as the author of a measure before I go home." Some Are Waiting, DAI-
LY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 18, 1897, at 8.
Not all bills which ended up in pigeonholes were meant to be there. An impor-
tant bill reforming the Political Code's provisions on licensing which was intended to
provide city's with additional revenue was "lost" and not presented to the Governor
for his signature. Salary Bill Lost, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 6, 1897, at 1.
See New License Bill, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Feb. 16, 1897, at 8, for a de-
scription of the bill. Another bill that was "lost" reduced salaries of a number of
state officers. A Legislative employee was later indicted on charges that he deliber-
ately mislaid it. Two Under Arrest, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 30, 1897, at
1.
291. Takes Them All In, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Apr. 20, 1897, at 5.
292. For Ranchers, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 2, 1897, at 5 (sponsor states
"This bill is copied from the statutes of California, where it has been in effect for
many years and apparently- has been considered good law.")
293. Important Bills, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 3, 1897, at 7.
294. Important Bills, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 3, 1897, at 5 (Sponsor argues
"My bill is only a copy of the old law with the added clause that convict labor may
be allowed outside prison walls . . . ") Text of measure given in Important Bills,
HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 4, 1897, at 2.
295. A number of amendments to the code provisions relating to mining were
proposed: S.B. 31 amended section 4635 of the Political Code to reduce fees for filing
and recording locations of placer and quartz claims, mill sites, and appropriation of
water from $2 and $1 to $1 and twenty-five cents respectively. The Senate, HELENA
DAILY HERALD, Jan. 21, 1897, at 5. The bill did not pass.
296. Col. Botkin President, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 13, 1897, at 5.
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payment to county sheriffs from forty to fifty cents per day for
boarding prisoners in jails.297 In the same vein, a bill was intro-
duced to resolve a conflict between the state constitution and the
Political Code concerning when county commissioners took of-
fice. 98 The content and brevity of press reports describing the
host of bills to amend the Codes suggest that there were many
instances of minor problems with code changes to Montana
law.299 Despite the near universal agreement before pas-
sage that the Codes required substantial improvement to meet
Montana's needs,3" the Fourth and Fifth Legislatures made
few changes, of either a major or minor character. Abundant
evidence supports the accuracy of the pre-passage view of the
need for amendments. Errors in fish and game laws, mining, and
livestock related provisions suggest a failure to adapt the Codes
297. Raised by A Clerk, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 16, 1895, at 8;
Prisoners' Board, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 13, 1897, at 5. The Codes had altered
a great number of financing arrangements. For example, section 2389 of the Political
Code reserved all fees collected by the Secretary of State and ten percent of all fees
collected by the clerk of the Supreme Court for the state law library, producing more
than $10,000 annually, far more than Governor Smith thought necessary. Communi-
cations, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 14, 1897, at 8 (relating message from governor
requesting revision of the section.)
A similar error occurred in setting mileage and per diem pay for members of
the legislature. The code set these at the amounts the Montana Constitution provid-
ed for the First Legislature while a later bill passed by the Fourth Legislature
halved the mileage allowance. Rosebud County, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 4, 1897,
at 8. Apparently the later statute was not properly added to the Codes, and the
members of the Fifth Legislature collected the additional moneys before the error
was discovered. Id. Eventually it was determined that the holdover members of the
Senate were entitled to the higher amount but not the newly elected members. Mile-
age Question, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 9, 1897, at 5.
298. County Commissioners, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 13, 1897, at 3 (bill in-
troduced to amend constitution to resolve issue).
299. See, e.g., No More Economy, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 12, 1897, at 5.
There are numerous such reports. The brevity of the description suggests an editorial
judgment of a lack of importance since the Herald, for example, routinely printed the
full text of bills. Among the bills reported introduced in the week of January 11-16,
1897 (the first full week of legislative consideration of bills), for example, there were
thirty-seven bills introduced in the House, sixteen of which were described in a man-
ner suggesting they were minor amendments to the Codes. Unfortunately the Fifth
Legislature's practice of not printing House bills unless they were recommended by a
committee for adoption, The First Stir, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 8, 1897, at 2,
and the sketchy nature of nineteenth century legislative records prevents a more
complete analysis.
The Codes' size surfaced as an argument against the populist initiative and
referendum bill, with Helena Daily Herald asking "How would you referee the laws
passed by the legislature of 1895, consisting of 2000 pages, 16,539 sections, and
numerous chapters and titles-as a whole, by codes, titles, chapters, pages or sec-
tions?" Answer-No Evasion, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 5, 1897, at 4 (editorial).
300. See HELENA DAILY HERALD, supra note 157 at 1.
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even in areas critically important to Montana's economy. Mon-
tanans had welcomed the Codes as a clarifying measure, as an
end to the confusion of the pre-code statutes, as a means by
which the ordinary citizen would understand the law, and as a
modernizing mechanism. By the end of the Fifth Legislature,
evidence cast doubt on the Codes' success in any of these ar-
eas.
30 1
F. Is Montana New York?
New York and its methods are not to be reconciled with the
plains of Montana, nor can the one understand the other.3 2
How reasonable was reliance on the New York Field Codes
as filtered through Dakota and California? Montana differed
significantly from the source states. The economies differed in
scale and composition, the populations differed in size and distri-
bution. Because Montana and the source states were not similar,
the problems a set of Codes would need to address would often
differ. Even when the problems did not differ, the societal dis-
similarities would often dictate different answers.
Table 1" contains a number of measures of Montana's,
California's, and New York's economies in the time periods
roughly contemporaneous with the drafting of the Codes in each
state. Table 2'° gives greater detail on the composition of
California's and Montana's economies at the relevant times.
Table 3305 gives demographic data.
301. One example of the lack of clarity induced by the Codes concerned the
power of county boards of commissioners with respect to the employment of deputies.
"In some counties the question has caused a vast amount of argument between the
commissioners and county officials reslting [sic], in a number of instances, in serious
ructions between them." Power of Boards, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 6,
1897, at 5.
302. Hill Cattle Corp. v. Killhorn, 79 Mont. 327, 337, 256 P. 497, 501 (1927)
(statement of defense counsel). The argument concerned whether Montanans had to
fulfill their contracts in the same way as New Yorkers rather than the Field Codes,
but the sentiment carries over.
303. Reliable data from the nineteenth century of any sort is difficult to come
by. These data are from SIMON KUZNETS ET AL., POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH, UNITED STATES, 1870-1950 93-94, 129-31 (1960) (This data com-
piled from Tables A 2-8, A 3-5, A 3-6, and A 3-7). They are for the census years
closest to the drafting or adoption of the codes (1870 for California and New York
and 1890 and 1900 for Montana.)
304. EvERETT S. LEE ET. AL., POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH, UNITED STATES, 1870-1950 623, 627-28 (1957) This data derived from Table
L-5.
305. HOPE T. ELDREDGE & DORTHY S. THOMAS, POPULATION REDISTRIBUTION AND
417
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Table 1: Economic Statistics
Category relative to California New York Montana
United States average (year) (year) (year)
(U.S. = 100)
Percent labor force in 690 (1880) 16 (1880) 727 (1890)
mining
Percent labor force in 83 (1880) 165 (1880) 60 (1900)
manufacturing
Relative wages per 96 (1869) 96 (1869) 115 (1889)
$1,000 value added
Relative value added 106 (1869) 172 (1869) 66 (1889)
per capita
Relative wages per wage 137 (1869) 107 (1869) 158 (1889)
earner
Table 2: Workforce by Industry
New York 1880 California 1880 Montana
1900
All industries 1,884,600 376,500 114,800
Agriculture 433,400 (23%) 94,900 (25%) 31,100 (27%)
Forestry & Fisher- 3,800 (0.2%) 3,000 (0.1%) -
ies
Mining 5,800 (0.3%) 49,300 (13%) 21,700 (20%)
Construction 149,700 (8%) 28,900 (8%) 6,100 (5%)
Manufacturing 419,300 (22%) 42,400 (11%) 10,100 (9%)
Transportation 135,600 (7%) 26,600 (7%) 15,400 (13%)
Trade, finance 322,400 (17%) 55,800 (15%) 12,700 (11%)
Services & public 411,300 (22%) 75,200 (20%) 17,000 (15%)
administration
As these tables demonstrate, Montana, California, and New
York, at the times of the Codes' debate in each, differed striking-
ly in economic and demographic characteristics. Not only were
California's and New York's economies much larger on an abso-
lute scale, but they had much larger trade and manufacturing
ECONOMIC GRowTH, UNITED STATES, 1870-1950 242-43, 254-55, 259 (1964). This data
compiled from Tables A 2-8, A 3-5, A 3-6, and A 3-7.
70
Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/1
1995] ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF CODIFICATION 419
sectors.3" Montana also had a high wage sector in its economy,
reflecting both the relative scarcity of labor and the high rewards
possible in the dominant mining sector.0 7
Table 3: Demographic Characteristics
California New York Montana
(1870- (1870- (1890-
1880) 1880) 1900)
Natural increase 119,000 614,000 25,000
Net migration 149,000 86,000 73,000
Net migration of foreign born white 77,000 245,000 27,000
population
Rates of net foreign born white 121 52 155
migration per 1,000 average
population
Rates of net native white migration 162 -48 365
per 1,000 average native white
population
The general statistics fail to capture how fully mining and
livestock dominated the 1890s Montana economy. In 1896 cop-
per, gold, silver, and coal mining produced roughly fifty-four
million dollars of output.3 °8 Livestock produced about eleven
million dollars of revenue in 1896. All other agriculture and
manufacturing combined produced less than three million dollars
in revenue.3" The livestock industry'0 shouldered the major
burden of funding the state government, constituting forty per-
cent of the total value of assessed property in the state in 1896,
compared to five percent for mining interests.
Montana's demographics in the 1890s also differed sharply
from the source states. Montana was much larger geographically
than New York31 (although roughly the same size as Califor-
306. See Table 2.
307. See Table 1.
308. Montana's Resources Ably Pictured, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 13, 1897,
at 2. Copper dominated mining, accounting for over $25 million, silver accounted for
$22 million, gold $4.3 million, and coal $4 million. Id.
309. Other agriculture accounted for $1.5 million of revenue. Timber production
produced approximately $1 million in revenues, while manufacturing accounted only
for $1.2 million. Notable manufacturing included beer, brick, sewer pipes, iron work,
cigars, and soap. Montana's Resources Ably Pictured, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 13,
1897, at 2.
310. Montana had almost 192,378 horses, 659,474 cows, 2,815,829 sheep, and
21,793 hogs in 1896. Stock Interests, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Jan. 20, 1897, at 2.
311. 146,201 square miles compared to 47,645 square miles. BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970 38
(1975).
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nia)."1 Its greater size was combined with a much smaller pop-
ulation than either of the two source states. 13 In addition,
Montana's population was changing in strikingly different ways
from those states. Table 3 shows some indicators of the scope of
those changes: Montana was experiencing significantly larger
rates of immigration than either of the source states, and its
migrant stream was composed of relatively more native
whites.314 Montana, as a state comprised of recent immigrants,
also had quite different patterns of land holding than either New
York, which had a "quasi-feudal" system of land tenure,"' or
California, which had a long history of settlement and the com-
plication of pre-existing Mexican land titles with which to con-
tend.3"6
Although these are only rough proxies for the differences in
the types of legal problems present in the different jurisdictions,
these dissimilarities suggest that Montana's legal system faced
quite different problems from those that confronted the source
states' legal systems. Commerce in California, and particularly
in New York, was much more complex than in Montana. Agricul-
ture in both source states was of a completely different charac-
ter, as were patterns of land holding. Moreover, a small number
of mining concerns dominated Montana's economy.1 7 Coping
with the concentrated political power this economic concentration
implied would require quite different laws and governance struc-
tures than necessary in a less concentrated economy, such as
California's or New York's. The states' legal cultures also differed
significantly. Western states had, and still have, far less respect
for formalities than New York, a crucial difference when inter-
312. 155,900 square miles. Size is not everything, of course, and Montana's ge-
ography is quite different from California's. Id. at 38.
313. Montana's population in 1890 was 143,000; New York's in 1860 was
3,881,000 and in 1880 it was 5,083,000; California's population in 1870 was 560,000.
Id. at 25, 30, 32.
314. The data do not include African-Americans as no significant migration of
African-Americans into Montana occurred in this period. See LEE, supra note 304, at
168-69 (referring to Table P-i).
315. Natelson, supra note 14, at 90 (noting that much of New York's law on
covenants running with the land came from litigation by members of the established
families who sought to protect vested interests.)
316. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo required the United States to respect val-
id Mexican land grants in California. For a discussion of the problems caused by
California's Mexican land law inheritance, .see Robert Swenson, Sources and Evolution
of American Mining Law, § 1.10, in 1 THE AMERICAN LAW OF MINING (lst ed. 1983).
317. See MICHAEL P. MALONE AND RICHARD B. ROEDER, MONTANA: A HISTORY OF
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preting statutes.31 s
Even California, whose economy and demographics during
codification were closer to Montana's than New York's ever were,
was a quite different society. Montana was virtually empty thir-
ty-five years earlier (except for the Native American presence
and whites quickly evicted them from areas whites sought to
occupy). California had significant Asian and Hispanic popula-
tions and a culture predating annexation to the United States.
Montana's population was largely white319 and its culture re-
cently developed. Furthermore, California went directly to state-
hood (after a brief period of anarchy),320 while Montana lan-
guished under federal territorial rule for longer than many new
states. 321' Additionally, as a largely Democratic territory during
a lengthy period of national Republican rule, Montana suffered
from an exceptional number of appointees who were out of touch
with local views. Laws derived from California and New York
would obviously require a great deal of adaptation to meet
Montana's needs in the 1890s.
G. Consequences
In some respects, each of the four Codes' stories is similar:
In each case a massive restructuring of a portion of the legal
system was adopted with little thought. The legislators' willing-
ness to defer to Wade, Sanders, and Booth, who were among the
few with some idea of the Codes' substance, is both a tribute to
the esteem the legislators held those men and an indication of
the legislative system's inability to cope with reform on such a
318. See Natelson, supra note 14, at 90 n.322 (noting difference with respect to
formalities in property law.)
319. LEE, supra note 304, at 349, 352 (referring to Table P-4A).
320. Congress adjourned in 1849 without providing for a territorial government.
Thus between 1849 and 1850 there was no legal structure in place to resolve most
disputes. PAULA MITCHELL MARKS, PRECIOUS DUST 248 (1992); Charles W. McCurdy,
Stephen J. Field and Public Land Law Development in California, 1850-1866: A Case
Study of Judicial Resource Allocation in Nineteenth Century America, 10 LAW & SOC.
REV. 235-36 (1976). In addition, as summed up by Swenson, "[tihe legal status of
California at successive periods of time between the years 1846 and 1849 is not
entirely clear." Swenson, supra note 316, at 20.
321. Montana was a territory for over twenty-five years, longer than eight of the
other fourteen territories which made up the "Second United States Empire" (Colora-
do, Kansas, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma, Oregon and Wyoming). The
territories stuck in territorial status longer were Utah (held back by anti-Mormon
sentiment), Dakota (longer only because organized before Montana), New Mexico,
Washington (organized earlier), Arizona, and Idaho (organized earlier). JACK ERICSON
EBLEN, THE FIRST AND SECOND UNITED STATES EMPIRES 140 (1968).
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massive scale. Men who fought bitterly over county boundaries
accepted without public protest the complete revamping of the
legal system. 2
The consequences of each of four Codes' adoption differ in
some respects. Numerous states adopted similar codes of civil
procedure,2 ' and adoption in Montana, for the most part, mod-
ernized Montana practice. The various errors and mistakes in
the Civil Practice Code were probably caught relatively quickly
through the experience of the trial bar. Because civil procedure
codes were the one innovation of Field's adopted by a significant
number of states, adopting a procedure code similar to other
states' had the advantage of producing ready-made interpreta-
tions of the Code's provisions. In addition, since lawyers on the
Code Commission and legislative committees revised and re-
viewed the Code, they were probably in the best position of any
group in the state to ensure that the Codes adequately addressed
their interests.324 The involvement of former judges McConnell,
Cole, and Wade, as well as the presence of Sanders and other
prominent attorneys on the various committees, also made it
unlikely that the Civil Procedure Code would significantly di-
verge for long from the bar's needs.3 ' Even if successful at
meeting the needs of the bar, however, the Code of Civil Proce-
dure might not have been optimal for the other citizens of Mon-
tana. The keen interest of powerful sectors like the livestock
industry in the Code's provisions suggests it may not have met
other citizens' needs.
The Penal Code, aside from its potential for disrupting the
322. While it is true that county boundaries could have a direct impact on legis-
lators, through changes in legislative districts, the Codes too had direct impacts on
legislators. They were not simply abstract provisions, but immediate changes in laws
important to most Montanans.
323. Arizona, California, Colorado, Dakota Territory, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kan-
sas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, Washington Territory, Wisconsin, and Wyoming all
adopted forms of the procedure code. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 343.
324. Montana's lawyers were not, however, unanimously enthusiastic about the
Codes. The complaints of the elite lawyers in the Montana Bar Association suggest
that many Montana lawyers were apathetic about the Codes. Many Lawyers Came,
DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 13, 1897, at 1 (retiring president of the associa-
tion complains that "the greater number of our lawyers seem to be indifferent" to
"the work of remodelling our laws and the purification of our legal system[.l")
325. See It Is Indifference, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Jan. 14, 1895, at 5
(noting that the Code of Civil Procedure had relatively few changes from the existing
rules, listing those which would "be welcomed" by the bar in the report of the Mon-
tana Bar Association President's speech on the Codes.) There were a significant num-
ber of problems in the short run. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 56422
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livestock industry, probably made little difference in the day-to-
day life of most Montanans. Again, the bar could correct any
egregious errors hampering the judicial system, and the other
provisions largely dealt with defining crimes and punishments in
a way not radically different from earlier law. With a few excep-
tions, notably the fish and game laws,2 6 this Code probably
came closest to the codifiers' ideal of a volume that ordinary
citizens could consult to learn the substance of the law. By col-
lecting into a single volume and systematically arranging all the
provisions of the criminal law, the Penal Code made the rules
easier to find, even if it did little to clarify the rules' substance.
As has been true of massive crime bills since, however, it was
not enough to solve Montana's crime problems: a Butte crime
wave in 1897 brought the report of a new vigilance committee's
formation. 27
The Political Code presented different problems. It signifi-
cantly changed Montana's state and local government. That
alone meant little, as virtually every legislative session resulted
in changes, although the extent of the changes made by the
Political Code seemed larger. Based on the enormous spoils con-
trol of state government offered, and the regular and dramatic
changes in partisan control of Montana's state government
throughout the 1890s, the Political Code could be seen as just
one of many restructurings to benefit friends and punish ene-
mies. To the extent it succeeded in organizing the laws into a
coherent framework, it at least served the purpose of making
future legislatures' restructurings more convenient. (There is
some doubt as to how well it succeeded at even that limited
goal.)3" The Code Commissioners were more ambitious than
that, however. They sought to impose their own vision of an
appropriate government structure on Montana. The restructur-
ing of municipal salaries and fees, for example, fundamentally
altered the nature of local government by reducing the rewards
326. See supra note 276.
327. 3-7-77, Beware!, HELENA DAILY HERALD, Feb. 25, 1897, at 8. Vigilantism
played an important role in Montana's early history, and the ubiquitous Wilbur F.
Sanders was a leader of the 1866 Vigilance Committee. See THOMAS J. DIMSDALE,
THE VIGILANTES OF MONTANA (reprint 1953) (1866) for a first hand account of their
activities. "3-7-77" was the 1866 Vigilance Committee's sign, although its significance
remains unclear.
328. See, e.g., the comments of M.D. Leehey, a member of the 1897 legislature
from Silver Bow County, quoted in Will Be A Busy One, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Hele-
na), Dec. 25, 1896, at 5 (noting the need for amendments to fix "many things" in the
Codes, particularly in the Political Code.)
423
75
Leaphart: The Honorable William D. Murray
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1995
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
for government service and incentives for particular officials.
Except where the Commissioners crossed particularly powerful
(and alert) interests like the livestock industry, they largely
succeeded. Even if the codifiers' vision was the correct one for
Montana at the time, the adoption of the structure without de-
bate betrayed the principle of self-government. Montana, like
many Western states, has a rich heritage of provisions designed
to bring government closer to the people. The widespread chang-
es in the Codes deserved public debate.
The Civil Code had the most potential for far-reaching ef-
fects. Field's original intent was to displace the common law. The
provisions seeking to create a United States version of the Code
Napoleon were revised out of the Code by the Californians before
it arrived in Montana.329 Nevertheless, even without formal
displacement of the common law, the Civil Code revolutionized it
by offering rules on a wide range of subjects. By occupying space
that the common law might have filled differently, the Civil Code
in particular changed the development of the law in Montana.
The next section examines the Code provisions on the duration of
employment contracts as one example of the Codes' impact. Else-
where, Professor Robert Natelson has traced the impact of the
implementation of the Code provisions on covenants running
with the land.3  Montana's experience in these two areas sug-
gests that the success of legal revolutions depends on more than
having "plenty of laws." Success also requires institutions that
implement those laws.
It is important to examine the Codes' implementation to
gain an understanding of whether the Codes succeeded in direct-
ing the growth of Montana law. This specific area also illustrates
a different type of problem with the Montana courts' treatment
of the Code; here a combination of misinterpretations and failure
to heed the Code provisions lost Montana the opportunity to
develop an appropriate law.
III. IMPLEMENTATION: THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT
A comparison of the Code states' experience with the com-
mon law states' experience involving similar rules and areas of
the law helps to demonstrate the limits of codification. This
section examines wrongful discharge, an area where Montana
and the other Code states have ignored the Code provisions. 1
329. Natelson, supra note 14, at 41.
330. Natelson, supra note 14.
331. See Andrew P. Morriss, Developing a Framework for Empirical Research on
424 [Vol. 56
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Examining an area where the Codes' provisions failed to alter
the common law's development highlights the importance of
institutions that are willing to live within the confines of legal
structures. The Montana courts, as well as the courts of the
Dakotas and California, have not only followed prevailing com-
mon law developments despite Code provisions to the contrary,
they have also led those innovations. Without a legal culture
that respected the Codes, the Codes' influence quickly declined.
The development of the modern law of wrongful discharge
makes this decline clear. Because employment contracts, like
other contracts, often fail to contain specific terms regarding
particular issues, courts must fill the gaps with default rules. A
surprisingly common omission in employment agreements is the
term of the contract. Late nineteenth century courts faced in-
creasing numbers of claims from discharged employees. In re-
sponse, every state eventually adopted the employment-at-will
rule for indefinite employment contracts.3 2 This rule simply
means that where parties have failed to provide either a term for
the contract or limits on the conditions under which it may ter-
minate, either party may end the contract at any time. Most
importantly, the existence of such a rule precludes wrongful
discharge claims. Beginning in 1959, courts began to erode the
at-will rule, creating common law exceptions that allowed dis-
charged employees to sue their former employers.
Like the common law states, the Field Code states adopted
versions of the at-will rule in their Codes. Examining these rules
and subsequent common law developments in the Field Code
states is useful because the parallel evolution of the common law
on the subject provides a benchmark against which to evaluate
the Codes' rules. Together with the history of the Code provi-
sions on covenants running with the land discussed in Professor
Natelson's article, the experience with these provisions provides
the Common Law: General Principles and Case Studies of the Decline of Employment
at Will, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. -, - (forthcoming 1995), for a discussion of the
modern rules in wrongful discharge cases.
332. For an in-depth empirical analysis of the adoption of the employment at
will rule, see Andrew P. Morriss, Exploding Myths: An Empirical and Economic Re-
assessment of the Rise of Employment At-Will, 59 Mo. L. REV. 679 (1994). The expla-
nation of the adoption of the at-will rule is controversial. For other views, see Jay
M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 118 (1976) (arguing for a Marxian explanation); Sanford M. Jacoby, The Dura-
tion of Indefinite Employment Contracts in the United States and England: A Histori-
cal Analysis, 5 CoMP. LAB. L. 85 (1982) (forwarding a social class explanation); and
Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, The Doubtful Provenance of 'Wood's Rule" Revis-
ited, 22 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 551 (1990) (arguing against Feinman's interpretation).
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a means of evaluating the Codes' impact.
A. Field's Drafts
The 1862 draft of the Field Civil Code contained four sec-
tions concerning employment termination, only one of which
dealt with indefinite contracts."' 3 Section 830 stated: "An em-
ployment having no specified term may be terminated at the will
of either party on notice to the other." As authority, the draft
cited three sections of Story's agency treatise."s As noted earli-
er, Field drew on a wide range of sources for the Civil Code's
provisions.3 He certainly had access to, and used, English pre-
cedent and so he would have known of the contemporaneous
English practice that presumed a definite term."'6 He also
would have known of Blackstone's presumption of a yearly hiring
based on agricultural work cycles.3 7 He also used authority
from other states, and thus undoubtedly knew of alternatives to
the at-will rule used by mid-century American courts." In-
333. Section 831 listed events which terminate employment; § 832 made employ-
ment terminable upon the death or incapacity of the employer; and § 833 required
employees to continue service after the death or incapacity of the employer so far as
was necessary to protect the interests of the employer's successor in interest from
.serious injury."
334. Sections 462, 476, and 477.
335. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
336. See Jacoby, supra note 332, at 95-102, for a discussion of the English prac-
tice.
337. Blackstone's rule was:
If the hiring be general without any particular time limit, the law construes
it to be a hiring for a year; upon a principle of natural equity, that the
servant shall serve, and the master maintain him, throughout all the revo-
lutions of the respective seasons, as well as when there is work to be done,
as when there is not: but the contract may be made for any larger or
smaller term.
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 413 (1765).
338. He was also aware of the at-will provisions, of the Federal Currency Act, as
he was counsel in a case where his client lost because of that section. Taylor v.
Hutton, 18 Abb. Prac. 16, 34 Barb. 195 (1864). It does not appear, however, that
Field thought he was changing the common law of New York in this regard. Al-
though he had license to innovate, the Final Report noted that the innovations were
identified in the text, and none of the employment termination provisions were so
identified. Id. Thus, Field apparently thought that Blackstone's rule was no longer
good law in New York by 1865. National banks and many of their state counterparts
operated then (and today) under the strongest version of the at-will rule, one which
precluded other types of contracts for certain bank officers. See Harrington v. First
Natl Bank of Chittenango, 1 Thomp. & C. 361, 366 (N.Y. 1873) ("I think the power
as well as the right of the defendant to dismiss the plaintiff exists by the act of
Congress, under which all national banking institutions are organized, of which law
the plaintiff is presumed to have notice. . . . The plaintiffs appointment could legal-
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stead of relying on those sources, he turned to Story's agency
treatise,"' which provided that the principal could end the
agency "at his mere pleasure. " "
The 1865 Civil Code draft included new sections modifying
ly be made in no other way, and could only be held by the tenure specified, to wit:
the pleasure of the appointing power . . ."). The National Bank Act of 1864 re-
quired banks organized under it to "elect or appoint directors, and by its board of
directors appoint a president, vice-president, cashier, and other officers, define their
duties, require bonds of them and fix the penalty thereof, dismiss said officers or any
of them at pleasure, and appoint others to fill their places . . . ." Similar language
was in the previous year's banking acts. 12 Stat. 665, 668 (National Currency Act)
("To remove such president, cashier, officers, and agents at pleasure . . . ."); 13 Stat.
101 (National Bank Act). The modem version of this provision is contained in 12
U.S.C. § 24 (1992) and the Federal Home Loan Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1432(a) (1993).
Similar provisions were present in state banking statutes as early as 1806. See, e.g.,
LAWS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Ch. 260, § 18 (1838), passed at the Sixty-First
Session of the Legislature; 3 THE STATUTE LAW OF KENTUCKY, Ch. CCCXCIII § 11
(William Littell ed., 1806) ("Cashier, and such other offices and servants under them
as may be necessary . . . removable at pleasure . . . ."); 1 RESOLVES AND PRIVATE
LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 86-87 (1834); and STATUTES AT LARGE OF
SOUTH CAROLINA 14-15 (1810). New York passed the first general banking statute in
1838 and other states soon followed. BRAY HAMMOND, BANKING BEFORE THE CIVIL
WAR 5-7 (Deane Carson ed., 1963). The New York act included "at pleasure" lan-
guage.
339. Why would Field rely on Story rather than Blackstone? After all, Blackstone
specifically addressed employment while Story's treatise was on agency. There are
several explanations. First, Field's reliance on Story may be partially due to Story's
own support for codification earlier in the century. Field used a report on codification
in Massachusetts written by Story to argue for codification in New York, even re-
printing it in 1852. Field cited Story's support for codification in an 1886 speech to
the American Bar Association. David D. Field, Remarks Before the American Bar As-
sociation (Aug. 20, 1886), in 3 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS
OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 231 (T. Cole ed., 1890). Story's actual support for codifica-
tion may have been considerably less than Field's, since the report, "while presenting
excellent reasoned arguments for codification, had really been an attempt to forestall
a general codification in Massachusetts." VAN EE, supra note 32, at 47. See Codifica-
tion of the Common Law, THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY (William
W. Story ed., 1852).
Second, the nineteenth-century view of the law included the belief that general
rules could be stated which would govern a wide range of situations. Thus, agency
was simply a general category which included employment. See RESTATEMENT OF
AGENCY § 2 (1933). The first report of the Code Commission, for example, reported
that a unified approach was needed to resolve the contradictions in the law. FIRST
REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE CODE 6 (1858), discussed in J.O. Muus, The
Origin of the North Dakota Civil Code, 4 N.D. L. REV. 103, 114 (1937).
Third, Field had been influenced by William Sampson's writings on the com-
mon law which were particularly critical of English common law. VAN EE, supra note
32, at 42. Sampson was an Anglophobe in general, although it is not clear Field
shared those sentiments. VAN EE, supra note 32, at 42. An earlier tour of Europe
had confirmed his preference for continental civil law over common law generally and
English common law in particular. VAN EE, supra note 32, at 18-19. Field might
therefore have sought to minimize his reliance on Blackstone.
340. JOSEPH STORY, STORY ON AGENCY § 476 (2d ed. 1844).
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the at-will provision as well as changes in the language of the
1862 draft's section 830. That section, now section 1029, became:
An employment having no specified term may be terminated by
either party, on notice to the other, except where otherwise
provided by this title.
Two new provisions were added, sections 1035-36, which read:
1035. A servant is presumed to have been hired for such length
of time as the parties adopt for the estimation of wages. A hir-
ing at a yearly rate is presumed to be for one year; a hiring at
a daily rate, for one day; a hiring by piece work, for no specified
term.
1036. In the absence of any agreement as to wages, a domestic
servant is presumed to be hired by the month; a clerk, or other
servant not merely mechanical, or agricultural, by the year;
and other servants for no specified term.
The new draft supplemented the citations to Story's treatise with
case citations.3" Finally, the 1865 draft added a new section
providing that personal service contracts (other than apprentice
341. To § 1029 were added citations to: Hathaway v. Bennett, 10 N.Y. 108 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1854); Ward v. Ruckman, 34 Barb. 419 (1861); and Beeston v. Collyer, 4
Bing. 309. The new sections were supported by citations to: Davis v. Marshall, 4
L.T.R. (N.S.) 216; 6 H. & N. [Am.ed.] 916 (§ 1035) and Fawcett v. Cash, 5 B. & Ad.
904, 110 E.R. 1026 (1834) (§ 1036). The case citations Field added to the 1865 draft
provide some additional information on the change. To the general at-will provision,
Field added citations to Ward and Hathaway, two New York decisions. In Ward, a
ship captain sought damages through an action for conversion of an interest in a
schooner and for wrongfully depriving the captain of "master's interest" in the ship.
In a brief opinion, the General Term of the New York Supreme Court found dis-
missal of the case justified because, among other reasons, such a contract could not
be unlimited and therefore would be terminable upon reasonable notice. (The authori-
ty cited for this was Story's partnership treatise. Ward, 34 Barb. at 420.) In
Hathaway, a newspaper publisher was sued for terminating a carrier. Field himself
argued for the carrier, seeking reversal of the dismissal of the claim. Field argued
that the English rule of allowing "one month's notice" should apply, but the court
rejected his argument, as no custom had been shown to apply to justify such notice.
To support the presumption of a contract for the period for estimation of wages,
Field turned to the English case of Davis v. Marshall, 4 L.T.R. (N.S.) 216, 6 H. &
N. [Am. ed.] 916. There the court upheld a verdict for an employee, finding that the
combination of the employee's position (as a shoe -manager) and hiring at thirty
pounds per year was sufficient to show a year's contract despite monthly payments.
Davis, 4 L.T.R. at 217. For the presumption of a month, Field cited Fawcett v. Cash,
another English case, and one he had unsuccessfully relied on in his argument in
Hathaway. In Fawcett, an employee sued under a written contract which provided for
wages at a fixed rate "for the first year" and thereafter for a fixed annual increase.
Fawcett, 5 B. & Ad. at 905. The judges' opinions all found this to be sufficient proof
of an annual contract to support a verdict.
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contracts) were not enforceable for more than two years. 2
These changes moved the Field Civil Code away from the pure
at-will provision and toward a presumed term.'
Although many New York interests opposed the idea of codi-
fication, the opponents' attack focused mainly on the specifics of
Field's draft.3 Despite the controversy that raged around
Field's draft, the employment sections did not seem to signifi-
cantly interest either the bar or the public. None of the 1880s
revisions to the Civil Code altered the employment termination
provisions.' The Association of the Bar of the City of New
York's Special Committee to Urge the Rejection of the Proposed
Civil Code produced lengthy critiques of a number of Code sec-
tions. Neither these critiques nor the reports themselves criti-
cized the weak version of the at-will rule as excessively favorable
to employers; critiques of other sections did make this crit-
icism.' One report attacked the time limitation on personal
342. Section 1013.
343. I found no direct evidence explaining why the Civil Code was changed in
this regard. All that is known is that Field distributed the 1862 draft to "judges and
others" for review and that the Code Commissioners "re-examined these two Codes
[the Civil and Penal] and considered such suggestions as had been made" and "fi-
nally revised and agreed upon them." NINTH REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE
CODE, at iv (Comn. Print 1865). One possible but unlikely explanation for the chang-
es between the 1862 and 1865 drafts is simply that Field's practice led him to dis-
cover the pay period rule, and that he found it preferable to a blanket at-will rule
on theoretical or policy grounds. Because Field was devoted to preserving his own
reputation, VAN EE, supra note 32, at 253-310 (see a chapter entitled What's Field
Whining About? for an account of Field's defense of his conduct in the Erie litiga-
tion), the more likely explanation may, therefore, be that he seized the opportunity
to "correct" the judges in Hathaway by adding §§ 1035-36.
344. Field himself noted this, stating that "[tihe real objection on the part of
lawyers is to any codification of the common law, though by way of warding off
discussion respecting the desirability of such a work they take objection to this par-
ticular code." Field, Codification, supra note 27, at 23. See also Fisch, More Notes,
supra note 54, at 20.
345. See Assembly Bill No. 182, §§ 1029, 1035-36 (1880); Assembly Bill No. 62,
§§ 1029, 1035-36 (1881); Assembly Bill No. 215, §§ 1029, 1035-36 (1882); Senate Bill
No. 300, §§ 1423, 1441-42 (1883); Senate Bill No. 87, §§ 1423, 1441-42 (1884); Senate
Bill No. 135, §§ 1423, 1441-42 (1885); Assembly Bill No. 275, §§ 1423, 1441-42
(1885); Assembly Bill No. 50, §§ 1423, 1441-42 (1886); Assembly Bill No. 329, §§
1423, 1441-42 (1887); Senate Bill No. 258, §§ 1423, 1441-42 (1888); and Assembly
Bill No. 132, §§ 1423, 1441-42 (1888).
346. ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE SPE-
cIAL COMMVITTEE "TO URGE THE REJECTION OF THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE, APPOINTED
MARCH 15, 1881" (Oct. 21, 1881) with attached Memorandum of Clifford Hand, Mar.
28, 1881; ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE SPE-
CIAL COMMITrEE "TO URGE THE REJECTION OF THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE, REAPPOINT-
ED NOVEMBER 1, 1881" (Oct. 10, 1882) with attached circular "Ought the Bill Enti-
tled 'An Act to Establish a Civil Code' to be Enacted Into a Law?" (May 1882); ex-
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service contracts other than apprenticeship, suggesting that the
authors did not find the other provisions on employment dura-
tion especially objectionable. 7
B. Montana
1. The Code Provisions
California modified Field's 1865 draft'" provisions on em-
tracts from Letters of John T. Doyle, Esq., Apr. 22, 1882 and May 28, 1882; ASSoCI-
ATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SPE-
CIAL COMMITTEE "TO URGE THE REJECTION OF THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE," REAP-
POINTED OCTOBER 9, 1883 (Oct. 14, 1884) with attachments: "Paper by Theodore W.
Dwight on the Obligations of the Legislature to Adopt the Code and on the Law of
Landlord and Tenant," (Mar. 12, 1884) (discussing the title on hiring in general,
which was located near the provisions on employment; "Paper by James C. Carter,
An Examination of the First Forty-five Sections of the Title of Insurance in the Pro-
posed Civil Code," Mar. 10, 1884; "Paper by Win. B. Hornblower: 'Negotiable
Instruments' and rTIrusts'," Mar. 11, 1884; "Paper by Albert Mathews, upon Several
Sections of the Proposed Civil Code: 'Loans'," (Mar. 4, 1884); "Points Submitted by
Mr. George H. Adams, of the Committee of the Association of the Bar in the City of
New York, in opposition to the Proposed Civil Code, to the Judiciary Committees of
the Senate and Assembly," (Mar. 12, 1884); and "Paper by J. Bleecker Miller, on
Corporations under the Proposed Civil Code," (no date); ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, FIFTH ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE "TO
URGE THE REJECTION OF THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE, REAPPOINTED OCTOBER 14, 1884
(Dec. 8, 1885) and ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, EIGHTH
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMrrEE "TO URGE THE REJECTION OF THE PRO-
POSED CIVL CODE, REAPPOINTED DECEMBER 14, 1888 (Dec. 11, 1888).
347. The only critique sponsored by the Association to specifically discuss the
employment sections, Miller, supra note 346, at 56-61, criticized the weak at-will rule
only for its effect, in combination with other provisions, on the hiring of contractors
to perform specific work. Miller, supra note 346, at 56-61. Interestingly, this paper
cites Wood's treatise in its criticism of the provision allowing discharge of ill employ-
ees. Miller, supra note 346, at 60. Particularly since other employment provisions
were specifically criticized as too favorable to employers (Field represented a number
of major railroads and other corporate clients, see VAN EE, supra note 32, at 212-52
(describing Field's practice)), it is significant that the at-will section was not also so
criticized.
348. As in Field's 1865 draft, the Dakota Territorial Code stated, under the
heading "Termination At Will," that "except 'vhere otherwise provided by this title"
employments having no specified term "may be terminated at the will of either par-
ty." 1877 Code, supra note 54, § 1152. The Dakota Code, however, provided that for
"servants" (without specifying the definition of servant) the period used for estimation
of wages (a month if no such period was used) was to be the term. Only piece rate
workers defaulted to contracts with no specified term. 1877 Code, supra note 54, §§
1157-59. These provisions survived each subsequent territorial revision.
They continued after statehood in North Dakota until 1961. North Dakota
repealed the two presumed term provisions, along with the other provisions in Ch.
34-04, the Master and Servant section of the Code, in 1961. S.L. 1961, ch. 234, 31.
It did not repeal the at-will provision. There is no legislative history indicating why
this occurred. The sponsors of the repeal also sponsored a bill providing compensa-
82
Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/1
1995] ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF CODIFICATION 431
ployment duration, and the Montana Civil Code simply adopted
and renumbered the California modifications.349  California
adopted three provisions concerning indefinite-term employment
contracts in the 1872 Code. California section 199930 stated:
An employment having no specified term may be terminated at
the will of either party, on notice to the other, except where
otherwise provided by this Title.
California sections 2010-11, gave the "otherwise" mentioned in
California section 1999. California section 2010 provided:
A servant is presumed to have been hired for such length of
time as the parties adopt for the estimation of wages. A hiring
at a yearly rate is presumed to be for one year; a hiring at a
daily rate, for one day; a hiring by piece work, for no specified
term.
California section 2011 provided:
In the absence of any agreement or custom as to the term of
service, the time of payment, or rate or value of wages, a ser-
vant is presumed to be hired by the month, at a monthly rate
of reasonable wages, to be paid when the service is performed.
The only significant difference from Field's 1865 draft was the
substitution of the text of California section 2011 for Field's
tion for work already performed for employees who were dismissed for good cause
and for those who quit for good cause, as well as bills dealing with reform of the
laws governing union-sector arrangements. S.L. 1961, chs. 233, 235-36.) The legisla-
ture passed all four bills during the same eight-day period (between March 8 and 16,
1961), suggesting some linkage.
The provisions remain in force in South Dakota today, S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. §§ 60-1-3 and 60-1-4 (1988), but are rarely cited and appear to have been last
cited in a published opinion in Amunson v. Hovelsrud, 42 N.W.2d 228 (S.D. 1950).
349. The common law states were also adopting similar duration of employment
doctrines. By 1895, twelve common law states had adopted employment-at-will rules.
These twelve constituted more than half of the U.S. economy by several measures.
See Morriss, supra note 332, Table III, at 703; Generally these rules were somewhat
stronger than the version in the Field Code states' codes since they applied with
fewer exceptions. Nonetheless, if Field had been in advance of the common law's
development in 1865, the common law had clearly caught up with his draft in the
intervening thirty years. By the time Montana adopted the Codes, the at-will rule
covered a majority of the United States economy and applied in most jurisdictions
which had considered the question. For details on the common law adoption, see
Morriss, supra note 332, at 700, Table II.
350. In 1915, California modified § 1999 to provide: "An employment, having no
specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party, on notice to the other.
Employment for a specified term shall mean employment for a period greater than
one month."
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section 1036.
Read together, these provisions create four groups of employ-
ees. First, those employees who have definite-term contracts
(including employees with explicit at-will contracts) obviously
have a contract for the term agreed. Second, employees who have
indefinite contracts that contain a provision concerning wages
per unit time have a contract for that period. Third, employees
who have a contract that does not mention the time or rate of
wages but are not paid under a piece rate have a monthly con-
tract. Finally, employees who are paid piece rates have at-will
contracts.35'
The Montana Commissioners included California cases in
their annotations, as well as citations to cases from other states
and to Field's draft.3 52 To support Montana section 2703 (re-
numbered from California section 1999), the Commissioners cited
only one case,1 3 DeBriar v. Minturn ,3  and summarized its
351. These provisions survived until 1969, although the legislature moved them
to the Labor Code when it was created in 1929. Repealed by Stats. 1969, 1537 § 1,
pt. 3132.
352. As authority for § 1999, the California annotators (two of the three mem-
bers of the Code Commission) cited the same sections of Story's agency treatise and
cases as Field's 1865 draft. For § 2010 the annotators again copied Field's case cita-
tion but added a note that "[iut seems eminently proper, also, that the presumption,
in the absence of express agreement, should here follow the same rule adopted for
rent." Note, § 2010, 1872 Code, at 611. In addition to the note, the annotators re-
ferred to the section on rent, a California case supporting the rent rule, and to a
California case holding no implied contract existed to pay for the service of a
partner's wife as cook. For § 2011, which differed from Field's 1865 draft, they cited
the same English case as Field, Fawcett v. Cash, 5 B. & Ad. 904, 110 E.R. 1026
(1834), but added citations on the measure of damages.
They also added a "but see" citation to DeBriar v. Minturn, lending indirect
support to Horace Wood's much maligned later reliance on that case. Wood was a
nineteenth century treatise writer whose 1877 treatise on employment law, HORACE
G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT COVERING THE RELA-
TION, DUTIES AND LIABILITIES OF EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYEES (1st ed. 1877), is often
claimed to be the source of the at-will rule. See, e.g., Feinman, supra note 332; Note,
Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN, L. REV. 335 (1978). Wood's innova-
tion is generally denounced as unsupported by authority by those who believe he
created the rule. These claims rest primarily upon an analysis of "footnote four" of
the first edition of his treatise. Wood's defenders have argued that Wood did not
invent the rule and that Wood properly cited the cases in footnote four, including
DeBriar. For a full discussion of Wood's treatise, including its second edition in 1887,
see Morriss, supra note 332, at 756-60.
353. The annotation for this also cites Sullivan v. Grass Valley Quartz Milling &
Mining Co., 77 Cal. 418 (1888) for the right of an employee to compensation for past
performance in some circumstances, a subject whose relationship to § 2703 may have
been clearer to the nineteenth century legal mind than to this writer.
354. 1 Cal. 450 (1851). The California annotators cited this case, as did Horace
Wood, in support of his version of the at-will rule.
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holding as: "Master may discharge servant at any time after
notice where there is no term of service, and may eject the ser-
vant by force if necessary.""5 As elaborately argued in the liter-
ature concerning Wood's treatise, due to the factual circum-
stances of DeBriar, it provided somewhat tenuous support for
any rule concerning employment duration.356 Since by 1895 nu-
merous cases existed that were more persuasive support for the
at-will rule, the choice of DeBriar suggests that either the rule
was so obvious that it needed little support, or the section was so
inconsequential that it did not merit the minimal attention need-
ed to locate better authority.
For Montana section 2721's pay period rule (renumbered
from California section 2010), the annotation cites Beach v.
Mullin.357 The annotation then cites two cases for the proposi-
tion that other evidence may overcome the presumption, and one
case for the proposition that "permanent" employment constitut-
ed employment-at-will. 35" The text of section 2721 does not ad-
dress either issue, and the citations appear to be aimed at filling
gaps left by the drafters.
For Montana section 2722's presumption of a month (renum-
bered from California section 2011), the annotation is primarily
devoted to undercutting the text of the section: It notes that a
discharged employee may recover only nominal damages and
that custom may vary the presumption; and, giving a "but see"
cite to DeBriar, cites an English case that indirectly supports
it. 3
59
2. Experience in the Montana Courts
Montana has proven a fertile field for such litigation and has
developed its own law and precedent accordingly.36
355. CODES AND STATUTES OF MONTANA, IN FORCE JULY 1, 1895. Reported by D.
S. Wade, F. W. Cole, and B. P. Carpenter, Annotated by Edwin S. Booth § 2703, at
1194 (1895).
356. It dealt with the eviction of a former employee from rooms provided by the
employer. 1 Cal. at 451. See, e.g., Note, supra note 352.
357. 5 N.J.L. [Vroom] 343 (1870).
358. Overcoming the presumption: Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56
(1870); Prentiss v. Ledyard, 28 Wisc. 131 (1871). Permanent employment: Lord v.
Goldberg, 81 Cal. 596 (1889).
359. Fawcett, 5 B. & Ad. 90, 110 E.R. 1028. Fawcett found a year contract, and
one judge noted in passing: "This is not the case of a domestic servant, where the
contract might have been put an end to by paying a month's wages or giving a
month's warning." 110 E.R. at 1027 (Patteson, J.).
360. Prout v. Sears, Roebuck, and Co., 236 Mont. 132, 156-57, 772 P.2d 288, 290
433
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The Montana courts have paid little attention to these Code
provisions.3"' Although there have been occasional flashes of
recognition that the Code provisions differ in both character and
content from common law rules, when the courts have referred to
these provisions they have often done so in a manner that ig-
nores the Code provisions' plain meaning. The result has under-
cut the certainty that the Codes sought to create and has distort-
ed Montana law.
The first reported Montana case wrestling with the problem
of interpreting employment contracts with vague or nonexistent
duration provisions did not appear until 1923. In Weir v.
Ryan,"2 the Montana Supreme Court found that a monthly
rate of pay and the oral statement "I will give you work the year
round" sufficient to establish a year contract rather than a
(1989).
361. The experience of the other Field Code states has been similar. The Cali-
fornia courts' interpretation of the codified at-will rule has not differed significantly
from the common law states' courts interpretation of their rules. The codified at-will
rule did not prevent California from adopting the nation's first public policy excep-
tion, without discussion of authority or more than a passing mention of the codified
rule. Petermann v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 344 P.2d 25 (Cal.App.
1959) (creating the first public policy exception without citing authority or acknowl-
edging it was changing a statutory rule). Nor did it prevent California from adopting,
at least temporarily, some of the most far-reaching theories for wrongful discharge
litigation. Cleary v. American Airlines, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (es-
tablishing the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing theory and allowing
tort damages for breach of the covenant) rev'd in part and affd in part, Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (eliminating tort damages from the
implied covenant, significantly reducing its attractiveness to plaintiffs).
South Dakota's courts have not interpreted the duration Code provision nor
have the South Dakota courts relied on it in any significant way. Similarly, North
Dakota courts have paid little judicial attention to the Code provisions on employ-
ment term. See, e.g., McGregor v. Harm, 125 N.W. 885 (N.D. 1910) (concerning term
of contract does not mention the code's pay period section despite contract's use of
weekly period for calculating compensation and conclusion that contract was for a
weekly term); Wood v. Buchanan, 5 N.W.2d 680, 682 (N.D. 1942) (stating, rather
than citing the at-will section, "In this country a general or indefinite hiring is pre-
sumed to be a hiring at will and may be terminated at the will of either party. 39
C.J., pp. 44, 71; 1 Labatt's Master & Servants, 2nd Ed., §§ 159, 160, 165." The fail-
ure to cite the code is even more astonishing since the next sentence cites C.L. 1913,
§§ 6135-6137!); Wadeson v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 343 N.W.2d 367, 370
(N.D. 1984) (noting that at-will rule was stated in Sand v. Queen City Packing Com-
pany, 108 N.W.2d 448 (N.D. 1961), without mentioning the code provision).
Neither provision has hampered the adoption of modern common law excep-
tions. See, e.g., Johnson v. Kreiser's, Inc., 433 N.W.2d 225, 227 (S.D. 1988) (adopting
public policy exception despite noting the general rule of employment at will set
forth in the statute) and Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793
(N.D. 1987) (adopting public policy exception without mentioning statute).
362. 68 Mont. 336, 218 P. 947 (1923).
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month-to-month contract.3" The opinion did not mention the
Code provisions. The defendant's position that the contract was
month-to-month clearly reflected the Code's requirement that an
employee whose wages were calculated on a monthly basis have
a monthly contract. This is evidence of the Codes' indirect influ-
ence. Most notable about Weir, however, is the extremely weak
evidence needed to remove the employee from the default rules'
operation. Some common law rule states had much stronger
versions of the at-will rule under which "work the year round"
would not have overcome the default presumption.364 The court
addressed the issue in the same fashion in 1935 in Harrington v.
Deloraine Refining Co.,365 with similar results.
Until 1980, published cases paid little attention to duration
issues in employment contracts after Harrington, perhaps be-
cause the Code provisions were clear and easily applied. The
Montana Supreme Court's decision in Keneally v. Orgain366 be-
gan a steady flow of opinions that destroyed the system of rules
established by the Codes. In Keneally, a discharged employee
made a claim for wrongful discharge against his supervisor
(Orgain) and employer (National Cash Register). In reciting the
facts, the Montana Supreme Court simply labeled plaintiffs
contract "at will" without mentioning section 39-2-503 of the
Montana Code (the current location of the at-will provision), and
then noted that the contract was "governed by an NCR employ-
ment contract and company manuals."367
Discussing only a five-year-old federal district court opinion
from Missouri that had not recognized a claim,3 s the court not-
ed the growing national trend to recognize claims for discharges
that violated public policy.369 Although the court found that
363. Id. at 339, 218 P. at 948.
364. See, e.g., Rape v. Mobile & O.R.R. Co., 100 So. 585 (Miss. 1924); Louisville
Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Zeigler, 244 S.W. 899 (Ky. 1922); Combs v. Hazard Ice &
Storage Co., 290 S.W. 1035 (Ky. 1927).
365. 99 Mont. 78, 43 P.2d 660 (1935). The only difference was the defendant's
claim that the employee's contract was specifically "at the pleasure" of its board of
directors rather than on a month-to-month basis. Duration had been indirectly dis-
cussed in Miller v. Yellowstone Irrigation District, 91 Mont. 538, 9 P.2d 795 (1932).
366. 186 Mont. 1, 606 P.2d 127 (1980).
367. Id. at 3, 606 P.2d at 128. Because it would be unlikely that an employee of
Keneally's position (account manager) would not be paid in a fashion as to remove
him from the default at-will provisions, it may be that Keneally had an explicit
provision in his contract providing that he was an at-will employee, although the
court does not mention such a provision.
368. Percival v. General Motors Corp., 400 F.Supp. 1322 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
369. 186 Mont. at 5, 606 P.2d at 129.
435
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Keneally had not alleged facts that would establish a claim, it
noted that "[w]e do not disagree at this juncture that in a proper
case a cause for wrongful discharge could be made out by an
employee."370 The court did not explain how to reconcile the
creation of a public policy exception to the codified at-will rule.
Five months later in Reiter v. Yellowstone County, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court addressed a public employee's claim that
his discharge violated his due process rights.37' Invoking the
Due Process Clause of the state or federal constitution required
identification of a property right in continued employment. Cit-
ing the Code's at-will provision, but ignoring the implied dura-
tion provisions," 2 the Montana Supreme Court found no prop-
erty interest could exist since Reiter was an at-will
employee.373
Reiter also argued that the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing inherent in all contracts existed in his employ-
ment contract. The longevity of his service meant that the im-
plied covenant created a property right in his continued employ-
ment.374 The court rejected this argument:
Appellant's argument on implied contracts cannot successfully
circumvent the Montana statute which clearly denies his claim
of entitlement to continued employment. Even though appellant
may have had an implied contract with the county by virtue of
his longevity of service, it would be a contradiction in terms to
say that he had an "implied specified" period of employment. A
specified term is one which the parties expressed, and there
was no expression here concerning the length of employment.
Section 39-2-503, MCA, operates to fill the gap left by the par-
ties by defining the relationship as an "at-will" employment.
While the rule may well be outdated, it is uniquely a province
of the legislature to change it.3 7 '
370. Id. at 6, 606 P.2d at 130.
371. 192 Mont. 194, 627 P.2d 845 (1981).
372. The implied duration provisions appear in the section entitled "Master and
Servant" following the at-will provision, which is in the section headed "Termination
of Employment." One might argue that there is a distinction between employees and
servants and that the implied duration provisions do not therefore apply to employ-
ees. The definition of servant in § 39-2-601 is sufficiently broad that this would be a
difficult argument to sustain in light of the historical use of "master and servant" to
refer to employers and employees. More to the point, no Montana opinion makes
such a distinction.
373. 192 Mont. at 199, 627 P.2d at 848.
374. Id. at 199, 627 P.2d at 849.
375. 192 Mont. at 200, 627 P.2d at 849.
[Vol. 56436
88
Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/1
1995] ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF CODIFICATION
The difficulty with this analysis is that it ignores section 39-2-
602 of the Montana Code, which implies a term to contracts
based upon the period used for estimation of wages. Although
the opinion does not disclose the basis for the estimation of
Reiter's wages, it seems unlikely that Reiter would not have had
his wages estimated on an annual basis, the usual practice for
supervisors.
Despite its failure to consider section 39-2-602 of the Mon-
tana Code, the Montana Supreme Court clearly recognized the
statutory nature of the at-will rule in Reiter. The court's inter-
pretation of the law thus far made only limited inroads on the
Code provisions.37 In January 1982, however, the court decided
two cases which signalled that it did not view its development of
wrongful discharge law as constrained by the Code provisions.
In Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Company377 ("Gates
I"), the court addressed. the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing suggested by Reiter, and held that a fact question
existed concerning whether the employer's failure to follow its
own handbook of personnel policies, which included procedures
to be followed in termination cases, would constitute a violation
of the covenant. 78 Although the Gates I court attempted to dis-
tinguish Reiter due to that case's public employment context,379
that distinction was irrelevant to the issue of the Code rule's
applicability. The court did not directly address Reiter's holding
that the statute imposed the at-will rule and could not be cir-
cumvented through common law developments.
In Nye v. Department of Livestock,' the Montana Supreme
Court reviewed a district court's dismissal of a public employee's
wrongful discharge claim. Because Nye was classified (again
probably incorrectly) as an at-will employee under section 39-2-
503 of the Montana Code,381 the district court rejected her
claim. The Montana Supreme Court found that simply classify-
ing an employee as "at will" was insufficient to end the inquiry
because "the tort of wrongful discharge may apply to an at-will
376. The public policy exception that the Keneally opinion hinted at was a rela-
tively minor restriction on the operation of the at-will and presumed term provisions,
while the failure to consider the presumed term provisions was an oversight which
could have been easily corrected.
377. 96 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982).
378. 196 Mont. at 184, 638 P.2d. at 1067.
379. Id. at 183, 638 P.2d at 1066.
380. 196 Mont. 222, 639 P.2d. at 498 (1982).
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employment situation."382 Pausing only to note that "the theory
of wrongful discharge has developed in response to the harshness
of the application of the at will doctrine, under which an employ-
ee may be terminated without cause[,J" the Montana court ex-
panded the notion of public policy to include administrative rules
requiring certain procedures before dismissal.3"
The only authority cited was the New Jersey Supreme Court
decision in Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp.,"' and the
Montana court misapplied that case in three respects. First,
Pierce involved the modification of a common law rule rather
than a statutory rule. Second, the "harsh" rule that Pierce modi-
fied was not the same as the rule provided by the combination of
sections 39-2-503 and 39-2-602 of the Montana Code. Under New
Jersey's version of the at-will rule, an employer could terminate
with or without cause all employees not covered by a specific
contractual term governing duration or discharge.8 In Mon-
tana, most employees would have a claim for breach of contract
of the presumed term contract created by section 39-2-602 of the
Montana Code. Third, Pierce suggested a far less expansive mod-
ification than that provided in Nye. In Pierce, the New Jersey
Supreme Court found a public policy exception to the at-will rule
where an employee refused "to perform an act that is a violation
of a clear mandate of public policy" and listed a number of sourc-
es of such a mandate.3  Nye transformed reference to sources
into the basis for a claim. The regulation became a means of cir-
cumventing the at-will rule when the public employer violated
its rules on the procedures for discharge, an action for which a
remedy already existed under Montana law.8 7
A second opinion in Gates (Gates II) allowed the court to
provide details of the cause of action available under the implied
covenant.3" Despite the recitation that Gates was employed
under "an oral contract of indefinite duration,"39 the Gates II
opinion did not address the implied term provisions of the
Code.390
382. Nye, 196 Mont. at 228, 639 P.2d. at 502.
383. Id.
384. 417 A.2d 505 (N.J. 1980).
385. Id. at 509.
386. Id. at 512.
387. Nye v. Department of Livestock, 196 Mont. 222, 225, 639 P.2d 498, 499-500
(1982) (describing administrative appeal of discharge).
388. Gates v. Life of Montana Ins. Co., 205 Mont. 304, 668 P.2d 213 (1983).
389. Id. at 306, 668 P.2d at 214.
390. Although the majority's description of the facts concerned the coercion of a
438 [Vol. 56
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After Gates II, the Montana Supreme Court continued to
expand the implied covenant theory while refraining from com-
ment on how the theory could co-exist with the Code provisions.
For example, in Dare v. Montana Petroleum Marketing Co., 391
the Montana Supreme Court held that:
Whether a covenant of good faith and fair dealing is implied in
a particular case depends upon objective manifestations by the
employer giving rise to the employee's reasonable belief that he
or she has job security and will be treated fairly. The presence
of such facts indicates that the term of employment has gone
beyond the indefinite period contemplated in the at will em-
ployment statute, Section 39-2-503, MCA, and is founded upon
some more secure and objective basis.392
Not only did the court fail to follow the at-will provision, but it
also ignored the pay period rule, which would have reinforced
the at-will presumption.393
If Montana was modifying a common law at-will rule, the
analysis might have been appropriate. The idea that evidence
might suggest that the parties went "beyond" the indefinite em-
ployment relationship provided by a common law rule could be a
valid application of a default rule.394 Faced with a codified rule,
however, it is difficult to understand how the Montana court
reached such a conclusion. Even if one accepts the Montana
Supreme Court's reading of the at-will rule as generally applica-
ble, its modification of the rule ignores the difference between
the formulation of the codified rule and the common law rule.
The codified rule provides that "an employment having no speci-
fied term may be terminated at the will of either party on notice
to the other, except where otherwise provided by this chap-
ter .... ."3 To belabor the obvious, under normal rules of stat-
utory construction, the clause beginning with "except" would
operate to preclude the creation of remedies not provided by the
letter of resignation from an employee and a supervisor's refusal to return the letter
when asked, Justice Gulbrandson's dissent (joined by Justice Harrison) pointed out
that the case was not tried solely on a theory that those actions were the tortious
conduct, but rather that it was termination without notice which also produced liabil-
ity. Id. at 312, 668 P.2d at 217 (Gulbrandson, J., dissenting).
391. 212 Mont. 274, 687 P.2d 1015 (1984).
392. Dare, 212 Mont. at 282, 687 P.2d at 1020 (citation omitted).
393. Dare had been paid by the hour. Id. at 277, 687 P.2d at 1017.
394. In the case of a clear and long-standing rule such as the at-will rule, I
would argue that it would be more appropriate not to modify the rule under such
circumstances.
395. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-503 (1993).
439
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statute.
In 1984, Montana's implied covenant doctrine developed a
reach beyond that given the doctrine anywhere else when the
Montana Supreme Court upheld an award of $125,000 in com-
pensatory damages and $25,000 in punitive damages for a respi-
ratory therapist discharged during a probationary period.396 Be-
sides the huge award for a probationary employee, Crenshaw v.
Bozeman Deaconess Hospital is significant as the court's only
attempt to explain how the implied covenant theory relates to
the codified at-will rule:
We hold that the "at-will" statute, section 39-2-503, MCA, is
very much alive. The Gates I decision does not preempt the
statute. There is no legitimate precedent for an exception for
probationary employees. Therefore, Crenshaw even as a proba-
tionary employee was owed a duty of good faith under the man-
date of Gates I. This requirement of good faith and fair dealing
does not conflict with section 39-2-503, MCA, but merely sup-
plements it. Employers can still terminate untenured employ-
ees at-will and do so without notice. They simply may not do so
in bad faith or unfairly without becoming liable for damag-
es.
39 7
The ability to terminate "except in bad faith or unfairly" is, of
course, not the ability to discharge "at the will of either par-
ty."398 "Supplementing" the Code section in this fashion was
inconsistent with the plain language of the Code.
The court continued to expand the covenant's reach through-
out the 1980s. In Kerr v. Gibson's Products Co. of Bozeman,"'
the court found that defendant's having "repeatedly acknowl-
edged respondent's work as satisfactory through promotions and
pay increases" was sufficient evidence to make it reasonable for
the employee "to believe she had job security and would be treat-
ed fairly" and invoke the covenant.' Under such a test, few
employees were left outside the covenant's reach, and the Code
sections became irrelevant.
The effect of the Montana Supreme Court's employment
decisions in the 1980s was to effectively repeal sections 39-2-503
and 39-2-602 of the Montana Code. The presence of section 39-2-
396. Crenshaw v. Bozeman Deaconess Hosp., 213 Mont. 488, 693 P.2d 487
(1984).
397. Crenshaw, 213 Mont. at 498, 693 P.2d at 492.
398. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-503 (1993).
399. 226 Mont. 69, 733 P.2d 1292 (1987).
400. Kerr, 226 Mont. at 73, 733 P.2d at 1295.
[Vol. 56
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503 of the Montana Code did nothing to slow the court's adoption
of the most pro-plaintiff interpretations of the modern common
law exceptions, ultimately provoking a backlash that led to the
1987 statutory replacement.0 1 The Montana Legislature proved
no more observant of section 39-2-503 of the Montana Code than
the courts were, however, and it neither repealed nor explained
the reasons for the survival of section 39-2-503 of the Montana
Code when it passed the 1987 Wrongful Discharge From Employ-
ment Act. 2 Similarly, both the Montana Supreme Court and
the Montana Legislature have ignored the effects of section 39-2-
602 of the Montana Code, which created presumed term exemp-
tions from the at-will rule that would have allowed employees a
measure of protection from arbitrary discharge.
Unfortunately, the best one can say for Montana's experi-
ence with these sections of the Civil Code is that the provisions
did little harm. Because the at-will provisions closely resembled
those adopted in the common law states, they did not distort the
Montana legal system in the same ways as the Code provisions
concerning covenants. 3 By ignoring these sections, the Mon-
tana courts ended up more or less in the same position as most
of the common law rule states. If the Montana courts paid atten-
tion to the provisions, they might have prevented or delayed the
creation of common law wrongful discharge remedies by remov-
ing many employees from the at-will category. The state's econo-
my might have thus avoided significant harm.' Since common
law wrongful discharge remedies appear to have a negative im-
pact on state economies,' the Code provisions could have been
401. See LeRoy H. Schramm, Montana Employment Law and the 1987 Wrongful
Discharge From Employment Act: A New Order Begins, 51 MONT. L. REv. 94, 96-106
(1990).
402. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 to -914 (1989).
403. See Natelson, supra note 14.
404. See Meech v. Hillhaven West, Inc., 238 Mont. 21, 48, 776 P.2d 488, 504
(1989) (upholding Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act against constitutional
challenges and summarizing testimony that "large judgments in common law wrong-
ful discharge cases could discourage employers from locating their businesses in Mon-
tana"). Such a course would have also likely forestalled the passage of the new Act.
See Alan B. Krueger, The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal Legislation in the United
States, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 644 (1991) (showing that passage of the Montana
act, and introduction of similar acts elsewhere, is heavily dependent on employer
support). Although I disagree with some of Krueger's characterizations of court opin-
ions, I found his conclusions generally did not depend upon those characterizations.
See Morriss, supra note 331, at _.
405. JAMES DERTOUZOS & LYNN KAROLY, LABOR MARKET RESPONSE TO EMPLOYER
LIABILTY, Rand Corporation, Institute for Civil Justice Paper R-3989-ICJ (1992) (find-
ing that adoption of common law exceptions to employment-at-will had a significant
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a positive force. Because the courts ignored them, however, they
had no significant impact on the development of wrongful dis-
charge law in Montana.
Ironically, given the Code provisions' New York origins, the
cost of ignoring the Codes was the lost opportunity to create a
Montana jurisprudence of employment duration. Such a jurispru-
dence would have enhanced, rather than wounded, Montana's
economy. Had the Montana Supreme Court simply applied the
language in the Code provisions, it would have created a remedy
for limited damages for most employees and precluded the ex-
treme results (e.g. Crenshaw's huge award for a probationary
employee) that threatened economic harm. In addition, through
application of the Code provisions, the Montana court might
have developed clear rules regarding the evidence required to
overcome the default rule provisions. Most importantly, by con-
sistently apprying the Code provisions, the Montana courts
would have developed the necessary information for the Montana
Legislature to modify the Code provisions to fit Montana's needs.
IV. CONCLUSIONS FROM THE CODES: THE RULE OF LAW AND
LAW REFORM
It is difficult to measure the importance of this great sub-
ject. Gathering together and arranging in logical order the
fragmentary elements of a legal system, the reorganization and
re-expression of a body of laws for a people, is an event that
can have no parallel in magnitude in the history of that people.
A Dictator may take the place of a President; a commune may
sweep away the Dictator; still the great body of laws remains '
substantially the same. The system that we now establish, will
go down with succeeding generations, until a new race shall
come, or until new conditions, wrought under the law of prog-
ress, shall make a new system necessary in one, five or twenty
centuries.'
Charles Lindley
The final assessment of the Codes depends on the quality of
contemporary alternatives. Clearly, problems with the status quo
needed to be addressed. Although writing alternative history is
and negative impact on gross state product, suggesting that the social cost of wrong-
ful discharge suits is large). As with Krueger's analysis, a reanalysis of Dertouzos
and Karoly's data to account for my characterizations of legal opinions did not
change their basic conclusions. See Morriss, supra note 331 at
406. LINDLEY, supra note 67, Appendix at v.
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always dangerous, 7 a clear alternative to Codes existed. In-
stead of a Code Commission, the last Territorial Legislature
might have authorized a commission to undertake a new revision
of the existing statutes. Limited to rearrangement of the existing
law and recommendations for clarifying amendments, the com-
mission could have eliminated much of the disorder in the statu-
tory law. The invention of pocket parts alone might have solved
many problems. Considering the additional confusion caused by
the Codes' and their amendments' conflicting provisions, errors,
and clerical mistakes and the more limited scope of a revision
(most of the Civil Code would not have been part of any revi-
sion), a revision commission probably would have avoided many
of the mistakes of past revisers. (Incorporating future laws into
revision would have been no harder than incorporating them into
the Codes.)
Such a course would have left Montana with fewer rules
than it had after adoption of the Codes, particularly in private
law areas. The law would have developed through the normal
common law process of case-by-case decisions, as in most states.
This process would have undoubtedly taken longer to develop
rules, but the rules chosen would probably have more appropri-
ately fit Montana's conditions.
Not only would revision have avoided many of the opportuni-
ties for the sale of legislative services to "fix" the Codes, but it
would have also forestalled the development of the special inter-
ests that the new Code provisions created. When the Codes es-
tablished a rule that previously did not exist (as opposed to sim-
ply rearranging existing Montana statutes), some interests bene-
fitted from the new rule. Those interests now had a stake in
defending the continued existence of the new rule, an interest
they would not have had otherwise.' By creating a rule, the
legislature provided an incentive to organize the affected inter-
ests in the rule's defense, assisting in overcoming the collective
action problems inherent in lobbying.
Additionally, the lack of a comprehensive code would have
407. See Robert N. Strassfeld, If... Counterfactuals in the Law, 60 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 339 (1992).
408. Of course, even in the absence of a specific rule, an interest group might
have an interest in obtaining that rule, and so organize to influence the legislature.
Gaining a new benefit and defending an existing benefit are different, however, and
the costs of creation of a new benefit are likely to be higher than the costs of de-
fending an existing one. This suggests that existing benefits will be defended on
more occasions than new benefits will be successfully sought.
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eliminated the political legitimacy granted to interventionist
legislation by the Codes' attempt to gather all of Montana society
within their framework. Of course, legislators in states without
codes have managed to serve special interests at the expense of
the public and to pass statist legislation. Nevertheless, increas-
ing the barriers to such actions would have served Montana well.
Montana's experience with the Codes has some relevant
lessons for those considering large scale legal reform. Simply
having "plenty of laws" does not ease the confusion accompany-
ing a new legal system. If the laws do not fit the circumstances
and needs of the society that they are to regulate, their effects
may range from irrelevance to distortion. Since the collapse of
the communist regimes of the Eastern Bloc, lawyers from the
United States and Western Europe have flocked to offer advice
on appropriate laws and legal systems to the new governments
in Russia and Eastern Europe. Western lawyers are involved in
every aspect of law reform from training judges' to drafting
laws4' ° and constitutions.411 Those new states are in a posi-
tion not entirely dissimilar to Montana's in 1889-they have a
confusing hodgepodge of laws leftover from the communist era
combined with the new statutes, some of which are based on pre-
409. James H. Andrews, Helping Law Come In From the Cold, CHRISTIAN Sm.
MONITOR, Mar. 21, 1994, at 15 (describing CEELI project to produce 350 page "bench
book" for Russian judges); Gloria J. Garland, Building a Justice System Upon A
Weak Judiciary, THE RECORDER, May 11, 1994, at 8 (CEELI liaison describes judicial
training project in Slovakia).
410. This has been most extensively described in popular press accounts. See,
e.g., Greg Rushford, World Bank: Building Economies, Laws, LEGAL TIMES, June 13,
1994, at S38 ("[c]hief counsel of World Bank's Europe and Central Asia Division . . .
[is] intimately involved in helping craft the legal framework to enable the formerly
communist countries ... to develop market-based economies."). Some law review
accounts are beginning to appear, however, focused on specific areas of the law. See,
e.g., Spencer W. Waller, Neo-Realism and the International Harmonization of Law:
Lessons from Antitrust, 42 KAN. L. REV. 557, 570 (1994) ("Much of the effort [of U.S.
legal consultants in Eastern Europe] appears to be aimed at selling the Sherman Act
as an appropriate model for other countries that are drafting new competition provi-
sions."); Roger W. Mastalir, Regulation of Competition in the 'New" Free Markets of
Eastern Europe, 19 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 61, 84 (1993) (noting that despite
attention paid to local conditions and history in drafting laws, "Eastern Europe has
extensively transplanted policies and regulations from Western antitrust law . .. ").
411. Jonathan M. Moses, U.S. Lawyers are Welcomed by Russia, WALL ST. J.,
June 12, 1992, at B6 (describing influx of United States lawyers, judges and law
teachers into former Soviet Bloc); Nancy E. Roman, Democracy Gets U.S. Legal Aid,
WASH. TIMES, Apr. 11, 1993, at Al ("Within months of the Berlin Wall coming down,
Eastern Europe was awash with Western lawyers offering advice, setting up private
companies and trying to help draft constitutions."); Donn Rubin, Tales from the Alba-
nian Constitutional Trenches, CoNN. L. TRIB., Nov. 22, 1993, at 17 (CEELI liaison in
Albania details efforts to produce new constitution).
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communist legal systems.41" Like the new state of Montana,
many of these nations were delivered from rulers imposed by
outsiders and anxiously seek to assert their independence
through changes to their legal systems. Montana's experience
with the Codes suggests some of the pitfalls encountered in im-
portation of "foreign" law in similar circumstances.
The most obvious lesson is that wholesale adoption of laws
or governmental structures from elsewhere probably does not
produce viable, stable legal regimes in the long run. Similarly,
the importance of having the institutional structure to support
the implementation of law reform is highlighted by Montana's
experience with the Field Codes. Without a legal culture that
respected the Codes as codes, Code rules such as the employ-
ment termination provisions fell into obscurity. Although these
conclusions may appear obvious, they escaped legislators in Da-
kota Territory, California, and Montana in the nineteenth cen-
tury, and may be missed again.
Montana's experience with the Codes suggests caution when
adopting massive legal reforms. Creating conditions of certainty
under which the rule of law can flourish requires much more
than reams of laws. Indeed, it may require that there not be
reams of laws. Laws must answer the questions people ask, not
questions from another time and place-as did the requirement
of fish guards for irrigation ditches during the winter months in
Montana. When the law provides answers, these solutions must
be appropriate to the conditions the law seeks to regulate. Pro-
fessor Natelson's analysis indicates that some of Montana's rules
concerning covenants running with the land are clearly not ap-
propriate to Montana's conditions. If the courts ignore the an-
swers, as with the employment-at-will provisions, the point of
the Code as a code is destroyed. Reforms must try not to disrupt
existing, functioning institutions, as the Codes clearly did with
respect to livestock brands and municipal government.
Montana's governance structure's complete failure to review
the Codes before passage in 1895 suggests the limits to which
412. See, e.g., Frank Jossi, For Albanians, Uncharted Legal Territory, NAT'L L.J.,
Dec. 5, 1994, at A12 (describing lack of office space, uncollected state of legal materi-
als requiring knowing the week a statute passed to locate it, and lack of law librar-
ies). Albanians and their Western advisors seem to be falling into the "plenty of
laws" trap. The article quotes Roland Bassett, a Texas lawyer representing the Amer-
ican Bar Association in Albania: "I read where the Prime Minister said that the
Albanian Parliament passed 89 pieces of legislation last year and that no other coun-
try in the Free World had passed that many laws. But that's not many compared to
what they need." Id.
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legislative institutions can process massive reforms. Presented
with a 170 pound stack of Codes, the legislators simply abdicated
their responsibilities to understand what they enacted. Anxious
to return to subdividing Montana's counties and collecting text-
book companies' 'boodle', they focused on the physical process of
making the bills laws rather than on the Codes' substance. Aside
from the Great Falls Tribune, no one seemed to have asked the
obvious question: why are we passing these laws? When present-
ed with four bills, which together overwhelmed the legislature's
physical capacities, it seems difficult to explain why legislators
rushed ahead rather than undertaking a more modest re-
form.4
13
When Montana's codification commission began work in
1889, the Territory's statutory law was a disaster: printed ver-
sions of laws were often scarce or unavailable, laws were badly
drafted, and contradictory provisions abounded. Despite the
problem's origins in the previous territorial legislatures' actions,
the Code Commission prescribed more legislation on a grander
scale. Montana's legislators succumbed to legislation's appear-
ance as "a quick, rational, and far-reaching remedy against every
kind of evil or inconvenience."4 4 As Bruno Leoni noted, howev-
er, "a remedy by legislation may be too quick to be efficacious,
too unpredictably far-reaching to be wholly beneficial, and too
directly connected with the contingent views of a handful of
people (the legislators), whoever they may be, to be, in fact, a
remedy for all concerned."415 Leoni's general argument de-
scribes the problems with Montana's codification efforts. "Bolting
the codes" left Montana with a massive tangle of legislation that
required years to adapt to Montana's conditions. Adoption of
Codes written for New York and California, with the adjust-
ments of the Code Commissioners and the few members of the
legislature who succeeded in affecting the Codes' provisions, gave
Montana laws written to serve the interests of a tiny minority of
Montanans.
Adoption had costs beyond the salaries of the clerks retained
to enroll the bills by hand. Creating massive bodies of laws re-
quiring hundreds of amendments over the following years divert-
413. Admittedly, overwhelming the Fourth Legislature was not exceptionally diffi-
cult. It managed to lose a bill passed by both houses raising legislative salaries for
the next session, a subject presumably dear to most members' pocketbooks. The Same
Old Price, DAILY INDEPENDENT (Helena), Mar. 10, 1895, at 1.
414. BRUNo LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAw 5 (1961).
415. Id. at 5.
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ed legislative efforts to adjusting the Codes and away from other,
potentially beneficial pursuits. Montana's legislatures in the
years after 1895 could have spent time on local issues, but too
often they were busy fixing the Codes.
More generally, the Codes also had an effect on Montana's
common law development. Having rejected Field's original vision
of displacement of the common law, the Montana Codes had to
coexist with the common law. Sometimes the courts ignored or
misinterpreted the Code provisions, as with the development of
the modern law of wrongful discharge. Other times, however, the
Code provisions distorted the common law's development, as
Professor Natelson described with respect to covenants running
with the land.41 Natelson summarized the problem with the
code provisions, stating "newly-borrowed concepts must be kept
within common law containers, from which those concepts can be
readily returned if they fail to meet local needs. During the early
years of a state's juristic development, locking borrowed ideas in
statutory strongboxes seems most unwise."417 To the extent
that the Codes prevented the development of a Montana common
law appropriate to Montana's conditions, codification had a
heavy price.
The Codes' comprehensiveness imposed an additional cost.
The existence of the comprehensive Civil Code promoted the idea
that the legislature's role legitimately included subjects such as
limiting the freedom of individuals to contract for employment
longer than two years4"" or requiring licenses of the owners of
stallions whose owners sold their breeding services.4"9 The codi-
fiers created a system built around legislation rather than law.
This left Montana with an interventionist government mindset
that continues today.42°
Even if we restrict our evaluation to the central problem the
codifiers set out to solve, the lack of certainty in Montana's legal
system, the Codes cannot be considered a success. Certainty in
416. See Natelson, supra note 14, at 44, 58, 63-64.
417. Natelson, supra note 14, at 91.
418. Civil Code § 2674.
419. Political Code sec. 4070.
420. See, e.g., MONT. CODE. ANN. §§ 16-2-101 to -303 (establishing state liquor
monopoly); 17-6-401 to -411 (socialized venture capital program); 19-2-101 to 19-21-
212 (state monopoly retirement system for most state employees); 30-14-214 (requir-
ing minimum fair prices for agricultural products); 30-14-801 to -806 (minimum pric-
ing of motor fuels) (extended Ch. 519, L 1993); 80-2-201 to -245 (socialized hail in-
surance); 81-23-302 (minimum price for milk); 81-8-606 (pork marketing); 81-21-411
(barring sale of filled dairy products) (1993).
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the law means more than creation of written rules; it also re-
quires stability of the rules themselves over time.421 The legal
upheaval of the Codes' adoption and the endless amendments
that followed hardly promoted certainty in this second sense,
even if the Codes themselves met the test of precision. In at-
tempting to repair the damage of a territorial history of partisan
bickering and pandering to special interests, the codifiers rushed
through too much, too fast. Moreover, the treatment of the
Codes' provisions by the Montana courts has sometimes promot-
ed confusion.422 Rather than curing confusion, the Codes trans-
formed and multiplied it.
Moreover, code systems at best provide rules optimal at the
time of adoption.42 "As soon as a code is passed, however, it
begins to become obsolete, and its maladaption becomes larger
until a new code is adopted. The common law, on the other hand,
is always somewhat maladapted, but its lack of adaptation is
limited because it is continually changing. " "" When a legisla-
ture adopts a set of codes with Montana's haste and lack of con-
sideration, even the initial advantage of optimality is sacrificed.
Is there something to celebrate in this centennial year of the
Codes? The codifiers thought they were creating something that
history would celebrate. Sanders, for example, enthused that:
[A] citizen of Montana, who has but little money to spend on
books, needs to have lying on his table but three: an English
Dictionary to teach the knowledge of his mother tongue; this
Book of the Law [the Codes], to show him his rights as a mem-
ber of civilized society; and the good old Family Bible to teach
him his duties to God and to man. 25
Unfortunately they were wrong.
In 1876, Decius Wade published his only novel, Clare Lin-
421. LEONI, supra note 414, at 95:
[T]he certainty of the law has been conceived in two different and, in the
last analysis, even incompatible ways: first, as the precision of a written
text emanating from legislators, and secondly, as the possibility open to
individuals of making long run plans on the basis of a series of rules spon-
taneously adopted by people in common and eventually ascertained by judg-
es through centuries and generations.
422. Natelson, supra note 14, at 58, 63-65, 88 (describing effect of decisions to
undermine Civil Code; describing circular arguments used to avoid code provisions;
and concluding that Montana cases inconsistent with the Code cannot be explained
by changed circumstances).
423. Rubin, supra note 7, at 11.
424. Rubin, supra note 7, at 11.
425. Letter to Henry Field, Jan. 24, 1896, in HENRY FIELD, supra note 26, at 92.
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coln.426 Although Wade was a far better writer of judicial opin-
ions427 than of novels,4 the cautionary words of his hero
Richard Pembroke to the villain William Stacy would have been
wise advice for Wade, Sanders, and their fellow codifiers in the
1890s:
And so, in conquering a profession, or even a book, if we hurry
by, or go around principles we do not comprehend or under-
stand, we shall find ourselves cut off from our base of supplies,
floundering in an unknown country, beset with difficulties upon
every hand, an enemy behind harassing and distressing us and
defeat would be the certain result; while if we conquer every
principle as we proceed, leaving no troublesome enemy in the
rear, victory is ensured before even the campaign is com-
menced.4
Montana's legislators would have served their state better had
they followed that advice and refrained from reform on such a
dramatic and massive scale. A slow and steady revision of exist-
ing law would have avoided the distortions introduced by the
inappropriate provisions of the "foreign" codes on Montana's le-
426. DECIUS S. WADE, CLARE LINCOLN (1876).
427. Wade's, and his associates', opinions are referred to as "everywhere recog-
nized among the soundest and ablest in the whole country" and Wade's decisions
"had much to do with perfecting the practice of law in the courts of Montana." C.P.
Connolly, supra note 254, at 60.
428. CLARE LINCOLN is deservedly obscure, although it was apparently popular in
Montana when published. Id. at 62. Given the difficulty of obtaining a conveniently
readable copy (I was able to borrow a microfilm copy through interlibrary loan), I
will briefly summarize the plot for the curious. Those who plan to read the book, a
course I advise against, should skip the remainder of this footnote. Richard
Pembroke, a schoolteacher, Harvard man, and heir to an old New England family
now burdened by a debt to a miser, Bowker, falls in love with his 13 year old pupil,
Clare Lincoln. Torn from her by the outbreak of the Civil War, Richard meets up
with Clare's dying father on the battlefield and receives a message for Clare. Mean-
while, Clare's mother has died and Clare is taken in by kindly Doctor Cornelius
Hume, a wealthy man who sees his lost daughter Laura in Clare. Clare is wooed by
William Stacy, a cad who affects a humble demeanor to gain her hand in marriage,
anticipating that Doctor Hume will leave his vast estate, Evergreen Home, to Clare.
Rejected by Clare, Stacy plots with the unethical lawyers Sharp Popper and Popper
Sharp to forge a will of a prior owner of Evergreen Home (from whose heirs Hume
had bought the property) and secure Evergreen Home for himself. Ultimately, Clare
travels to the English Channel Islands where she discovers the true last will of the
original owner, returns with it in time for Richard to triumph at the trial and save
Evergreen Home for Dr. Hume. Clare is then discovered to be the only heir of the
miser Bowker and so owner of Richard's family estate, which Bowker had seized
when Richard's parents had defaulted on their mortgage. Clare and Richard marry
and all is well. The reader who has made it through this footnote has just spared
herself reading the 451 pages of the novel.
429. WADE, supra note 426, at 192.
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gal development. Legal reformers elsewhere would do well to
heed the lessons of Montana's experience with the Codes.
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FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN INDIAN COUNTRY
Sharon L. O'Brien*
The Supreme Court's opinions in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n.1 and Employment Division v. Smith2
dealt devastating blows to Indian religious rights and their as-
sumed protection under the First Amendment.3 In terms of his-
torical precedent, the decisions were not surprising. The United
States has a history of overt and covert policies designed to de-
stroy or to impede the practice of Indian religions.4
The Court's ruling in Smith considerably narrowed the "com-
pelling interest test" previously used by courts5 to determine
whether the government illegally infringed on religious rights.
The decision galvanized religious leaders and constitutional
scholars around the country to pass the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act of 1993 (RFRA).6 RFRA, finding that "laws 'neutral'
toward religion may burden religious exercise"7 and that "gov-
ernments should not substantially burden religious exercise
without compelling justification,"8 restores the compelling inter-
est test established in Sherbert v. Verner9 and Wisconsin v.
Yoder."°
While prompted by the Court's failure to protect Indian
religious rights, the passage of RFRA is, nonetheless, not expect-
ed to adequately secure to American Indians the free exercise of
* Chair, Department of Government, University of Notre Dame; BA Millsaps
College; M.A. and Ph.D. University of Oregon.
1. 485 U.S. 439 (1988); see infra text and accompanying notes 127-31.
2. 494 U.S. 872 (1990); see infra text and accompanying notes 62-72.
3. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof. . . ." U.S. CONST. amend I.
4. See infra notes 20-32 and accompanying text.
5. According to Justice Brennan a government's compelling interest included
only those actions that posed a substantial threat to the public safety, peace, or
order. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(aX3).
9. 374 U.S. 398, 406-09 (1963) (explaining the compelling interest test).
10. 406 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1972); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b)(1). The act specifically
refers to the Court's decision in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
which eliminated the "compelling government interest" test. See 42 U.S.C. §
2000bb(a)(4). The legislation reinstates the compelling interest rule, but does not
overrule the decision in the Smith case, which still stands as law.
The only exception allowed by the act is if there is a compelling governmental
interest which is the least restrictive means of furthering the government's interest.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(b). The Act also provides for judicial remedies against the
government. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l(c).
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their First Amendment rights." To ensure the protection of In-
dian religious freedoms, the Indian Religious Coalition" has
lobbied for the last four years to obtain passage of legislation de-
signed to fill the gaps in RFRA 3 and to secure the unrealized
promises of the previously enacted 1978 American Indian Reli-
gious Freedom Act (AIRFA).'4
This article argues that the federal government is obligated
by the special status of American Indians and Congress' special
trust relationship with tribes to ensure the preservation of Indi-
an religious rights. Part I provides an overview of the historical
events, cultural conflicts, and legal issues that have merged to
create the current precarious state for Indian religious expres-
sion. The government's historical treatment and cultural under-
standings of Indian religions is briefly examined as well as the
courts' findings in several recent decisions relating to peyote use,
11. See infra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
12. The Coalition, which was founded in 1988 by the Native American Rights
Fund (NARF), the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI), and the Associa-
tion on American Indian Affairs (AAIA), is now comprised of more than 63 organiza-
tions. For a listing of the members (as of 1993) of the American Religious Freedom
Coalition for the Amendments to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act, see
Effectiveness of Pub. L. No. 95-341, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act:
Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Native American Affairs of the House
Comm. on Natural Resources, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 69 (1993).
13. Congress considered three bills in the last session. S. 2269, 103d Cong., 2d
Sess. (1994), introduced by U.S. Senator Daniel K Inouye (D-Haw.) on July 1, 1994,
is the most comprehensive of the three. See generally Proposed Amendments to the
American Indian Religious Freedom Act 1993: Oversight Hearings on the Need for
Proposed Amendments to the American Indian Religious Freedom Act Before the Unit-
ed States Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [here-
inafter Proposed Amendments]. On August 10, 1994, the Senate Indian Affairs Com-
mittee favorably reported the bill, but offered a substitution: the bill died on the
floor of the house. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, Bill Tracking S. 2269,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994), available in LEXIS, Genfed Library, BLT 103 file.
Representative William B. Richardson (D-N.M.) introduced two bills in the
House. H.R. 4230, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) introduced on April 14, 1994, amends
the American Indian Religious Freedom Act to provide for the traditional use of
peyote by Indians for religious purposes. On October 7, 1994, the House passed H.R.
4230, American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-
344, 108 Stat. 3125 (1994).
Another bill, American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994,
H.R. 4155, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) introduced March 24, 1994, was not passed
in the last Congress. The purpose of the bill is to provide for access to sacred sites
on federal lands. See Proposed Amendments, supra at pt. 1.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1978). This law instructed the President to direct all
federal agencies to review their procedures and policies and determine changes need-
ed to preserve Native American religious rights and practices. Agencies, which were
to consult with traditional Indian leaders, were to report their findings to Congress
within 12 months. For legislative history, see H.R. REP. No. 95-1308, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1978) reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1262.
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the religious practices of inmates, the taking of ritual animals,
and sacred site access.
Part II reviews the judicial interpretations and issues that
still inhibit the protection of Indian religious rights, despite the
best intentions of RFRA and the proposed Native American Cul-
tural Protection and Free Exercise of Religion Act of 1994.1'
Part III reviews the Court's application of the trust doctrine and
the government's responsibility to preserve tribal existence and
culture.
I. INDIAN RELIGIOUS PRACTICE
As many authors have written, Indian religions interweave
and integrate all aspects of human and spiritual existence.16
Most Indian languages do not possess a word translatable as
"religion."'7 Rather, the concept of religion permeates one's exis-
tence and is indistinguishable from one's cultural, political, and
economic existence. Western religion, on the other hand, is un-
derstood and referenced to a linear concept of time and to the
celebration of important messiahs, prophets, and sacred events.
The rituals of many Indian religions are required to main-
tain the spiritual and earthly harmony and balance of nature,
the community, and the person. As Deward Walker has ex-
plained, "American Indian culture... entails actually entering
sacredness rather than merely praying to it or propitiating it.""
15. See supra note 13.
16. Indian religions cannot be discussed as a monolithic system of beliefs and
practices. Tribal religions do tend to share some common features as do Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam.
Several books and articles have detailed the United States' treatment of Amer-
ican Indian religious rights. See, e.g., HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM (Christopher Vecsey ed., 1991); JOSEPH E. BROWN, SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF
THE AMERICAN INDIAN (1982); AKE HULTKRANTZ, THE RELIGIONS OF THE AMERICAN
INDIANS (1979); VINE DELORIA, JR., GOD IS RED (1973); Robert S. Michaelsen, Ameri-
can Indian Religious Freedom Litigation: Promise and Perils, 3 J.L. & RELIGION 47
(1985); OMER C. STEWART, PEYOTE RELIGION: A HISTORY (1987); John Rhodes, An
American Tradition: The Religious Persecution of Native Americans 52 MONT. L. REV.
13 (1991); Deward E. Walker, Jr., Protection of American Indian Sacred Geography,
in HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 100 (Christopher Vecsey ed.,
1991).
17. Michaelsen, supra note 16, at 49.
18. Walker, supra note 16, at 104.
Whereas Judeo-Christian religion tends to create its own sacred space and
times arbitrarily by special rituals of sacralization, American Indians at-
tempt to discover "access points" or "portals" to the sacred ....
These access points to the sacred ... are not only points in space,
but also points in time .. dawn ... dusk . . . equinoxes and solstic-
es ... certain ... points may be used rarely but can still be very valuable
1995] 453
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For a society accustomed to primarily attending services on Sun-
days and to worship at any of several locations, it is most diffi-
cult to appreciate a non-Western religion that requires the per-
formance of a ritualistic act at a certain time and in a certain
place.
American society's ignorance of and animosity towards Indi-
an religions is long standing, deep seated, and multilayered.
Hostility to Indian religions has assumed many forms, ranging
from the direct to the indirect. The very premise of Christianity,
which requires a belief in Christ as a source of redemption, in-
herently demands the proselytation of non-Christians. 9 The
saving of heathen souls is a directive of many Christian sects. As
an admittedly Christian nation,0 it is understandable that ef-
forts to christianize the American Indian very early suffused
federal policies.2 From the beginning of the nation's develop-
ment, federal efforts to civilize and christianize Indians were
indistinguishable policies. The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
turned to the churches for administrative, personnel, and finan-
cial support in their efforts to acculturate the Indian.2 The poli-
cy to exterminate the buffalo,23 thereby starving the Lakota and
at appropriate times.
Walker, supra note 16, at 104.
19. See, e.g., FORREST G. WOOD, THE ARROGANCE OF FAITH: CHRISTIANITY AND
FAITH IN AMERICA (1990); DAvID E. STANNARD, AMERICAN HOLOCAUST: COLUMBUS
AND THE CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD (1992); Steven Newcomb, The Evidence of
Christian Nationalism in Federal Indian Law: The Doctrine of Discovery, Johnson v.
McIntosh, and Plenary Power, 20 REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE 303 (1993).
20. See Edwin B. Firmage, Free Exercise of Religion in Nineteenth Century
America: The Mormon Cases, 7 J.L. & RELIGION 281 (1989).
21. FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
AND THE AMERICAN INDIANS (1984).
22. The government and the religious societies were intertwined in their efforts
to civilize and Christianize the Indians throughout the 19th century. The government
supported missionaries with funds, assigned agencies to religious societies, and pro-
vided land for the building of churches. The question is whether this intermingling
constituted an establishment of religion. FEDERAL AGENCIES TASK FORCE, DEP'T OF
THE INTERIOR, AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT REPORT 3-6 (1979) [herein-
after AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT REPORT]. This study was mandated
by § 2 of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), Pub. L. No. 95-341, §
1, 92 Stat. 469 (1978).
In Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908), the Court ruled that the use of
federal funds to establish a Catholic Church on the Rosebu~d Indian Reservation did
not violate the Establishment Clause. See FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, THE CHURCHES AND
THE INDIAN SCHOOLS 1888-1912 (1979).
23. It is estimated that white hunters had killed forty million buffalo within
three decades. In 1889, 20 buffalo were known to still live within the Yellowstone
Park. See FRANK G. ROE, THE NORTH AMERICAN BUFFALO: A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE
SPECIES IN ITS WILD STATE 493 (1951); PETER MATTHIESSEN, WILDLIFE IN AMERICA
454 [Vol. 56
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other plains tribes into submission,24 attacked the very cultural
and spiritual psyche of the tribes. In 1892, Commissioner of the
BIA, Thomas Morgan, directed Indian Courts of Federal Offenses
to enforce a series of laws outlawing religious practices, includ-
ing "heathenish" dances, plural marriages, ceremonies by medi-
cine men, intoxicants, and the destruction of property at buri-
als.25 Violators were punishable by imprisonment or denial of
rations.26
By 1934, BIA Commissioner John Collier had ended the
Bureau's overt and repressive policies. However, society's and
the government's failure to understand the tenets, premises and
needs of Indian religious practices caused indirect attacks to
persist.27 Prevention of access to sacred sites for ceremonies and
the collection of herbs and medicines, imprisonment for the ritu-
al killing and possession of animal parts," the use of sacramen-
tal peyote, and the display of sacred objects and human remains
prompted tribal lobbying for passage of AIRFA.29
This joint resolution directed the federal government to
"protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right
of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional reli-
gions of the American Indian." ° After many unsuccessful legal
attempts by Indians to cite the AIRFA for the protection of their
rights,31 few would disagree with Justice O'Connor's description
(1959).
24. In 1840 a state legislative report concluded, "[S]o far as game and hunting
are concerned, the sooner our wild animals are extinct the better, for they serve to
support a few individuals just on the borders of a savage state . .. ." JAMES A.
TOBER, WHO OwNS THE WILDLIFE?: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF CONSERVATION IN
NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 714 (1981). During congressional discussion of the
Buffalo Protection Bill, congressmen argued that the extermination of the buffalo
promoted the submission of the Indian. 2 CONG. REC. 2105-08 (1874).
25. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 29-30 (1892); see AMERI-
CAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT REPORT, supra note 22, at 6; see also Circular
No. 1665 6-7 (April 26, 1921).
26. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS 29-30 (1892) at 29; see
AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT REPORT, supra note 22, at 6.
27. See, e.g., American Indian Religious Freedom: Hearings on S.J. Res. 102 Be-
fore the Senate Select Comm. on Indian Affairs, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
28. Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068, 1069 (Alaska 1979).
29. See Circular No. 2970, signed by Secretary of the Interior Harold C. Ickes
at the request of Commissioner John Collier, and sent to all Indian agencies. Enti-
tled "Indian Religious Freedom and Indian Culture," the circular stated that "no
interference with Indian religious life or ceremonial expression will hereafter be toler-
ated." Id.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1988).
31. See Sharon O'Brien, A Legal Analysis of the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act, in HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 16
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of the policy as a law with "no teeth."32
A. Religious Rights: Tests and Interpretations
Over the last one hundred years, the Supreme Court has
developed a number of tests and interpretative approaches to
determine when the government is impermissibly prohibiting the
free exercise of one's religion and/or when it is improperly in-
volved in the establishment of religion. When seeking to protect
their religious rights from governmental interference, individuals
must answer a number of questions developed by the courts and
must convince the judiciary to employ those tests and interpreta-
tions that will most benefit their arguments. For example, is the
belief sincerely held? Is the practice in question central to the
plaintiffs practice of his religion? Does the governmental law or
regulation prohibit belief, interfere with religious practice or
actually prevent the practice of the religion? If a governmental
exemption from the law in question is needed, is the exemption a
"proper accommodation" or a violation of the Establishment
Clause? Will the exemption violate the equal protection rights of
non-members?
The Court first considered the proper interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause in Reynolds v. United States, an 1878
case.33 Reynolds, a Mormon arrested for polygamy, argued the
First Amendment protected his right to marry more than one
wife. The Supreme Court ruled that a Mormon's religious direc-
tive to engage in polygamy did not exempt him from adherence
to a criminal statute.' Establishing a test that distinguished
between belief and conduct, the Court reasoned that the First
Amendment protected belief, but not conduct.35 Conduct threat-
ening the civil order could be regulated by the government.3 6
In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the
at 27; Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("Thus AIRFA requires
federal agencies to consider, but not necessarily to defer to Indian religious values. It
does not prohibit agencies from adopting all land uses that conflict with traditional
Indian religious beliefs or practices.").
32. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439, 455
(1988) (quoting 124 CONG. REG. 21,445 (1978) (statement of Rep. Udall)). AIRFA con-
tains no enforcement mechanisms to ensure the protection of Indian religious rights
or penalties for their violation.
33. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
34. Id. at 166-67.
35, Id. at 167.
36. Id. at 164-65; see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Davis
v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890).
[Vol. 56
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Court revised the belief/conduct test. 7 In that case, the Court
ruled that the government could not interfere with the exercise
of religious rights without a compelling interest.3 8 In the 1963
case Sherbert v. Verner,39 the Court instructed that the "compel-
ling interest" test be construed as narrowly as possible. Accord-
ing to Justice Brennan, a government's "compelling interest"
entailed only those actions that posed a substantial threat to the
public safety, peace, or order.' The Court again applied this
reasoning in Wisconsin v. Yoder,4' a case in which the Amish
requested an exemption from Wisconsin's school attendance laws
on the grounds that their religion forbade them to send their
children to school past the eighth grade. The Court acceded, rul-
ing that the state's need for its school attendance policy did not
outweigh the rights of the Amish to be protected in the exercise
of their religious duties.42
The next section of this article briefly reviews the judicial
efforts of Indian people in the last three decades to protect their
religious practices by navigating through the courts' various
First Amendment tests and interpretations. Practices briefly
reviewed include the Native American Church's use of peyote;
the right of Indian inmates to gain access to religious expression,
rites, and spiritual leaders; the right to hunt and use animals in
religious ceremonies; and Indian access to sacred lands.
B. Use of Peyote
Archaeologists estimate that peyote use among Indians is
more than 10,000 years old.' Obtained from the button of the
cactus Lophophora Williamsee, religious practitioners ingest
peyote by chewing, making a tea of the button, or swallowing a
capsule. Peyote, which contains mescaline, induces a hallucino-
genic state. This condition, according to believers, allows the
opening of their minds to God's teachings. Peyote is revered as a
deified messenger. Today, the majority of Indian people who use
peyote are members of the Native American Church. Incorporat-
ed in 1918 in Oklahoma, the Native American Church is estimat-
37. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
38. Id. at 639.
39. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
40. Id. at 403.
41. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
42. Id. at 234.
43. STEWART, supra note 16, at 17.
1995] 457
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ed to have approximately 250,000 members.
Indians have suffered historically from repeated efforts to
prohibit and to eradicate their use of peyote. The Spanish out-
lawed peyote use in 1620. The BIA directed its Indian agents
throughout Oklahoma, formerly the Indian Territory, between
1888 and 1934 to consider peyote an intoxicating liquor and to
"seize and destroy" it. In 1889, the Oklahoma Territory enacted
the first statutory prohibition of peyote, which was subsequently
repealed in 1908. Congress considered, but did not enact, twelve
bills between 1917 and 1933 to ban peyote."
By the 1960s, government officials had acquired a more
sophisticated understanding of the role and function of peyote in
Indian religious services. Although the 1965 Drug Abuse Control
Amendments Act45 and the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Preven-
tion and Control Act of 19704 list peyote as an illegal Schedule
I intoxicant Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) regulations specif-
ically exempt peyote used in Indian religious ceremonies.47
Laws in twenty-two states now permit peyote use.' In at least
three of these states, exemptions resulted from state court rul-
ings that laws prohibiting peyote use violated the religious rights
of American Indians."
44. Indian Religion ; Must Say No, THE ECoNOMIST, Oct. 6, 1990, at 25.
45. Pub. L. No. 89-74, 79 Stat. 226 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 321,
331, 333, 334, 360, 372 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
46. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1236, 1247 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §
812(c) (1988)); see David P. Babner, The Religious Use of Peyote After Smith II, 28
IDAHO L. REV. 65, 80-81 (1991-1992) (discussing the exemptions afforded by the DEA
for Indian religious use of peyote).
47. 21 C.F.R. § 1307.31 (1994) ("The listing of peyote as a controlled substance
in Schedule I does not apply to the nondrug use of peyote in bona fide religiots [sic]
ceremonies of the Native American Church, and members of the Native American
Church so using peyote are exempt from registration.")
48. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-31-6(D) (Michie Supp. 1989); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 12-22-317(3) (1990); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3402(B) (1989); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-4116(c)(8) (1992).
For a breakdown of the individual state statutes regarding the use of peyote, see
H.R. REP. NO. 675, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
49. In People v. Woody, 394 P.2d 813 (Cal. 1964), the California Supreme Court
dismissed the conviction of two Native American Church members arrested for in-
gesting peyote. In an often cited passage, the court reasoned:
[Tihe right to free religious expression embodies a precious heritage of our
history. In a mass society, which presses at every point toward conformity,
the protection of a self-expression, however unique, of the individual and
the group becomes ever more important. The varying currents of the subcul-
tures that flow into the mainstream of our national life give it depth and
beauty. We preserve a greater value than an ancient tradition when we
protect the rights of the Indians who honestly practiced an old religion in
using peyote ....
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Somewhat ironically, the courts have supported and justified
Indian sacramental peyote use most strongly in cases that have
not involved Indians as plaintiffs or defendants. 0 In several
instances, non-Indians have requested that an exemption for
religious drug use either be extended to their drug of choice,
such as marijuana," or to their churches. 2 To not extend a
similar exemption, these groups have argued, violated their free
exercise rights, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Establish-
ment Clause.
In Olsen v. DEA, for example, members of the Ethiopian
Zion Coptic Church argued that the government's refusal to
provide an exemption for marijuana use in their church services
unfairly infringed upon their Equal Protection rights and violat-
ed the Establishment Clause in light of the peyote exemption for
American Indians."3 In response, the court distinguished be-
tween the central role played by peyote in the Native American
Church and the function of marijuana in the Ethiopian Zion
Coptic Church.5' Within the Native American Church, the court
stated, peyote is regarded as a deity; it is an object of worship. 5
The use of peyote outside of church services by any Native Amer-
ican Church member is regarded as sacrilegious." The court
stressed that the Ethiopian Coptic Church allowed for marijuana
use outside the church. 7
Id. at 821-22; see also Whithorn v. State, 561 P.2d 539 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977);
State v. Whittingham, 504 P.2d 950 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (holding First Amendment
protects rights of Indians to use peyote in bona fide pursuit of religious faith), review
denied, 517 P.2d 1275 (Ariz. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 946 (1974).
50. Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1214-16 (5th
Cir. 1991); United States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595, 599 (D.N.D. 1984) (holding
that despite the importance of peyote to the Native American Church, the state in-
terest overrides defendants' free exercise claim).
51. See United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497, 512-13 (1st Cir. 1984) (denying
marijuana exemption for Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church); Leary v. United States, 383
F.2d 851, 861 n.11 (5th Cir. 1967). In at least one case, a court has denied a re-
quest by Indians to exempt use of marijuana on religious grounds. United States v.
Carlson, No. 90-10465 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 1992) (unpublished disposition at 958 F.2d
242 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding no religious exemption for marijuana use by Yurok Indi-
an in religious ceremonies).
52. See Peyote Way, 922 F.2d at 1212; Kennedy v. Bureau of Narcotics and
Dangerous Drugs, 459 F.2d 415, 417 (9th Cir. 1972) (refusing request by Church of
the Awakening that peyote exemption extend to their church); Warner, 595 F. Supp.
at 597.
53. 878 F.2d 1458, 1459 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
54. Olsen 878 F.2d at 1464-65.
55. Id. at 1464.
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A second line of challenges has come from peyote users who
are not members of the Native American Church but of other
non-native churches that incorporate the use of peyote. In Peyote
Way Church of God v. Thornburgh, members of the Peyote Way
Church of God argued that the Free Exercise and the Equal
Protection Clauses of the Constitution required a similar exemp-
tion for their church. 8 The Fifth Circuit recognized that the
federal government's political relationship with tribes and its
obligation under the trust relationship to protect Indian culture
and religion ameliorated violations of the First Amendment and
Equal Protection Clause.59 Specifically, the court stated: "We
hold that the federal [Native American Church] exemption allow-
ing tribal Native Americans to continue their centuries-old tradi-
tion of peyote use is rationally related to the legitimate govern-
mental objective of preserving Native American culture."0
Despite these legislative, regulatory, and judicial advances,
Indians were still prohibited in approximately twenty-eight
states from using peyote-laws which the Supreme Court judged
in Employment Division v. Smith6 do not violate the First
Amendment rights of American Indians. In Smith, the Supreme
Court considered a case involving two Indian alcohol drug coun-
selors who were fired from their jobs for testing positive for peyo-
58. 922 F.2d 1210, 1212-13 (5th Cir. 1991).
59. Id. at 1217. The court in Peyote Way stated:
The unique guardian-ward relationship between the federal government and
Native American tribes precludes the degree of separation of church and
state ordinarily required by the First Amendment. The federal government
cannot at once fulfill its constitutional role as protector of tribal Native
Americans and apply conventional separatist understandings of the estab-
lishment clause to that same relationship.
Id. at 1217.
60. Id. at 1216; see also United States v. Rush, 738 F.2d 497, 513 (1st Cir.
1984) ('[Rleligion is an integral part of the Indian culture and that the use of...
peyote [is] necessary to the survival of Indian religion and culture.") (quoting Peyote
Way Church of God, Inc. v. Smith, 556 F. Supp. 632, 637 (N.D. Tex. 1983)); United
States v. Warner, 595 F. Supp. 595 (D.N.D. 1984); Peyote Way Church of God, Inc.
v. Smith, 556 F. Supp. 632, 639 (N.D. Tex. 1983) ("Congress has the power or duty
to preserve our Native American Indians . ..as a cohesive culture."). But see United
States v. Boyll, 774 F. Supp. 1333 (D.N.M. 1991) (ruling that Native American
Church exemption is not restricted solely to non-Indian members); Native American
Church v. United States, 468 F. Supp. 1247, 1251 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (holding that ex-
emption for peyote is equally available to the plaintiff, if in fact, it is a bona fide
religious organization, using peyote for sacramental purposes and regarding it as a
deity); State v. Whittingham, 504 P.2d 950, 952 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1973) (holding Free
Exercise Clause protects use of peyote in connection with a bona fide practice of a
religious belief).
61. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
112
Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/1
FREEDOM OF RELIGION
te use. The two counselors, both recovering alcoholics, were prac-
ticing members of the Native American Church."2 Their use of
peyote and their spiritual beliefs had played a major role in their
own recovery from alcoholism. Arguing they were fired for legiti-
mate cause, the State denied them unemployment benefits. The
men appealed, charging the state with a violation of their First
Amendment rights. 3 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority,
ruled that state law forbidding the ingestion of peyote did not
violate the counselors' First Amendment Rights.6 Justice Scalia
reasoned that, in essence, states may choose to allow or to pro-
hibit the religious use of peyote by American Indians, depending
upon the state's definition of "public safety." 5
In reaching its decision, the Court declined to use the two-
part compelling interest test that it had previously employed to
determine if a law impermissibly burdened religion.6 In a re-
turn to the belief/conduct interpretation, Justice Scalia stated
that allowing individuals to determine which laws they would
obey according to their personally held religious beliefs would
allow a religious objector "to become a law unto himself."" The
protection of minority religions, according to Justice Scalia, was
a "luxury" that would "court[ ] anarchy." The Court concluded
that if minority religions desired such protection, the most ap-
propriate forum was the political process and the passage of
specialized laws.69
On October 6, 1994, Congress responded to Justice Scalia's
invitation with the passage of AIRFA.70 The law provides that
"the use, possession, or transportation of peyote by an Indian for
bona fide traditional ceremonial purposes in connection with the
practice of a traditional Indian religion is lawful, and shall not
be prohibited by the United States or any State."v"
62. Id. at 874.
63. Id., at 874.
64. Id. at 890.
65. Id. at 878-89; see, e.g., State v. Bullard, 148 S.E. 2d. 565, 569 (N.C. 1966);
State v. Big Sheep, 75 Mont. 219, 239, 243 P. 1067, 1073 (1926).
66. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885. According to Scalia, the Court had used the
Sherbert test only in instances related to a denial of unemployment compensation.
Id. at 883-85.
67. Id. at 879 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1878)).
68. Id. at 888.
69. Id. at 890; see supra notes 11-13 and accompanying text.
70. AIRFA, Pub. L. No. 103-344, §§ 1-3, 108 Stat. 3125, 3125 (1994).
71. AIRFA, Pub. L. No. 103-344, § 3(5Xb)(1), 108 Stat. 3125, 3125 (1994). Sec-
tion 3(4) of the law specifically cites the Smith decision and the uncertainty raised
by the case as to the protection of peyote under the compelling interest test. Section
1995]
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C. Exercise of Prisoners' Religious Rights
Minorities comprise a disproportionate number of inmates in
the federal and state prisons. Indians are no exception. Accord-
ing to the 1980 census, there are as many Indians living in pris-
on cells as live in college dorm rooms.72
Prisoners do not forfeit all their constitutional rights once
incarcerated.73 The right to practice one's religion is clearly re-
tained.74 From a rehabilitative standpoint, an inmate's re-iden-
tification with his or her religious and cultural teachings has
proven beneficial.75 For many Indian prisoners, access to spiri-
tual leaders; the practice of their traditional ceremonies, includ-
ing those associated with the sweat lodge, the pipe and the Na-
tive American Church; the wearing of a medicine bag, or wearing
one's hair long or with a headband are important to Indian spiri-
tual existence. The judiciary has supported Indian prisoners in
their requests to express their religious needs only in those in-
stances in which penological interests relating to security and
health are found to be of less importance. The test employed by
the courts to determine how one's religious needs are weighed
against the prison's interest is obviously critical to the outcome.
The courts have employed two primary tests to determine if
prison regulations legitimately interfere with prisoners' constitu-
tional rights." The older of the two is the "least restrictive
means" test, which requires prison officials to attain their objec-
tives by using the least restrictive procedures or methods.77 The
3(b)(6) provides that any regulations promulgated by federal agencies and states in
the enforcement of their traffic laws must comply with the balancing test set forth in
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993).
Although the courts have not yet adjudicated Pub. L. No. 103-344, supporters
hope that this law will finally secure to Indians the complete protection of religious
peyote use that the First Amendment and AIRFA failed to provide.
72. See MATTHEW SNIPP, AMERICAN INDIANS: THE FIRST OF THIS LAND 106
(1989).
73. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545 (1979).
74. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (prisoner retains First
Amendment rights not inconsistent with penological objectives); Cruz v. Beto, 405
U.S. 319, 322 (1972).
75. Alcohol use is implicated in a significant portion (97%) of crimes for which
Indians are convicted. See RONET BACHMAN, DEATH AND VIOLENCE ON THE RESERVA-
TION 30-32 (1992). One of the most effective methods for reversing alcohol use on
reservations has been the use of religious and cultural teachings.
76. See Comment, The Religious Rights of the Incarcerated, 125 U. PA. L. REV.
812, 837-56 (1977) (arguing that courts have employed at least seven different stan-
dards to determine prisoners' free exercise claims).
77. Teterud v. Burns, 522 F.2d 357, 359 (8th Cir. 1975).
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more recent test, enunciated in two 1987 Supreme Court cases,
Turner v. Safley" and O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,79 provides
that prison regulations may interfere with First Amendment
guarantees if "reasonably related"" to the legitimate interests
of the prison facility."'
Indian inmates, on balance, have successfully argued that
they, like Christian and Muslim prisoners, have a right of access
to their own spiritual leaders and ceremonies.82 How often and
under what conditions this right of access occurs is more
problematic. In Allen v. Toombs," an Indian inmate requested
daily access to a sweat lodge, arguing that his fellow Christian
prisoners were able to attend church daily. The Ninth Circuit
ruled that access to a weekly sweat lodge ceremony provided
inmates with a reasonable ability to exercise their religious
rights.' In 1992, the Seventh Circuit ruled that an Indian
prisoner's attendance at three ceremonies within a four month
time period, provided him with an adequate opportunity to prac-
tice his religious ceremonies." In Indian Inmates v.
Grammer,"6 the court held that not permitting Indian inmates
to use peyote during their Native American Church services was
a "serious interference with their free exercise rights," but that
prisons, nonetheless, have the right to refuse peyote use for
purposes of security, safety, and discipline. 7
78. 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
79. 482 U.S. 342 (1987) (upholding prison regulations which prevented Islamic
prisoner from attending Friday services and from wearing a beard).
80. In Turner, the Supreme Court established a four prong test to determine
the validity of a prison regulation in the face of constitutional guarantees: (1) wheth-
er a "valid, rational connection" existed between the regulation and the legitimate
government interest; (2) whether an alternative means was available to allow for the
exercise of the right in question; (3) the manner in which an accommodation would
affect the prison resources and the impact the accommodation would have on prison
guards and other inmates; (4) if an alternative exists to the impeding prison func-
tion. 482 U.S. at 89-91.
81. O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349.
82. See, e.g., Indian Inmates v. Gunter, 660 F. Supp. 394 (D. Neb. 1987);
Marshno v. McMannus, Case No. 79-3146 (D. Kan. Nov. 14, 1980); Bear Ribs v.
Taylor, Civ. No.77-3985RJK(G) (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 1979).
83. 827 F.2d 563 (9th Cir. 1987).
84. Allen, 827 F.2d at 566-67.
85. Frederick v. Murphy, No. 91-3699, 1994 WL 4851 (7th Cir. Jan. 12, 1993);
see also Gunter, 660 F. Supp. at 398-99 (concluding that Indian prisoners had a right
to visit with medicine men, but not to access sweat lodges).
86. 649 F. Supp. 1374, 1374 (D. Neb. 1986).
87. Gunter, 649 F. Supp. at 1379. H.R. 4230 provides: "This section shall not be
construed as requiring prison authorities to permit, nor shall it be construed to pro-
hibit prison authorities from permitting, access to peyote by Indians while incarcerat-
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Many penological institutions argue that the same objectives
of security, safety, and discipline require inmates to maintain
short hair. For the vast majority of prisoners this mandate repre-
sents little hardship. For many Indian people, however, the
wearing of long hair is of deep religious importance, signifying
oneness with the Great Spirit. Braids symbolize the integration
of one's mind, body, and spirit. In two earlier cases, Teterud v.
Burns and Gallahan v. Hollyfield,89 the courts held that the
two prisons in question had violated the Indian inmates' First
Amendment right by requiring the wearing of short hair."
The courts' current interpretation has severely compromised
Indian rights in this regard. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,"
the Court ruled that penological requirements for short hair
outweighed a Moslem prisoner's religious requirement to main-
tain long hair. Two subsequent appellate decisions applied the
Court's ruling to Indian inmates. In Hall v. Bellmon92 and
Holmes v. Schneider,93 the courts held that the prisons' right to
force the cutting of hair for reasons of safety overrode the Indian
inmates' constitutional claims to First Amendment protection. 4
Prisoners' requests to wear headbands-the symbol of the
sacred circle-have received an equally mixed reception. In a
district court decision, Reinert v. Haas, the court analogized the
headband's symbol to the sacred circle with the sign of the Chris-
tian cross and found that Indian inmates possessed a constitu-
tionally protected right to wear their headbands." More recent-
ed within Federal or State prison facilities." H.R. 4230, 103d Cong. 2d Sess. § 3b(5)
(1994).
88. 522 F.2d 357, 362-63 (8th Cir. 1975); see also Alabama & Coushatta Tribes
v. Big Sandy Sch. Dist., 817 F. Supp. 1319, 1329 (E.D. Tex. 1993) (finding the deci-
sion in Teterud to be persuasive in ordering an injunction against school regulations
requiring Indian children to cut their hair, despite the Supreme Court's ruling in
Smith).
89. 670 F.2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1982).
90. Gallahan, 670 F.2d at 1346-47.
91. 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
92. 935 F.2d 1106, 1114 (10th Cir. 1991).
93. No. 92-1451, 1992 WL 323469 (8th Cir. Nov. 6, 1992).
94. In Pollock v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S.
897 (1988), reh'g denied, 488 U.S. 987 (1988), the Sixth Circuit (applying the Turner
factors, supra note 81) ruled that, "[a]ifter balancing the defendant's interest in keep-
ing prisoners' hair short against the right of the plaintiff to exercise the religion of
the Lakota Indians, we hold that the regulation restricting hair length, as applied to
the plaintiff, is not unconstitutional." Pollock, 845 F.2d at 659-60; see also Iron Eyes
v. Henry, 907 F.2d 810, 814 (8th Cir. 1990); Cole v. Flick, 758 F.2d 124 (3rd Cir.
1985) (denying prisoner's right to wear long hair for religious purposes protected by
First Amendment).
95. 585 F. Supp. 477, 481 (S.D. Iowa 1984).
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ly, however, the Ninth Circuit in Standing Deer v. Carlson,96
ruled that prison regulations against wearing headgear were
"logically connected" to prison objectives to maintain security.97
It is too early to determine if RFRA will adequately assist
Indian prisoners in the protection of their First Amendment
rights.98 In several opinions courts have ruled that RFRA has
provided a new standard of judicial review. By reinstating the
"compelling interest" test, justices are now to consider "the least
restrictive means" of furthering prison objectives rather than
considering whether prison restrictions serve a "legitimate
penological interest."99
D. Use of Animals for Ceremonial Purposes
Animals play a central role in many Indian religious ceremo-
nies. Fishing tribes of the Pacific Northwest celebrate salmon.
Alaskan natives consider the bear, moose, and elk to be of ritual-
istic importance. Whales are central to the spiritual integrity of
Inuit groups. Many Indian peoples believe the eagle is preemi-
nent, symbolizing a spiritual connection with the Great Creator.
The necessity to incorporate certain animals into Indian rituals
directly conflicts with state and federal laws protecting wild-
life."° The 1918 Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 0 ' the 1940 Bald
Eagle Protection Act,0 2 and the 1973 Endangered Species
96. 831 F.2d 1525 (9th Cir. 1987).
97. Standing Deer, 831 F.2d at 1528.
98. As of fall 1994, courts had not heard any cases involving Indian inmates
and alleged violations of RFRA.
99. See generally Abbott Cooper, Dam the RFRA at the Prison Gate: The Reli-
gious Freedom Restoration Act's Import on Correctional Litigation, 56 MONT. L. REV.
325 (1995); see also Ira C. Lupu, Of Time and the RFRA: A Lawyer's Guide to the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 56 MONT. L. REv. 171, 203-05 (1995). See, e.g.,
Brown-El v. Harris, 26 F.3d 68, 69 (8th Cir. 1994); Messina v. Mazzeo, 854 F. Supp.
116 (E.D. N.Y. 1994).
100. However, various exemptions do appear in specific treaties, typically allow-
ing for subsistence takings by Eskimos and Indians. For example, the 1916 Canadian
Convention excepts the taking of birds by Eskimos and Indians for food and clothing.
Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16, 1916, United States-Great
Britain (on behalf of Canada), 39 Stat. 1702, 1703, T.S. No. 628. Eagles first received
federal protection pursuant to the 1936 convention between the United States and
Mexico. See Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds and Game Mammals,
Feb. 7, 1936, United States-Mexico, 50 Stat. 1311, T.S. No. 912 (providing for later
inclusion of migratory birds at the request of the Presidents of both nations).
101. 16 U.S.C. §§ 703-15 (1988).
102. See Tina S. Boradiansky, Comment, Conflicting Values: The Religious Killing
of Federally Protected Wildlife, 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 709 (1990), for a discussion of
how these acts have impacted on the religious taking of animals. The author argues
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Act103 prohibit Indians from taking protected animals from
their own lands. To counter these federally imposed prohibitions
and state game laws, tribes have argued that these laws violate
protected hunting and fishing rights °4 and violate their First
Amendment rights. 5
Again the courts' understanding of and rulings concerning
ceremonial animal use has been inconsistent. In United States v.
Billie,"° the court refused to find the defendant, the tribal
chairman of the Seminole Tribe, exempt from violating the En-
dangered Species Act on the basis of his First Amendment
rights. Employing the centrality test, 0 7 the court ruled that the
panther was not indispensable to the practice of the Seminole
religion. Moreover, the court asserted, the panther's importance
to Billie's spiritual life was outweighed by the government's
interest in protecting wildlife.
However, in United States v. Abeyta,'0° the court ruled that
the First Amendment protected the Pueblos' taking of golden
eagles on their own lands. As the symbol of the overseer of life,
the eagle holds an exalted position in Pueblo religious life. The
government's use of a permit system to dispense eagle parts for
religious purposes was found to be an impermissible burden on
Indian religious practices."°
Not surprisingly, tribes have proven most successful in pro-
that Indian religious rights should not be interpreted as more protected than the
rights of endangered species.
103. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988).
104. See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); United States v. Fryberg, 622
F.2d 1010 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980); United States v. Allard,
397 F. Supp. 429 (D. Mont. 1975).
105. See United States v. Dion, 762 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Top Sky, 547 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. 1301
(D. N.M. 1986); United States v. Thirty Eight Golden Eagles, 649 F. Supp. 269 (D.
Nev. 1986).
106. 667 F. Supp. 1485, 1497 (S.D. Fla. 1987).
107. Billie, 667 F. Supp. at 1497.
108. 632 F. Supp. 1301 (D. N.M. 1986).
109. Abeyta, 632 F. Supp. at 1307. The permit system was also challenged in
Top Sky, 547 F.2d at 483 (ruling that the defendant did not have standing to assert
infringement on Indian Religious practices and free exercise and that commercial
purposes were outside scope of religious practices). See also Golden Eagles, 649 F.
Supp 269 (recognizing permit system as a burden, but holding wildlife protection an
appropriate governmental interest).
In recognition of this impediment, President Clinton established new policies
for use of eagle feathers by Indian religious leaders. See Memorandum for the Heads
of Executive Departments and Agencies, Policy Concerning Distribution of Eagle
Feathers for Native American Religious Purposes from William J. Clinton, April 29,
1994.
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tecting their rights before courts when they have successfully
translated for the courts their practices into Christian analo-
gies.11° In Frank v. Alaska,"' the Alaska Supreme Court up-
held the First Amendment rights of an Alaskan native by ex-
empting him from criminal charges for killing a moose out of
season. The use of moose meat in a funeral ceremony, the court
concluded, was of equal symbolism to the "wine and wafer in
Christianity."
1 1 2
E. Access to and Protection of Religious Sites113
Given the courts' application of First Amendment tests and
interpretations, Indians have found it virtually impossible to
obtain protection of and access to their sacred sites."' In
110. See Reinert v. Haas, 585 F. Supp. 477, 481 (S.D. Iowa 1984) (contrasting
the penitentiary's prohibition of Native Americans wearing headbands with permitting
Christians to wear crosses and medals).
111. 604 P.2d 1068, 1072 (Alaska 1979).
112. Frank, 604 P.2d at 1072. The court further ruled that exempting Indians
from state game law was a justifiable accommodation of religious practice that did
not violate the Establishment Clause. Rather, such an approach reflected the
government's "obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences." Id. at 1075
(quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972)); see also Golden Eagles, 649
F. Supp. at 276 ("As the claimant's affidavits demonstrate, experts in comparative
religion have likened the status of the eagle feather in Indian religion to that of the
cross in the Christian faith.').
It is ironic at the minimum, and unfair, at the maximum, that the courts are
most understanding of Indian religious rights when they are able to translate Indian
religious practices or to favor Christianity as the preeminent religion-in contraven-
tion to the Establishment Clause.
113. A number of legal scholars have detailed the problems which arise for
tribes in their efforts to protect their sacred lands. See, e.g., Robert C. Ward, The
Spirits Will Leave: Preventing the Desecration and Destruction of Native American
Sacred Sites on Federal Land, 19 EcOLOGY L. Q. 795 (1992).
114. See, e.g., Crow v. Gullet, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 977 (1983); Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied 449
U.S. 953 (1980); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452
U.S. 954 (1981).
In 1970, in one of the few instances in which the government has returned
land to a tribe, President Richard Nixon executed the return of Blue Lake to the
Taos, an area of deep cultural significance. FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER
1127 (1984); see Jack F. Trope, Protecting Native American Religious Freedom: The
Legal, Historical, and Constitutional Basis for the Proposed Native American Free
Exercise of Religion Act, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 373 (1993) (reporting
that an administrative law judge ruled against the development of a proposed hydro-
electric plant); In re Northern Lights, Inc., 39 Fed. Energy Reg. Comm'n Rep. (CCH)
9 61,352 at 107-08 (1987).
In 1992 the Blackfeet of Montana filed a suit to restore their rights to hunt,
fish, log, graze livestock, and operate commercial ventures in Glacier National Park
under the terms of their 1895 treaty. More than 120 tribes border federal parks.
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Sequoyah v. Tennessee Valley Authority,"' the Cherokees filed
suit for an injunction against the flooding of lands by the Tellico
dam. Flooding would prevent access to their sacred birthplace,
Chota-an area important for the collection of medicinal
herbs-and to their ancestral burial grounds."6 Dismissing the
centrality of the Cherokees' religious beliefs, the court ruled that
the tribal members were expressing "a personal preference;"
their concerns were not with religious beliefs, but with the "his-
torical beginnings of the Cherokees and their cultural develop-
ment."
117
That same year, the Tenth Circuit refused a request by
Navajo religious leaders that Rainbow Bridge National Monu-
ment be closed periodically to tourists and that alcoholic bever-
ages not be sold at the monument."' The court acknowledged
that the Navajos regarded Rainbow Bridge as the incarnation of
a deity and that it was therefore of central importance to Navajo
religion." But, in a return to the Reynolds test, the court con-
cluded that although the Park Service's regulations hindered the
Navajo's religious exercise, the regulations did not compel the
Navajos to violate the tenets of their religion. 20 Moreover, the
government's need for low-cost electricity and to promote tourism
outweighed the Navajo's right to freedom of expression.'2 ' Fi-
nally, the government's closure of the monument to tour-
ism-even periodically-would constitute impermissible support
of a religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.'22
The Navajos, joined by the Hopis, were equally unsuccessful
in preventing the Forest Service's and the Department of
Agriculture's expansion of a ski area in the San Francisco
Todd Wilkinson, Ancestral Lands: Native Americans Seek to Restore Treaty Rights to
Worship and Hunt in Many National Parks, 67 NATIONAL PARKS 30 (July 1993). In
the Rocky Mountain region alone, more than 50 Indian nations possess a historic or
spiritual interest in 41 park units. Id. at 35. Recent improvements in negotiations
and communications have also been undertaken in very recent years between the
Park Service and the tribes. Id.; see also Patrick Dawson, Indian Religion a Matter
of Land, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 7, 1993, at 8; Jessica Maxwell, Curly Bear's Prayer;
One Blackfeet Indian's Effort to Stop Gold Mining in the Sweet Grass Hills Area of
Montana, 95 AUDUBON 114 (Mar. 1993) (discussing the BLM's proposed expansion of
a gold mine on the edge of the Fort Belknap Reservation in Montana).
115. 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980).
116. Sequoyah, 620 F.2d at 1160.
117. Id. at 1164.
118. Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172 (10th Cir. 1980).
119. Id. at 176.
120. Id. at 178.
121. Id. at 176-78.
122. Id. at 179.
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Peaks.123 The court concluded that while the religious leaders
had demonstrated the importance of the peaks to their religion,
they had not proven their "indispensability."'24 Accordingly, the
proposed development only "offended," but did not "penalize"
members for their religious practices.'25
The Lakota and Tsistsistas (Cheyenne) confronted similar
reasoning in Crow v. Gullet2" where religious leaders attempt-
ed to halt the expansion of tourist facilities at Bear Butte. State
projects and regulations had seriously compromised tribal
members' ability to worship at this sacred location. Again, the
courts recognized that Bear Butte was one of, if not the most
sacred of the ceremonial sites in the Black Hills.'27 However,
interference with the tribal members' ability to practice their
religion did not force them to relinquish their religious beliefs or
to totally abandon their religious practices. Furthermore, the
lower court warned that if the government acceded to the spiri-
tual leaders' requests, its actions could be construed as overly
accommodating and possibly in violation of the Establishment
Clause.1
The Court echoed this analysis in Lyng v. Northwest Indian
Cemetery Protective Ass'n." 2 Members of the Yurok, Karok, and
Tolowa tribes sought to prevent the Forest Service from con-
structing a five-mile logging road through their sacred lands.3 0
The Court again declined to apply the strict scrutiny test that
required careful assessment if religious rights were even indi-
rectly coerced or penalized. 3' Justice O'Connor, writing for the
majority, agreed that "the Indian respondents' beliefs are sincere
and that the Government's proposed actions will have severe
adverse effects on the practice of their religion.""2  The
123. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
956 (1983), and cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1056 (1983).
124. Id. at 744.
125. Id. at 745.
126. 541 F. Supp. 785, 794 (D.S.D. 1982), affld, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 977 (1983). In Badoni, the court ruled that to exclude tourists
from the Navajo's sacred area as requested "would seem a clear violation of the
Establishment Clause." 638 F.2d 172 at 179. The Fifth Circuit has used Smith to
find that "the federal and Texas statutes prohibiting peyote possession do not offend
the First Amendment's free exercise clause." Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v.
Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210, 1213 (5th Cir. 1991).
127. Crow, 541 F. Supp. at 788.
128. Id. at 794.
129. 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
130. Lyng, 486 U.S. at 442.
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government's proposed actions, nonetheless, would not prohibit
the tribes from exercising their religious beliefs."= Further-
more, the Court ruled that the hands of the federal government
could not be tied in the conduct of its own business on its own
land."'
II. RFRA, AIRFRA, AND THE FUTURE OF INDIAN RELIGIOUS
RIGHTS
From the perspective of Indian religious practitioners, it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that the courts have subjected
Indian religious rights to a more rigorous standard of review
than other religious groups."' In several non-Indian decisions,
courts have stated that they were not competent, nor would they
question or judge the accuracy of a religious belief.3 However,
in the Seqoyah and Badoni cases, the courts engaged in exactly
that speculation. 7 Even if Indian plaintiffs pass the sincerity
and centrality tests, they have found it difficult to win the com-
pelling-interest test and convince the courts that their right to
practice their religion outweighs the government's overriding
need to pursue its own interest." In many instances, when
133. Contrast the Court's decision in this case with the laws of Israel and
Saudia Arabia protecting sacred places. Israel's Law states:
1. The Holy Places shall be protected from desecration and any other
violation from anything likely to violate the freedom of access of the mem-
bers of the different religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings
with regard to those places.
2.(a) Whosoever desecrates or otherwise violates a Holy Place shall be
liable to imprisonment for a term of seven years. (b) Whosoever does any-
thing likely to violate the freedom of access of the members of the different
religions to the places sacred to them or their feelings with regard to those
places shall be liable to imprisonment for a term of five years.
Israel's Protection of Holy Places Law of 5727 (Sefer ha-Chukim, 1967).
134. Lyng, 485 U.S. at 453. See Ward, supra note 113 for a discussion of those
federal uses most endangering access and protection of Indian sacred sites and the
range of current federal laws designed to protect some aspect of land use. As Ward
concludes, none of these federal laws, e.g., the Antiquities Act of 1906 or the Nation-
al Historic Preservation Act of 1966, are adequate to the protection of sacred lands.
Ward, supra note 113, at 820.
135. As many commentators have pointed out, the Court's standards are
ethnocentrically based. See Timothy L. Fort, The Free Exercise Rights of Native Amer-
icans and the Prospects for a Conservative Jurisprudence Protecting the Rights of
Minorities, 23 N. M. L. REV. 187, 204 (1993).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
137. See Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159, 1164 (6th Cir. 1980); Badoni v.
Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 178 (10th Cir. 1980); see also Inupiat Community v. United
States, 548 F. Supp. 182, 188 (D. Alaska 1982).
138. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988).
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tribes had hoped to prove the validity of their claims using a
compelling-interest test, courts have declined to apply the test
and have instead retrenched to the stricter belief-conduct inter-
pretation. The re-use of this test has allowed the government to
conclude that as long as the government is not telling Indians
how to believe or preventing them from believing, the govern-
ment may restrict and even destroy their ability to practice their
religion.139 Finally, when Indian religious leaders have hoped to
obtain a permissible exemption or accommodation from the gov-
ernment as the Court has extended to other religious groups,
Indians have been told that such an exemption would be an
impermissible violation of the Establishment Clause."4 °
RFRA directs the courts to return to the pre-Smith position
and to employ the compelling interest test when evaluating gov-
ernment infringement on religious rights. The legislation, al-
though supported by tribes, does not offer Indian people ade-
quate protection in the preservation of their religious practices.
The reasons for this concern are substantial. The constitutional-
ity of RFRA may be challenged."' Does Congress have the au-
thority to dictate to the judiciary which tests or which preferred
interpretations the courts should use?"" Will RFRA pass the
Court's analysis of the Acts Establishment Clause implications?"
139. Id. at 451-52.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 114-18; see also Rodney K. Smith, Sover-
eignty and the Sacred: The Establishment Clause in Indian Country, 56 MONT. L.
REV. 295 (1995). See generally Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217 (1993); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec.
Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
141. See, e.g., Canedy v. Boardman, 16 F.3d 183, 186 n.2 (7th Cir. 1994) ("The
constitutionality of this legislation-surely not before us here-raises a number of
questions involving the extent of Congress's [sic] powers under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.").
142. Congress ostensibly has the authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to pass RFRA. Section 5 provides Congress with the authority "to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 5.
According to Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879), Congress possesses the
authority to pass legislation to enforce constitutional amendments as long as that
authority is not prohibited. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326-27
(1966).
143. Establishment Clause cases have proven the most troublesome for the Court
in the last thirty years. See Fort, supra note 132, at 188 & n.3.
The Court currently employs a three-prong test to determine if a government
action violates the Establishment Clause: the action must neither advance nor inhibit
religion, have a primarily secular effect, and not excessively entangle the government
with religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). "Excessive entangle-
ment" is concluded by determining: the nature and character of the religion benefit-
ting from the governmental action, the nature of the governmental assistance, and
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Even if the constitutionality of RFRA is secure, it is unlikely
that RFRA's provisions are sufficiently broad to cover all instanc-
es pertaining to important Indian religious practices.'" The
Justice Department, for example, has already indicated that it
does not consider RFRA to protect access to sacred sites.'"
Recognizing the possible shortcomings of RFRA and the
obvious failures of AIRFA, congressional supporters of Indian
religious rights have introduced a number of bills designed to
protect Indians' First Amendment rights." The most compre-
the characterization of the resulting relationship between the government and the
religion. Id. at 615.
The Court has accommodated religious practices without finding an interfer-
ence with the Establishment Clause in several instances. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (allowing exemptions from state school attendance laws); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970) (allowing state property tax exemption for churches);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (allowing state unemployment benefits for
Seventh Day Adventist who was fired for her inability to work on Saturday, her Sab-
bath); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)
(allowing unemployment benefits to Jehovah's Witness who quit job on religious
grounds); Michael W. McConnell, Accomnwdation of Religion, 1985 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 4
n.8 (citing other examples). But see Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116
(1982) (overturning a zoning law which allowed churches to prevent issuance of li-
quor licenses to establishments within 500 feet of church property).
Several authors have argued that the protection of Indian religious sites and
practices would not excessively entangle the United States government with Indian
religions. See, e.g., Michaelsen, supra note 16; Ward, supra note 114.
In Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v. Thornburgh, 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir.
1991), the court addressed the establishment issue:
The unique guardian-ward relationship between the federal govern-
ment and Native American tribes precludes the degree of separation of
church and state ordinarily required by the First Amendment. The federal
government cannot at once fulfill its constitutional role as protector of tribal
Native Americans and apply conventional separatist understandings of the
establishment clause to that same relationship.
. . . Thus, we hold that the federal NAC exemption represents the
government's protection of the culture of quasi-sovereign Native American
tribes and as such, does not represent an establishment of religion in con-
travention of the First Amendment.
Id. at 1217.
144. For a detailed examination of those areas in which RFRA is unlikely to
protect Indian concerns, see Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. on Civil
and Constitutional Rights of the House Judiciary Comm., 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 424-
43 (1992); see also Trope, infra note 114 (summarizing the concerns expressed in the
hearings).
The proposed Senate Bill 2269, in an acknowledgement that RFRA is not pre-
sumed to cover all religious practices, states in Title VI, § 601 (b) that the act is
considered as a supplement to the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.
145. See Statement by Philip P. Frickey, Hearings, Senate Select Committee on
Indian Affairs, Mar. 8, 1993, pp. 13-14; 105-13.
146. President Clinton stated at his meeting with tribal leaders in April:
Last year, I was pleased to sign a law that restored certain constitutional
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hensive is Senate Bill 2269, which is intended to supplement
RFRA and is designed to overcome the Court's decisions in Lyng
and Smith.147 In general, the proposed legislation provides for a
scheme by which sacred sites are to be identified and protected;
an exemption for the religious use, possession, or transportation
of peyote by American Indians at the federal and state levels;
Indian inmates to have access to spiritual leaders, sacred objects
and religious facilities, and to have the right to wear their hair
long (the use of peyote by prisoners is neither exempted or pro-
moted); and the prompt disbursement of bald and golden eagles
and simplification of the permit process for the taking of bald
and golden eagles. In addition, the legislation provides for the
levying of penalties and fines for violation of the Act's provi-
sions."4
Passage of this Act and the one proposed in the House to
protect religious sites remains uncertain. Like RFRA, the bills'
constitutionality may be challenged or the bills may be interpret-
ed so weakly as to offer Indians little protection. 49 If passed,
the bills face uncertain adjudication before the courts."' The
Court's support of any religious rights-but especially those of
Indians-is speculative. Religious freedom cases by definition are
complex cases to resolve. This is understandable given the
changing nature of American society, the innate tension between
the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, and the First
protection for those who want to express their faith in this country.
No agenda for religious freedom will be complete until traditional
Native American religious practices have received all the protection they
deserve. Legislation is needed to protect Native American religious practices
threatened by [flederal action. The Native American free exercise of religion
act is long overdue. And I will continue to work closely with you and Mem-
bers of Congress to make sure the law is constitutional and strong. I want
it passed so that I can invite you back here and sign it into law in your
presence.
Remarks to American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Leaders, in 30 Wkly Compi-
lations Pres. Doc. 941, 942, 944 (April 29, 1994).
147. S. 2269, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
148. S. 2269, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
149. This is the fate of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act. See supra
note 14.
150. Walker, supra note 16 (arguing that the "centrality" test be replaced by an
"integrity" test); Martin C. Loesch, The First Americans and the "Free" Exercise of
Religion, 18 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 313, (1993) (arguing that the test of "indirect" harm
be dropped); John Rhodes, An American Tradition: The Religious Persecution of Na-
tive Americans 52 MONT. L. REv. 13 (1991) (arguing for the adoption of a "substan-
tial threat" test); Comment, The Trust Doctrine: A Source of Protection for Native
American Sacred Sites, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 705 (1989) (arguing that the
government's trust obligation to protect Indian lands should extend to sacred sites).
1995] 473
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Amendment's importance within constitutional law.
The inherent difficulties of religion cases when combined
with American society's ignorance of native religious practices
severely handicap Indian people in the preservation of their
religious identities. Indian people, by having to struggle against
a pervasive lack of knowledge and against a sense of superiority
that has generated years of persecution, are inextricably placed
at a disadvantage.'51 Perhaps no other field of American law is
so replete with examples of judicial activism and redefinition as
that which concerns the general rights and status of Indians.
And, as described above, tribes are particularly perplexed about
the rationale for the courts' use of interpretative tests in deciding
their religious rights.5 2
It is for these reasons that tribes cannot rely solely on legis-
lation such as AIRFA or RFRA and their legal interpretations to
adequately protect tribal religious rights. In addition to their
efforts to pass protective legislation and adjudication, tribes
must continue to push for expanded recognition and interpreta-
tion of their special status as inherent sovereigns that maintain
a trust relationship with the federal government. Courts' ac-
knowledgement of the government's obligation to protect Indian
existence under the trust relationship should provide the courts
with the necessary "hybrid" situation described by Scalia in the
Smith case or the necessary "weight" needed to tip the balance
for the protection of Indian First Amendment Rights under a
restored compelling interest test.
III. THE TRUST DOCTRINE AS A COROLLARY TO FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION
The federal government, by virtue of the unique political
status possessed by tribes, may extend special treatment to Indi-
an people. Indeed, the extension of positive rights and special
treatment may be necessary (or even required), as in the case of
religious exemptions, to preserve Indian existence.
Tribes, as inherent sovereigns, lie outside the constitutional
151. See Firmage, supra note 20, at 282 (explaining how Christianity in the last
century suffused the Court's writings). For examples of such writings see Vidal v.
Girard's Ex'r, 43 U.S. 127 (2 How. 1844) and Holy Trinity Church v. United States,
143 U.S. 457 (1892).
152. For an updated description of the problems confronted by Indian people, see
the hearings held by the House and Senate since passage of AIRFA. Oversight Hear-
ing on the Need for Amendments to the Indian Religions Freedom Act Before the
Senate Select Committee on Indian Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d. Sess. (1992).
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standards imposed by the Bill of Rights upon other groups and
individuals in American society. Unlike the states, tribal govern-
ments are not pro-forma bound by the United States
Constitution's Bill of Right guarantees when regulating actions
of their members.15 Tribal status and the special political rela-
tionship that Congress maintains with Indian people, taken
together, allow for a separate standard of individual treatment
in seeming contradiction to the Fourteenth Amendment Equal
Protection Clause.
The Supreme Court most squarely recognized this principle
in the 1896 Talton v. Mayes'TM case, which considered the
applicability of the Fifth Amendment to the Cherokee Nation.
The previous year, the Cherokee Nation Supreme Court had
sentenced Bob Talton, an enrolled member of the Cherokee Na-
tion, to death for murder. Talton appealed his conviction to the
United States Supreme Court alleging that the Cherokees had
violated his Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the
United States Constitution by empaneling a Cherokee grand jury
of five members. In finding that the Cherokees were not bound
by the requirements of the Fifth Amendment, the Court ruled
that "the powers of local self government enjoyed by the Chero-
kee nation existed prior to the Constitution, they are not oper-
ated upon by the Fifth Amendment."'55
153. This does not mean that tribal individuals do not possess individual
protections against their tribal governments. Most tribal governments have adopted
within their tribal constitutions their own set of individual guarantees. And, in 1968
Congress passed the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303, which applied
many rights found in the federal Bill of Rights to tribal governments. The fact re-
mains, however, that tribal sovereignty is inherent and does not receive its political
authority from the United States Constitution.
154. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
155. Talton, 163 U.S. at 384. The Court also stated:
[Whether the Fifth Amendment applies to the Cherokee nation] depends
upon whether the powers of local government exercised by the Cherokee na-
tion are Federal powers created by and springing from the Constitution of
the United States, and hence controlled by the Fifth Amendment to that
Constitution, or whether they are local powers not created by the Constitu-
tion, although subject to its general provisions and the paramount authority
of Congress.
Id. at 382-83.
In Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co., 43 N.W. 602 (Mich. 1889), the state court
ruled that Indian marriages involving polygamy did not violate state or federal law:
While most civilized nations in our day very wisely discard polygamy, and
it is not probably lawful anywhere among English speaking na-
tions . . . .We must either hold that there can be no valid Indian marriage,
or we must hold that all marriages are valid which by Indian usage are so
regarded .... They did not occupy their territory by our grace and permis-
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In 1959, the Tenth Circuit applied the same logic to the
applicability of the First Amendment to the actions of the Navajo
government. In deciding that the Free Exercise Clause did not
prevent the Navajo tribal government from barring the sale, use,
or possession of peyote on the reservation, the court stated:
[Indian tribes] have a status higher than that of states. They
are subordinate and dependent nations possessed of all powers
as such only to the extent that they have expressly been re-
quired to surrender them .... No provision in the Constitution
makes the First Amendment applicable to Indian nations nor is
there any law of Congress doing so."
Tribal exemptions from the usual standards of constitutional
application are most readily apparent in the number of cases
involving Indian exemptions from the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause. In 1978, the Supreme Court issued two
decisions concerning the applicability of the Equal Protection
Clause to the rights of Indian individuals and the rights of tribal
governments. In Morton v. Mancari,'15 7 two non-Indian BIA em-
ployees sued the federal government for violation of the Fifth
Amendment.15 They charged that the BIA's Indian preference
requirement constituted improper racial discrimination and vio-
lated their right to equal treatment.159 The Indian preference
laws, which had operated since 1934, mandated that Indian
individuals be given preferential hiring and promotion with the
BIA.' ° The Court ruled that such a provision was not violative
of the Due Process Clause.16" ' Preferential hiring of American
sion, but by a right beyond our control. They were placed by the
[C]onstitution of the United States beyond our jurisdiction, and we had no
more right to control their domestic usages than those of Turkey or India.
Id. at 605.
The Kobogum decision is particularly interesting given the importance to the
discussion of religious protection of the Supreme Court's ruling in Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). The Michigan court declined to apply the rationale in
Reynolds holding in Kobogum. See id. at 605-06.
156. Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134-35 (10th
Cir. 1959); see also Mission Indians v. American Mgt. & Amusement, Inc., 840 F.2d
1394 (9th Cir. 1987); Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert.
denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959); Seneca Constitutional Rights Org. v. George, 348 F.
Supp. 51 (W.D.N.Y. 1972); Glover v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 19 (D. Mont.
1963).
157. 417 U.S. 535 (1974).
158. Id. at 539.
159. Id.
160. See id. at 537-38.
161. Id. at 555.
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Indians was not a racial arrangement but a political arrange-
ment that was tied rationally to the government's fulfillment of
its special political relationship with tribes.16
In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez," Maria Martinez chal-
lenged the validity of the Santa Clara Pueblo's enrollment re-
quirements."' Children born to Santa Clara Pueblo women
who married outside the tribe were ineligible for membership;
yet, the ordinance extended membership to children of male
members who married outside the tribe." Mrs. Martinez, on
behalf of herself and her children, argued that the tribal laws
constituted impermissible sex and ancestry discrimination in
violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.1"
The Court ruled, "[T]ribes remain quasi-sovereign nations
which, by government structure, culture, and source of sover-
eignty are in many ways foreign to the constitutional institutions
of the Federal and State Governments."67 Therefore the Court
held that the United States was obligated to protect Indian sta-
tus and culture and denied Mrs. Martinez's claim.'6
As discussed previously, challenges to special treatment for
American Indians have arisen in a number of cases dealing with
federal and state exemptions for sacramental peyote use by
American Indians. 169 Courts have supported differential treat-
162. Morton, 417 U.S. at 553-55. The Court based its decision on: (1) the histori-
cally unique guardian-ward trust relationship of the federal government with quasi-
sovereign Native American tribes; (2) Congress' plenary authority under Article 1 "'to
regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes;" (3) the federal government's treaty
power in Article II, § 2; and (4) precedent in which the Court had upheld preferen-
tial treatment of Indians. Id. at 551-55.
163. 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
164. Id. at 51.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 71. "As [the Supreme Court has] repeatedly emphasized, Congress'
authority over Indian matters is extraordinarily broad . . . ." Id. at 72; see United
States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641 (1977) (finding an equal protection violation by
prosecuting Indians under stricter federal law rather than less-strict state law); see
also Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 926 (1976);
Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d 1110 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979)
(upholding New Mexico's right to pass legislation allowing for Indian commercial
sales to the exclusion of other artists in defined locations); White v. Califano, 437 F.
Supp. 543 (D.S.D. 1977) ("[A]n equal protection analysis cannot be reached in this
case because federal law requires that Florence Red Dog be treated differently than
other South Dakota citizens precisely because she is an Indian person residing in
Indian country."). For a discussion of the Equal Protection Clause as it relates to
American Indians, see Ralph W. Johnson & Susan E. Crystal, Indians and Equal
Protection, 54 WASH. L. REV. 587 (1979).
168. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 71-72.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 46-60.
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ment for Indian peyote use when challenged by non-Indians. In
Peyote Way Church of God v. Thornburgh,7 ' the Fifth Circuit
held that federal and state exemptions for the use of peyote by
Native American Church members did not violate the petitioners'
free exercise rights, equal protection rights, or the Establishment
Clause.'
If, as courts have concluded, Indians are not necessarily
judged by the same standards of constitutional interpretation as
non-Indians, an important question remains: By what standards
are Indians' rights to be judged? The answer to this question is
found partly in the answer to why Indians are not judged by the
same constitutional standards. Indians are accorded a different
standard of protection and review because of their special status
and relationship to the federal government. This relationship,
referred to as the trust relationship, obligates the federal govern-
ment to protect tribal existence for as long as the tribes request
such protection. Accordingly, the courts must interpret Indian
First Amendment rights such that Indian religions are pre-
served.
The trust doctrine is, admittedly, one of the most reinvented
and reconstructed concepts in federal Indian law.' The source
of its creation,1 73 to whom it extends, and what it entails are
debated issues. The source of this debate lies in the shifting
history of federal-Indian relations. The European powers, fol-
lowed by the United States, recognized the Indian nations as
independent sovereigns, conducting their relations through the
treaty process. As Indian power diminished and American objec-
tives towards Indian lands, resources and existence transformed
over time, federal policies changed. The government embarked
on a process of "domesticating" Indians both legally and sociolog-
ically into the American mainstream. The judiciary has support-
ed these changes in federal policies through creative legal find-
170. 922 F.2d 1210 (5th Cir. 1991).
171. Id. at 1213, 1216, 1220.
172. Note, Rethinking the Trust Doctrine in Federal Indian Law, 98 HARV. L.
REV. 422 (1984); Robert N. Clinton, Isolated in Their Own Country: A Defense of Fed-
eral Protection of Indian Autonomy and Self-Government, 33 STAN. L. REV. 979
(1981); Reid P. Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to
Indians, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1213 (1975).
173. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 225-26 (1983) (stating
that the trust doctrine is implicit in certain statutes and arises from a general trust
relationship between the United States and Indian people); United States v. Sioux
Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 415 (1980); Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286,
296-97 (1942); Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219, 228-29 (1923). Treaties also
serve as a source of the trust relationship.
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ings and new interpretations and tests.7 4 The trust doctrine or
relationship has prevailed despite changing federal policies and
definitions of Indian status.'75
Today the trust relationship can be described as an implicit
compact between the United States government and the aborigi-
nal peoples of the United States. It is a relationship derived and
emanating from the natives' cession of lands to the United
States. In return for land, the United States has obligated itself
to protect native existence.7 6 Given that existence is self-defin-
ing, the trust relationship requires a cooperative and equitable
relationship between the two parties.
The existence of the trust doctrine is well documented
through treaties,"' legal opinions,"' and congressionallegislation.179 Chief Justice John Marshall first referred judi-
174. The Court's distinction between recognized and aboriginal title in Tee-Hit-
Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 2721 (1955), and United States v. Santa Fe
Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941) is one example. See Joseph W. Singer, Well Set-
tled?: The Increasing Weight of History in American Indian Land Claims, 28 GA. L.
REV. 481 (1994) (discussing how the Court's definition of aboriginal rights deviates
from Justice John Marshall's description of Indian property rights). Given this histor-
ical context, the attempt to provide an overall and coherent framework for federal
Indian law, based on logical precedent, is an enterprise taxing to even the most cre-
ative legal minds.
175. Several authors have pointed to the trust doctrine's importance in assisting
tribes to protect their religious rights, but have understandably concluded that the
courts' use of the trust relationship is too misunderstood and misapplied. See Ward
supra note 113, at 809. But see Jeri Beth K. Ezra, Comment, The Trust Doctrine: A
Source of Protection for Native American Sacred Sites, 38 CATH. U. L. REv. 705
(1989).
176. See WILLIAM C CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 34-37 (2d
ed. 1988); Chambers, supra note 172 at 1219; Clinton, supra note 172, at 984-86;
Sen. Daniel K Inouye, Discrimination and Native American Religious Rights, 23
U.W.L.A. L. REv. 3, 18 (1992).
As the Court made clear in Mitchell, there is an "undisputed existence of a
general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people." 463
U.S. at 225. This general trust relationship, however, does not automatically provide
Indian people with a cause of action for money damages for the breach of the trust.
See Gila River Pina-Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 427 F.2d 1194,
1201 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (Davis, J., concurring) ("[Tlhe 'fair and honorable dealings' clause
was [not] a catch-all allowing monetary redress for the general harm-psychological,
social, cultural, economic-done the Indians by the historical national policy of semi-
apartheid."), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 819 (1970).
177. The United States has negotiated more than 800 treaties with tribes. Of
these, 371 remain legally binding. For a listing of most treaties negotiated with Indi-
an Nations, see CHARLES J. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS, LAWS AND TREATIES (1904).
178. See infra text accompanying notes 180-99.
179. See infra text accompanying notes 200-04. The existence of a trust duty
between the United States and an Indian or Indian tribe can be inferred from the
provisions of a statute or regulation, "reinforced by the undisputed existence of a
general trust relationship between the United States and the Indian people." Mitch-
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cially to the relationship in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia"8 and
in Worcester v. Georgia.181 The Cherokees were a domestic de-
pendent nation"8 2 that exercised exclusive authority within its
territorial boundaries."8 According to Marshall, the relation-
ship between the Cherokees and the United States was that of a
ward to his guardian.'8 " The Cherokees were a protectorate of
the United States; a weaker state, which without giving up its
sovereignty, had accepted the protection of a more powerful
state. 1"
Over the years, the courts have continually reinterpreted the
trust relationship as that of guardian to a ward.' As guard-
ian, the United States possessed total rights and control to dic-
tate the content and parameters of the relationship. The Court's
reasoning was carried to its most extreme in the United States v.
Kagama"' and Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock's  decisions. In
Kagama, the Court emphasized that tribes are the wards of the
government and stated that as a result of "their very weakness
and helplessness, so largely due to the course of dealing of the
Federal Government with them and the treaties in which it has
been promised, there arises the duty of protection, and with it
the power."'89 In Lone Wolf, the Court found that the only limi-
tations on the government's authority were those "considerations
of justice as would control a Christian people in their treatment
of an ignorant and dependent race."9 °
By the mid-1930s, in United States v. Creek Nation,9 ' the
Court had begun to re-balance the trust relationship, acknowl-
ell, 463 U.S. at 225; see also Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, Nos. 69, 299
& 353, slip. op. at 5 (Ct. Cl. Sept. 19, 1978) ("The trust relationship does not depend
for its existence on the terms of treaties, agreements, and statutes.").
180. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
181. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
182. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
183. Id. at 17, 53, 74.
184. Id. at 17.
185. Id. at 17, 24.
186. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903); United StAtes v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 383 (1886).
187. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 383-84.
188. 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
189. Kagama, 118 U.S. at 384.
190. 187 U.S. at 565 (quoting Beecher v. Wetherby, 95 U.S. 517, 525 (1877)). In
Sioux Nation of Indians v. United States, 601 F.2d 1157 (Ct. Cl. 1979), Judge
Nichols referred to the date of the Lone Wolf decision as "one of the blackest days in
the history of the American Indian, the Indians' Dred Scott decision." Id. at 1173
(Nichols, J., concurring).
191. 295 U.S. 103 (1935).
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edging that the United States possessed judiciable obligations in
its relationship with Indian tribes.'92 A series of cases followed
in which the Court ruled that the United States possessed a
fiduciary responsibility to protect tribal lands'93 and resourc-
es. 194
Subsequent decisions9 ' confirmed the United States' obli-
gation to protect Indian culture and existence, including
health 96 and education. In Peyote Way Church of God, Inc. v.
Smith.1 the court stated, "Congress has the power ... to pre-
serve our Native American Indians... as a cohesive culture
until such time, if ever, all of them are assimilated in the main
stream of American culture."' 9 The court held that the federal
exemption "allowing tribal Native Americans to continue their
centuries-old tradition of peyote use is rationally related to the
legitimate governmental objective of preserving Native American
culture." '
192. Id. at 108-09. In Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, the Court held that the
government's disposition of tribal lands under the public land laws would be an act
of confiscation, not guardianship. 249 U.S. 110 (1919)
193. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980); Menominee
Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404 (1968); see Jeri Beth K. Ezra, Comment, The
Trust Doctrine: A Source of Protection for Native American Sacred Sites, 38 CATH. U.
L. REV. 705 (1989) (discussing the trust doctrine's application to sacred sites as a
function of the government's obligation to protect Indian property rights).
194. In Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942), the Court
extended the government's responsibility to include tribal funds held in trust. See
Ezra, supra note 193, at 719-20.
195. See FRANCIS P. PRuCHA, THE GREAT FATHER: THE UNITED STATES GOVERN-
MENT AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 399 (1984).
196. See, e.g., White v. Califano, 581 F.2d 697, 698 (1978) ("We think that Con-
gress has unambiguously declared that the federal government has a legal responsi-
bility to provide health care to Indians."). In Lincoln v. Vigil, 113 S. Ct. 2024, 2033
(1993), the Court refused to determine whether the Secretary's decision to cancel a
program for handicapped children violated the trust relationship, but stated: "What-
ever the contours of that relationship, though, it could not limit the Service's discre-
tion to reorder its priorities from serving a subgroup of beneficiaries to serving the
broader class of all Indians nationwide."
197. 556 F. Supp. 632 (N.D. Tex. 1983).
198. Id. at 639.
199. 922 F.2d 1210, 1216 (1991). In at least two cases, the courts have found
that the states may legitimately exercise a trust relationship towards Indians. See,
e.g., Livingston v. Ewing, 601 F.2d 1110 (10th Cir. 1979) (upholding a Sante Fe, New
Mexico ordinance which allowed Indian artisans exclusive commercial areas against
equal protection claims by finding that states may exercise the federal trust power
for the benefit of American Indians), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 870 (1979); St. Paul In-
tertribal Hous. Bd. v. Reynolds, 564 F. Supp. 1408, 1412 (D. Minn. 1983) ("State
action for the benefit of Indians can also fall under the trust doctrine and therefore
be protected from challenge under the equal protection clause or civil rights stat-
utes.").
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In several recent bills, Congress has acknowledged the spe-
cial political relationship that it maintains with tribes and has
accepted its responsibility to ensure the continued future of Indi-
an people. In the 1978 Indian Child Welfare Act2" Congress
stated:
Recognizing the special relationship between the United States
and the Indian tribes and their members and the Federal re-
sponsibility to Indian people ... Congress, through statutes,
treaties, and the general course of dealing with Indian tribes,
has assumed the responsibility for the protection and preserva-
tion of Indian tribes and their resources .... 201
The 1976 Indian Health Care Improvement Act affirms that
"Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of this Nation, in
fulfillment of its special responsibilities and legal obligations to
the American Indian people, to meet the national goal of provid-
ing the highest possible health status to Indians."2 °2 The re-
cently passed Indian Tribal Justice Act states that "the United
States has a trust responsibility to each tribal government that
includes the protection of the sovereignty of each tribal govern-
ment.- o
The proposed Native American Cultural Protection and Free
Exercise of Religion Act of 1994 emphasizes:
[T]he United States has a unique, government-to-government
relationship... which permits the United States to take mea-
sures to protect against interference with the continuing cultur-
al cohesiveness and integrity of Indian tribes and Native Amer-
ican traditional cultures ... as part of the historic Federal-
Indian trust relationship it is the intent of the United States to
pursue enforceable Federal policies which will protect the Na-
tive American community and tribal vitality and cultural integ-
rity .... 04
200. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
201. Sub-section (3) continues: "[T]here is no resource that is more vital to the
continued existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and . . . the
United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protecting Indian children ..
25 U.S.C. § 1901(3)(1988) (emphasis added).
202. Pub. L. No. 94-437, § 3, 90 Stat. 1400, 1401 (1976) (codified in scattered
sections of 25 U.S.C.); see White v. Califano, 437 F. Supp. 543, 555 (D. S.D 1977),
affd per curiam, 581 F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1978) ("We think that Congress has unam-
biguously declared that the federal government has a legal responsibility to provide
health care to Indians. This stems from the 'umique relationship' between Indians
and the federal government, a relationship that is reflected in hundreds of
cases . . ").
203. 25 U.S.C. § 3601(2) (1988 & Supp. 1993).
204. S. 2269, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 101(4)(5) (1994); see also The Indian Self-
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Recent presidential addresses provide further proof of the
government's responsibility to protect Indian existence. In a
meeting with Indian leaders in 1991, President Bush stated,
"[t]oday we move forward toward a permanent relationship of
understanding and trust, a relationship in which the tribes of
the nation sit in positions of dependent sovereignty along with
other governments that compose the family that is America.""5
In April 1994, President Bill Clinton held a historic meeting
with tribal leaders at the White House. In his address he not
only reaffirmed the importance of the government's obligation,
but specifically spoke of the government's responsibility to pre-
serve Indian existence and religion:
Today I reaffirm our commitment to self-determination for
tribal governments. I pledge to fulfill the trust obligations of
the Federal Government. I vow to honor and respect tribal
sovereignty based upon our unique historic relationship. And I
pledge to continue my efforts to protect your right to fully exer-
cise your faith as you wish... your culture and your very exis-
tence.2°
IV. CONCLUSION
Justice Scalia based his rejection of the strict scruti-
ny/compelling state interest test in Smith on the Court's prior
refusal to grant exemption unless the free exercise claim was
supported by another constitutional claim, such as the right to
free speech in the Sherbert2 °7 decision and the right to educate
one's children in Yoder.2' However, the Court has at its dispos-
al the trust doctrine, which not only meets this hybrid re-
quirement, but by the Court's own analysis, must be used to
Determination and Education Assistance Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-450n (1988).
205. 27 PuB. PAPERS 783, 785 (June 14, 1991).
206. President William Clinton further emphasized:
This then is our first principle: respecting your values, your religions, your identity,
and your sovereignty. This brings us to the second principle that should guide our
relationship: We must dramatically improve the Federal Government's relationships
with the tribes and become full partners with the tribal nations .... The judgement
of history will be that the President of the United States and the leaders of the
sovereign Indian nations met and kept faith with each other and our common heri-
tage and together lifted our great nations to a new and better place.
Remarks to American Indian and Alaska Native Tribal Leaders, in 30 PUB. PAPERS
941, 942, 944 (April 29, 1994).
207. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
208. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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protect tribal rights.2" As the Court has recognized,21° the
United States government is not mandated by the United States
Constitution and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to hold Indians to the same standards of constitu-
tional protection as other groups. The Court's decisions in
Talton, Mancari, Martinez, and a number of other cases have
conclusively proven this.2" The tribes' status as inherent sover-
eigns predating the existence of the United States Constitution
precludes any other analysis.2 2
The courts then may apply a separate standard to tribes.
The trust doctrine, as discussed, obligates the United States
government to take those measures, which, as trustee, will en-
sure continued tribal existence. Congress, the President, and the
courts have recognized that religion is an immutable aspect of
Indian culture, life, and existence.21 As the receiver of more
than ninety-seven percent of the continental United States, the
government has obligated itself, as trustee, to be held to high
fiduciary standards. 4
209. See Fort, supra note 135, at 205-08 (offering an analysis whereby the Court
can protect the rights of minorities through the First Amendment).
210. From a political philosophical perspective, one can also argue that Indian
people are not part of the consent of the governed.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 153-69.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 153-69.
213. See Michaelsen, supra note 16 at 47.
214. Over the years the Court has developed canons of construction to be applied
in deciding Indian rights cases. See, e.g., Bryan v. Itasca City, 426 U.S. 373 (1976);
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985) (requiring clear and
specific statement by Congress before divestment of Indian authority); DeCoteau v.
District County Court, 420 U.S. 425 (1975).
484 [Vol. 56
136
Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/1
A TRIUMPH OF MYTH OVER PRINCIPLE: THE
SAGA OF THE MONTANA OPEN-RANGE
Roy H. Andes*
"Oh give me lands,
Lots of lands under starry skies above,
Don't fence me in. . .
I. INTRODUCTION
Many city people-as well as full fledged Montana-
borns-find part of Montana's charm in its wide open spaces.
Cresting a hilltop by car, one may encounter a cowperson on
horseback, a Kenworth tractor-trailer, a bull elk, or a pair of
black angus heifers. By romantic tradition and to large extent by
law, all have equal run of Montana's range. The "open range"
tradition permits free-ranging livestock, limited only by fence-
building or herding by persons who wish to exclude wandering
animals. The word "free" is literal; the livestock-owner pays
nothing for grazing other people's unfenced grass.
Most people assume that "open range" is the law of Mon-
tana.2 The Supreme Court of the Montana Territory so held in
Smith v. Williams.3 Therein, the court concluded that damages
caused by trespassing livestock may not be recovered unless the
plaintiff had erected a statutory "legal" fence to fence out ani-
mals.4 But that tradition may not well-serve modern Montana
with high speed automobiles, growing population and increasing
urbanization. This Article first surveys national range law, then
compares the national trend to Montana's law. The Article con-
cludes by assessing to what extent open range rules should re-
main part of Montana law.
* Agency Counsel, Montana Department of State Lands; M.A. Communication
Studies, University of Montana, 1988; J.D. University of Virginia School of Law,
1977; B.A., History, Bridgewater College, 1973.
1. Lyrics by Robert Fletcher; melody by Cole Porter.
2. See Williams v. Selstad, 235 Mont. 137, 766 P.2d 247 (1988); State ex rel.
Martin v. Finley, 227 Mont. 242, 738 P.2d 497 (1987); Siegfried v. Atchison, 219
Mont. 14, 709 P.2d 1006 (1985); Ambrogini v. Todd, 197 Mont. 111, 642 P.2d 1013
(1982).
3. 2 Mont. 195, 202 (1874).
4. Smith, 2 Mont. at 197-202 (interpreting the predecessor statute to MONT.
CODE ANN. § 81-4-215 (1993)).
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II. RANGE LAw NATIONALLY
A. In the Beginning-Mere Custom
An understanding of range law requires examination of its
social and legal history. One scholar described the law of the
range as the purest example of geographical circumstances deter-
mining legal rules.5
In contrast to the open range policy of the western United
States, the common law of the range derives from England and
requires the stock owner to restrain his livestock from running
at large. Failure to restrain animals imposes strict liability for
any damages caused by trespassing livestock. Such common law
range rules apply in most jurisdictions, particularly the eastern
states.6
However, by early custom in the West, the federal govern-
ment allowed private individuals to gratuitously graze stock at
large on federal lands. The practice was permitted because of the
presence of "great plains and vast tracts of unenclosed land,
suitable for pasture."7 At the time, "[it] was reasoned that much
of the land would be unused if farmers were required to limit
grazing to areas enclosed with fences."8 Nineteenth century eth-
ics abhorred such "waste," so the western territories and newly
admitted states generally continued the open range custom ei-
ther by statute or judicial decision.' In 1894, the United States
Supreme Court summarized as follows:
As there are, or were, in the State of Texas, as well as in the
newer [s]tates of the West generally, vast areas of land over
which, so long as the government owned them, cattle had been
permitted to roam at will for pasturage, it was not thought
proper, as the land was gradually taken up by individual pro-
prietors, to change the custom of the country in that particular,
and oblige cattle owners to incur the heavy expense of fencing
their land, or be held as trespassers by reason of their cattle
5. Bernhard Grossfeld, Geography and Law, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1510, 1515
(1984).
6. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 535 (1911); Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S.
320, 326 (1890); W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 76, at 53841 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 504 cmt. f
(1977).
7. Light, 220 U.S. at 535.
8. Marsha K. Ternus, Liability for the Escape of Animals, 30 DRAKE L. REV.
257, 257 (1980).
9. See KEETON, supra note 6, at 540, text accompanying notes 21-22.
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accidentally straying upon the land of others.°
The "open range" was mere custom-"an implied li-
cense"-unless embodied in state or territorial statutes." The
United States Supreme Court in 1911 described it thusly:
And so, without passing a statute, or taking any affirmative
action on the subject, the United States suffered its public
domain to be used for [open range]. There thus grew up a sort
of implied license that these lands, thus left open, might be
used so long as the Government did not cancel its tacit con-
sent. 12
B. Range Law Becomes Statute
Range custom evolved into statutes when state and territori-
al legislatures began to enact legislation. The "open range" stat-
utes in western states followed an almost identical pattern.
Montana's statute provides:
If any [livestock] break into any enclosure and the fence of the
enclosure is legal, as provided in [another code section], the
owner of the animals is liable for all damages to the owner or
occupant of the enclosure. This section may not be construed to
require a legal fence in order to maintain an action for injury
done by animals running at large contrary to law. 3
The First Territorial Legislature at Bannack enacted the Mon-
tana Open Range Statute in 1865. Today, its language remains
substantially unchanged. 4 A later companion section defines
"legal fence" as to height and spacing of posts and wires. 15
The statutes of most other western states are substantively
identical to Montana's, including Arizona, Arkansas, California,
the Dakotas, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Texas and Wash-
ington."6 These statutes are notable as much for what they
10. Lazarus v. Phelps, 152 U.S. 81, 85 (1894).
11. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 326 (1890).
12. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 535 (1911).
13. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-215 (1993). This statute is referred to as the
"Montana Open Range Statute" throughout the text of this article.
14. AcTs, RESOLUTIONS AND MEMORIALS OF THE TERRITORY OF MONTANA,
PASSED BY THE FIRST LEGIsLATIvE ASSEMBLY § 1, at 351-52 (Bannack 1864) (current
version at MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-215 (1993)).
15. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-101 (1993).
16. Kobayashi v. Strangeway, 116 P. 461, 462 (Wash. 1911); Union Pac. Ry. Co.
v. Rollins, 5 Kan. 98 (1869); Thomas L. Palmer, Determining Liability of Ranchers
and Farmers for Injuries Caused by Fencing or Not Fencing Rangelands, 14 J. AGRIc.
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failed to do, as for what they did do. On their face the statutes
forbid collection of damages from the owner of wandering live-
stock unless one had a "legal fence" around one's land. Signifi-
cantly, these statutes did not declare a right to graze livestock
on another person's land. Neither did they discuss any other
remedies one might employ-such as injunctions, nuisance law,
or self-help. Likewise, the statutes did not treat other issues that
might arise-such as standards of care or highway problems.
Compared to the broad custom they replaced, the open range
statutes were facially quite narrow. This divergence left much
room for judicial interpretation.
C. A Changing West Provokes Changing Range Laws
Well before the turn of the century, fundamental societal
changes, primarily the increase in population and a change of
attitude towards pastureland and farmland, were already under-
mining the rationale for the open range. Other changes included:
the arrival of railroads capable of delivering fence posts to the
prairies, the invention of barbed wire in the 1870's, and the iron
windmill which could provide water to livestock nearly any-
where. 7
By 1889, the law of the open range was under attack. 8 In
1894, in Lazarus v. Phelps,9 the United States Supreme Court
held that common law liability principles continued to apply,
despite Texas' open range statute, where the defendant had
stocked the range with more animals than his portion of the land
would support. The Court construed the Texas Open Range Stat-
ute narrowly:
The object of the statute ... is manifest .... It could nev-
er have been intended, however, to authorize cattle owners
deliberately to take possession of such lands, and depasture
their cattle upon them without making compensation, particu-
larly if this were done against the will of the owner, or under
such circumstances as to show a deliberate intent to obtain the
benefit of another's pasturage. In other words, the trespass au-
thorized, or rather condoned, was an accidental trespass caused
by straying cattle .... The ordinary rule that a man is bound
to contemplate the natural and probable consequences of his
TAX'N & L. 25, 27 (1992); Grossfeld, supra note 5, at 1517 n.47.
17. Grossfeld, supra note 5, at 1517.
18. Buford v. Houtz, 133 U.S. 320, 328 (1890).
19. 152 U.S. 81 (1894).
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own act would apply in such a case.20
The Lazarus Court listed a variety of acts that would take a
stock owner's actions outside the protection of the Texas Open
Range Statute, including driving cattle upon another's lands,
overstocking the range, and enclosing another's lands along with
one's own.2
1
In essence, Lazarus established the principle that the com-
mon law remains intact, except to the extent it is modified by
open range statutes. The Court interpreted the Texas Open
Range Statutes as narrowly condoning only accidental trespass
by livestock.22 Other trespasses remained subject to common
law remedies. 23 By the first decade of this century, most courts
in open range states were either following the narrow-construc-
tion principle from Lazarus, or independently adopting it on
their own.24
Soon after Lazarus, the gratuitous open range came to an
end on most federal land. In 1897 forest reserve legislation com-
manded the responsible federal agency "to make such rules and
regulations... as will insure the objects of such reservation...
and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction."2' The reg-
ulations adopted by the Secretary of Agriculture prohibited all
but de minimis grazing on national forest reserves without pay-
ing for a grazing permit.
The federal regulations were challenged by Fred Light, a
rancher who owned 540 acres of Colorado land near the Holy
Cross Forest Reserve. He annually grazed 500 head of cattle on
the unfenced range consisting of his ranch, the land around it,
and the Reserve. The government sued to enjoin Light from
turning out his cattle to wander on the Reserve. Light responded
that Colorado's range statute gave him license to freely graze his
20. Lazarus, 152 U.S. at 85 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 85-86.
22. Id at 85. The Texas open range statutes provided: "Every gardener, farmer,
or planter shall make a sufficient fence about his clear land under cultivation at
least five feet high, and make such fence sufficiently close to prevent hogs from pass-
ing through the same." TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. § 2431 (1840). "If it shall appear that
the said fence is insufficient, then the owner of such [livestock] shall not be liable to
make satisfaction for such damages." TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. § 2434 (1840).
23. Lazarus, 152 U.S. at 84-86.
24. Kobayashi v. Strangeway, 116 P. 461 (Wash. 1911); Jones v. Blythe, 93 P.
994 (Utah 1908); Bell v. Gonzales, 83 P. 639 (Colo. 1905); Martin v. Platte Valley
Sheep Co., 76 P. 571 (Wyo. 1904); Monroe v. Cannon, 24 Mont. 316, 61 P. 863
(1900); Poindexter v. May, 34 S.E. 971 (Va. 1900); Union Pac. Ry. v. Rollins, 5 Kan.
98, 103-04 (1869). See also Robinson v. Kerr, 355 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1960).
25. Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, 30 Stat. 11, 35. (appropriations bill).
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stock and that the forest regulations were void to the extent that
they exempted federal lands from the open range laws of Colora-
do. 2
6
In Light v. United States, the United States Supreme Court
held that the federal government is not prohibited by the Colora-
do Open Range Statute from revoking the license to graze on
federal land, whether the land is owned in either a sovereign or
proprietary capacity.27 In that the case the Court stated, "Fence
laws do not authorize wanton and willful trespass, nor do they
afford immunity to those who, in disregard of property rights,
turn loose their cattle under circumstances showing that they
were intended to graze upon the lands of another."28 The Court
interpreted Mr. Light's refusal to get a grazing permit, his state-
ment that he would resist the removal of his cattle from the
reserve, and his intention to continue "turning out his cattle" as
beyond the protection of Colorado's open-range statute.29 While
the Court did not expressly require all users to acquire forest
grazing permits, the holding is broader than it asserts. The
Court upheld the grazing restrictions despite the absence of
evidence that Mr. Light committed any sort of overt act of the
kind proscribed in Lazarus.3 ° Most significantly, the Court im-
plicitly held, for the first time, that passive open-range grazing
could create liability on unfenced land.
Since Light, grazing prohibitions on unfenced federal land
have withstood every challenge. In Shannon v. United States,3
the same 1897 federal legislation was at issue in Montana's
Little Belt Mountains. The defendant argued that the Montana
Open Range Statute justified his grazing. The Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that the Property Clause of the United States Constitution
preempted any police power legislation of Montana that might
otherwise apply:
[Montana] could not give to the people of that state the right to
pasture cattle upon the public domain, or in any way to use the
same. Its own laws in regard to fencing and pasturing cattle at
large must be held to apply only to land subject to its own
dominion. No one within the state can claim any right in the
26. Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 525, 526 (1911).
27. Id. at 537 (citing inter alia Lazarus, 152 U.S. at 81, and Monroe v. Can-
non, 24 Mont. 316, 61 P.2d'863 (1900)).
28. Light, 220 U.S. at 537.
29. Id. at 536-38.
30. Lazarus, 152 U.S. at 85-86; see supra text accompanying note 21.
31. 160 F. 870 (9th Cir. 1908).
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public land by virtue of such a statute.32
Subsequently, the holdings of Light and Shannon were adopted
in United States v. Thompson,33 despite arguments that neither
case was applicable unless the defendant willfully committed
trespass upon federal land. The court in Thompson concluded
that while state police power statutes might permit cattle on
private lands to graze at large unless "fenced out," proprietary
federal property rights entitle the United States to reverse that
rule on federal land.34 Consistent subsequent cases appear to
settle the issue: The free "open range" in national forests and re-
serves is officially dead, state customs and statutes notwith-
standing.3"
Changes in grazing laws were also underway within open
range states. Most state legislatures enacted herd district stat-
utes that, by initiative of a local community, allowed the commu-
nity to fully or partially revert to the common law inside the
districts.36 Many other types of statutes also reimposed common
law fencing requirements in varying degrees and for various
purposes in what had formerly been the open range.37
In addition, by the beginning of this century, most state
courts were adopting the narrow-construction principle from
Lazarus which held that open range statutes are effective only to
modify, but not abolish common law liability." The common law
requires owners to "fence in" their livestock or else pay for re-
sulting trespasses. Thereupon, western courts became engaged in
the task of distinguishing protected activities under open range
statutes from those subject to common law liability. For example,
the Washington Supreme Court concluded that common law
rules controlled where adjoining landowners jointly enclosed
within an exterior boundary fence had not exercised their statu-
32. Shannon, 160 F. at 875.
33. 41 F. Supp. 13, 15 (E.D. Wash. 1941).
34. Id. at 15-16.
35. Bilderback v. United States, 558 F. Supp. 903 (D. Or. 1982); United States
v. Holman, 247 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. Mo. 1965); United States v. Johnston, 38 F.
Supp. 4 (S.D. W. Va. 1941); United States v. Gurley, 279 F. 874 (N.D. Ga. 1922).
36. See, e.g., Easley v. Lee, 721 P.2d 215 (Idaho 1986); Lindsay v. Cobb, 627
P.2d 349 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981).
37. See, e.g., Vanderwater v. Hatch, 835 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1987); Fuchser v.
Jacobson, 290 N.W.2d 449 (Neb. 1980); Carver v. Ford, 591 P.2d 305 (Okla. 1979);
Wenndt v. Latare, 200 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 1972); Vangilder v. Faulk, 426 S.W.2d 821
(Ark. 1968); Poindexter v. May, 34 S.E. 971 (Va. 1900); Haigh v. Bell, 23 S.E. 666
(W. Va. 1895).
38. See supra note 24.
1995] 491
143
Leaphart: The Honorable William D. Murray
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1995
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
tory right to erect a partition fence between them. 9 The court
awarded the plaintiff damages caused by defendant's trespassing
livestock.4'
For the last half-century, range issues in state courts have
increasingly shifted from farmer/rancher litigation to motor-
ist/rancher cases. These new-generation range cases typically
involve claims for death or injury from vehicle accidents caused
by livestock wandering onto highways.
Historically, the common law had provided a "public ways"
exception to the fencing-in requirement for livestock. Unless the
animals were known to possess "an unruly disposition," they
were free to roam public roads at will.4 1 Thus, in highway cases
in western states these two different theories were effectively
argued to justify judgments for defendant stockmen, both com-
mon law and open range law.42
As vehicle congestion increased, however, many state courts
began to modify the common law, stating essentially, "There is
no reason for exempting cattle owners from the same duty appli-
cable to other people to use 'ordinary care or skill in the manage-
ment of [their] property."'43 Thus, in many states the common
law immunity was changed to reflect an ordinary negligence
standard for stock owners-a trend increasingly followed
throughout the United States." Even most of the open range
states now appear to require "ordinary due care" by owners of
livestock with regard to the animals' presence on public high-
ways.' In doing so, some courts expressly considered and re-
jected the applicability of their states' open range laws in vehi-
cle-livestock collisions." A few dissenting courts remain, but the
39. Kobayashi v. Strangeway, 116 P. 461, 462 (Wash. 1911).
40. Id.; see supra note 24.
41. See, e.g., Pelham v. Spears, 132 So. 886 (Ala. 1931).
42. See, e.g., Bartsch v. Irvine Co., 149 Mont. 405, 427 P.2d 302 (1967).
43. Galeppi Bros. v. Bartlett, 120 F.2d 208, 210 (9th Cir. 1941) (quoting CAL.
CIV. CODE § 1714).
44. George v. Perkins, 221 So. 2d 717 (Miss. 1969); Rice v. Turner, 62 S.E.2d
24 (Va. 1950); Bender v. Welsh, 25 A.2d 182 (Pa. 1942); Drew v. Gross, 147 N.E.
757 (Ohio 1925); James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Liability of Owner of Animal
for Damage to Motor Vehicle or Injury to Person Riding Therein Resulting From
Collision with Domestic Animal at Large in Street or Highway, 29 A.L.R. 4th 431,
443-47 (1984).
45. Galeppi Bros., 120 F.2d at 209 (applying California law); Carrow Co. v.
Lusby, 804 P.2d 747 (Ariz. 1990); Grubb v. Wolfe, 408 P.2d 756 (N.M. 1965);
Eixenberger v. Belle Fourche Livestock Exch., 58 N.W.2d 235 (S.D. 1953); Shepard v.
Smith, 263 P.2d 985 (Idaho 1953); Summers v. Parker, 259 P.2d 59 (Cal. Ct. App.
1953); Jackson v. Hardy, 160 P.2d 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 1945).
46. Carrow, 804 P.2d at 750-54; Grubb, 408 P.2d at 758-60; Galeppi Bros., 120
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modern view that stock owners will be held to ordinary negli-
gence duties seems to be most widely accepted.47
Although open range statutes remain on the books in many
states, the circumstances justifying them have largely vanished
in the dust of history. Erecting fences and watering stock in
remote places is no longer impossible, and little chance remains
of "wasting" uneaten grass. More significantly, most of the West
is now in private or proprietary ownership with commensurate
competing land uses. In light of these changes, legislative and
judicial inroads have cut deeply into the open range. However,
Montana's situation appears to be unique.
III. MONTANA RANGE LAW
A. Before the Turn of the Century
The early Montana Supreme Court briefly gave great defer-
ence to the concept of the open range.' In 1874, the court in
Smith v. Williams interpreted the territorial Open Range Stat-
ute49 to require complete enclosure as a prerequisite to receiv-
ing damages from trespassing stock."0 The court insisted that a
"legal fence" at the point of breach was insufficient." Again, in
1889, the court affirmed a jury instruction under the Open
Range Statute that if a defendant drove livestock onto plaintiffs
unfenced land for pasture, but did not do so with malice, then
the defendant must prevail in a damages action.2
By the close of the century, Montana's range was changing
along with the rest of the country's. The 1895 legislature enacted
various regulations and closures of the open range. These enact-
ments categorically closed the range to "swine,"" and any "stud
horse, ridgeling, or unaltered male mule or jackass over [eigh-
teen] months. . . ."' The open range was closed to rams and
F.2d at 210; Jackson, 160 P.2d. at 165.
47. Compare Galeppi Bros., 120 F.2d at 209; Carrow Co., 804 P.2d 747; Grubb,
408 P.2d 756; Eixenberger, 58 N.W.2d 235; Shepard, 263 P.2d 985; Summers, 259
P.2d 59; Jackson, 160 P.2d 161 with George, 221 So. 2d 717; Rice, 62 S.E.2d 24;
Bender, 25 A.2d 182; Drew, 147 N.E. 757.
48. See Smith v. Williams, 2 Mont. 195 (1874).
49. AcTS, RESOLUTIONS AND MEMORIALS OF THE TERRITORY OF MONTANA,
PASSED BY THE FIRST LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY § 1, at 351 (Bannack 1864) (current
version at MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-215 (1993)).
50. Smith, 2 Mont. at 201.
51. Id.
52. Fant v. Lyman, 9 Mont. 61, 22 P. 120 (1889).
53. IV. THE CODES AND STAT. OF MONT. tit. XIV., § 1165 (1895).
54. LV. THE CODES AND STAT. OF MONT. tit. XIV., § 1163 (1895).
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"he goat[s]" from August 1 to December 1." Over the years,
those types of restrictions multiplied. The following are all now
forbidden to run at large in Montana: swine, sheep, llamas, al-
pacas, bison, goats,56 "male equine animals,"57 mixed-breed
bulls, and bulls of any kind between December 1 and June 1.58
Over time the legislature has imposed many regulations on
what was once the open range.59 Herd district laws were enact-
ed in 1917.6o Owners or possessors of fifty-five percent of the
land, not less than twelve square miles in size, must petition to
create a district." Allowing animals to run at large in a herd
district is a misdemeanor.62
B. Open Range Cases From 1900 to 1960
Apace with a changing Montana, in 1900, the Montana Su-
preme Court criticized its 1889 Fant decision and expressly
adopted the Lazarus principle, becoming one of the first state
courts to do so.63 Monroe v. Cannon applied common law strict
liability principles to permit a landowner to seek damages from a
sheepman who had herded his stock onto the plaintiffs land,
saying:
[A]ppellant contends that the provisions of [the Montana Open
Range Statute]... negative the right to sue for damages,
where the premises are not inclosed by a legal fence .... If
appellant is correct, no man whose field, or pasture, or garden
is not inclosed by a legal fence, is entitled to any protection
under the law from the trespasses of any man who may desire
to drive or herd his cattle or sheep upon it .... The mistake
appellant makes is in concluding that the [Montana Open
Range Statute].. . does not modify, but abrogates the rights ex-
isting under the common law."
In adopting the Lazarus principle, the Montana Supreme Court
55. IV. THE CODES AND STAT. OF MONT. tit. XrV., § 1164 (1895).
56. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-201 (1993).
57. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-204 (1993).
58. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-210 (1993).
59. See generally MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 81-4-201 to -220 (1993); MONT. CODE.
ANN. §§ 76-16-101 to -415 (1993); see also 1939 Mont. Laws 554, § 26.
60. 1917 Mont. Laws 102 (current version at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 81-4-309 to -
328 (1993)).
61. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-301 (1993).
62. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-306 (1993).
63. Monroe v. Cannon, 24 Mont. 316, 324-26, 61 P. 863, 865-66 (1900).
64. Id. at 321-22, 61 P. at 864-65 (emphasis added).
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applied an elementary rule of statutory construction-common
law controls except when modified by statute.65 The court held
that deliberate herding of stock onto unfenced private lands was
not within the scope of the Open Range Statute, and was not,
therefore, insulated from common law strict liability.
Two years later, in Beinhorn v. Griswold,6 the Montana
Supreme Court broadened its interpretation of the Lazarus prin-
ciple in light of the Open Range Statute. Beinhorn's cattle were
grazing public range when they wandered onto Griswold's un-
fenced mining claim, drank from open containers of cyanide
solution and, regrettably, died. At issue was the standard of care
to be imposed on Griswold-was he entitled to treat the cattle as
trespassers, licensees or invitees? Using the Lazarus principle,
the court concluded that common law tort rules were not dis-
placed by the Open Range Statute. Thus, the cattle were treated
as trespassers:
The owner is entitled to the exclusive possession of his
land, whether fenced or not; and it is beyond the power of the
legislature to prescribe, or of custom to create, a right in anoth-
er to occupy the land or enjoy its fruits. Either written law or
custom may withhold from the owner who does not fence his
land a remedy for loss suffered by reason of casual trespasses
by cattle which stray upon it, and may give a remedy for such
trespasses to those only who inclose their land .... This is
undoubtedly a legitimate exercise of the police power. It falls
far short, however, of conferring a legal right to dispossess the
nonfencing owner .... The owners of domestic animals hold no
servitude upon or interest, temporary or permanent, in, the open
land of another, merely because it is open. 7
Starting with Monroe and Beinhorn, for the first sixty years
of this century, the Montana Supreme Court conscientiously
applied the Lazarus principle to open range issues. The court
decided fifteen open range cases, using the common law rather
than the Open Range Statute in ten of them." In only two cas-
65. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1-108-109, 1-2-103 (1993); O'Fallon v. Farmers Ins.
Exch., 260 Mont. 233, 244, 859 P.2d 1008, 1015 (1993); State ex rel. La Point v. Dis-
trict Court, 69 Mont. 29, 33, 220 P. 88, 89 (1923); Finlen v. Heinze, 28 Mont. 548,
563-64, 73 P. 123, 126 (1903).
66. 27 Mont. 79, 69 P. 557 (1902).
67. Id. at 89, 69 P. at 558 (emphasis added).
68. Thompson v. Mattuschek, 134 Mont. 500, 333 P.2d 1022 (1959); Hill v.
Chappel Bros. Inc., 93 Mont. 92, 18 P.2d 1106 (1932); Herness v. McCann, 90 Mont.
95, 300 P. 257 (1931); Long v. Davis, 68 Mont. 85, 217 P. 667 (1923); Dorman v.
Erie, 63 Mont. 579, 208 P. 908 (1922); Chilcott v. Rea, 52 Mont. 134, 155 P. 1114
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es did the court apply the Open Range Statute and insulate
stock owners from liability.69 Generally, the court's decisions
carefully distinguished conduct prohibited under common law
grazing rules from actions that were permitted by the Open
Range Statute. In doing so, like other states' courts, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court increasingly tended to restrict the types of
conduct permitted on the open range.
In 1912, the court expanded on Monroe by holding that one
who deliberately herds stock on unfenced range does so "at his
peril" with regard to the location of boundaries between his
leased range and his neighbor's land.7 ° In Herrin v. Sieben, the
plaintiff owned land in checkerboard with the defendant's feder-
ally leased range. The evidence supporting the jury verdict
showed that the defendant had "depastured substantially the
whole area of plaintiffs lands, and that during this time he real-
ized no benefit from them."71
In 1916, the common law liability imposed upon herders of
stock was expanded a step further.72 In Chilcott v. Rea, the de-
fendants were herding sheep along a public road when nightfall
forced them to bed down the sheep without food or water.73
During the night the sheep broke through a fence and consumed
$7,570 worth of the plaintiffs orchard. The defendants argued
that "no right to recover for depredations of this sort can be
based upon ordinary negligence, but the 'complaint must either
show that the lands were inclosed with a legal fence, or that the
trespass was the result of the willful, intentional act of the de-
fendants.' 74 The supreme court disagreed, stating:
[W]here negligence is charged to the owner of such animals,
and where it is claimed by him that the nonexistence of a legal
fence was a factor in the control by him of such animals, the
absence of a fence or its nonlegal character might be material
(1916); Herrin v. Sieben, 46 Mont. 226, 127 P. 323 (1912); Musselshell Cattle Co. v.
Woolfolk, 34 Mont. 126, 85 P. 874 (1906); Beinhorn, 27 Mont at 89, 69 P. at 558;
Monroe v. Cannon, 24 Mont. 316, 61 P. 863 (1900).
69. Dunbar v. Emigh, 117 Mont. 287, 158 P.2d 311 (1945); Schreiner v. Deep
Creek Stock Ass'n, 68 Mont. 104, 217 P. 663 (1923). Three cases were ultimately de-
cided on collateral issues: Thompson v. Tobacco Root Coop., 121 Mont. 445, 193 P.2d
811 (1948); Rea Bros. Sheep Co. v. Rudi, 46 Mont. 149, 127 P. 85 (1912); Clemmons
v. Gillette, 33 Mont. 321, 83 P. 879 (1905).
70. Herrin, 46 Mont. at 233, 127 P. at 327.
71. Id. at 229, 127 P. at 326.
72. Chilcott, 52 Mont. at 138, 155 P. at 1115.
73. Id. at 139, 155 P. at 1115.
74. Id. 138, 155 P. at 1115.
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upon the question of his negligence; but where animals are held
in herd... and they invade such property through either the
willful act or the negligence of their owner... such invasion is
an actionable trespass, and the want of a legal fence is not
material."
Monroe, Herrin, and Chilcott established the principle that
herding stock on unfenced land would give rise to common law
damages if the injury resulted from a willful act, negligence, or
an error in ascertaining ownership boundaries. Thereafter, the
Montana Supreme Court began to impose common law liability
on various other open range activities, even though no herding
was involved.
In 1922, the court held that the Open Range Statute was
intended only to avoid liability for stock running on the public
range, but not to apply in disputes between adjoining owners
whose lands are wholly enclosed from the public range.76 In
Dorman v. Erie, Mr. Erie's half-mile long fence was located thir-
ty feet inside of the boundary line with his neighbor. Erie fre-
quently opened the gate in this fence, thereby allowing his cattle
to graze on the thirty-foot strip as well as his neighbor's adjoin-
ing pasture. The supreme court imposed liability on Eire, noting
that Monroe v. Cannon "declared that the purpose of [the Open
Range Statute] was to condone trespasses committed by animals
lawfully running at large, and that the common-law rule is left
otherwise unchanged."77
Then, in 1932, the court in Hill v. Chappel Bros. Inc., ex-
pressly followed Lazarus and prohibited overstocking of the
range.78 In that case, the defendants and the plaintiffs had both
leased vast tracts of open range on the Fort Belknap Indian
Reservation. Defendants, however, ran several thousand more
horses on the range than their share would support. The court
concluded: "[F]ence laws do not furnish immunity to one who, in
disregard of property rights, turns loose his cattle under circum-
stances showing that they were intended to graze upon the land
of another."79
Likewise, in 1959, in Thompson v. Mattuschek, the court
75. Id. at 138-39, 155 P. at 1115 (emphasis added).
76. Dorman v. Erie, 63 Mont. 579, 583-84, 208 P. 908, 909 (1922) (citing cases
from the following open range states: Washington, Utah, Indiana and California).
77. Id. at 585, 208 P. at 909.
78. 93 Mont. 92, 101, 18 P.2d 1106, 1109 (1932).
79. Hill, 93 Mont. at 101, 18 P.2d at 1109 (citing Light v. United States, 220
U.S. 523, 527 (1910)).
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held that tearing down the partition fence between neighbors
was beyond the protection of the Open Range Statute where, as
a result, defendant's cattle grazed on plaintiffs land."0
Mattuschek's and Thompson's land was wholly enclosed by an
external perimeter fence."'
Only two of the fifteen open range cases decided by the Mon-
tana Supreme Court between 1900 and 1960 invoked the immu-
nities of the Open Range Statute. 2 In the first case, decided in
1923, the court explained that merely using line-riders for the
general purpose of keeping cattle under control did not automati-
cally impose common law liability for straying cattle." The
court ruled that to be held liable, the stockowner must act negli-
80. 134 Mont. 500, 509, 333 P.2d 1022, 1027 (1959).
81. By statute in Montana, fences are of two basic kinds: personal and parti-
tion. Personal fences are built entirely on one persons property and at one's personal
expense. Partition fences are built on, or as directly adjoining property boundaries as
feasible (bluffs, perhaps interfering). See Montgomery v. Gehring, 145 Mont. 278, 400
P.2d 403 (1965). The expense of building and maintaining partition fences will, under
certain circumstances, be shared. Regarding partition fences, any agreement between
the parties controls. The statutes only apply if there is no agreement. See Thompson,
134 Mont. at 508, 333 P.2d at 1026.
Absent an agreement, statutes provide that the construction and maintenance
of partition fences between neighbors, both of whom enclose their lands, shall be
shared equally. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-206 (1993). Likewise, where externally
fenced lands are shared in common between adjoining landowners, and one owner
wishes to end the common range, he can on six months notice, compel the adjoining
owner to build half the fence or share half the cost of construction. MONT. CODE
ANN. § 70-16-208 (1993).
Where the perimeter of the common pasture is not fenced, if one party fences
his land, he may erect a partition fence between him and his neighbor. But the
neighbor will not be required to pay for half, unless and until the neighbor chooses
to fence his perimeter and thereby makes use of the partition fence previously erect-
ed. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-207 (1993); see, e.g., Sparks v. Halseth, 154 Mont. 395,
465 P.2d 100 (1970).
The reverse is also true. Where a partition fence divides properties, both of
which are fenced on the perimeter, one party, on six months notice, may decide to
remove his half of the partition fence, unless his neighbor buys him out. The buyout
means paying half the value of the fence. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-210 (1993). This
only works where the initiating neighbor also removes or destroys a substantial part
of his perimeter fence. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-207 (1993).
Where a legitimate partition fence exists, and the parties are jointly responsi-
ble for it, a neglect to repair by any party empowers his neighbor to repair it as his
expense on 5 days notice or to replace it on 60 days notice. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-
16-209 (1993). Each landowner is responsible for maintaining the "right" half of the
fence as he views it from his property. Where one owner's land is completely en-
closed by the others, then they are each to maintain half of the fence to the right of
the northeasterly corner as each views it. MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-205 (1993).
82. Dunbar v. Emigh, 117 Mont. 287, 158 P.2d 311 (1945); Schreiner v. Deep
Creek Stock Ass'n, 68 Mont. 104, 217 P. 663 (1923).
83. Schreiner, 68 Mont. at 108-12, 217 P. at 664-66.
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gently or willfully in causing the animals' presence on the
plaintiff's land."
Then, in 1945, the court held that when there was no evi-
dence of willfulness or negligence, "the mere knowledge or expec-
tation by one who turns cattle loose in a place where he has a
right to release them that they may or probably will wander
upon the lands of another ... is not alone sufficient to consti-
tute willful trespass."85 The court interpreted the Open Range
Statute to insulate such a defendant from injunctive relief as
well as damages.86  Notably, a substantial part of the
defendant's land was wholly surrounded by the plaintiffs, and
the court pointed out that the injunction remained valid to the
extent that "there were willful acts or negligence on [defendant's]
part in causing the livestock to enter plaintiffs lands."87 Both
Schreiner v. Deep Creek Stock Ass'n and Dunbar v. Emigh were
careful to discuss and distinguish the application of the Lazarus
principle.'
For sixty years, therefore, the Montana Supreme Court was
largely consistent in its treatment of open range issues. Acciden-
tal trespass by livestock at large was insulated by the Open
Range Statute from liability for damages. However, numerous
other trespasses at common law were not insulated-herding of
stock willfully, negligently, or in error as to land boundaries. In
addition, overstocking, willful fence destruction and any turning
loose of one's livestock "under circumstances showing that they
were intended to graze upon the land of another" 9 were all sub-
ject to common law damages.
C. The Modern Court Adopts the Myth
The year 1964 marked a turning point for Montana range
law. Thereafter, the Montana Supreme Court departed altogeth-
er from its careful scholarship that for six decades had main-
tained a balance between open range and common law princi-
ples. The change might be attributed to new members on the
court. Also, by then issues of range law occupied less space on
84. Id.
85. Dunbar, 117 Mont. at 292, 158 P.2d at 313.
86. Id. at 294, 158 P.2d at 314.
87. Id. at 293, 158 P.2d at 314.
88. Id. at 291-94, 158 P.2d at 313-14; Schreiner, 68 Mont. at 109-12, 217 P. at
664-66.
89. Thompson v. Mattuschek, 134 Mont. 500, 508, 333 P.2d 1022, 1026-27
(1959) (quoting Dunbar, 117 Mont. at 291, 158 P.2d at 313).
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the jurisprudential horizon which possibly produced less incen-
tive for careful scholarship. For whatever reason, beginning in
1964, the Montana Supreme Court ceased even to consider the
Lazarus principle in any of its decisions and embarked on what
can fairly be described as a wholesale embrace of the western
myth of the open range. 0
Another change happened in the 1960's. As in other courts
in the nation,91 most Montana open range cases shifted to live-
stock accidents on highways92 or other livestock tort situa-
tions.9" Only one case considered a fairly traditional open range
issue. 4
In the first case of this era, decided in 1964, an electrical
substation was fenced five feet inside the property boundary.
The power company sprayed a poisonous chemical along the base
of the fence solely on its own land. The plaintiff's cattle, which
were fenced into the adjoining field but not separated from the
substation fence, died after consuming the poisoned grass. The
supreme court affirmed a jury verdict on the basis of a duty to
warn the cattle's owner. The court's opinion discussed neither
the Lazarus principle nor common law tort principles (which ar-
guably would have applied under the Lazarus principle). Instead,
with a lengthy factual discussion, the court stated that defen-
dant should be held to the standard of care of an "ordinary pru-
dent person," and distinguished Beinhorn v. Griswold "on its
facts."96 The Hopkins decision could probably be justified under
common law principles as holding that the plaintiffs cattle bene-
fitted from an implied license to graze up to the substation fence,
90. No Montana Supreme Court case after 1945 has cited either Lazarus or
Monroe. Compare infra notes 92-93 with Dunbar, 117 Mont. at 292, 158 P.2d at 313.
However, in 1959, the court discussed and applied the Lazarus principle, without
citing it. Thompson, 134 Mont. at 508-09, 333 P.2d at 1026-27.
91. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
92. Yager v. Deane, 258 Mont. 453, 853 P.2d 1214 (1993); Williams v. Selstad,
235 Mont. 137, 766 P.2d 247 (1988); Siegfried v. Atchison, 219 Mont. 14, 709 P.2d
1006 (1985); Ambrogini v. Todd, 197 Mont. 111, 642 P.2d 1013 (1982); Sanders v.
Mount Haggin Livestock Co., 160 Mont. 73, 500 P.2d 397 (1972); Jenkins v. Valley
Garden Ranch, Inc., 151 Mont. 463, 443 P.2d 753 (1968); Bartsch v. Irvine Co., 149
Mont. 405, 427 P.2d 302 (1967).
93. State ex rel. Martin v. Finley, 227 Mont. 242, 738 P.2d 497 (1987) (address-
ing livestock as a public nuisance); Hopkins v. Ravalli County Elec. Coop., 144 Mont.
161, 395 P.2d 106 (1964) (addressing premises liability).
94. Montgomery v. Gehring, 145 Mont. 278, 283, 400 P.2d 403, 406 (1965).
Although the case principally involved boundary definitions in a deed, the Montana
Supreme Court sua sponte added a discussion on open range fencing.
95. Hopkins, 144 Mont. at 163, 395 P.2d at 109.
96. Id. at 165, 395 P.2d at 108.
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and therefore the plaintiff was owed the duties due to a licensee.
The decision was so vague it is difficult to discern the court's
reasoning.
In 1967, the court considered its first automobile/livestock
collision case. The wife of the plaintiff was killed in an auto colli-
sion with a black horse that wandered onto the highway in open
range at night.97 The plaintiff argued that the defendant had a
tort duty of ordinary "due care" arising from both common law
and statute.98 A $64,000 jury verdict for the husband was re-
versed in an opinion that quoted the Smith, Beinhorn, Schreiner,
Thompson, and Montgomery cases for the general proposition
"that Montana remains an open range state" and "the owner of
livestock has no duty to prevent the livestock from wander-
ing."" The Montana Supreme Court, therefore, held that the
defendant had "no duty" in tort or otherwise to keep his horse off
the highway.1" The court did not further analyze open range
issues. It made no comment on the holding of Beinhorn which
applied the Lazarus principle."' Nor did the court note that
Schreiner had been partly repudiated by Herness, precisely on
the question of whether "negligence" removed a stock owner from
the protection of the Open Range Statute.10 2 Without mention
or discussion, the court ignored the authorities cited by the
plaintiff from the growing number of states that impose ordinary
negligence duties on the owners of stock involved in highway
crashes."
Thereafter, in six subsequent highway cases the Montana
Supreme Court reflexively cited and applied the Bartsch holding
without further analysis of open range issues."' The court's
opinions propounded wide generalities such as, "An open range
designation implies that an owner is not liable for his wandering
97. Bartsch v. Irvine Co., 149 Mont. 405, 407, 427 P.2d 302, 303 (1967);
Respondent's Brief at 1-2, 18-37, Bartsch (No. 11252).
98. Bartsch, 149 Mont. at 407, 427 P.2d at 303.
99. Id. at 407-409, 427 P.2d at 304-305.
100. Id. at 409, 427 P.2d at 305.
101. Beinhorn v. Griswold, 27 Mont. 79, 89-90, 69 P. 557, 558-59 (1902).
102. Herness v. McCann, 90 Mont. 95, 102, 300 P. 257, 259 (1931).
103. See supra note 45 and accompanying text; see also Respondent's Brief at 18-
37, Bartsch (No. 11252).
104. Yager v. Deane, 258 Mont. 453, 458-60, 853 P.2d 1214, 1217-19 (1993); Wil-
liams v. Selstad, 235 Mont. 137, 139, 766 P.2d 247, 248 (1988); Siegfried v. Atchison,
219 Mont. 14, 16, 709 P.2d 1006, 1007 (1985); Ambrogini v. Todd, 197 Mont. 111,
119, 642 P.2d 1013, 1018 (1982); Sanders v. Mount Haggin Livestock Co., 160 Mont.
73, 78, 500 P.2d 397, 400 (1972); Jenkins v. Valley Garden Ranch, Inc., 151 Mont.
463, 465, 443 P.2d 753, 754-55 (1968).
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livestock." °5 Most recently the court hailed, "[O]ur consistent
refusal to impose a duty on ... livestock owners relative to fenc-
Y)106ing livestock off roadways ....
In two highway cases, the court did rule favorably for plain-
tiffs injured by collisions with livestock. But in neither case did
the court analyze the Lazarus principle nor otherwise integrate
its decisions with earlier ones. In 1972, in Sanders v. Mount
Haggin Livestock, the court concluded: "No one will dispute that
Montana is an open range state. This Court has many times so
ruled. But, as with every rule of law, definite exceptions do exist.
The exception to the open range rule exists when the animals in
question are in charge of herders." °7 Unfortunately, the court
in Sanders apparently failed to comprehend either the source of
the exception it applied,' 8 or its scope.0 9 Nor did the court
correctly analyze the common law duties that consequently re-
sult." At common law, even as modified by cases in majority
courts, one is entitled to herd livestock on public roadways, but
in doing so the herdsman must exercise due care."'
In 1982, the court again reflexively followed Bartsch, and
pronounced Montana to be an open range state. However, the
court reversed summary judgment for the defendant because a
1974 statutory amendment, that forbade the negligent release of
livestock onto primary highways, gave rise to an issue of
fact."2 That statute was enacted in 1951 to forbid "willful" re-
lease of stock on fenced highways,"3 then amended to impose a
negligence standard on the stock owner."4 Even today, howev-
105. Ambrogini, 197 Mont. at 119, 642 P.2d at 1018.
106. Yager, 258 Mont. at 460, 853 P.2d at 1219.
107. 160 Mont. at 78, 500 P.2d at 400.
108. Monroe v. Cannon, 24 Mont. 326, 61 P. 863 (1900) following Lazarus v.
Phelps, 152 U.S. 81 (1893); see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
109. Sanders, 160 Mont. at 78, 500 P.2d at 400. Sanders suggests that any ani-
mals in the charge of herders are within the exception, even though Schreiner v.
Deep Creek Stock Ass'n., 68 Mont. 104, 217 P. 663 (1923), and Herness v. McCann,
90 Mont. 95, 300 P. 257 (1931), hold otherwise, depending on circumstances.
110. Sanders, 160 Mont. at 78, 500 P.2d at 400.
111. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
112. Ambrogini v. Todd, 197 Mont. 111, 119-21, 642 P.2d 1013, 1018-19 (1982)
(citing MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 60-7-201 to -202 (1993)).
113. 1951 Mont. Laws 157-58 (codified as amended at REV. CODE MONT. § 32-
1018 (1947) (superseded)) (crime of using United States highways for pasturage or
running of livestock).
114. 1974 Mont. Laws 872 (codified as amended at REV. CODE MONT. § 32-21-
176 -177 (1974) (superseded) (current version at MONT. CODE ANN. § 60-7-201 (1993))
(revision of laws relating to the department of highways).
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er, the statute is subject to broad exclusions,"' and the legisla-
ture, perhaps well-representing its ranching constituency, has
put most of the burden for fencing highways onto the state."'
These legislative changes, even though significant, do not ad-
dress a myriad of situations; such as liability for escaping stock,
city and county road issues, and ordinary nuisance.
In 1987, the Montana Supreme Court considered one of
these issues in a case brought by the Mineral County Attorney
for statutory public nuisance against stock owners whose ani-
mals were roaming at will on public roads and private land."'
The court quashed an injunction against the stock owners. Once
again, the court reflexively followed Bartsch and refused to apply
the public nuisance statute in the face of the open range cus-
tom." The court made no mention of Lazarus, Monroe, or the
Open Range Statute itself."9
A more scholarly opinion would have affirmed the district
court. For example, the supreme court could easily have recon-
ciled the two seemingly inconsistent statutes since the Open
Range Statute forecloses only "damages." The Open Range Stat-
ute says nothing about preempting other statutory remedies
such as nuisance. Alternatively, the court could have applied the
Lazarus principle to affirm the injunction as a legitimate exer-
cise of public nuisance law-a common law set of principles that
survive the Open Range Statute.
IV. CONCLUSION
The open range remains a charming myth of the old West.
But Montana has changed since the enactment of the Open
Range Statute 130 years ago. The Montana Supreme Court so
declared in Ambrogini in 1982, saying, "The open range tradition
has become increasingly eroded over the years as a greater num-
ber of motorists have appeared on Montana's roads and
highways."2 ' Similarly, in a 1967 plaintive concurrence, Jus-
tice John C. Harrison cried out for changes to the open range
115. MONT. CODE ANN. § 60-7-202 (1993).
116. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 60-7-101 to -103 (1993) (requiring the Department of
Transportation to erect fences in most new or reconstructed areas of the state high-
way system).
117. State ex reL. Martin v. Finley, 227 Mont. 242, 245, 738 P.2d 497, 499
(1987).
118. Il
119. MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-4-215 (1993).
120. Ambrogini v. Todd, 197 Mont. 111, 119, 642 P.2d 1013, 1018 (1982).
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law of Montana. 2' Still, the modern supreme court has all but
abdicated power on open range questions by reflexively repeating
the myth. In so doing, the court abandons the issue to the
legislature's periodic tinkering.
Today, however, public policy needs reason rather than ro-
mance. Motorists are maimed or die in collisions with livestock
whose owners are not required to fence them off highways.'
Roaming livestock belonging to a single owner can create a pub-
lic nuisance for an entire community. 12 These situations need
not be condoned by law. The Montana Supreme Court should
return to its historically narrow construction of open range law
by re-embracing its own sixty years of authority from 1900 to
1960. The court should follow the lead of other western state
courts that impose a duty of ordinary care on stockowners.
Unfortunately, since 1964, the Montana Supreme Court's
unequivocal embrace of the open range concept makes it doubtful
the court will be receptive to a revival of the Lazarus principle
from Monroe v. Cannon. Doing so would require the court to
limit, criticize, or outright overrule many recent decisions.'
Nonetheless, the court has corrected its errors in the past;'
the court should do so again.
121. Bartsch v. Irvine Co., 149 Mont. 405, 410-11, 427 P.2d 302, 305 (1967)
(Harrison, J., concurring).
122. See, e.g., Yager v. Deane, 258 Mont. 453, 853 P.2d 1214 (1993); Bartsch,
149 Mont. 405, 427 P.2d 302.
123. See, e.g., State ex rel. Martin v. Finley, 227 Mont. 242, 738 P.2d 497 (1987).
124. Williams v. Selstad 235 Mont. 137, 766 P.2d 247 (1988); State ex rel. Mar-
tin, 227 Mont. 242, 738 P.2d 497; Siegfried v. Atchison, 219 Mont. 14, 709 P.2d 1006
(1985); Sanders v. Mount Haggin Livestock Co., 160 Mont. 73, 500 P.2d 397 (1972);
Jenkins v. Valley Garden Ranch, Inc., 151 Mont. 463, 443 P.2d 753 (1968); Bartsch,
149 Mont. 405, 427 P.2d 302.
125. With regard to determining titles in navigable rivers, for purposes of distin-
guishing the doctrines of avulsion from accretion and reliction, the Montana Supreme
Court redefined the term avulsion consistently with other authorities and repudiated
its earlier holding. Montana Dep't of State Lands v. Armstrong, 251 Mont. 235, 238,
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THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978:
A MONTANA ANALYSIS
INDIAN CHILDREN ONCE YOUNG FOREVER INDIAN'
Debra DuMontier-Pierre
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978, Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA) to prevent the unwarranted breakup of Indian families
and to give Indian tribes a substantial role in matters concerning
custody of Indian children.2 Through ICWA, Congress declared a
national policy to keep Indian children with their families, to
defer to tribal jurisdiction in child custody proceedings, and to
place Indian children who have been removed from their homes
with extended family members or within their own Indian
tribe.3 To counter cultural biases, ICWA establishes minimum
federal substantive and procedural requirements that state
courts must follow in child custody proceedings involving Indian
children.4
Even though Congress enacted ICWA seventeen years ago,
state courts, attorneys and agencies still ignore the letter and
the spirit of ICWA.5 For example, the Idaho Supreme Court
recently reversed the lower court's finding that ICWA did not
apply in a child custody proceeding involving an Indian child.
The court remanded the case and ordered the lower court to
apply ICWA.6 In that case, the mother arranged for placement
of her Indian child through an adoption agency.7 The agency
placed the day-old baby with a non-Indian couple, the Swensons.
Even though the adoptive parents notified the Indian tribe of the
action to terminate the father's rights,8 apparently the mother
1. THEY ARE YOUNG ONCE BuT INDIAN FOREVER: A SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF
INVESTIGATIVE HEARINGS ON INDIAN CHILD WELFARE (Joseph A- Myers ed., 1981).
2. Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§
1901-1963) (1988)).
3. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988).
4. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (1988).
5. See, e.g., In re J.W., 498 N.W.2d 417 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993) (finding no com-
pliance with ICWA for failure to give notice to tribe).
6. In re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925, 933 (Idaho 1993), cert. denied 114 S. Ct.
173 (1993).
7. Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d at 927.
8. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1988) (guaranteeing right of an Indian tribe or custo-
dian to intervene in a child custody proceeding of Indian child); 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a)
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and the adoptive parents delayed notifying the father and Indian
tribe of the child's birth and subsequent adoption proceedings.9
The Indian tribe immediately moved to intervene, ° and sought
placement of the Indian child with an extended family member
as mandated by ICWA." Despite the Indian family placement
preference required by ICWA, the Indian child remained with
the Swensons throughout the four-year court battle.
In In re Baby Boy Doe, the adoption agency and the attorney
for the non-Indian couple ignored ICWA, and the trial court
attempted to circumvent the Act. The court's holding in that case
demonstrates that ignoring the requirements of ICWA prolongs
the custody dispute and promotes delay which is detrimental to
all parties. 2 Furthermore, it fosters public misunderstanding
about the policy of ICWA and the Indian tribe's role in seeking
to protect Indian children. 3
The United States Supreme Court has decided one case
regarding ICWA.'4 Still, no uniform application of ICWA exists
on a national level. Numerous state decisions interpreting ICWA
have resulted in confusion and inconsistency in the application of
ICWA.'5 This article concentrates on Montana's reaction and re-
sponse to ICWA. Part II provides a brief background on the ne-
cessity for the enactment of ICWA. Part III examines the appli-
cability of ICWA and the judicially created exception attempting
to avoid application of ICWA. Part IV discusses the dual jurisdic-
tional scheme of ICWA and the sole United States Supreme
Court opinion interpreting ICWA.
(1988) (requiring party seeking termination of parental rights to notify parent, custo-
dian or Indian tribe).
9. Robert J. McCarthy, Swenson v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 1 NATIVE AM. BAR
ASS'N NEWSLETTER at 9, (1994).
10. Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d at 928.
11. Id.
12. Id.; see also In re M.R.D.B., 241 Mont. 455, 787 P.2d 1219 (1990) (trans-
ferring jurisdiction to Indian tribe two years after tribe intervened since the Indian
child was ward of the tribal court).
13. Lisa Morris, Welfare Act Fosters Racist Action, LAKE COUNTY LEADER
(Polson, Mont.), Nov. 18, 1993, at 5A. The first paragraph states:
In Idaho last month, a child was taken from his parents. Mr. and Mrs.
Leland Swenson of Nampa, Idaho, lost their child to the Oglala Sioux tribe.
The Indian Child Welfare Act prevailed again .... But every time that I
hear about another child being taken from a home that he is happy with,
and placed in a home with "his" people, I get sick to my stomach.
Id.
14. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989) (af-
firming the intent and purposes of the ICWA).
15. CRAIG, J. DORSAY ET AL 1992 UPDATE TO THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT
AND LAWS AFFECTING INDIAN JUVENILES MANUAL 1 (1992)
[Vol. 56506
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The latter sections are devoted to Montana. Part V analyzes
Montana child custody proceedings involving Indian children,
before and after the enactment of ICWA. Part VI examines
Montana's legislative response to ICWA. Part VII examines the
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes' commitment to imple-
ment ICWA. In conclusion, Part VIII finds that ICWA is in the
best interest of the Indian child, that the tribal court system is
the best forum to determine Indian child custody issues, and
that ICWA is a law that should be followed, not ignored.
II. BACKGROUND
The wholesale separation of Indian children from their families
is perhaps the most tragic and destructive aspect of American
Indian life today. 6
The ICWA became necessary to counteract the detrimental
effects of past federal and state policies dealing with Indian
tribes. The federal Indian policy of assimilation 7 and termina-
tion" nearly destroyed the Indian family. In 1968, the Associa-
tion on American Indian Affairs (AAIA) conducted a survey of In-
dian child custody problems in states with large Indian popula-
tions. 9 The AAIA reported that Indian children were "removed
from their families and placed in adoptive care, foster care, spe-
cial institutions, and federal boarding schools at rates grossly
disproportionate to non-Indian [children]." 0 After four years of
investigative hearings,2 Congress found an alarmingly high
percentage of Indian families separated by the unwarranted
removal of their children.2 2 Additionally, the states' failure to
16. William Byler, The Destruction of American Indian Families, in THE DE-
STRUCTION OF AMERICAN INDIAN FAMILIES 1 (Steven Unger ed., 1977).
17. The General Allotment Act of 1887, Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (codified as
amended at 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1988)) (allotting individual Indians plots of land at-
tempting to assimilate tribal members into mainstream of American culture).
18. DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 229-51 (3d ed. 1993) (de-
scribing Termination Period (1945-1961), an attempt to end trust relationship of the
federal government with Indian tribes and subject Indian tribes to state law).
19. See CRAIG J. DORSAY, THE INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT AND LAWS AFFECT-
ING INDIAN JUVENILES MANUAL 34 (1984).
20. Steven Unger, Preface to THE DESTRUCTION OF AMERICAN INDIAN FAMILIES
at iii (Steven Unger ed., 1977).
21. See Dorsay, supra note 19, at 268 (listing various legislative history refer-
ences). For more information on legislative hearings, treatises and law review arti-
cles, see Mary L. Vanderpan, In Re D.L.L. & C.L.L., Minors: Ruling on the Constitu-
tionality of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 26 S.D. L. REV. 68 n.6 (1981).
22. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1988). This code section provides as follows:
1995] 507
159
Leaphart: The Honorable William D. Murray
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1995
508 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
recognize the unique values of Indian culture contributed to the
removal of Indian children from their homes.23
Indian children adopted into non-Indian homes encounter
serious adjustment problems in adolescence.24 Studies indicate
that Indian children placed in non-Indian homes have significant
social problems including a high rate of suicide and substance
abuse.25 In 1974, the chairman from the Winnebago Tribe testi-
fied at an ICWA hearing:
I think the cruelest trick that the white man has ever
done to Indian children is to take them into adoption
courts, erase all of their records and send them off to some
nebulous family that is A-1 in the state of Nebraska and
that child reaches 16 or 17, he is a little brown child resid-
ing in a white community and he goes back to the reserva-
tion and he has absolutely no idea who his relatives are,
and they effectively make him a non-person and I
Recognizing the special relationship between the United States and
the Indian tribes and their members and the Federal responsibility
to Indian people, the Congress finds-
(1) that clause 3, section 8, article I of the United States Constitu-
tion provides that "The Congress shall have Power * * * To regu-
late Commerce * * * with Indian tribes" and, through this and
other constitutional authority, Congress has plenary power over
Indian affairs;
(2) that Congress, through statutes, treaties, and the general
course of dealing with Indian tribes, has assumed the responsibili-
ty for the protection and preservation of Indian tribes and their
resources;
(3) that there is no resource that is more vital to the continued
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and
that the United States has a direct interest, as trustee, in protect-
ing Indian children who are members of or are eligible for mem-
bership in an Indian tribe;
(4) that an alarmingly high percentage of Indian families are bro-
ken up by the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from
them by non-tribal public and private agencies and that an alarm-
ingly high percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian
foster and adoptive homes and institutions; and
(5) that the States, exercising their recognized jurisdiction over
Indian child custody proceedings through administrative and judi-
cial bodies, have often failed to recognize the essential tribal rela-
tions of Indian people and the culture and social standards pre-
vailing in Indian communities and families.
23. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (1988). See Dorsay, supra note 19, at 34; Charles
Horejsi et al., Reactions by Native American Parents to Child Protection Agencies:
Cultural and Community Factors, LXXI CHILD WELFARE 329 (July-Aug. 1992).
24. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. '30, 33 (1989).
25. Donna Goldsmith, There is Only One Child, and Her Name is Children, 36
FED. B. NEWS & J. 446, 449 (1989).
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think... destroy him.2"
Congress enacted ICWA because it found that Indian children
raised in non-Indian families lose ties with their tribal communi-
ty, risking identity problems and alienation from both worlds.27
III. THE APPLICABILITY OF ICWA
The purpose of ICWA is "to protect the best interests of
Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indi-
an tribes and families ... ."" Some of ICWA's safeguards in-
clude: notice of the proceedings to the parent and Indian tribe;29
appointment of counsel;0 an opportunity for the Indian tribe to
intervene and request transfer of the proceeding to tribal
court;31 requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt before
terminating parental rights;32 and preferred placement of the
child with an Indian family.3
All too often, dire consequences result when the applicability
of ICWA goes unrecognized. The child's parent, custodian or
Indian tribe may petition the court to invalidate a child custody
proceeding that violates ICWA. 4 In addition, if an attorney fails
to follow the requirements of ICWA, the proceeding may result
in an invalid proceeding and a malpractice action.35 Moreover, a
violation of ICWA may result in civil tort liability if an individu-
al, acting under the color of state law, violates another person's
federal rights.36 Even before a child custody proceeding is filed
in court, a caseworker or attorney should determine whether
ICWA applies in the proceeding so that the child and the tribe
receive the minimum federal protection.
26. S. REP. No. 597, 95th Cong., 2d. Sess. 43 (1977).
27. Irving N. Berlin, Anglo Adoptions of Native Americans: Repercussions in
Adolescence, AMERICAN ACADEMY OF CHILD PSYCHIATRY 387 (1978).
28. 25 U.S.C. § 1902 (1988).
29. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988).
30. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(b) (1988).
31. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (1988).
32. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(f) (1988).
33. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1988).
34. 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1988).
35. Doe v. Hughes, 838 P.2d 804 (Alaska 1992) (holding that even though adop-
tion decree was affirmed, law firm's failure to comply with terms of ICWA was mal-
practice).
36. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). See also B.J. Jones, Potential Federal Court Reme-
dies for ICWA Violations, Address Before the Indian Law Conference, Albuquerque,
New Mexico (Apr. 7, 1994), in FED. B. ASS'N 331, 334.
5091995]
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A. The Two-Step Analysis
To satisfy the purpose and requirements of ICWA, adoption
agencies, practitioners, social workers and courts of Montana
should learn to recognize an ICWA case. An ICWA case has two
pre-requisites: 1) a child custody proceeding, and 2) an Indian
child. First, ICWA defines a child custody proceeding to include
foster care placement, 37 a termination of parental rights,3" a
pre-adoptive placement,39  or an adoptive placement. 0  The
ICWA explicitly excludes divorce proceedings and juvenile
criminal proceedings.41 Second, the child involved must be an
Indian child as defined by ICWA. An "Indian child" means "any
unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a
member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an
Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian
tribe."42 The Indian tribe's determination whether a child is a
member of that tribe is conclusive.43 Membership in an Indian
tribe does not require enrollment of the child" because an Indi-
an tribe may recognize other criteria for membership.' In addi-
tion, a state court may apply ICWA prior to the determination of
the tribe that the child is eligible for membership.46 A state
court is deemed notified that an Indian child is involved
whenever informed of such by any party to the case.47
Despite the clear guidelines, however, state courts still vio-
late ICWA. For example, in In re Baby Boy Doe, even though the
37. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(l)(i) (1988).
38. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(ii).
39. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1)(iii).
40. 25 U.S.C. 1903(1)(iv).
41. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).
42. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).
43. In re Junious M., 193 Cal. Rptr. 40, 44 (Cal. App. 1983).
44. Id. But see In re J.L.M., 451 N.W.2d 377 (Neb. 1990) (holding membership
and enrollment synonymous).
45. See, e.g., THE LAW AND ORDER CODE OF THE CONFEDERATED SALISH AND
KOOTENAI INDIAN TRIBES OF THE FLATHEAD INDIAN RESERVATION, MONTANA, Ch. VI,
§ 1(6)(o) (1986) ('Indian youth or Indian child' means a child of Indian descent who
is either enrolled or enrollable in an Indian tribe, band, community or who is a bio-
logical descendant of an enrolled member and has significant contacts or
identification with an Indian community.").
46. In re Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d 925, 931 (Idaho 1993). The party asserting
the applicability of the ICWA has the burden of producing the necessary evidence for
the trial court to make this determination. Id.
47. Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg.
67,584, 67,586 (1979) [hereinafter BIA Guidelines]. In 1979, the BIA published the
Guidelines for State Courts providing interpretations and assistance in implementing
and applies the ICWA. Id. at 67,584.
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child involved was one-half Indian blood quantum, the trial
judge ruled that ICWA did not apply because the child was not
an "Indian child."48 The child's tribe appealed the determination
of the trial court. The appellate court found that the Indian
tribe's appeal was frivolous and ordered the tribe to pay $8,500
in attorney fees.49 As discussed earlier, the Idaho Supreme
Court reversed the "Indian child" determination finding the evi-
dence presented satisfied ICWA and the federal guideline defini-
tion of an Indian child.5° The attitude of the lower court toward
the Indian tribe's challenge illustrates the indifference and disre-
spect Indian tribes encounter when seeking to enforce ICWA's
mandates.
B. Existing Indian Family Exception
Courts in some states have created judicial exceptions to
avoid the mandates of ICWA,5" even though the plain language
of the Act requires only two prerequisites to trigger application
of ICWA.52 In In re Baby Boy Doe, the trial court adopted the
"existing Indian family" test to avoid application of ICWA.53 The
trial court reasoned that ICWA only applies when a child custo-
dy proceeding involves an Indian child who has been removed
from an existing Indian family.54 The trial court held that
ICWA did not apply because Baby Boy Doe lived with the non-
Indian adoptive couple since his birth, had never lived in the
Indian community, and had never been exposed to Indian cul-
48. Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d at 929. The Tribe's enrollment director advised the
court that membership could not be determined because the birth certificate was
missing from child's application. Id. at 930.
49. Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d at 929.
50. Id. at 931-34. The evidence included the Tribe's requirements for enroll-
ment, the finding that the father was one of the child's parents, and that the father
owned land on the reservation which established the child's eligibility for membership
with the Tribe. Id.
51. In re Adoption of Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d 168 (Kan. 1982); see, Toni H. Da-
vis, The Existing Indian Family Exception to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 69 N.D.
L. REV. 464 (1993) (analyzing "existing Indian family" exception and theory that
judicially created exception undermines the ICWA).
52. 25 U.S.C. § 1903 (1988).
53. Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d at 928.
54. Id.; see also Baby Boy L., 643 P.2d at 175; In re S.C. & J.C., 833 P.2d
1249, 1253 (Okla. 1992) (relying on existing Indian family exception to refuse to
apply ICWA to father's efforts to invalidate adoption, and supporting judicially creat-
ed exception with the failed 1987 amendment to the ICWA that would have over-
ruled the exception).
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ture.55
Reversing the lower court, the Idaho Supreme Court refused
to adopt the existing Indian family exception.56 The Idaho Su-
preme Court concluded that although other states have applied
the Indian family requirement, the United States Supreme Court
did not uphold this requirement.57 Similarly, in another case
involving Montana Indian children, the Illinois Court of Appeals
refused to adopt the existing Indian family exception and trans-
ferred a child custody proceeding to the Fort Peck Tribal Court
in Montana.5" The Illinois appellate court reasoned that the em-
phasis of ICWA is not only on the child's past and present ties to
the Indian community, but also on whether such ties might be
established in the future.59 Similarly, other state courts should
reject the "existing Indian family" exception and require adoption
agencies, state officials, and social workers to faithfully follow
the mandates of ICWA.60
IV. JURISDICTION
After finding ICWA applies in a case, the court will next
address the jurisdiction issue. The heart of ICWA is the dual
jurisdictional scheme based on the domicile of the Indian
child.61 Seeking to address the unwarranted separation of Indi-
an families, ICWA favors tribal court jurisdiction. Still, the state
court determines the residence and domicile of the child, a major
factor in the determination of jurisdiction.62
A. Exclusive or Concurrent Jurisdiction
First, reaffirming the role of the Indian tribe, the ICWA
grants the tribal court exclusive jurisdiction in a child custody
proceeding involving an Indian child domiciled on the reserva-
tion or who is a ward of the tribal court regardless of domicile.63
55. Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d at 928.
56. Id. at 931-32.
57. Id. at 931. See also Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indiana v. Holyfield, 490
U.S. 30 (1989) (holding that twin babies immediately placed for adoption after birth,
who never lived with an Indian family or returned to their Indian community, did
not render the ICWA inapplicable).
58. In re Adoption of S.S., 622 N.E.2d 832 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
59. Id. at 840.
60. Davis, supra note 52, at 495-96.
61. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 36; 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1988).
62. BIA Guidelines, supra note 47, at 67,584; 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (1988).
63. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1988). The statute provides an exception when jurisdic-
[Vol. 56
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Second, ICWA allows concurrent jurisdiction between tribal court
and state court if the Indian child is not domiciled on the reser-
vation." Upon petition of either the parent, the Indian custodi-
an or the child's Indian tribe, the state court must transfer the
proceeding to tribal court.65 However, ICWA provides three ex-
ceptions to the preferred jurisdiction of tribal court. First, the
Indian tribe may decline jurisdiction." Second, either parent
may object to the transfer of the proceeding to tribal court.
Third, the state court may find that "good cause" exists not to
transfer the proceeding to tribal court. 7
Acknowledging interracial relationships between Indian and
non-Indian couples,68 ICWA includes political compromises evi-
dent in the jurisdictional portion of ICWA. For example, in In re
Baby Boy Doe, the mother filed an objection to the Indian tribe's
motion to transfer and superseded the Indian tribe's request to
transfer the case to tribal court under ICWA.69 Congress has
not passed legislation to remove the exceptions that mandate the
transfer of a proceeding from a state court to a tribal court.7"
B. Holyfield Analysis: Definition of Domicile
A decade after the enactment of ICWA, the United States
Supreme Court addressed the issue of domicile in Mississippi
Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield.7' In its only interpre-
tation of ICWA, the Court affirmed the congressional intent and
purpose of ICWA.72 Holyfield involved an unmarried couple who
tion is otherwise vested in the state by existing federal law. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §
1162(a) (1988); 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1988).
64. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1988).
65. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1988).
66. Indian tribes rarely decline jurisdiction. But see In re W.L., 260 Mont. 325,
859 P.2d 1019 (1993) (involving mother in dependency and neglect proceeding who
unsuccessfully sought transfer to tribal court). In W.L., the court does not explore the
Indian tribe's reasons for declining jurisdiction.
67. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b) (1988). See infra p. 33 and note 155. For analysis of
exceptions, see Michael E. Connelly, Comment, Tribal Jurisdiction under Section
1911(b) of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1878 (sic): Are the States Respecting Indi-
an Sovereignty?, 23 N.M. L. REV. 479 (1993).
68. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1988) (providing that ICWA does not apply in divorce
proceedings involving custody disputes).
69. 849 P.2d 925, 928 (Idaho 1993).
70. S. 1976, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). See also John R. Renner, The Indian
Child Welfare Act and Equal Protection Limitations on the Federal Power Over Indi-
an Affairs, 17 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 129 (1992).
71. 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
72. Id. at 36.
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were both enrolled members of the Mississippi Band of Choctaw
Indians and resided on the Choctaw Reservation, in Neshoba
County, Mississippi. The couple drove 200 miles to an off-reser-
vation hospital where the mother gave birth to twins on Decem-
ber 29, 1985. 7" The couple voluntarily placed the twins for adop-
tion with a non-Indian couple, the Holyfields.74 The trial court
granted the Holyfield's petition for adoption and entered the
final decree less than one month after the birth of the twins.75
Two months later, the Indian tribe filed a motion to vacate the
adoption based on a violation of ICWA.76 The Indian tribe
claimed ICWA granted exclusive jurisdiction to the tribe.7
Reasoning that the parents "went to some efforts" to see that
the babies were born outside the confines of the reservation, the
trial court denied the Indian tribe's motion.78 The trial court
held that the state court had jurisdiction because the twins, at
no time from their birth to the present date, had ever resided on
or physically been on the Choctaw Indian Reservation.79 The
Supreme Court of Mississippi affirmed the finding that none of
the provisions of ICWA applied and held the trial court properly
exercised jurisdiction."
On appeal, however, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed the Mississippi court's decision.81 Finding that ICWA
applied, the Court determined the sole issue was whether the
twins were "domiciled" on the reservation for purposes of juris-
diction.82 The Court emphasized that exclusive tribal jurisdic-
tion is central to the overall scheme of ICWA.83 After reviewing
ICWA and the legislative history, the Court reasoned that it was
doubtful Congress intended state law to define key jurisdictional
73. Id. at 37.
74. Id. at 38.
75. Id. at 37 n.10. Mississippi state law required a six-month waiting period be-
tween interlocutory and final decrees of adoption, but also grants the court discretion
to waive the requirement. Id.
76. Id. at 38 (basing motion on 25 U.S.C. § 1914 (1988)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 39. No obstetric facilities were located on the reservation, but a hos-
pital was located nearer to the reservation than 200 miles. Id. at 37.
79. Id. at 39 (remarking on the trial court's one-page opinion relying on these
two facts to reach its conclusion).
80. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 511 So. 2d 918 (Miss.
1987), rev'd, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
81. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 40.
82. Id. at 42. It was undisputed that the state court adoption was a "child
custody proceeding", and the twins were "Indian children" as defined by the ICWA.
Id.
83. Id. at 41.
[Vol. 56
166
Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/1
ICWA: A MONTANA ANALYSIS
definitions." More importantly, the Court recognized the Indian
tribe's interest stating:
Tribal jurisdiction under §1911(a) was not meant to
be defeated by the actions of individual members of
the tribe, for Congress was concerned not solely
about the interests of the Indian Children and fami-
lies, but also about the impact on the tribes them-
selves of the large numbers of Indian children adopt-
ed by non-Indians."
The Court held that to allow an individual tribal member to
defeat the exclusive jurisdiction of the tribe simply by giving
birth off the reservation would nullify the purposes of ICWA.5
The Court declared the adoption invalid and held that the
tribal court had exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to ICWA.87 The
Court noted that if the state court had initially complied with
the mandates of ICWA, it would have avoided three years of
delay and anguish." In addition, the Court refused to "reward
those who obtain custody, whether lawfully or otherwise, and
maintain it during any ensuing [and protracted] litigation."89
The Court concluded that "we must defer to the experience, wis-
dom, and compassion of the [Choctaw] tribal courts to fashion an
appropriate remedy." 0  Accordingly, Holyfield confirms that
maintaining contact with the Indian tribe serves the Indian
child's interest, as well as the survival of Indian culture depen-
dent on the Indian tribe's ability to continue as a self-governing
community. 1
84. Id. at 45.
85. ld. at 49.
86. Id. at 50 (citing House Report at 12, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 7534 ("One of
the effects of our national paternalism has been to so alienate some Indian [parents]
from their society that they abandon their children at hospitals or to welfare depart-
ments rather than entrust them to the care of relatives in the extended family.").
87. Id. at 54.
88. Id.; In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986) (involving Navajo
boy placed with Utah non-Indian couple with consent of mother. Six years after the
removal of the child, the Utah Supreme Court declared the state adoption invalid
and concluded that the Navajo Tribal Court had exclusive jurisdiction.).
89. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 54 (quoting Halloway, 732 P.2d at 972).
90. Id. Mr. Holyfield died while this case was pending. Upon remand to tribal
court, the court terminated the parental rights and granted the adoption petition of
Mrs. Holyfield. See Diane Allbaugh, Tribal Jurisdiction Over Indian" Children: Missis-
sippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 16 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 534, 558 (1991).
91. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 33.
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V. MONTANA'S JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF ICWA
The evolution of ICWA involves Montana court decisions,
Indian children and Indian tribes. Montana is home to seven
federally recognized Indian reservations.2 The removal of Indi-
an children from their homes is a national crisis, and Montana
shares this problem.9" In Montana, the Native American popu-
lation comprises a little less than five percent of the state's resi-
dents.94 In 1978, however, Congress found that Indian children
of Montana were thirteen times more likely to be placed in adop-
tive or foster care homes than non-Indian children. 5 Currently
in Montana, forty-two percent of children placed out of the home
for two years or more are Indian children.96
A. Pre-ICWA
The Pre-ICWA decisions of the Montana Supreme Court
portray Montana as one of the states Congress found insensitive
to tribal jurisdiction in Indian child custody proceedings. 7 In
1972, Montana reported the first case allowing a state court to
assume jurisdiction of an Indian child allegedly abandoned off
the reservation by his parents.9 In In re Cantrell, the mother
resided on the reservation, and prior to the state court proceed-
ing, the Tribal Court of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation adjudi-
cated custody proceedings of the Indian child. Nevertheless, the
Montana Supreme Court reasoned that the abandonment of the
child occurred off the reservation, continued for over a year,
thereby vesting jurisdiction of the custody proceeding with state
court.99
92. JAMES J. LOPACH ET AL., TRIBAL GOVERNMENT TODAY: POLITICS ON MON-
TANA INDIAN RESERVATIONS 3 (1990).
93. Russel L. Barsh, The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Critical Analysis,
31 HASTINGS L.J. 1287, 1288 (1980).
94. LOPACH ET AL., supra note 92, at 3.
95. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530, 7531; see Barsh, supra note 93, at 1288-90.
96. Telephone Interview with Trudy Flamand Miller, Indian Child Welfare Spe-
cialist, Department of Family Services, Helena, Mont. (Apr. 5, 1995) (During inter-
view, Ms. Miller indicated this statistic includes state, tribal and Bureau of Indian
Affairs placements).
97. See 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (1988).
98. In re Cantrell, 159 Mont. 66, 495 P.2d 179 (1972). For an analysis of pre-
ICWA cases, see Manuel P. Guerreo, Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978: A Response
to the Threat to Indian Culture Caused by Foster and Adoptive Placements of Indian
Children, 7 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 51 (1979).
99. Cantrell, 159 Mont. at 71, 495 P.2d at 182.
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Again the Montana Supreme Court attempted to defeat
tribal jurisdiction supporting an individual's choice to use a state
forum rather than deferring to tribal jurisdiction in a child custo-
dy proceeding involving an Indian child.00 Despite Montana's
equal protection concern, the United States Supreme Court re-
versed.1"' In Fisher v. District Court, the Court held that tribal
court has exclusive jurisdiction in an adoption proceeding involv-
ing parties who are all tribal members and residents of Indian
reservation.1 2 The Court found that tribal jurisdiction benefits
the plaintiffs class and furthers congressional policy of Indian
self-government.0 3 For those reasons, the Court concluded that
tribal jurisdiction outweighed the denial of a state forum to the
Indian plaintiff.
In contrast, another Montana tribal court claimed exclusive
jurisdiction of a child custody proceeding involving an Indian
child filed in a Maryland state court. In Wakefield v. Little Light,
the Crow Tribal Court of Montana appointed a non-Indian couple
the legal guardian of an Indian child for a limited period.1" Af-
ter leaving the reservation, the non-Indian couple petitioned the
Maryland state court seeking custody of the child over the objec-
tions of the Indian mother and Indian tribe.0 5 The Maryland
Court of Appeals declared that child-rearing is an essential tribal
function and that state interference in custody matters of Indian
children is a significant infringement on the right of Indian
tribes to govern themselves. 16 The Maryland court held that
the child's domicile should be used to determine subject matter
jurisdiction, and in this case the Crow Tribal Court of Montana
had exclusive jurisdiction of an Indian child domiciled on the
reservation.0 7 Consequently, Congress codified the Fisher prin-
ciple in ICWA jurisdiction scheme.0 8
100. Firecrow v. District Court, 167 Mont. 139, 536 P.2d 190 (1975), cert. grant-
ed, 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
101. Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 391 (1976) (per curiam).
102. Id. at 389.
103. Id. at 390-91. See also Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (upholding
the Bureau of Indian Affairs race-based policy in employee promotions because it
furthered Indian self-governance).
104. Wakefield v. Little Light, 347 A.2d 228, 230 (Md. 1975).
105. Id. at 230-31.
106. Id. at 237-38 (citing Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1959) which
held that Indian tribes have the right to make laws and be governed by those laws.
States may act where essential tribal relations are not involved and where the rights
of Indians are not jeopardized).
107. Id. at 239.
108. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) (1988).
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B. Post-ICWA
As a result of the high population of Native Americans in
Montana, the Montana Supreme Court has considered several
ICWA cases. Twenty-five percent of state foster care placements
in Montana are Indian children."9 A chronological analysis of
these cases demonstrates the court's vacillating position constru-
ing ICWA. The Montana Supreme Court's interpretation of
ICWA is both supportive and restrictive."0 Montana acknowl-
edges the importance of ICWA but does not advance the literal
and broad interpretation of Holyfield in construing ICWA.
Shortly after the passage of ICWA, the Montana Supreme
Court restricted the application of ICWA creating a judicial ex-
ception for intra-family disputes involving custody of Indian
children."' In In re Bertelson, a custody dispute arose between
the non-Indian mother and the Indian paternal grandpar-
ents."' Relying on congressional policy, the Montana Supreme
Court reasoned that ICWA did not apply in an intra-family dis-
pute because the purpose of ICWA was to "preserve Indian cul-
ture values under circumstances in which an Indian child is
placed in a foster home or other protective institution.""'
Although the Montana Supreme Court found that ICWA did
not apply, it remanded Bertelson requiring the trial court to
apply a balancing test to determine whether jurisdiction was
more appropriate in state or tribal court."4 The Montana Su-
preme Court cautioned the trial court to respect tribal sovereign-
ty and to consider the rights of the Indian child and the Indian
tribe in deciding whether to accept or decline jurisdiction."'
Identifying its goal to choose the most appropriate forum, the
109. Telephone Interview with Francis A. Kromkowski, Department of Family
Services, Helena, Montana (Apr. 22, 1994).
110. Margery H. Brown & Brenda C. Desmond, Montana Tribal Courts: Influenc-
ing the Development of Contemporary Indian Law, 52 MONT. L. REV. 211, 294-95
(1991).
111. See In re Bertelson, 189 Mont. 524, 617 P.2d 121 (1980).
112. Id. at 528, 617 P.2d at 124. Initially, the Montana Supreme Court reversed
the District Court decision holding that the tribal court was the best forum for the
custody dispute. Id. However, the court granted the mother's petition for rehearing
alleging the court relied on erroneous facts. Id. at 528, 617 P.2d at 124.
113. Bertelson, 189 Mont. at 531, 617 P.2d at 125.
114. Id. at 540-41; 617 P.2d at 130-31. Initially, the state court took jurisdiction
of the case because the father voluntarily sought a divorce in state court. In re Stan-
ley, 7 Indian L. Rep. (Am. Indian Law. Training Program) 4039, 4039-40 (June 6,
1980).
115. Bertelson, 189 Mont. at 533, 617 P.2d at 126.
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Montana Supreme Court cautioned the lower court not to ignore
the importance of the child's Indian heritage and customs when
determining jurisdiction."'
However, due to the significant tribal interests and the man-
dates of ICWA, the Montana Supreme Court should have trans-
ferred the custody dispute to tribal court when it arose instead of
remanding the matter. The child, an enrolled tribal member, was
a ward of the tribal court. The child resided with her
grandparents on the Rocky Boy Reservation, and the mother had
voluntarily left the child with the grandparents.117 Despite the
Montana Supreme Court's recognition of tribal interests,
Bertelson circumvented ICWA protection. A custody dispute
within the extended family is not excluded by ICWA definition of
a child custody proceeding."' Consequently, other courts have
declined to follow Bertelson finding the Montana Supreme
Court's exception in the case "contrary to the express provisions
of the ICWA."'1
Even though the Montana Supreme Court created a judicial
exception to avoid application of ICWA, the court has also
stressed the necessity to follow the mandates of ICWA. For in-
stance, a court's failure to appoint counsel for an indigent parent
or Indian custodian, as required by the express language of
ICWA to ensure procedural fairness, is reversible error. 2 ° Also,
the Montana Supreme Court acknowledges a responsibility to
promote and protect the unique Indian culture in applying state
law and ICWA. 21 In In re Baby Girl Jane Doe, the Montana
Supreme Court faced a conflict between a mother's interest in
anonymity22 and the Indian tribe's interest in enforcing the
116. Id. at 540, 617 P.2d at 130.
117. Id. at 528, 617 P.2d at 124.
118. 25 U.S.C. § 1903(1) (1988) (explicitly excluding application of the ICWA in
divorce or juvenile delinquency proceedings).
119. See, e.g., A.B.M. v. M.H. & A.H., 651 P.2d 1170, 1173 (Alaska 1982) (in-
volving custody issue between natural mother and her sister and brother-in-law); In
re Crystal K, 276 Cal. Rptr. 619 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (applying ICWA between di-
vorced parents in which mother sought termination of father's rights in step-parent
adoption); Adoption of Lindsay C., 280 Cal. Rptr. 194 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (applying
ICWA to step-parent adoption).
120. In re M.E.M., 195 Mont. 329, 335, 635 P.2d 1313, 1316-17; see also In re
G.L.O.C., 205 Mont. 352, 668 P.2d 235, 237 (1983) (stating trial court must deter-
mine non-Indian parent's right to counsel prior to transfer of ICWA case).
121. M.E.M., 195 Mont. at 332, 635 P.2d at 1316. But see, Newville v. State,
__ Mont. __ , 883 P.2d 793, 796 (1994) (involving negligence action for injuries
suffered by Indian child while in foster care. The Montana Supreme Court stated:
"Adoptive placement was further complicated because any adoptive placement had to
comply with the provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act 25 U.S.C. § 1915.").
122. In re Baby Girl Jane Doe, 262 Mont. 380, 865 P.2d 1090 (1993); 25 U.S.C.
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statutory preference for placement of an Indian child.' 23 Re-
versing the lower court, the Montana Supreme Court held an
Indian tribe's statutory right to enforce the placement preference
in an adoption of an Indian child is paramount to achieve the
goals of ICWA and to protect the best interest of the child.124
Assisting state courts with interpretation and implementa-
tion of ICWA, the Bureau of Indian Affairs published guidelines
for state courts.'25 While the BIA guidelines are not binding on
a state court, the Montana Supreme Court has held in In re
M.E.M. that the BIA Guidelines are applicable and should be
considered in ICWA cases. 2 ' In that case, the Montana Su-
preme Court vacated the lower court's order terminating paren-
tal rights and remanded the case for determination of the juris-
dictional issue.'27 The Montana Supreme Court directed the tri-
al court to consider the BIA Guidelines in determining whether
to transfer jurisdiction to the intervening tribal court.'28
Without citing a source, however, the Montana Supreme
Court reinstated the best interest of the child principle to pre-
vent a transfer of jurisdiction to tribal court.'29 Contrary to the
protective measures of ICWA, the court incorporated the state's
subjective and vague standard which Congress sought to remove
by enacting ICWA. 3 ° Congress recognized that state agencies
and judges are accustomed to non-Indian values and often make
subjective decisions detrimental to Indian children based on
those values. The congressional policy clearly states that the
underlying principle of ICWA, instead of a judge's subjective
§ 1915(c) (1988) (regarding anonymity in application of preferences).
123. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1988) provides as follows:
In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State
law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good
cause to the contrary, to a placement with
(1) a member of the child's extended family;
(2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; or
(3) other Indian families.
124. Baby Girl Jane Doe, 262 Mont. at 388, 865 P.2d at 1095.
125. BIA Guidelines, supra note 47, at 67584.
126. M.E.M. 195 Mont. at 336-37, 635 P.2d at 1318 (finding that "qualified ex-
pert witness" was not defined by ICWA, but that BIA guidelines provided state court
with definition to consider).
127. Id. at 337, 635 P.2d at 1318.
128. Id. at 336, 635 P.2d at 1317.
129. Id.; see, e.g. In re N.L., 754 P.2d 863, 869 (Okla. 1988) (citing In re M.E.M.
and holding that the trial court may consider the best interest of the Indian child as
a factor in determining whether to transfer the case to tribal court).
130. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(5) (1988).
520 [Vol. 56
172
Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/1
ICWA: A MONTANA ANALYSIS
opinion, is in the best interest of the child.131
Justice Sheehy's dissent in In re M.E.M. suggests that non-
Indian subjective values were factored into the court's majority
decision of jurisdiction. Justice Sheehy stated that instead of
remanding the matter, the case should be transferred immedi-
ately to the intervening tribal court of North Dakota.'32 Justice
Sheehy accused the trial court of refusing to transfer jurisdiction
because it disapproved of the tribal court's child custody arrange-
ments.'33 He stressed that "the purpose of the ICWA is to re-
move as far as possible the white man's perceptions in these
matters where Indian values may conflict."3 4 Justice Sheehy
added that the case should be transferred to the tribal court,
"before a federal court does it for us."135
Inconsistently claiming to recognize the policies of the
ICWA, the Montana Supreme Court in another case, In re
M.E.M., Jr., allowed a child custody proceeding to bypass the
procedural safeguards of ICWA." In that case, the mother al-
leged that the prior temporary custody proceeding violated ICWA
and requested that the Montana Supreme Court invalidate both
the temporary and permanent custody proceedings.'37 Assum-
ing arguendo that the temporary custody proceedings violated
ICWA, the Montana Supreme Court nonetheless refused to inval-
idate the permanent custody proceeding because the court found
that it complied with ICWA.'38 Still, the court encouraged "the
district courts to diligently follow the requirements of the ICWA"
emphasized in the mother's brief.'39 The federal minimum pro-
tection of ICWA seeks to ensure procedural fairness and requires
strict adherence. Thus, a violation of ICWA, regardless at what
stage of the process, should invalidate a proceeding.
The Montana Supreme Court has not always neglected the
policy of ICWA. Two years later, In re M.E.M., Jr. returned to
the Montana Supreme Court for consideration of the substantive
131. H.R. REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), reprinted in U.S.C.C.AN.
7530, 7541.
132. M.E.M., 195 Mont. at 337, 635 P.2d at 1318 (Sheehy, J. dissenting).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. But see Robert J. McCarthy, The Indian Child Welfare Act: In the Best
Interests of the Child and Tribe, CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 864, 869 n.55 (1993) (citing
principles of federalism and noting that federal courts have limited review of state
court ICWA decisions).
136. In re M.E.M., Jr., 209 Mont. 192, 679 P.2d 1241 (1984).
137. Id. at 195, 679 P.2d at 1243.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 198, 679 P.2d at 1245.
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requirements of ICWA. 4 ° The Montana Supreme Court proper-
ly permitted the aunt of the Indian child, an extended family
member, to intervene in the adoption proceeding commenced by
a non-Indian family.'' Further, the Montana Supreme Court
held that on remand the competing petitions for adoption of the
child must be considered in light of ICWA's placement prefer-
ence. 
142
In another positive response to ICWA, in In re M.R.D.B., the
Montana Supreme Court held that the tribal court retains exclu-
sive jurisdiction of a minor child, who is a ward of the tribal
court, and that the parent may not prevent the transfer.'4
More importantly, the Montana Supreme Court rejected the
family bond argument and properly deferred the determination
of the best interest of the child to the tribal court.'4 In a spe-
cially concurring and dissenting opinion, however, Justice Weber
expressed shock at the disregard for the due process rights of the
mother in establishing the child as a ward of the tribal court.'45
Justice Weber also expressed concern that the United States
Supreme Court opinion in Holyfield held the interests of the
Indian tribe superior to the interests of the parents. 146
Unfortunately, Justice Weber's opinion reflects the all-too-
common non-Indian's misunderstanding of the Indian communi-
ty. Initially, ICWA forces Indian tribes into an adversary role if
the tribe wishes to invoke the procedural and substantive re-
quirements of ICWA.147 Indian tribes are viewed as placing the
rights of the child secondary to the desires of the tribe."' When
140. In re M.E.M., Jr., 223 Mont. 234, 725 P.2d 212 (1986).
141. Id. at 236, 725 P.2d at 213.
142. Id. at 236, 725 P.2d at 214; see 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1988).
143. In re M.R.D.B., 241 Mont. 455, 462, 787 P.2d 1219, 1223 (1990) (responding
to situation in which mother initially consented to tribal jurisdiction, but later at-
tempted to prevent transfer to tribal court by withdrawing her consent); see also 25
U.S.C. § 1911(a) ("Where an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the Indian tribe
shall retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the
child.").
144. M.R.D.B., 241 Mont. at 463, 787 P.2d at 1224 (expressing full confidence
that tribal court will consider the best interest of all parties). In fact, the White
Mountain Apache Tribal Court, persuaded by the adoptive parents' commitment to
the child's heritage, allowed the non-Indian couple from Colorado to adopt the seven-
year-old girl. The Associated Press, Apaches OK Girl's Adoption by Anglos, ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, Mar. 20, 1991, at B4.
145. M.R.D.B., 241 Mont. at 464, 787 P.2d at 1224. But see Tribal Children's
Code, supra note 45, at VI-5(r) (referring to ward as "protected child").
146. M.R.D.B., 241 Mont. at 464, 787 P.2d at 1225.
147. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(c) (1988) (granting Indian tribe right to intervene at any
point in state court proceeding).
148. Ester C. Kim, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield: The Con-
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a parent relinquishes the right to raise the child, however, the
tribe has not only an interest, but an obligation to protect the
best interests of the child." 9 Anglo society places the rights of
an individual over the rights of the community.15 Society con-
siders the right to raise one's child an essential and basic civil
right. In contrast, the Indian community focuses on the collective
rights of the community as a large cultural group and not on in-
dividual rights.15'
Again demonstrating resistance to tribal jurisdiction, in In re
T.S., the Montana Supreme Court refused to transfer a child
custody proceeding of an Indian child to an Alaskan tribal court,
claiming the transfer would not be in the best interests of the
child.'52 A child custody proceeding involving an Indian child
may remain in state court if the Indian tribe declines jurisdiction
or either parent objects to the transfer to tribal court.'53 In ad-
dition, the state court may avoid tribal court jurisdiction if the
court finds "good cause to the contrary" exists to refuse transfer
of the proceeding. Unfortunately, a state court is free to use its
discretion to create a definition of "good cause" to prevent trans-
fer to tribal court.'"
For example, in In re T.S., the Montana Supreme Court
considered the BIA Guidelines which interpret "good cause to the
contrary" not to transfer a proceeding to tribal court.'55 The
templation of All, the Best Interests of None, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 761 (1991) (claim-
ing that the goals of the ICWA-to protect the best interests of the Indian child and
promote stability and security for Indian tribes-are unattainable).
149. MYERS, supra note 1, at 48 (emphasizing that the accomplishment of objec-
tives of ICWA is the responsibility of Indian tribes, Indian organizations and Indian
parents).
150. Donna J. Goldsmith, Individual vs. Collective rights: The Indian Child Wel-
fare Act, 13 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 7-8 (1990).
151. Id.
152. In re T.S., 245 Mont. 242, 250, 801 P.2d 77, 82 (1990), cert. denied, 500
U.S. 917 (1991).
153. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(b). In T.S., the mother and the Indian tribe sought trans-
fer to tribal court. 245 Mont. at 244, 801 P.2d at 79.
154. Connelly, supra note 67, at 483.
155. See BIA Guidelines, supra note 47, at 67,591:
§C.3 Determination of Good Cause to the Contrary
(a) Good cause not to transfer the proceeding exists if the Indian child's
tribe does not have a tribal court as defined by the Act to which the case
can be transferred.
(b) Good cause not to transfer the proceeding may exist if any of the follow-
ing circumstances exist:
(i) The proceeding was at an advanced stage when the petition to
transfer was received and the petitioner did not file the petition
promptly after receiving notice of the hearing.
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court did not, however, fashion a "good cause" remedy to avoid
transfer under the BIA Guidelines. Rather, the court defeated
ICWA's preference for tribal court jurisdiction using the vaguely
defined "best interest of child" factor created in an earlier ICWA
case.156 The Montana Supreme Court refused to transfer juris-
diction out of concern that the Alaskan tribal court would re-
move the child from the longest, most stable and protected envi-
ronment she had ever known.' Attempting to justify this deci-
sion, the Montana Supreme Court noted that the Indian child re-
sided in a home with a Native American foster mother who was
fully capable and willing to teach the child about "her Indian
heritage."" As the dissent reveals, it is doubtful the culture of
the Eskimo tribe of the King Island Native Community compares
to the Plains Indian Tribe of the foster mother. 59
In Holyfield, the United States Supreme Court cautioned
state courts to limit review in jurisdictional proceedings to the
determination of who should make the custody determination
pursuant to ICWA, not what the outcome of the determination
should be."6 Nevertheless, in In re T.S. the Montana Supreme
Court confused the legal issue of jurisdiction with the determina-
(ii) The Indian child is over twelve years of age and objects to the
transfer.
(iii) The evidence necessary to decide the case could not be ade-
quately presented in the tribal court without undue hardship to
the parties or the witnesses.
(iv) The parents of a child over five years of age are not available
and the child has had little or no contact with the child's tribe or
members of the child's tribe.
(c) Socio-Economic conditions and the perceived adequacy of tribal or Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs social services or judicial systems may not be consid-
ered in a determination that good cause exists.
(d) The burden of establishing good cause to the contrary shall be on the
party opposing the transfer.
156. In re T.S., 245 Mont. 242, 247, 801 P.2d 77, 79 (citing In re M.E.M., 195
Mont. 329, 336, 635 P.2d 1313, 1317 (1981)). Noting that the primary responsibility
for interpreting the ICWA lies with the state court, the Montana Supreme Court,
citing the BIA Guidelines, claimed the legislative history of the ICWA used the term
"good cause" to provide state courts with flexibility to determine the disposition of a
child custody proceeding involving an Indian child. T.S. at 246, 801 P.2d at 80.
157. Id. at 249, 801 P.2d at 81.
158. Id. at 248, 801 P.2d at 81. In Holyfield, the United States Supreme Court
stressed that the Indian Placement preference is the most important substantive
requirement imposed on state courts. 490 U.S. at 36-37.
159. T.S., 245 Mont. at 251, 801 P.2d at 83 (Sheehy, J., dissenting).
160. Holyfield, 490 U.S. at 53 ("We have been asked to decide the legal question
of who should make the custody determination ... not what the outcome of that
determination should be.").
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tion of the child's placement.161 The Montana Supreme Court
boldly declared that the United State Supreme Court decision
did not control because, unlike Holyfield, the Indian child in this
case was not domiciled on the reservation.162 In addition, In re
T.S. advocated the "existing Indian family" exception, not to
avoid the application of ICWA, but to avoid tribal court jurisdic-
tion. The court claimed:
When the child has been domiciled on the reservation and has
significant contacts with the Tribe it is reasonable to assume
that jurisdiction should be transferred to the Tribe. In this case
we have the opposite circumstance which § 1911(b) is meant to
address. T.S. has never lived on the reservation, is not a mem-
ber of the Tribe and has never had any contact whatsoever
with the Tribe. The record demonstrates a total absence of
evidence demonstrating that it is in T.S.'s best interest that
jurisdiction be transferred to the Tribe.163
The Montana Supreme Court's analysis reflects a lack of
faith in the actions of tribal court. The Montana Supreme Court
implied that it, rather than the Alaskan tribal court, knew the
best interests of an Indian child. 6' Furthermore, In re T.S. re-
veals the need for educating courts and agencies regarding the
policy and application of ICWA.'65 The court's application of
ICWA in this case fails on at least three points. First, the Mon-
tana Supreme Court did not defer to the Indian tribe seeking
jurisdiction of one of its own tribal members. 6 Second, the
Montana Supreme Court used a procedural rule to refuse consid-
ering the Indian Child Welfare specialist's recommendation to
transfer jurisdiction to the tribal court. Lastly, the guardian ad
litem expressed misgivings about ICWA. 67 The trial court ad-
monished the guardian ad litem that his thoughts about ICWA
161. T.S., 245 Mont. at 248-49, 801 P.2d at 80-81.
162. Id. at 250, 801 P.2d at 82.
163. Id. at 250, 801 P.2d at 82.
164. Connelly, supra note 68, at 487. See also BIA Guidelines, supra note 47, at
67,591 (providing recommendations for implementing 25 U.S.C. § 1901-63 and stating
that in most cases state courts should not determine whether or not a child's con-
tacts with a reservation are so limited that a case should not be transferred).
165. "State courts seem to believe that Tribal Courts eat Indian children. Tribal
Court determines the best interest of the Indian child when jurisdiction is returned."
Lecture by Evelyn Stevenson, Managing Attorney, Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes, Univ. of Montana, School of Law (May 12, 1994).
166. T.S. was eligible for membership in the King Island Native Community.
T.S., 245 Mont. at 244, 801 P.2d at 78.
167. Id. at 251, 801 P.2d at 83.
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were irrelevant, but it is doubtful that an individual with appre-
hension of ICWA will promote the Act. Similar to pre-ICWA
cases, the Montana Supreme Court still appears willing to subor-
dinate the Indian tribe's interests to what it perceives as the
best interest of the Indian child.
168
VI. MONTANA'S LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE TO ICWA
When state and federal law conflict in a child custody pro-
ceeding involving an Indian child, federal law controls. 169 How-
ever, whenever state law provides a higher standard of protec-
tion than ICWA, application of state law is appropriate.7 v
Some states have enacted legislation to improve the protection of
Indian children in state court proceedings.' 7' Generally, the
state ICWA only applies in a proceeding if the federal ICWA is
also applicable.7 2 The state of Montana has not enacted a state
Indian Child Welfare Act and the Montana Code fails to refer-
ence ICWA in sections dealing with child custody proceedings.
For example, the factors considered in the adoption policy, to
ensure that the best interest of the child is met, do not refer to
ICWA requirements.'73 Further, a court ordered investigation
into an adoption proceeding does not include a finding of
whether ICWA applies or if efforts were made to comply with
ICWA. 74 For private adoption organizations arranging adop-
tion placements, the Montana Code fails to provide notification
168. Michael J. Dale, State Court Jurisdiction Under the Indian Child Welfare
Act and the Unstated Best Interest of the Child Test, 27 GONZ. L. REV. 353, 387-88
(1991-92) (analyzing state courts' Anglo best interest test in discretionary application
of ICWA).
169. 25 U.S.C. § 1921 (1988).
170. 25 U.S.C. § 1921.
171. Some states have enacted a State Indian Child Welfare Act. See, e.g., NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 43-1501 to 43-1516 (1993); OKLA. STAT. TIT. 10 §§ 40 - 40.9 (1987 &
Supp. 1995). Other states annotate or reference the ICWA. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§
25.23.060, 25.23.173, 25.24.150, 47-10.080 (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-525.01
(1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-1110, 38-1503, 59-2128 (1993 & Supp. 1994); MINN.
STAT. §§ 257.0651, 259.57 et seq. (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 125A.050 et seq. (1993);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 32A-1-8 et seq. (Michie 1993); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 109.309 et seq.;
418.627, 419A.002 et seq. (1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-16-80 (Law. Co-op 1993); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 26-7A-2; 26-7A-43, 26-7A-44 (1994); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 13.70.100 et seq., 26.33.040 et seq. (West 1995); WIS. STAT. §§ 48.028, 48.48,
48.981 (1994).
172. In re Adoption of Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059 (Okla. 1985), cert. denied 484
U.S. 1072 (1988).
173. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-114 (1993).
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procedures to Indian tribes for child custody proceedings involv-
ing Indian children.175 Finally, the General Index of the Mon-
tana Code under adoption of children does not refer to ICWA or
Indian children.
176
In 1987, however, in a more enlightened move, the legisla-
ture created the Indian Child Welfare specialist position.
17
This position is a unique measure of Montana's commitment to
ICWA. The specialist acts as a liaison with Indian tribes and the
state.178 The position requires a thorough knowledge of ICWA
and Montana Tribes, as well as superior negotiation and conflict
management skills.'79
The duties of the specialist include:
(1) developing Indian foster homes and other Indian placement
resources;
(2) providing technical advice to tribal, state and county agen-
cies and district courts on matters pertaining to Indian child
welfare;
(3) providing assistance in negotiating cooperative agreements
to provide foster care services to Indian children;
(4) conducting training seminars on implementing ICWA;
(5) applying for and accepting grants and other funds for Indi-
an child welfare activities;
(6) developing and maintaining a list of attorneys to represent
indigent parents and Indian custodians in Indian child welfare
proceedings;
(7) making recommendations to the department on legislation
and rules concerning Indian child welfare matters; and
(8) performing other duties concerning Indian child welfare
175. MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-8-108 (1993) (entitled "Who may place a child for
adoption"); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 52-2-401 to -407 (1993) (setting forth requirements
for child adoption agencies). However, note that section 41-3-108 of Montana Code
provides for child protective teams to assess the needs and treatment plans for child
and family. In 1989, the Montana Legislature amended the statute to include "[I]f an
Indian child or children are involved, someone, preferably an Indian person, knowl-
edgeable about Indian culture and family matters [should be included in the team]."
See also MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-525 (1993) (detailing youth court proceedings).
Likewise MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-3-205(i) the exceptions to the confidential nature of
case reports concerning children include "an agency of an Indian tribe or the rela-
tives of an Indian child if disclosure of the records is necessary to meet requirements
of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act."
176. Statutes involving Indian Tribes or Indian people are generally listed under
"Indians" in the General Index of the Montana Code.
177. MONT. CODE ANN. § 52-2-117 (1993).
178. Telephone Interview with Shirley Brown, Administrator, Department of
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matters as determined by the director.'
The responsibilities and goals of the specialist include:
a. improving the IV-E foster care contracts with reservations by
monitoring each contract annually;
b. negotiating new IV-E contracts as requested by the tribe;
c. maintaining current IV-E State/Tribal Agreements;
d. coordinating training on Native American cultural issues and
ICWA;
e. improving the knowledge of Department of Family Services'
staff about ICWA through clarification and interpretation;
f. informing the legislature, agencies and the public about Indi-
an child welfare issues; and
g. other duties and responsibilities such as representing the
department on ICWA related committees, task forces and other
work groups; coordinating intra/interagency linkages and activ-
ities to promote mutual understanding and service planning
and clarifying policies and resolving conflicts; promoting aware-
ness of Indian Child Welfare Services through public appear-
ances and written documents as requested by the supervi-
sor.'
8 1
To successfully achieve the goals of the Indian Child Welfare
specialist, however, the state should consider hiring more than
one individual to fulfill these numerous duties. As demonstrated
in In re T.S., the district court may disregard the specialist's
recommendation. In that case, the specialist had not reviewed
the entire file or interviewed the child, her mother or foster
parents. 8 ' Nonetheless, the court should have at least consid-
ered the specialist's recommendation as an expert on the policy
of ICWA.X'
In addition, the state is installing a new computer system to
centralize information regarding placement of Indian chil-
dren."M Available in 1996, the Child and Adult Protective Ser-
180. S.B. 217, 54th Sess. (1995) (amending MONT. CODE ANN. § 52-2-217 (1993)
to include: 1) a requirement that the secretary of state send a copy of this section to
each of the seven Montana reservations and to the tribal chairperson of the Little
Shell Band and 2) to allow the director of the Department of Family Services (DFS)
to appoint an individual who is not an employee of the DFS as the specialist).
181. Department of Family Services Employee Performance Appraisal Form,
State of Montana, Helena, Mont. (1994).
182. In re T.S., 245 Mont. 242, 250, 801 P.2d 77, 82 (1990).
183. S.B. 217, 54th Sess. (1995) (amending MONT. CODE ANN. § 52-2-217(2)
(1993)).
184. Telephone Interview with Francis A, Kromkowski, Department of Family
Services, Helena, Mont. (Apr. 22, 1994).
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vices (CAPS) system will track both state and tribal cases and
provide the state with complete statistical information regarding
ICWA issues." CAPS will require state social workers to im-
mediately identify whether the child involved is an Indian child.
In addition, CAPS will provide information to assist the social
worker in locating an available Indian home for preferred place-
ment as required under ICWA.186
In August, 1994, the state issued a memorandum of under-
standing establishing the Indian Advisory Council consisting of
representatives from the Department of Family Services, Bureau
of Indian Affairs, each of the seven Indian tribes in Montana and
two urban Indian organizations. The Council meets quarterly to
discuss social services issues and address problems arising due
to the lack of education regarding ICWA.' 7 For example, ICWA
provides that when a final decree of adoption of an Indian child
is vacated or set aside, the biological parent may petition for
return of custody.'" Unfortunately, county attorneys represent-
ing the Department of Family Services may not be familiar with
ICWA and do not often consider the biological parent as a place-
ment resource in this situation.'89 Furthermore, the biological
parents do not realize they have a right to petition under
ICWA.190
Acknowledging that many Indian children are placed in non-
Indian homes, the state is attempting to expand its pool of avail-
able Indian homes by employing the assistance of Native Ameri-
can organizations to recruit Indian parents for foster care and
adoptive placements.' 9' For example, the Department of Family
Services, in partnership with one Indian tribe, has hired a tribal
member to recruit Indian homes for placements on that reserva-
tion.'92 Indian tribes of Montana should recruit qualified mem-
bers of their community to participate in state foster care and
adoptive placements and to coordinate information with the
185. Telephone Interview with Trudy Flamand Miller, supra note 96.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. 25 U.S.C. § 1916(a) (1988).
189. Telephone Interview with Trudy Flamand Miller, supra note 96 (noting that
the social worker in many cases is the expert on the law regarding child custody
proceedings in cases involving Indian children).
190. Id
191. Id. (noting that 25% of state foster care placements are Indian children and
many of these children are placed in non-Indian homes).
192. Id. (identifying Great Falls, Montana as a target area for recruitment and a
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state.'9'
Montana's creation of an Indian Child Welfare specialist
position is a positive effort to implement ICWA. However, contin-
ued efforts are necessary to achieve the goals designated by the
legislature. The Indian tribes of Montana should coordinate their
efforts with the Montana Indian Child Welfare specialist to edu-
cate the public, attorneys and state officials regarding ICWA. In
addition, the legislature should amend all child custody proceed-
ing statutes in the Montana Code with references to ICWA."'
Amendments or annotations to child custody proceeding statutes
would alert Montana practitioners to the potential for federal
pre-emption of state law and may prevent delays and misunder-
standings in child custody proceedings involving Indian chil-
dren.195
VII. THE COMMITMENT OF CONFEDERATED SALISH AND
KOOTENAI TRIBES OF THE FLATHEAD RESERVATION TO ICWA
The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flat-
head Reservation (CS & KT or Tribes) is a progressive nation in
terms of self-governance.196 The Flathead Reservation is located
in Montana's northwest region, consisting of 1.24 million
acres.'97 On October 28, 1935, the CS & KT adopted a Tribal
Constitution and Bylaws, the first Indian tribe to do so under
the Indian Reorganization Act.'98 The CS & KT is committed to
self-governance and has seriously considered its role in the im-
plementation of ICWA. 99
193. Lack of an Indian home may constitute "good cause to the contrary" not to
place the child pursuant to the ICWA.
194. The enactment of a state ICWA in Montana is a debate for another day.
Some of the greatest loopholes in the ICWA are created in a state with a state Indi-
an Child Welfare Act. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. TIT. 10, § 40.3 (1987 & Supp. 1995)
(listing exceptions making the ICWA inapplicable); In re Adoption of Baby Boy W.,
831 P.2d 643, 648 (Okla. 1992) (requiring that child is part of an existing Indian
family before finding the ICWA applicable); In re S.C., 833 P.2d 1249 (Okla. 1992)
(determining that Holyfield did not invalidate existing Indian family exception).
195. A Montana ICWA case is referenced in Title 2. Government Structure and
Administration Chapter 1. Sovereignty and Jurisdiction Part 3. Jurisdiction on Indian
Lands. MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-1-304 (annotating In re M.E.M., 223 Mont. 234, 725
P.2d 212 (1986), which demonstrates the right to intervene in the adoption of an
Indian child. That section is entitled Rights, privileges and immunities). The M.E.M.
annotation may be more helpful in the adoption section of the Montana Code.
196. LOPACH ET AL., supra note 92, at 153.
197. LOPACH ET AL., supra note 92, at 157.
198. LOPACH ET AL., supra note 92, at 157. For an excellent analysis of the
tribal courts in Montana see Brown & Desmond, supra note 110.
199. For more information regarding the history of the Confederated Salish and
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A. Tribal Children's Code
In 1986, the CS & KT adopted the Tribal Children's
Code.2"0 The Tribal Children's Code recognizes and honors the
customs and traditions of an Indian child's particular Tribe;20'
it is consistent with the Indian Civil Rights Act,20 2 and with
the needs and realities of the tribal members living on the Flat-
head Reservation. The purpose statement of the Tribal Children
Code demonstrates the CS & KT's commitment to ICWA:
The Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes have adopted this
Tribal Children's Code, recognizing that Tribal children are the
Tribes' most important resource and their welfare is of para-
mount importance to the Tribes. It is the purpose of this Code
to provide and assure that each Tribal child within the jurisdic-
tion of the Tribal Court shall receive the care and guidance
needed to prepare such children to take their places as adult
member (sic.) of the Tribes; to prevent the unwarranted break-
up of Indian families by incorporating procedures that recog-
nize the rights of the children and parents or other custodial
adults, and, where possible, to maintain and strengthen the
family unit; to preserve and strengthen the child's individual,
cultural, and Tribal identity. Wherever possible, family life
shall be strengthened and preserved, and the primary efforts
will be toward keeping the child with his or her family, and if
this is not possible, then efforts shall be made toward maintain-
ing the child's physical and emotional ties with the child's ex-
tended family and with the Tribal community."3
The Tribal Children's Code provides a speedy and effective
procedure for processing referrals under ICWA,2°' because trib-
Kootenai Tribes see Flathead Culture Committee, A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FLAT-
HEAD TRIBES (2d ed.; St.Ignatius, Montana: Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes,
1979).
200. THE LAW AND ORDER CODE OF THE CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI
INDIAN TRIBES OF THE FLATHEAD RESERVATION, MONTANA, Ch. VI, § 1 (1986) [herein-
after LAw AND ORDER CODE].
201. Even though the Tribe is confederated, the Salish and Kootenai people have
separate and distinct cultures. See LOPACH ET AL., supra note 92, at 154.
202. Indian Civil Rights of 1968 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 1301 et seq.
(1988)).
203. LAw AND ORDER CODE supra note 200, ch. VI, § 1(2) (1986).
204. LAW AND ORDER CODE, supra note 200, ch. VI, § 5. This section entitled
"Referrals Under the Indian Child Welfare Act," provides:
The purpose of this Section is to provide for the speedy and effective
procedures for the processing of referrals under the Indian Child Act of
1978 from State or Tribal Courts, in order to best protect the interests of
the child of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes and the interest of
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al courts seeking transfer of jurisdiction have limited time to
petition after receiving notice.0 5 The Tribal Children's Code
designates the chief tribal judge as responsibile for ensuring a
proper investigation is conducted and determining whether a
transfer is in the best interest of the child.2"' In considering
whether the transfer of the case is in the best interest of the
child, the court may consider the following factors:
(1) past and present residences of the child;
(2) the child's or child's family ties with the Tribes or the Tribal
community;
(3) special conditions of the child and the Tribal or reservation
facilities to deal with such conditions;
(4) when jurisdiction should be taken-before or after the adjudi-
cation stage of the proceedings;
(5) consider the location of the witnesses and other evidence and
any process limitations of Tribal jurisdictions;
(6) continuing the child's surroundings and emotional contact;
and
(7) the wishes of the child's immediate or extended family and
other interested persons.0 7
Contrary to the state of Montana's concern, the CS & KT
does not decline jurisdiction of an ICWA referral on the basis of
difficulty or expense of a case. 8 Considering all circumstances,
the Tribes. It is intended that the Tribes will investigate cases referred to
them, and will act to transfer to the Tribal Court those cases in which
transfer is in the best interest of the child. The procedures found in this
Section are aimed at producing a thoughtful and wise decision in the mat-
ter of transfers.
205. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988) provides that:
No foster care placement or termination of parental rights proceeding shall be
held until at least 10 days after receipt of notice by the parent or Indian custodian
and the tribe or the Secretary: Provided, That the parent or Indian custodian or the
tribe shall, upon request, be granted up to 20 additional days to prepare for such
proceeding.
206. LAw AND ORDER CODE supra note 200, ch. VI, § 5, 9 5(e). In addition, the
Tribal Children's Code definition section is more extensive than the ICWA providing
definitions for "expert witness" and "tribal member" lacking in the ICWA. Compare
LAw AND ORDER CODE supra note 196, ch. VI, § 1, 1 6(j), (w) with 25 U.S.C. § 1903
(1988).
207. LAw AND ORDER CODE supra note 200, ch. VI, § 5, $ 5(e)-(g).
208. "[Tribal courts may pick and choose those Indian children over which they
will exercise jurisdiction, however State courts are allowed no choice. One potential
result, of course, is that tribal courts will waive jurisdiction in all difficult or expen-
sive cases while State courts . . . will have no choice but to accept those cases." H.R.
REP. No. 1386, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 44 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530,
7566 (dissent to passage of the ICWA by Richard A. Weber, Staff Attorney, Office of
Legal Affairs, Montana Dep't of Soc. and Rehab. Serv. sent to Montana Rep. Ron
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common sense best determines whether to request a transfer of a
proceeding from a state court." 9 If the CS & KT decides not to
petition for transfer of an ICWA case, the Tribes will file a No-
tice of Tribal Intervention in the state court requesting to moni-
tor the proceedings.21 ° The jurisdiction remains in state court
but the intervention allows the Tribes to monitor the proceedings
and ensure that the state court complies with ICWA.211 In ad-
dition, the CS & KT retains an interest in the child even if he or
she is placed off the reservation. Many times a child will return
to the CS & KT for information regarding his or her back-
ground." The CS & KT is in a better position to assist those
children through a continued involvement with the child.
As the Tribal Children's Code demonstrates, the CS & KT's
interest is not a competing interest with its tribal members. The
tribal court balances the interests of the family and the child,
with the CS & KT's interest of sovereignty and self-governance,
to determine the best interests of the child.
B. Foster Care Handbook
In addition to the Tribal Children's Code, the CS & KT en-
acted regulations for foster care homes. The Tribal Family Assis-
tance Program has also prepared a handbook on the role of the
parent to assist foster care families.21 The CS & KT's policy
stresses the importance of keeping the family together. However,
the Tribe also recognizes the need for Indian homes in which to
place children."4 The Montana Department of Family Services
recognizes tribal licensing of foster care homes on the Flathead
Reservation.' The CS & KTs effort to find suitable foster care
Marlenee).
209. Interview with Chief Tribal Judge W. Joseph Moran, Confederated Salish
and Kootenai Tribes, Tribal Court, in Pablo, Mont. (Mar. 17, 1994).
210. LAW AND ORDER CODE, supra note 200, ch. VI, § 5, 5(i).
211. Interview with Chief Tribal Judge W. Joseph Moran supra, note 209.
212. A Tribe may request either a record of placement from the State or, upon
the request of the adopted Indian child over the age of eighteen, disclosure of infor-
mation for enrollment. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1951(b) (1988).
213. FAMILY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM, THE CONFEDERATED SALISH AND KOOTENAI
TRIBES OF THE FLATHEAD RESERVATION, THE ROLE OF THE FOSTER PARENT: A HAND-
BOOK (1989).
214. The Tribal Social Service Department advertises in the C.S. & K. Tribe's
weekly newspaper for foster care homes. CHAR-KOOSTA NEWS (Pablo, Mont.), Mar. 3,
1995, at 10.
215. MONT. CODE ANN. § 52-2-722(2) (1993) (allowing applications by Indians on
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and adoption placement on the Reservation is evidence of its
commitment to the policy of ICWA.
Pursuant to ICWA and the State-Tribal Cooperative Agree-
ments Act,21 the parties have entered into an agreement re-
garding Indian children on the Flathead Reservation. The State
of Montana and the CS & KT share jurisdiction over child abuse
and neglect proceedings involving Indian children residing on the
Flathead Reservation. The agreement provides that the CS & KT
shall investigate reports involving children residing on the reser-
vation who are enrolled members of any federally recognized
Indian tribe, or who possess one-quarter Indian blood quantum,
regardless of the tribal affiliation. The state investigates all
other referrals concerning children residing on the reservation.
The agreement provides for reciprocal reporting and notification
procedures between state and tribal agencies.217
C. Tribal Court Administration
ICWA recognizes that tribal courts are the best forum to
decide an Indian child custody proceeding.218 Due to a lack of
understanding, state courts and non-Indian individuals may
perceive tribal courts as inferior systems.219 To correct this mis-
conception, ICWA requires state and tribal courts to give full
faith and credit to an Indian tribe's public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings in Indian child custody proceedings.22 ° Fur-
thermore, as one state court recognized:
[The] relationship between Indian tribes and Indian children
domiciled on the reservation finds no parallel in other ethnic
216. MONT. CODE ANN. § 18-11-101 (1993).
217. Child Welfare Agreement Between the Department of Family Services and
the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Indian Reservation,
(1991). The agreement was originally intended to remain in effect until June 30,
1992; however, the agreement's duration was extended to Feb. 1, 1994. (on file with
the Montana Law Review).
218. 25 U.S.C. § 1911 (1988). Unfortunately, tribal court involvement is curtailed
until the state court notifies the parent or Indian tribe of the child custody proceed-
ing. 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a) (1988); see also Robert J. McCarthy, Indian Tribes and the
Custody of Indian Children, THE ADVOCATE 8, 10 (1993) (noting that Indian parents
receive notice of child custody proceedings in only 65% to 70% of the cases under
state jurisdiction).
219. INDIAN CHILD WELFARE ACT OF 1978: "A LAW FOR OUR CHILDREN" (Am.
Indian Law. Training Program) 111-6 to 111-7 (1979). But see MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-
8-103(6) (1993) (defining "court" as a Montana district court or a tribal court of a
Montana Indian reservation).
220. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1988).
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cultures found in the United States .... It is a relationship that
many non-Indians find difficult to understand and that non-
Indian courts are slow to recognize. It is precisely in recognition
of this relationship, however, that the ICWA designates the
tribal court as the exclusive forum for the determination of [a
child] custody [proceeding]. 2 1
The CS & KT strongly exemplifies a system that allows an
Indian tribe to effectively pursue and implement the policy of
ICWA. First, the CS & KT Council appoints its tribal court judg-
es.222 To ensure a sensitivity to the CS & KT's culture, a tribal
court judge must be a member of the Confederated Salish and
Kootenai Tribes, unless approved otherwise.223 Next, the CS &
KT contributes sufficient financial resources to effectively im-
plement ICWA. For example, funds are available for a represen-
tative of the CS & KT to appear at the child custody hear-
ings. 24 The CS & KT's legal services department is available to
represent the interests of a parent or Indian child. The Tribal
Court employs an in-house social worker to investigate ICWA
cases and report directly to the court. The state employs one
Indian Child Welfare Specialist, with the assistance of legal
staff, to serve the seven Indian reservations regarding ICWA. In
comparison, the CS & KT employs a team of experts (attorneys,
judges, social workers) with a personal self-interest in the protec-
tion of their Indian children and the survival of the Tribe.2
In many aspects, the stronger tribal court systems resemble
the Anglo system. The similarity may reduce the non-members'
fear of a tribal system created by the lack of understanding and
ignorance of the Indian Tribes' motives to govern its own people.
Unfortunately, few Indian tribes have the resources to develop a
system such as the CS & KT. Congress did not provide funding
221. In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962, 969-70 (Utah 1986).
222. Each judge of the Tribes is appointed by the Tribal Council for four years.
LAW AND ORDER CODE, supra note 200, ch. 1, § 3, 1 2-3. Tribal judges are not
required to hold a juris doctorate; however, the current chief tribal judge of the
Tribes is a licensed attorney. The appointed judges continually participate in judicial
training throughout their judicial career.
223. LAW AND ORDER CODE, supra note 200, ch. 1, § 3, % 4.
224. The Tribe may send a tribal attorney, the tribal court social worker, or
both to the state court proceedings virtually anywhere in the United States. Inter-
view with Evelyn S. Stevenson, Managing Attorney, Legal Services Department, Con-
federated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, in Pablo, Mont. (Mar. 30, 1995).
225. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, Ordinance 84A: (Apr. 1984) (es-
tablishing the Tribal Legal Department to provide responsive and competent legal
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for Indian tribes to effectively participate in ICWA proceedings,
so Indian tribes must find alternative resources.228 Of course,
Indian tribes have a concern for the best interest of their chil-
dren; however, many tribes lack funding to adequately enforce
their concern.227 As the CS & KT's system illustrates, adequate
funding empowers an Indian tribe to employ attorneys and social
workers, to develop codes and policies for tribal agencies, to
monitor the welfare of Indian children, and to timely intervene
in state court proceedings.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The ICWA was enacted in response to the culture bias found
in state court child custody proceedings involving Indian
children.228 In Holyfield, the United States Supreme Court
demonstrated a great deal of faith in tribal courts to adjudicate a
proper remedy in child custody proceedings. However, state
courts continue to show a distrust of tribal courts by attempting
to limit the application of ICWA. The result is delay in adjudica-
tion of a custody proceeding when courts are forced to follow the
mandates of ICWA. The ultimate consequence is misunder-
standing and bitterness toward Indian tribes who pursue en-
forcement of ICWA. The United States Supreme Court confirmed
that an Indian tribe's interest is unique in a child custody pro-
ceeding involving an Indian child. If the child resides off the
reservation, state courts should defer jurisdiction and allow the
tribal court to determine the factors of forum, personal jurisdic-
tion, and the availability of its resources to transfer the case to
tribal court. The state of Montana should follow the broad and
liberal interpretation of Holyfield when handling ICWA cases. It
is doubtful an Indian tribe will pursue jurisdiction of a case for
any reason other than seeking to protect the best interest of the
child.
Centuries of paternalistic attitudes have sought to require
226. Jesse C. Trentadue & Myra A. DeMontigny, The Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978: A Practitioner's Perspective, 62 N.D. L. REV. 487, 501 (1986).
227. See Dorsay et al, supra note 15, at 182 (citing In re Birdhead, 331 N.W.2d
785 (Neb. 1983); In re T.R.M., 489 N.E.2d 156 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986), vacated, 525
N.E.2d 298 (Ind. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1069 (1989); In re Robert T., 246 Cal.
Rptr. 168 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988)). Dorsay notes that some state courts are basing deci-
sions on Indian tribe's financial inability to participate in ICWA proceedings and pe-
nalizing Indian tribes for their failure to participate. Id.
228. 25 U.S.C. § 1901 (1988); see also Robert J. McCarthy, The Indian Child
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the Indian community to conform to Anglo norms. The ICWA
attempts to preserve Indian heritage and culture by providing an
Indian child the opportunity to learn his or her cultural identity
which is in the best interest of the child. Instead of challenging
the mandates of ICWA, practitioners and courts should learn the
policy of ICWA, and accept that Indian tribes provide the best
forum to determine the future of Indian children. Clearly, ICWA
is in the best interest of the Indian child, family and tribe.
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REFINING FEDERAL CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN
MONTANA
Carl Tobias*
I re-evaluated the experimentation that the Montana Feder-
al District Court and additional districts have performed under
the Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA) of 1990 in the most recent
issue of this journal.1 I reported that civil justice reform at the
national level had been relatively quiescent since I canvassed
national developments in the previous issue of the Montana Law
Review.2 All ninety-four federal districts were continuing to ex-
periment with mechanisms for decreasing cost and delay in civil
litigation and were continuing to assess the efficacy of those
procedures.3 I correspondingly discussed the Judicial Amend-
ments Act of 1994 that extended for a year the CJRA's deadlines
for the Judicial Conference to submit a report to Congress and
the RAND Corporation to complete a study on the pilot program
whereby ten districts experimented with six litigation manage-
ment and cost and delay reduction procedures prescribed by the
statute.
4
I also reported that Chief Judge Paul Hatfield sought the
views of the CJRA Advisory Group and the Local Rules Commit-
tee on the possible revision of the court's local rules. After con-
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Jerry Lynch and
Peggy Sanner for valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for
processing this piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. I am
especially grateful to Ann and Tom Boone for their generous gift which recognizes
the value of scholarship. I serve on the Advisory Group that the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Montana has appointed under the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990; however, the views expressed here and errors that remain are mine.
1. See Carl Tobias, Re-evaluating Federal Civil Justice Reform in Montana, 56
MONT. L. REV. 307 (1995) [hereinafter Tobias, Re-evaluating]. This is the most recent
installment of a series of articles that document and analyze developments in federal
civil justice reform in Montana. See Carl Tobias, Evaluating Federal Civil Justice
Reform in Montana, 55 MONT. L. REV. 449 (1994) [hereinafter Tobias, Evaluating];
Carl Tobias, Recent Federal Civil Justice Reform in Montana, 55 MONT. L. REV. 235
(1994); Carl Tobias, More on Federal Civil Justice Reform in Montana, 54 MONT. L.
REV. 357 (1993); Carl Tobias, Updating Federal Civil Justice Reform in Montana, 54
MONT. L. REV. 89 (1993); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Planning in the Montana Federal
District, 53 MONT. L. REV. 239 (1992); Carl Tobias, The Montana Federal Civil Jus-
tice Plan, 53 MONT. L. REV. 91 (1992); Carl Tobias, Federal Court Procedural Reform
in Montana, 52 MONT. L. REV. 433, 438-51 (1991).
2. See Tobias, Re-evaluating, supra note 1, at 308-11; see also Tobias, Evaluat-
ing, supra note 1, at 451-53.
3. See Tobias, Re-evaluating, supra note 1, at 308-09.
4. See Tobias, Re-evaluating, supra note 1, at 309-10; see also 28 U.S.C. §
473(a) (Supp. V 1993).
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sultation with both entities, the Chief Judge decided that the
Montana district should prepare a complete set of local rules
amendments in light of the 1993 Federal Rules revisions.5 Chief
Judge Hatfield, therefore, finalized proposals to amend the local
rules and circulated them to Judge Charles Lovell and Judge
Jack Shanstrom in November. I suggested that the district in-
tended to publish the proposed local rules revisions for public
comment in early 1995.
Since I last reported on civil justice reform, two important
developments have occurred. The House of Representatives
passed three bills-the Attorney Accountability Act (AAA), the
Securities Litigation Reform Act (SLRA), and the Common Sense
Product Liability and Legal Reform Act (PLLRA).6 None of these
measures directly modifies the CJRA, although the bills could
significantly affect civil justice reform. The second important
development is that the Montana Federal District Court formally
proposed the local rules revisions for public comment. This essay
undertakes the evaluation of these new developments in civil
justice reform.
The essay first provides an update of pertinent developments
respecting civil justice reform nationally and in the Montana
district. The essay emphasizes House passage of three important
measures relevant to civil justice reform and the proposed local
rules amendments which the Montana district issued. The piece
then affords a look into the future.
I. CMvL JUSTICE REFORM UPDATE
A. National Developments
Virtually no new developments in federal civil justice reform
at the national level that involve the district courts have oc-
curred since I last reported on reform.7 All thirty-four Early
Implementation District Courts (EIDC), including the Montana
district, and the remaining sixty districts that are not EIDCs
5. See Tobias, Re-evaluating, supra note 1, at 314; see also United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Montana, Proposed Amendments to Local Rules (Oct.
1994).
6. See Attorney Accountability Act, H.R. 988, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995);
Common Sense Product Liability and Legal Reform Act, H.R. 956, 104th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1995); Securities Litigation Reform Act, H.R. 1058, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1995). These effectively comprise the Common Sense Legal Reforms Act, H.R. 10,
104th Cong., lst Sess. (1995), the ninth tenet in the Republican Party's Contract
with America.
7. See Tobias, Re-evaluating, supra note 1, at 308-09.
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have continued experimenting with mechanisms for decreasing
cost and delay and have continued to assess those procedures'
effectiveness.' In the latest issue of the Montana Law Review, I
explained that the CJRA required the Judicial Conference to
submit to Congress by December 31, 1995 a report on the dem-
onstration program9 and that Congress had not extended this
deadline in the 1994 Judicial Amendments Act.1" Legislation
was recently introduced in the Senate that would extend the
deadline for a year.11
During the week of March 6, the House of Representatives
passed the AAA, the SLRA, and the PLLRA.12 This legislation
could significantly affect federal civil justice reform, but it is
unclear whether Congress will enact any of the bills. They,
therefore, warrant brief treatment here. Section 2 of the AAA
would modify the settlement offer provision in current Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 68 by prescribing fee-shifting in diversity
cases. 13 Section 3 of the legislation would change Federal Rule
of Evidence 702 in ways that limit expert testimony, ostensibly
to increase "honesty in testimony."1 4 Section 4 would alter the
1993 revision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 by eliminat-
ing safe harbors, making the provision applicable to discovery,
and making sanctions' imposition mandatory and compensato-
ry. 15
The SLRA would modify securities litigation in numerous
ways. Most important to the issues treated here, the legislation
would impose special pleading and class action requirements in
securities cases and would require losing parties to pay prevail-
ing litigants' attorney's fees in certain of those actions.16 The
PLLRA would institute a number of important changes in prod-
8. All districts had to issue civil justice expense and delay reduction plans by
December 1993. See Civil Justice Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 103(bXl), 104
Stat. 5096 (1990).
9. The program requires that the Western District of Michigan and the North-
ern District of Ohio experiment with systems of differentiated case management and
that the Northern District of California, the Northern District of West Virginia and
the Western District of Missouri experiment with various methods of reducing cost
and delay, including alternatives to dispute resolution (ADR). See Civil Justice Re-
form Act, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 104(b)(1)-(2), (d), 104 Stat. 5097 (1990).
10. See Pub. L. No. 103-420, § 4, 108 Stat. 4343, 4345 (1994).
11. See S. 464, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
12. I rely substantially in the remainder of this subsection on Carl Tobias,
Common Sense and Other Legal Reforms, 48 VAND. L. REV. 699 (1995).
13. See H.R. 988, supra note 6, § 2; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
14. See H.R. 988, supra note 6, § 3; see also FED. R. EVID. 702.
15. See H.R. 988, supra note 6, § 4; see also FED. R. CIv. P. 11.
16. See H.R. 1058, supra note 6, §§ 2-4.
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ucts liability law. The legislation would restrict seller liability in
numerous instances, permit punitive damages awards only upon
proof of actual malice by clear and convincing evidence, and
require that punitive damages be capped." The bill would also
impose several defenses to products liability cases and a special
Rule 11 that covers frivolous products suits." The measure pro-
hibits strict liability actions for commercial loss, includes a stat-
ute of repose, and limits the liability of health care providers and
drug manufacturers. 9
B. Montana Developments
On March 30, the Montana district issued proposed amend-
ments to its local rules and sought public comment on the pro-
posals.2 ° Most of the proposals are inconsequential or involve
style, but several are significant and substantive. One modifica-
tion would essentially reinstate the automatic disclosure proce-
dure that the district instituted in April 1992.21 The proposed
amendment also provides that sanctions "may be imposed for
violation of Rule 200-5(a) [and] shall be imposed in accordance
with the prescriptions" of Federal Rules 11 and 37.22
The other important modification implicates the provision
for the co-equal assignment of civil suits with the opportunity to
opt out and have Article III judges hear cases that were initially
17. See H.R. 956, supra note 6, §§ 102, 201.
18. See H.R. 956, supra note 6, §§ 104-105.
19. See H.R. 956, supra note 6, §§ 101, 106, 201, 203. When this essay went to
press in May, the Senate had passed a streamlined version of H.R. 956. See S. 565,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). That legislation did not include the provisions in H.R.
988 and H.R. 1058, and the Senate had not passed legislation that was analogous to
either H.R. 988 or H.R. 1058. However, the Senate did seem likely to pass legisla-
tion that is analogous to H.R. 1058. See S. 240 104 Cong., 1st Sess. (1995).
20. United States District Court for the District of Montana, Proposed Amend-
ments to Local Rules (Apr. 1995) [hereinafter 1995 Proposals].
21. See 1995 Proposals, Rule 200-5, supra note 20, at 18-20. Compare D. MONT.
R. 200-5(a) with United States District Court for the District of Montana" Order in
the Matter of Local Rules of Civil Procedure 2-3 (Jan. 25, 1994). The new proposal
makes two minor modifications in the 1992 version of subsections (iii) and (iv) of
Rule 200-5. The proposal replaces "identity" with more precise requirements that the
disclosing party provide the "name, and, if known, the address and telephone number
of each individual known or believed to "have discoverable information about the
claims or defenses, and a summary of that information." 1995 Proposals, Rule 200-
5(a)(iii), supra note 20, at 19. The proposal also provides that the disclosing party
may provide a copy of documents instead of a description. See 1995 Proposals, Rule
200-5(aXiv), supra note 20, at 19.
22. See 1995 Proposals, Rule 200-5(a)(4), supra note 20, at 19.
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assigned to magistrate judges. The proposal would require
that litigants exercise the option to request an Article III judge
"not later than twenty days from the date notification of assign-
ment to the magistrate judge is filed by the Clerk of Court."2'
The district has solicited the views on these proposed amend-
ments of the Montana Bar and the public, and these comments
were supposed to be "received by the Clerk of Court no later
than May 8."25
II. A GLANCE INTO THE FUrURE
A. National
All 94 districts will continue applying numerous measures
that are intended to decrease cost or delay. More conclusive
determinations regarding the procedures' effectiveness will have
to await additional experimentation, principally in the courts
that are not EIDCs. If Congress extends demonstration district
experimentation, the Federal Judicial Center and the Judicial
Conference should capitalize on the extra time. Congress should
reject those aspects of the AAA, the SLRA and the PLLRA that
govern procedure and fee shifting because they will disrupt nor-
mal procedural revision processes or CJRA experimentation or
will improperly restrict federal court access.2 6 If Congress is not
persuaded that the legislation will have these impacts or decides
to proceed for other reasons, Congress should at least delete
those provisions that will disrupt continuing reform initiatives,
such as CJRA experimentation.
B. Montana
The Montana district's consultation with the CJRA Advisory
Group and the Local Rules Committee before proposing amend-
ments in the local rules was advisable. The proposed revision in
automatic disclosure could cause confusion.27 The proposal
would essentially revert to the 1992 articulation after less than
23. See 1995 Proposals, Rule 105-2(d), supra note 20, at 2-3.
24. See 1995 Proposals, Rule 105-2(d), supra note 20, at 3.
25. United States District Court for the District of Montana, Notice, Proposed
Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the United States District Court for the
District of Montana (Mar. 30, 1995).
26. For more analysis of this legislation and suggestions for treating it, see
Tobias, supra note 12.
27. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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eighteen months of experience with a disclosure provision pre-
mised more closely on the 1993 Federal Rule amendment.28 Be-
cause both the new proposal and the 1994 enunciation provide
advantages and impose disadvantages, it may be preferable to
retain the 1994 provision, which at least contributes to national
procedural uniformity.
The proposed amendment's inclusion of a specific sanction-
ing provision may be unnecessary and confusing.29 The 1993
amendments of Federal Rules 26(g) and 37 expressly prescribe
sanctions for disclosure violations. 30 The reference to Federal
Rule 11 in the Montana District's proposal fosters complication
because Rule l1's 1993 amendment includes numerous procedur-
al requirements, such as safe harbors, that differ from those in
Rules 26(g) and 37.3 Moreover, the 1993 amendment of Rule
11(d) expressly states that the rule does "not apply to disclosures
and discovery requests, responses, objections and motions that
are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37."32
The proposed amendment's change in the opt-out provision,
which specifically provides a twenty-day period for requesting
assignment to an Article III judge, could avoid the problem of
demands that were exercised rather late in litigation after a
magistrate judge had handled the case to that point.33 The judg-
es in the district may want to institute measures which avoid
any perception that they might unfavorably view the assertion of
any such demands.'
III. CONCLUSION
Every district, including Montana, is continuing to experi-
ment with cost and delay reduction measures and evaluating
their effectiveness. Congress may extend the deadlines for com-
pleting the study of, and report and recommendations on, the
demonstration program. An extension should enhance their accu-
racy. Congress might also pass legal reform legislation, although
28. See Tobias, Re-evaluating, supra note 1, at 314.
29. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
30. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g), 37.
31. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
32. See FED. R. CIv. P. 11. Because the-Montana District's provision for disclo-
sure is stricter than Federal Rule 26(a), it could be argued that disclosure in the
district is not "subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37" and, therefore, that
special provision for sanctioning through Rule 11 is appropriate.
33. See Tobias, Re-evaluating, supra note 1, at 314-15.
34. See Tobias, Re-evaluating, supra note 1, at 315.
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enactment would be unwise. The Montana district has proposed
amendments of the local rules, and the judges are now consider-
ing the public comments on these proposed revisions.
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AN UPDATE ON THE 1993 FEDERAL RULES
AMENDMENTS AND THE MONTANA CIL RULES
Carl Tobias*
One year ago in the pages of the Montana Law Review, I
reported that the Montana Advisory Commission on Rules of
Civil and Appellate Procedure was considering whether to rec-
ommend that the Montana Supreme Court adopt for application
in the Montana state courts thorough amendments in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 11, which covers sanctions, and Federal
Rule 26, which prescribes mandatory pre-discovery or automatic
disclosure.1 The changes in these two provisions, which took
effect on December 1, 1993, were the most controversial compo-
nents of the most ambitious group of modifications in the Feder-
al Rules of Civil Procedure during their fifty-seven year history.2
The 1993 amendment in Rule 11 significantly altered the
1983 version of the Rule, an amendment which was the most
controversial change ever promulgated. The 1993 modification
substantially reduced the incentives for invoking Rule 11. For
instance, the 1993 amendment prescribes safe harbors, whereby
parties who are notified that they may have violated the Rule
are afforded twenty-one days to withdraw or alter the allegedly
offending paper.3 The 1993 revision correspondingly entrusts to
judicial discretion the imposition of sanctions when litigants or
lawyers contravene Rule 11 and admonishes judges that the
principal purpose of sanctions is deterrence, while suggesting
that monetary sanctions should rarely be levied.4 Some attor-
neys and additional interests opposed the amendment principally
because they believed that it would undermine the 1983
revision's effect as a deterrent to frivolous litigation.5 .
* Professor of Law, University of Montana. I wish to thank Peggy Sanner for
valuable suggestions, Cecelia Palmer and Charlotte Wilmerton for processing this
piece, and the Harris Trust for generous, continuing support. Errors that remain are
mine.
1. See Carl Tobias, The 1993 Federal Rules Amendments and the Montana
Civil Rules, 55 MONT. L. REv. 415 (1994).
2. See Supreme Court of the United States, Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Forms, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402 (1993).
3. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(cXl)(A), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421-23; see also
Carl Tobias, Civil Rights Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 IOWA L.
REV. 1775, 1784-85 (1992).
4. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 421-23; see also Carl
Tobias, supra note 3, at 1783-88.
5. See Supreme Court of the United States, Amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Forms, Dissenting Statement, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 402,
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The 1993 change in Rule 26, providing for automatic disclo-
sure, was the most controversial proposal to amend the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in the Rules' half-century history. The
1993 modification requires that plaintiffs and defendants di-
vulge, prior to discovery, "discoverable information relevant to
disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings."6
Nearly all elements of the organized bar and a number of
other interests strongly opposed the disclosure revision.7 These
attorneys and interests were uncertain about what they must
disclose, thought that the amendment would impose an addition-
al layer of discovery and believed that disclosure might conflict
with certain aspects of the American judicial process that de-
pends on "adversarial litigation to develop the facts before a
neutral decisionmaker."s The 1993 change authorizes each of the
ninety-four federal districts to alter or reject completely the Fed-
eral Rule amendment and quite a few courts, including the Mon-
tana District, have done so.'
Several factors led me to suggest that the Montana Supreme
Court incorporate into the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure the
1993 revision in Federal Rule 11. First, the 1993 modification in
Rule 11 represents a significant improvement in the 1983
amendment and constitutes a workable compromise. ° Promul-
gation of the 1993 federal amendment would foster intrastate
507-09 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) [hereinafter Dissenting Statement]. Justice Clar-
ence Thomas joined this dissent.
6. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (a)(1), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 431-32 (1993); see also
Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA.
L. REV. 1, 35-39 (1992).
7. See Carl Tobias, Improving the 1988 and 1990 Judicial Improvements Acts,
46 STAN. L. REV. 1589, 1612-13 (1994).
8. Dissenting Statement, supra note 5, at 510-11.
9. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 431-32; see also
Letter from Paul G. Hatfield, Chief Judge, U.S. Dist. Ct. for the Dist. of Mont., to
Members of the Federal Bar (Jan. 25, 1994) (on file with author) (advising bar that
court has temporarily modified automatic disclosure provision prescribed in April
1992 civil justice plan to conform more closely with federal amendment); Carl Tobias,
Refining Federal Civil Justice Reform in Montana, 56 MONT. L. REV. 539 (1995)
(indicating that court has proposed reverting to 1992 disclosure rule).
Arizona is the only state which prescribed automatic disclosure before the
Federal amendment became effective. See Symposium: Mandating Disclosure and
Limiting Discovery: The 1992 Amendments to Arizona's Rules of Civil Procedure and
Comparable Federal Proposals, 25 ARIz. ST. L.J. 1 (1993); see also Alaska Supreme
Court, Final Draft Discovery and Disclosure Rules (adopting disclosure procedure
which will become effective on July 15, 1995). See generally Jill S. Chanen, States
Considering Discovery Reform, A-B.A. J., Apr. 1995, at 20.
10. I rely substantially here on Carl Tobias, The Transmittal Letter Translated,
46 FLA. L. REV. 127 (1994).
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consistency between Federal and Montana Rule 11. Moreover,
Montana has prescribed many of the Federal Rules amendments
promptly after their adoption in the federal courts.
I also suggested that Montana Rule l1's actual operation in
practice should be relevant. It appeared that considerably less
formal Rule 11 activity had occurred under the Montana Rule 11
than the federal analogue, but it has been uncertain exactly how
much and what kind of informal activity, such as threats to
employ the Rule, have occurred.1 A significant amount of the
most damaging behavior that involved the 1983 revision to Fed-
eral Rule 11 implicated its informal invocation. 2 The Montana
Supreme Court and the state district courts have not construed
and applied Montana Rule 11 with complete consistency, and
there has been some satellite litigation under the Montana
Rule. 13
I suggested as well that the manner in which jurisdictions
other than Montana have handled Rule 11 might be relevant.
Quite a few states have now subscribed to the 1993 Federal Rule
revision. 4 It is also important to remember that a small num-
ber of jurisdictions had altered their counterparts of the 1983
federal provision before that amendment was changed. 5
I ultimately concluded that the issues critical to prescribing
the Federal revision for the Montana state courts were whether
the increased clarity and decreased incentives to rely on that
provision were greater than the possible loss in terms of deter-
ring frivolous lawsuits. I found that the heightened clarity of the
Federal modification, the amendment's limitation of incentives
for its invocation, and the more balanced approach suggested
that the Montana Supreme Court promulgate the federal change.
I determined that numerous considerations complicate the
question of whether the Montana state court system should pre-
scribe the Federal Rule 26 disclosure revision. One important
11. Cynthia Ford, Unraveling Rule 11, MONT. LAW. 3, 4-6 (Jan. 1993) [hereinaf-
ter Unraveling]; Cynthia Ford, MONT. LAW., Rule 11 is Working Well in Montana 9
(Feb. 1993).
12. See Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11, 46 U. MIAMI L. REV. 855, 861-65
(1992).
13. See Unraveling, supra note 11.
14. See, e.g., Mo. R. CIV. P. 55.03; WYO. R. CIV. P. 11; see also Joel L. Selig,
The 1994 Amendments to the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, 30 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 151, 156-62 (1995) (analyzing amendment to Wyoming Rule 11).
15. See, e.g., ALASKA R. C. P. 11; WASH. SUP. CT. CIV. R. 11. A few states nev-
er adopted provisions similar to the 1983 Federal Rule 11 because they seemingly
thought that its disadvantages outweighed its benefits. See, e.g., MASS. CIV. R. 11;
N.Y. CPLR 2105, 3020 (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1992); see also MD. R. 1-311.
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factor was the difficulty of ascertaining whether any of the auto-
matic disclosure procedures would be efficacious and, if so, which
would be most effective. A tiny number of the some twenty dis-
tricts which have been experimenting with disclosure for the
longest time employed mechanisms similar to the federal amend-
ment.16
I found some anecdotal evidence indicating that a number of
Early Implementation Districts Courts (EIDCs) which have been
applying disclosure have encountered little difficulty implement-
ing it. 7 Disclosure apparently operates best in rather routine,
simple litigation or when the disclosure is relatively general. s
Additional anecdotal material suggests that counsel are less
critical of automatic disclosure after they have acquired familiar-
ity with the measure. 9
I recommended several ways in which the Montana Supreme
Court could treat automatic disclosure. One approach was to
wait for more definitive conclusions from the ongoing experimen-
tation with disclosure in the federal district courts. I also sug-
gested that the Montana state courts might implement an exper-
imental program. For example, the Montana Supreme Court
could have identified several districts for experimentation with
disclosure techniques which have proved most promising in the
federal system.20 Moreover, the Montana Supreme Court might
have revised Montana Rule 26 to require some form of automatic
disclosure. I ultimately recommended that the lack of informa-
16. The districts based disclosure on the Advisory Committee's preliminary
draft. See Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 139,
144-45 (1993). Even these courts have not experimented with or assessed disclosure
for sufficient time to derive conclusive determinations about its effectiveness. Most of
the Early Implementation District Courts under the CJRA only instituted disclosure
during 1992, and few have rigorously evaluated its efficacy. See id. at 144-45.
17. These are the Northern District of California and the Districts of Arizona,
Massachusetts, and Montana. This evidence is premised on conversations with many
individuals, including advisory group reporters and members, court personnel, and
practitioners, who are familiar with civil justice reform in those districts. See general-
ly supra note 16 and accompanying text.
18. Unfortunately, discovery presents the most significant complications and
demands the most efficacious reform in complex litigation, such as civil rights class
actions and products liability cases, and when parties need relatively specific infor-
mation.
19. This idea is premised on the conversations, supra note 17. Numerous law-
yers apparently have found that disclosure principally requires attorneys and their
clients to participate in certain activities-especially document retrieval and label-
ling-earlier in litigation. This idea is based on the conversations, supra note 17.
20. See Carl Tobias, In Defense of Experimentation with Automatic Disclosure,
27 GA. L. REv. 665, 666-71 (1993); see also H.R. 2814, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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tion about how automatic disclosure in fact functions and about
which of the disclosure procedures is most workable meant that
the Montana Supreme Court should probably await the conclu-
sion of experimentation that is now proceeding in a number of
federal districts.
The Montana Advisory Commission on Rules of Civil and
Appellate Procedure has not yet submitted its recommendation
regarding the 1993 Federal Rules revisions to the Montana Su-
preme Court. 1 There is apparently little inclination on the part
of the members of the Commission or of the Montana Supreme
Court to adopt the 1993 amendments. The Commission and the
Court seem to have premised their determinations on the contro-
versial nature of the 1993 modifications in Rule 11 and in Rule
26 and on uncertainty about how the new provisions would actu-
ally operate, believing that it is preferable to see how the proce-
dures will function.
The positions of the Advisory Commission and of the Mon-
tana Supreme Court have much to commend them, and are de-
fensible, although I partly disagree with the decisions of the
Commission and the court. I believe that the 1993 Federal Rule
amendment in Rule 11 substantially improves the 1983 revision
which was extremely controversial. The 1993 version includes
phrasing that is clearer, while it reduces incentives to invoke the
provision. The determinations of the Commission and the court
regarding Rule 11 are more justifiable because Montana Rule 11
has apparently fostered comparatively little satellite litigation
and has been invoked rather infrequently, at least in formal
settings. The limited use of the provision is probably attributable
to the restraint and good judgment of judges, lawyers and par-
ties who participate in civil litigation in the Montana state
courts. Nevertheless, I think that amendment is now warranted,
and I urge the Commission and the court to reconsider their
decisions.
The decisions of the Advisory Commission and of the Mon-
tana Supreme Court respecting automatic disclosure are more
defensible. Rule 26(a) remains quite controversial at the federal
level, and fewer than a majority of the ninety-four districts have
subscribed to the Federal Rule amendment.22 None of the vari-
21. I rely substantially in this paragraph on telephone conversations with Ran-
dy Cox, Boone, Karlberg & Haddon and member of Montana Advisory Commission on
Rules of Civil and Appellate Practice (Dec. 5, 1994, Feb. 2, 1995 & May 23, 1995).
22. See Memorandum from Alfred W. Cortese & Kathleen L. Blaner, Mandatory
Disclosure Rule 26(a)(1): Not the Rule of Choice (Oct. 28, 1994) (on file with author);
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ous forms of automatic disclosure with which courts have been
experimenting has clearly emerged as very efficacious. The appli-
cation of disclosure in the Montana Federal District Court has
apparently worked rather well, but much of this can probably be
ascribed to the ingenuity and goodwill of the small, compara-
tively collegial federal bar. Only a few states have adopted dis-
closure, and many seem to be awaiting the results of federal
experimentation before proceeding. The determinations of the
Advisory Commission and of the Montana Supreme Court to
delay the adoption and implementation of disclosure, therefore,
seem advisable at this juncture.
CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court should adopt the 1993 Federal
Rule amendment to Rule 11 for application in the Montana state
court system. The controversial nature of the revision in Rule 26
means that the court should probably continue to defer that
provision's prescription while awaiting the results of experimen-
tation in the federal districts and the tiny number of states
which have adopted the procedure.
Donna Stienstra, Implementation of Disclosure in United States District Courts, With
Specific Attention to Courts' Responses to Selected Amendments to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 26 (Mar. 24, 1995).
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COMMENT
CONFLICT OF LAWS: THE RECENT HISTORY OF
MONTANA'S RULES FOR CONTRACTS
Robert C. Lukes"
The world is composed of territorial states having sepa-
rate and differing systems of law. Events and transac-
tions occur, and issues arise, that may have a significant
relationship to more than one state, making necessary a
special body of rules and methods for their ordering and
resolution.'
Courts often confront facts that require them to consider the
application of another jurisdiction's laws. For example, if a tort
occurred or a contract were entered into in state A, but the ac-
tion is brought in state B, the court of state B may find that the
proper law to apply is that of state A.
When the facts presented to a court may invoke the laws of
more than one jurisdiction, the court must determine which
substantive law will control the case. However, if the laws of the
different jurisdictions are equivalent, there is no conflict and the
issue is moot.' Although jurisdictional issues are a subset of the
conflict of laws subject, the determination regarding the substan-
tive law that a court should apply in a case is a different ques-
tion. Jurisdictional questions involve whether a court can exer-
cise power over a party or subject. On the other hand, substan-
tive conflict of law questions pertain only to the law that a court
will apply to the case and arise after it has established jurisdic-
* In Memory of Robert J. Lukes, M.D. (1922-1994).
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 1 (1971).
2. See, e.g., Gitano Group, Inc. v. Kemper Group, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 271, 275
(Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
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tion.3
A court determines the applicable substantive law by utiliz-
ing "conflict of laws" or "choice of law" rules. Although this re-
sults in a substantive determination, the process is procedural in
character. Traditionally, this determination is made without
regard to the actual substance of the laws which are in conflict.
A court applies the rules to the facts and reaches a conclusion.
The court's choice of the applicable law is crucial to the outcome
of many cases because it determines which jurisdiction's sub-
stantive law will be applied.
Conflict of laws often arise in contractual disputes. When
parties enter into a contract in one state, and then disputes
involving that contract arise in another, the laws of the two
states may conflict. When these conflicts arise, courts apply a
variety of rules, nearly all of which are judge-made common law
rules.4 The conflict of law rules, like many other procedural
rules of court, have evolved throughout the history of American
jurisprudence.
In Montana, the conflict of law cases concerning contracts
took a new direction beginning in 1979. The Montana Supreme
Court's decisions since that time are inconsistent and have creat-
ed confusion regarding the rules for conflict of laws. This Com-
ment will examine these decisions and discuss the inconsisten-
cies in the law to help clarify the current status of Montana's
conflict of law rules for contracts.
In part one, this Comment reviews the history of the more
significant conflict of laws theories. Part two turns the discussion
to a Field Code statute which has gained recent prominence in
Montana's conflict of laws analysis.5 Part three focuses on three
Montana conflict of law cases which rely on the Field Code stat-
ute. Part four compares these Montana decisions with cases from
other Field Code jurisdictions. In part five, the most recent Mon-
tana Supreme Court conflict of laws case, Casarotto v.
Lombardi,6 is juxtaposed with the court's prior decisions. In
conclusion, this Comment presents several alternatives to the
currently applied rules which should help improve Montana's
conflict of law rules for contracts.
3. For a brief discussion which clarifies this basic distinction, see ROBERT A.
LEFLAR, THE LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4 (1959).
4. Robert A. Leflar, The Nature of Conflicts Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1080,
1080 (1981).
5. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-102 (1993).
6. 268 Mont. 369, 886 P.2d 931 (1994).
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I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In the 1800s, Joseph Story propounded the first predomi-
nant conflict of laws theory in American jurisprudence.7 Based
on comity, his theory encouraged the recognition of a foreign
jurisdiction's laws in the general interest of justice and sought to
ensure that the presiding forum's laws would be applied recipro-
cally by other jurisdictions.8 Story's theory remained prominent
throughout the states during the later half of the 1800s and had
considerable influence in Europe as well.?
In the early part of this century, scholars extensively criti-
cized Story's approach to the conflict of laws. Joseph Beale's
vested rights theory thereafter gained prominence.' ° In 1934,
Beale was the reporter for the original Restatement of the Con-
flict of Laws [hereinafter First Restatement], which substantially
incorporated his views." The First Restatement dictates that
the law of the place where the contract was made controls the
validity and interpretation of the contract, whereas the law of
the place of performance controls issues concerning perfor-
mance.' Beale 'essentially took the older rule of lex loci con-
tractus, or the law of the place where the contract was entered,
and expanded it to distinguish issues of validity and perfor-
mance.
The First Restatement became the most influential theory
adopted by courts during the first half of this century,'3 despite
widespread criticism by academics.' 4 Although a small number
of jurisdictions continue to apply the rules of the First Restate-
ment, courts and scholars generally recognize it as too rigid and
mechanical, often leading to unjust results." Commentators
7. See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN
AND DOMESTIC (1865).
8. Id. § 38, at 34.
9. EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2.4, at 12-13 (1982).
10. See Scoles & Hay, supra note 9, at 13; see also JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREA-
TISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1935).
11. Scoles & Hay, supra note 9, at 13-15.
12. John G. Hanlin, The Choice of Law in the Interpretation of Insurance and
Reinsurance Contracts, 2 MD. J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 15 (1991); see also RE-
STATEMENT OF THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, §§ 311-76 (1934). Historically, the prominence
of this rule in American jurisprudence may be traced back to Scudder v. Union Nat'l
Bank, 91 U.S. 406 (1875).
13. Scoles & Hay, supra note 9, at 15.
14. See generally ROBERT A. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 1, at 1-2 (3d
ed. 1977).
15. See generally James A. McLaughlin, Conflict of Laws: The Choice of Law
Lex Loci Doctrine, the Beguiling Appeal of a Dead Tradition, Part One, 93 W. VA. L.
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have characterized Montana as one of the states that still clings
to the even older rule of lex loci contractus.6 Yet, the Montana
Supreme Court has denied this characterization. 7
General criticisms of the First Restatement and several
influential New York cases 8 led to a second Restatement on the
Conflict of Laws [hereinafter Restatement Second] in 1971. The
Restatement Second abandoned Beale's doctrine of vested rights
and adopted the "most significant relationship" test for the con-
flict of laws. Section 188 of the Restatement Second lists a num-
ber of factors that a court should weigh in contract situations to
determine which jurisdiction's law will apply. 9 This balancing
test from section 188 intends that the law of the jurisdiction
with the most substantial connections to the contract shall con-
trol the case.
The modern conflict of laws debate has generated several
other doctrines in addition to the one enunciated in the Restate-
ment Second, some of which have been adopted by other jurisdic-
tions.20 The amount of scholarship in this area is remarkable,2"
REV. 957 (1991) (claiming that even the certainty strived for in these older rules was
unachieved in implementation).
16. See Hanlin, supra note 12, at n.11; see also Gregory E. Smith, Choice of
Law in the United States, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1041, 1172, 1093-94 (1987) (providing an
analysis of conflict of law rules for all United States jurisdictions and classifying
Montana under "First Restatement Rules").
17. Kemp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 183 Mont. 526, 531, 601 P.2d 20, 23 (1979) (de-
claring that the Field Code statute relied upon by the court states the rule of lex
loci solutionis, or "the law of the place of performance").
18. Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963); Auten v. Auten, 124
N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954).
19. The factors are:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties. These contacts are to be evaluated according to
their relative importance with respect to the particular issue.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2) (1971).
20. For a discussion of these theories and a survey of jurisdictions adopting
them, see Smith, supra note 16. Smith claims that the modern era of conflicts law
began around 1963 and since that time courts have wrestled with these doctrines,
often reaching markedly inconsistent results. Id. at 1041.
21. See, e.g., Paul E. McGreal, Conflict of Laws, 47 SMU L. REV. 865 (1994);
Joel P. Trachtman, Conflict of Laws and Accuracy in the Allocation of Government
Responsibility, 26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 975 (1994); Symeon C. Symeonides, Louisi-
ana Conflicts Law: Two "Surprises", 54 LA. L. REv. 497 (1994); Stewart E. Sterk,
The Marginal Relevance of Choice of Law Theory, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 949 (1994);
Thomas H. Day, Solution for Conflict of Laws Governing Fraudulent Transfers: Apply
the Law that was Enacted to Benefit the Creditors, 48 BUS. LAW. 889 (1993); Kirt
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with the complexity and confusion engendered by this subject ap-
parent from the different types of rules that courts use. The
foregoing discussion provides a limited synopsis of the history of
the conflict of laws and places Montana's current rules in a larg-
er context.
II. MONTANA'S FIELD CODE STATUTE
In 1865, David Dudley Field submitted an enormous body of
codified laws-the Field Code-to the New York legislature.22
The Field Code was part of the movement to reform the system
of laws in the United States during the 1800s and was intended
as a comprehensive body of law that would entirely supplant the
common law.2" Although Field's home state of New York never
adopted the substantive portions of the Code,' five western
states adopted it in the late 1800s, including Montana.25 These
states abandoned the general purpose behind Field's creation
however, and adopted the Code in addition to the existing com-
mon law.
The Montana statute on conflict of laws, adopted verbatim
from the Field Code, is found at section 28-3-102 of the Montana
O'Neill, Contractual Choice of Law: The Case for a New Determination of Full Faith
and Credit Limitations, 71 TEx. L. REv. 1019 (1993); Dennis J. Tuchler, A Short
Summary of American Conflicts Law: Choice of Law, 37 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 391
(1993); Russel J. Weintraub, An Approach to Choice of Law that Focuses on Conse-
quences, 56 ALB. L. REV. 701 (1993); Brian N. Eisen, Cross Training: Sports Litiga-
tion and the Conflict of Laws, 3 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 41 (1993); James A.
McLaughlin, Conflict of Laws: The New Approach to Choice of Law: Justice in Search
of Certainty, Part Two, 94 W. VA. L. REV. 73 (1991); Ethan Glaubiger, Using Princi-
ples of Conflict of Laws to Chart the Murky Waters of Contractual Indemnity:
Angelina Casualty Co. v. Exxon Corp., USA, 15 TUL. MAR. L. J. 411 (1991); Richard
J. Bauerfeld, Effectiveness of Choice-of-law Clauses in Contract Conflicts of Law: Par-
ty Autonomy or Objective Determination?, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1659 (1982).
22. Roscoe Pound, David Dudley Field: An Appraisal, in FIELD CENTENARY
ESSAYS 3, 9 (Allison Reppy ed., 1949).
23. THE CIViL CODE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK § 6 (Proposed Draft 1865).
Field's declared purpose was not to create new laws for the state, but simply to codi-
fy the then existing common law of his time. Rodolfo Batiza, Sources of the Field
Civil Code: The Civil Law Influences on a Common Law Code, 60 TuL. L. REV. 799,
801 (1986).
24. Pound, supra note 22, at 10. New York adopted a Code of Civil Procedure
between 1876 and 1880 which was largely based on Field's work, but the remainder
of his work was never adopted by the state which had originally commissioned the
work. Id. .at 9-10.
25. Joseph M. Cormack, Conflict of Laws in Regard to Contracts in Field Code
States Other than California, 12 S. CAL. L. REv. 362, 363 (1939). For a history of
Montana's adoption of the Field Codes and their impact, see Andrew P. Morriss, This
State Will Soon Have Plenty of Laws: Lessons From One Hundred Years of Codifica-
tion, 56 MONT. L. REv. 359 (1995).
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Code [hereinafter the Field Code statute]. This statutory rule for
the conflict of laws remains unchanged since its enactment in
1895 and reads:
WHAT LAW AND USAGE TO GOVERN INTERPRETATION. A contract
is to be interpreted according to the law and usage of the
place where it is to be performed or, if it does not indicate a
place of performance, according to the law and usage of the
place where it is made.26
The Field Code statute is a rule of interpretation for contracts.
Although historically commentators distinguished between the
interpretation of a contract and its construction, it is now gener-
ally accepted that the interpretation includes both the construc-
tion and the legal effect of the contract's words.27 Problematic to
the application of the Field Code statute is the court's ability to
distinguish an issue involving the interpretation of a contract
from one involving a contract's validity. The Field Code statute
technically applies only in cases where the issue concerns inter-
pretation.
The Restatement of Contracts states: "Interpretations of
words and of other manifestations of intention forming an agree-
ment, or having reference to the formation of an agreement, is
the ascertainment of the meaning to be given to such words and
manifestations."28 Unfortunately, the interpretation of a con-
tract is often inexorably tied to its validity, and many of these
distinctions ultimately appear to be a matter of legal seman-
tics.29 As the Field Code statute is founded upon distinguishing
26. MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-3-102 (1993).
27. JOHN D. CALAMARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, The Law of Contracts, §§ 3-9 (3d
ed. 1987). Although the distinction between interpretation and construction is still
advocated by some commentators, even they recognize that (1) in many cases it is
impossible to draw a line between the interpretation and construction; and (2) courts
have generally ignored the distinction. See, e.g., Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpreta-
tion and Construction of Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 837 (1964). Professor
Patterson has defined the interpretation of a contract as "the process of endeavoring
to ascertain the meaning or meanings of symbolic expressions used by the parties."
Id. at 833. On the other hand, Patterson claims construction "is a process by which
legal consequences are made to follow from the terms of the contract and its more or
less immediate context." Id. at 835. This lack of clarity concerning the definition of
interpretation creates significant problems for applying Field Code statute. For the
purpose of this Comment on Montana conflict of laws, and in line with the modern
view, the word "interpretation" is taken to include construction. See also E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 7.1 (1982).
28. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 226 (1932). See also, Calamari & Perillo,
supra note 27, §§ 3-9.
29. Calamari & Perillo, supra note 27, §§ 3-9. "It is even difficult to tell
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issues of interpretation, its application becomes uncertain and
enigmatic.
In juxtaposition to the interpretation of a contract stands its
validity. If a contract fails basic questions of validity, issues of
interpretation are rendered moot. As the Field Code statute
governs only issues of interpretation, it does not apply as a con-
flict of laws rule when the issue concerns the validity of the
agreement.
However, when issues of interpretation arise, the Field Code
statute is a strict rule based on performance. In these cases, the
court should determine whether it can ascertain a place of per-
formance from the contract, and if so, the court should apply the
law from that place of performance. During the past fifteen years
the Montana Supreme Court has used the Field Code statute as
a platform to invoke a general rule distinguishing between issues
of validity of a contract and issues of interpretation.0 Beginning
in 1979 31-with one major exception-the court has relied upon
the Field Code statute to determine its conflict of law rules for
contracts.32
III. THE MONTANA CASES
In older cases involving the conflict of laws, the Montana
Supreme Court largely avoided the subject for nearly half a cen-
tury and never recognized the import of the Field Code statute in
this arena.' Although travel and commerce during the early
part of this century were more limited and the potential for in-
terstate conflict thereby reduced, the early cases on point avoid-
ed any discussion of potential conflicts.' In 1931, the Montana
Supreme Court first discussed the conflict of laws: the court
employed the rule of lex loci contractus without any reference to
whether the Restatement definition of interpretation refers to interpretation or con-
struction or both." Id.
30. See infra part III.
31. Kemp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 183 Mont. 526, 601 P.2d 20 (1979).
32. See infra text accompanying notes 42-79. But cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Estate of Braun, 243 Mont. 125, 793 P.2d 253 (1990). See infra text accompa-
nying notes 81-85.
33. See Shelton R. Williams, Conflict of Laws: Does R.C.M. 1935, Section 7537
Require the Conclusion that the "Place of Performance" Governs the Essential Validity
of a Contract?, 2 MONT. L. REV. 74 (1941) (claiming that as of publication, the Mon-
tana courts had yet to discuss the Field Code statute).
34. E.g., Capital Fin. Corp. v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 75 Mont. 460, 243 P.
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the Field Code statute.35 Yet, in a later case decided during the
1950s, the Montana Supreme Court put insurance companies on
notice that they will be subject to the rule of lex fori, or the law
of the forum.3" This meant that the court would always apply
Montana law, regardless of other factual considerations."
Prior to the Montana Supreme Court's most recent decision
in Casarotto, the seminal case in Montana for conflicts law was
Kemp v. Allstate Insurance Co. from 1979.8 The only notable
conflict of laws case before Kemp is In re Estate of
Dauenhauer,39 in which the court determined a child's legitima-
cy for purposes of inheritance. Confronted with a conflict of laws
issue, the court in Dauenhauer did not rely upon Montana case
law or statutory law, but relied instead upon the First Restate-
ment and the Restatement Second. 0 Because Dauenhauer did
not involve a contract situation, the Field Code statute did not
apply. However, the case is important in this context for the
Montana Supreme Court's recognition of the general applicability
of the Restatements when conflict of law questions arise. More-
over, in 1980 the Ninth Circuit looked to Dauenhauer, not to
Kemp, for guidance to determine Montana's conflict of law rules
in a contractual situation and applied "the most significant rela-
tionship" test from the Restatement Second."1 Thus, both the
Montana Supreme Court and the federal court applying Montana
law employed the Restatement in a narrow area of the conflict of
laws in the past.
In 1979, the Montana Supreme Court for the first time rec-
ognized the import of the Field Code statute in Kemp v. Allstate
Insurance Co.'2 Kemp is important for several reasons. First, it
35. Styles v. Byrne, 89 Mont. 243, 296 P. 577 (1931). The doctrine of lex loci
contractus demands the law of the place where the contract was entered into shall
control the case.
36. Trammel v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen and Enginemen, 126 Mont.
400, 409, 253 P.2d 329, 334 (1953) (applying Montana law and public policy to in-
clude a divorced wife within the insurance contract's meaning of "dependent").
37. Note that regardless of the conflict of laws rule that Montana applies, this
is very often the result. See infra note 72.
38. 183 Mont. 526, 601 P.2d 20 (1979).
39. 167 Mont. 83, 535 P.2d 1005 (1975).
40. Dauenhauer, 167 Mont. at 86, 535 P.2d at 1006.
41. Energy Oils, Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 626 F.2d 731, 734 n.6 (9th Cir.
1980) (holding that Montana law applied to the construction of assignments of oil
and gas leases). The federal court appears to assume that Montana's recognition of
the Restatement Second as valid authority in Dauenhauer made it a legitimate
source for any conflict of laws issue. The Field Code statute is not discussed in the
federal court's opinion. Id.
42. 183 Mont. 526, 531, 601 P.2d 20, 23 (1979).
560 [Vol. 56
212
Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/1
CONFLICT OF LAWS IN MONTANA
signals a departure from the prior cases in its recognition of the
Field Code statute as determinative in conflict of laws for con-
tracts. Second, in recognizing the efficacy of the Field Code stat-
ute in Kemp, the Montana Supreme Court acknowledged that
statutory law will control court rules which in other jurisdictions
are generally judge made. Finally, the court in Kemp attempted
to augment the statutory rule to cover situations beyond the
interpretation of contracts, thus providing a more complete con-
flict of laws rule for Montana.
In Kemp, the plaintiffs car accident in Montana was covered
under two insurance policies: one entered into in New York and
one in Vermont.4' The court recognized a conflict between the
laws of these states and Montana concerning the possibility of
"stacking" the uninsured motorist coverage. 44
Allstate argued that Montana followed lex loci contractus
and therefore, the law of Vermont should apply to the policy
entered into in Vermont, while New York law should apply to
the New York policy.'8 If the court in Kemp applied the laws of
these other jurisdictions, it would have precluded the "stacking"
of the plaintiffs policies and denied an increased recovery. Un-
like New York and Vermont, Montana permits the insured to
stack uninsured motorist polices." Therefore, under Montana
law a dramatically different recovery would result.
In contrast, the plaintiff urged the court to renounce lex loci
contractus as "archaic," and to apply the most significant rela-
tionship test from the Restatement Second. 47 The court did not
follow either argument, declaring that "[n]either party has cor-
rectly interpreted the affect in this case" of the Field Code stat-
ute.48 The court interpreted the statute to prescribe the rule of
lex loci solutionis, or the law of the place of performance.49 The
court stated:
43. Id at 528, 601 P.2d at 21.
44. Id. at 528-35, 601 P.2d at 21-24. "Stacking" laws concern the ability of the
insured to add separate uninsured motorist policies together for greater coverage.
Because of the contradictory positions of many jurisdictions, the issue of stacking is
notably present in many recent conflict of law cases. E.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,
449 U.S. 302 (1981); California Casualty Indem. Exch. v. Pettis, 239 Cal. Rptr. 205
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987).
45. Kemp, 183 Mont. at 530-31, 601 P.2d at 22-23.
46. See Bennett v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 261 Mont. 386, 862 P.2d
1146 (1993).
47. Kemp, 183 Mont. at 531, 601 P.2d at 23.
48. Id.
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Under the statute, it is only when the contract does not indi-
cate a place of performance that the interpretation would fall
under the rule of lex loci contractus. In this situation, we look
to the contract to determine if there is a place of performance
indicated; if there is, the law of the place of performance con-
trols under our statute, and there is no need to determine the
law of the place where the contract was made. ... '
The Kemp court then examined the insurance policies for indica-
tions of place of performance, noting that the policies were both
valid in the United States and Canada. The court concluded that
Montana, as part of the United States, was a contemplated place
of performance.51 Once this determination was made, the court
applied the Field Code statute and held that Montana law ap-
plied.52 Thus, the stacking of the policies was permitted which
increased the plaintiffs recovery.
The Montana Supreme Court's interpretation of place of
performance under the Field Code statute in Kemp was enor-
mously broad. 53 Because the contract was valid anywhere in the
United States or Canada, the court held that the parties had
therefore designated Montana as the place of performance. This
is quite a stretch. If this broad standard was consistently ap-
plied, one is hard pressed to create a realistic hypothetical where
Montana law would not control a contractual dispute.
Not only did the court in Kemp provide the broadest possible
interpretation in its determination of the place of performance,
but in its reliance upon the Field Code statute, it neglected to
mention that the statute would only apply in questions regarding
interpretation. As the previous quote from Kemp indicates, the
court implied that if any place of performance is decipherable
from the contract, the law of that place must be applied. The
court's language in Kemp is markedly forceful, mandating con-
siderations that make the place of performance primary. A read-
er relying upon Kemp could easily conclude that so long as a
contract was valid and performable in Montana, the court would
50. Id.
51. Kemp, at 531-32, 601 P.2d at 23. But see Rhody v. State Farm Mut. Ins.
Co., 771 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1985). Under facts similar to Kemp, the federal court
in Rhody sharply criticizes the Montana Supreme Court for determining that the
policy language intended Montana as a place of performance. The court in Rhody
held that no place of performance was indicated by such contractual language and
looked instead to where the contact was formed. Id. at 1419-20 & n.3.
52. Kemp, 183 Mont. at 533-34, 601 P.2d at 24-25.
53. See supra note 51 and comments concerning Rhody.
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apply Montana law to the case.
Later in its opinion, the Kemp court turned to alternative
sources to justify its resurrection of the heretofore idle Field
Code statute. The court cited an older California case for "the
longstanding rule [the Blair rule] that the law of place of perfor-
mance of an insurance contract controls as to its legal construc-
tion and effect, but the law of the place where the contract was
made governs on questions of execution and validity."' When
the court relied upon the Blair rule, it expanded the scope of its
conflict of law rules beyond that of the Field Code statute. In ad-
dition to conflict rules for the interpretation of contracts, the
Blair rule encompasses considerations of what law should apply
concerning issues of validity and execution. Thus, the breadth of
the Field Code statute grew to potentially become a complete
conflict of laws rule for contracts.
Indeed, in later cases in Montana, the Blair rule superseded
the implementation of Field Code statute.55 The Montana Su-
preme Court would cite to the Field Code statute, but then quote
or follow the Blair rule's interpretation of the statute. Although
the Blair rule's first appearance in Kemp is dicta, later cases
relied heavily upon it as the final word on Montana's conflict of
law rules for Montana.
The court's expansion of the Field Code statute with the
Blair rule essentially augmented the rule of performance with
the doctrine of lex loci contractus to cover issues of execution and
validity. The main distinction in the Blair rule between execu-
tion and validity versus interpretation are similar to the First
Restatement, yet the application of this distinction achieves a
diametrically opposed result. The First Restatement assigns
questions of interpretation to the law of the place where the con-
tract was formed; whereas the Blair rule, as it includes the man-
date of the Field Code statute, applies the law of the place of
54. Kemp, 183 Mont. at 533, 601 P.2d at 24 (citing Blair v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 104 P.2d 1075 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940)). The court also claimed that the ruling is in
accord with section 206 of the Restatement Second concerning "issues relating to
details of performance of a contract." Yet, section 206 clearly refers to minor "details"
of a contract, such as "manner, method and time" of performance. Comment b to this
section explicitly contains a caveat stating that "this Section is applicable only to de-
tails of performance and not to those matters which substantially affect the nature
and extent of the obligations imposed by the contract." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 206, cmt. b (1971).
55. See Omaha Property and Casualty Co. v. Crosby, 756 F. Supp. 1380 (D.
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performance to questions of interpretation.
Because the Blair rule is based on distinctions similar to the
those relied upon by the First Restatement, it consequently suf-
fers from many of the same deficiencies. First, it is a rigid rule,
providing little flexibility for a court to weigh the specific factors
of a case. Second, as noted previously, many factual situations
defy any clear distinction between interpretation and validity:
often both elements are at issue.5" Furthermore, Kemp's intro-
duction of the Blair rule without any discussion as to how it
differed from or expanded the scope of the Field Code statute
generated additional confusion. The rule that emerges from
Kemp is not only antiquated and rigid but suffers from a serious
lack of clarity.
The next case concerning the conflict of laws in Montana
arose in the federal district court. In Omaha Property and Casu-
alty Company v. Crosby,57 the issue presented was whether a
parent had an insurable interest in an automobile insurance
contract. In Crosby, a parent purchased an automobile insurance
policy in Montana and the son was later in an accident in Alas-
ka.' Initially, the court addressed whether the law of Alaska or
Montana would control the validity of the insurable interest.5 9
The court treated the conflict of law issue in summary fashion,
relying entirely upon the direction provided by the Montana
Supreme Court in Kemp.
In its reliance on Kemp, the federal court cited the Field
Code statute, then noted the Kemp interpretation of the statute
which pronounced the Blair rule. ° The Crosby court distin-
guished between the "legal construction and effect" and the "exe-
cution and validity" of the contract; it then concluded that since
the validity of the agreement was at issue, the law of the place
where the contract was formed would control.61 The court cor-
rectly recognized that under the Blair rule the insurable interest
involved a question of validity of the contract and therefore, the
location specified for performance in the contract was immateri-
al. 2 Because no interpretation of the contract was necessary,
56. Patterson, supra note 27.
57. 756 F. Supp. 1380 (D. Mont. 1990) (opinion by United States Circuit Judge
Pregerson of the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation as a United States District
Court Judge for the District of Montana).
58. Id. at 1381.
59. Id. at 1381-82.
60. Id. at 1382-83.
61. Id. at 1383.
62. Crosby, 756 F. Supp. at 1383. Some commentators claim that the distinction
[Vol. 56564
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the Field Code statute did not apply and only the broader Blair
rule from Kemp was relevant. The federal court accordingly ap-
plied Montana law and determined that the insurable interest
was valid.63
Following Crosby, the conflict of laws issue was again pre-
sented to the Montana Supreme Court in Youngblood v. Ameri-
can States Insurance Co." Youngblood involved an insurance
policy issued in Oregon and a subsequent accident that occurred
in Montana.' The main issue in the case was whether the sub-
rogation clause in the policy would enable the insurance compa-
ny to recoup from the plaintiff medical payments made on her
behalf after she settled with the tortfeasor." The court quoted
the Blair rule from Kemp, but did not actually state whether the
issue of the case revolved around the interpretation or the valid-
ity of the contract.6" The court applied the rule without making
this prerequisite distinction.
In Youngblood, the court identified language in the policy
that "requires American States to pay whatever damages are
required in Montana; that is, the contract is to be performed in
Montana."' Although unclear, it appears that the court must
have concluded that the issue concerned the interpretation of the
contract and applied the performance aspect of the Blair rule. If
the subrogation clause's applicability involved the validity of the
contract, the court should have applied the law where the con-
tract was entered into, i.e. Oregon. Under Oregon law, subroga-
tion clauses are valid.69
The Youngblood decision extended further the conflict of law
rules in Montana. The court supplemented its analysis, as based
on the rules from Kemp, with additional considerations primary
between validity and interpretation is simply an escape method for the courts to
apply the law achieving their desired result. See Smith, supra note 16, at 1043 n.12;
see also Joseph M. Cormack, California Conflict of Laws in Regard to Contracts, 12
S. CAL. L. REV. 335, 337 (1939) ("The validity of a contract in its every aspect de-
termines every detail of performance . . . whether and how a contract is to be per-
formed will completely determine the nature of its validity. Thus from a legal
standpoint the execution and performance aspects of a contract cannot be separat-
ed.").
63. Crosby, 756 F. Supp. at 1383-84.
64. 262 Mont. 391, 866 P.2d 203 (1993).
65. Youngblood, 262 Mont. at 393-94, 866 P.2d at 204.
66. Id.
67. Id at 394, 866 P.2d at 205.
68. Id One can only infer that again, as in Kemp, the court has taken general
policy language describing geographic limits on the validity of the policy and em-
ployed these to determine Montana as the place of performance.
69. Id. at 395, 866 P.2d at 205.
1995] 565
217
Leaphart: The Honorable William D. Murray
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1995
566 MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56
to conflict of law rules in contracts."0 First, the opinion noted
that Montana recognizes choice-of-law provisions within con-
tracts as a valid expression of the parties intention to select the
law that will govern all questions concerning a contract.71 Sec-
ond, Youngblood concluded that Montana is not bound to uphold
a clause within a contract, even if bargained for, if it is repug-
nant to the public policy of the state.7 2
These additional rules account for the somewhat confusing
analysis in the Youngblood opinion. After recognizing that the
insurance policy indicated Montana as the place of performance,
thereby determining Montana as the applicable law, the court
recognized that the contract included a choice-of-law provision.73
This provision indicated that Oregon law controlled the applica-
tion of the subrogation clause.74 After noting that such clauses
are enforceable and valid under Oregon law, the court applied
70. Youngblood, 262 Mont. at 395, 866 P.2d at 205. The majority of conflict of
law rules require a court to consider the facts to procedurally determine which
jurisdiction's law should be applied. However, one should note that some of these
conflict rules do concern choices-of "internal law," where the court goes beyond the
mere facts of the case to compare the possible substantive laws and determine the
result of their application in the case. As we shall see, this is the type of factor that
the Montana court includes with its considerations of public policy in Youngblood.
71. See also Steinke v. Boeing Co., 525 F.Supp. 234 (D. Mont. 1981). The gen-
eral rule in American jurisprudence recognizes the freedom of the parties to contract
to choice of law. Hanlin, supra note 12, at 16. Cf Casarotto v. Lombardi, 268 Mont.
369, 886 P.2d 931 (1994).
72. Youngblood, 262 Mont. at 395, 866 P.2d at 205. See also Steinke v. Boeing
Co., 525 F. Supp. 234, 236 (D. Mont. 1981); Hein v. Fox, 126 Mont. 514, 254 P.2d
1076 (1953).
Although Youngblood has characterized the imposition of public policy as part
of contract law (which it undoubtedly is), in this context it is more often recognized
as the final stage in the conflict of laws determination. That is, once the determina-
tion of a foreign jurisdiction's law is reached, this law can be compared to the public
policies of the forum state to ensure that no injustice is permitted through the hands
of the presiding court. For further discussion, see generally, Michael G. Guajardo,
Note, Texas' Adoption of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws: Public Policy
is the Trump Card, But When Can it be Played?, 22 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 837 (1991).
The reader should note the Montana Supreme Court's tendency to apply Mon-
tana law. This is not atypical of other jurisdictions. The flexibility provided by the
current confusion in conflict of law rules has created a situation where the court
would be free to choose a rule which achieved a particular outcome, if it so desired.
Additionally, the application of Montana public policy by the court can easily be seen
as the final trump, which can be exercised by the court on any given occasion to
select Montana law.
73. Youngblood, 262 Mont. at 394-95, 866 P.2d at 205.
74. Id. at 395, 866 P.2d at 205. The agreement states that "the Company shall
be entitled to reimbursement or subrogation in accordance with the provisions of
[Oregon Revised Statutes] 743.825." Id.
218
Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/1
CONFLICT OF LAWS IN MONTANA
Montana public policy to invalidate the clause. 5 To reiterate:
the court first recognized the applicability of Montana law be-
cause of the Blair rule, but retracted it because of the choice-of-
law provision in favor of Oregon law, then finally reinstated
Montana law because of public policy considerations.76 Thus in
Youngblood, public policy considerations trumped all other con-
flict of law factors.
The conflict of law rules from Kemp through Youngblood are
very unclear. Kemp recognized the authority of the Field Code
statute as a rule of performance for conflict of laws in contractu-
al situations.7" The Kemp court, in dicta, then augmented the
statute with the Blair rule. The federal court in Crosby utilized
the Blair rule, correctly distinguishing between issues of validity
and those of interpretation. 8 The Montana Supreme Court in
Youngblood next cited the Blair rule from Kemp, operated de
facto under a determination of place of performance, but neglect-
ed to address whether the issue concerned one of validity or
interpretation. Despite Youngblood's affirmation of Montana's
recognition of choice-of-law provisions in contracts, the court
used Montana public policy as a final trump in the conflict of
laws analysis to eviscerate the choice-of-law provision.9
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE KEMP ERA
The conflict of law rules, as stated and followed by the Mon-
tana Supreme Court during the Kemp era, are problematic for
four reasons. First, as noted above, the court's strong language
in Kemp concerning the Field Code statute leads the practitioner
to believe that courts should follow indications of the place of
performance in all circumstances. Second, the court expands the
Field Code statute in dictum without adequately discussing the
concepts of validity or interpretation of a contract. The court in
Kemp should have alerted the practitioner that this initial dis-
tinction is necessary and prescribed some guidelines for this
task.
The third reason that the conflict of law rules during the
Kemp era are problematic is that, even with a complete under-
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Kemp v. Allstate Ins. Co., 183 Mont. 526, 531, 601 P.2d 20, 23 (1979).
78. Omaha Property & Casualty Co. v. Crosby, 756 F. Supp. 1380, 1382-83 (D.
Mont. 1990).
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standing of the distinction between validity and interpretation, it
is nearly impossible to distinguish between these two issues in
many cases. As noted, many times both elements are at issue.80
The result is a rule that is based upon an unclear distinction
which creates an arbitrary conclusion.
Fourth, even when clearly defined and implemented, the
Blair rule, like many of the older conflict of law rules, is anti-
quated and poorly suited for a modern court. The world has
changed since the nineteenth century. Commerce and travel are
now international. Litigation is no longer centered around tech-
nical rules of pleading. The modern conflict of law rules have
likewise evolved markedly since the creation of the Field Code
statute and the Blair rule, generally reflecting the other changes
in law and society since that time. Most courts have adopted
modern rules to provide greater flexibility in weighing the di-
verse interests and contractual situations which are brought
before them. Courts found the older conflict of law rules, such as
the Blair rule, to be too rigid in their application, resulting in
unjust verdicts for the litigants.
Beyond these enumerated problems, Montana's conflict of
law rules from the Kemp era suffer from other more general
inadequacies. For example, one primary rule of contracts that all
courts attempt to follow is to fulfill the intentions of the parties.
To discern these intentions, courts will often carefully scrutinize
a contract or admit extrinsic evidence. In cases involving the
conflict of laws in contracts, courts generally have this same
purpose. With the modern complexity of contracts, commerce and
laws, it is difficult to imagine that a court can ascertain the
intentions of the parties simply by determining a place of perfor-
mance or through often arbitrary discernment of validity and
interpretation.
A good example of the potential inflexibility and harshness
of the older rules is evident from the facts in State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Estate of Braun,s" a recent Mon-
tana case. In Braun, a Montana resident was in a fatal car acci-
dent in Canada, and Canadian law drastically restricted the
recovery available under his insurance policy.82 The main issue
80. This is demonstrated by Youngblood. Does the issue in Youngblood relate to
whether the subrogation clause is valid, or does the issue involve the clause's inter-
pretation, its legal effect requiring repayment?
81. 243 Mont. 125, 793 P.2d 253 (1990).
82. Braun, 243 Mont. at 126, 793 P.2d at 253-54. Imposition of Canadian law
would have limited the damages to funeral expenses only. Id. at 132, 793 P.2d at
568 [Vol. 56
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in Braun was whether Canadian law would operate to limit the
damages available under the insurance contract. As an issue of
interpretation, under the Field Code statute and the court's
broad conception of "place of performance" from Kemp, a court
applying the statute should have concluded that Canada was a
place of performance as indicated in the policy and applied Cana-
dian law. This interpretation would have reduced the available
recovery under the policy from $200,000 as permitted by Mon-
tana law, to simply the costs of funeral expenses, as provided for
by Canadian law.'
Nevertheless, the court in Braun claimed that "[t]he ques-
tion of whether Montana law or Canadian law should govern the
measure of damages available to Appellants is a conflict of laws
question regarding tort law."" It is unclear from the opinion
why the court distinguished these facts from Kemp or Crosby,
which applied contractual rules for conflict of laws. The Montana
Supreme Court does not mention the Field Code statute or the
Blair rule from Kemp. Perhaps the strangest element of the
Braun opinion is the court's declaration that neither party had
argued that Canadian law should apply to the contract,' when
that appeared to be the main issue in the case.
The court in Braun did little to clarify Montana conflict of
law rules and the decision perhaps best serves as an example of
just how confused this area of the law has become in Montana.
Because the dispute in Braun involved how much recovery the
insurance contract permitted, the issue can best be characterized
as one of interpretation. In Montana, the Field code statute ap-
plies to issues of interpretation. Without the availability of the
public policy exception provided for in Youngblood, the court
257 (Weber, J., dissenting). Justice Weber's dissent would have limited Braun's recov-
ery to this amount on basic contract theory. The insurance policy contained a clause
which stated that the policy limited damages to those "legally entitled to collect from
the owner." Id. at 131, 793 P.2d at 257 (Weber, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 131-32, 793 P.2d at 256-57 (Weber, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 127, 793 P.2d at 254 (emphasis added). The court states that "no
question exists that Montana law governs the interpretation of the insurance contract
at issue here." Id. For this reason, and given other inconsistencies in the opinion,
this Comment has treated Braun as an anomaly. Thus, it was not included in the
substantive analysis on Montana's conflict of law rules.
Although conflict of law rules regarding torts are rarely addressed by the Mon-
tana Supreme Court, it appears that even under these rules, the court should have
applied Canadian law in Braun. Prior case law indicates that Montana follows the
rule that "the law of the place of the injury controls." Lewis v. Reader's Digest Ass'n,
Inc., 162 Mont. 401, 406, 512 P.2d 702, 705 (1973).
85. Braun, 243 Mont. at 127-31, 793 P.2d at 254-56.
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under the Field Code statute would have been forced to apply
Canadian law and essentially remove any insurance recovery af-
ter a wrongful death. Those would have been harsh results in-
deed, and it is no surprise that the court in Braun refused to
permit it.
In Kemp and its progeny, the Montana Supreme Court rec-
ognized the rigidity of the Field Code statute. As previously
noted, the court's recognition of the rigidity and incompleteness
of the Field Code statute accounts for its modification of the
statute in Kemp with the Blair Rule and the imposition public
policy considerations in Youngblood. Yet, these modifications
have only made an old and mediocre law more confusing and
arbitrary. Unlike the federal court in Crosby, both Montana
Supreme Court cases fail to discuss the necessary distinction
between interpretation and validity. Furthermore, the public
policy exception created in Youngblood could be interpreted to
lead to the doctrine of lex fori, or the law of the forum. Many of
the modern conflict of law rules do provide for public policy con-
siderations, but at least they attempt to delineate the scope and
application of public policy.
However, the court has altered Montana's rules for conflict
of laws since Youngblood. In its most recent case, Casarotto v.
Lombardi,86 the Montana Supreme Court has abruptly moved
away from the Kemp rules without resolving any of the prior
confusion or indicating for the future whether the court will
return to Kemp and its progeny. Indeed, time may prove that the
court has discarded the Field Code statute and Kemp. However,
at the present time Casarotto still leaves the door open on this
older line of cases. Yet before turning to Casarotto, it is neces-
sary to first complete the analysis of the Kemp era and the Field
Code statute, for despite Casarotto, there is a strong possibility
that the court may resurrect the Field Code statute at any time.
With this in mind, the following discussion of how the courts of
other Field Code jurisdictions have operated should be instruc-
tive. In the late nineteenth century, California, North Dakota,
South Dakota and Oklahoma also adopted the same Field Code
statute on the conflict of laws as Montana.87 The discussion now
turns to the courts of these other jurisdictions and their conflict
of law rules under the Field Code statute.
86. 268 Mont. 369, 886 P.2d 931 (1994).
87. See Cormack, supra note 25, at 362.
570 [Vol. 56
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V. OTHER FIELD CODE JURISDICTIONS
A. California"8
In California, despite earlier recognition of the efficacy of the
Field Code statute,89 the courts have recently applied the stat-
ute inconsistently, demonstrating a definite tendency for Califor-
nia to depart from the application of the rule based on perfor-
mance.90 One should initially note that California departed from
the strict application of the Field Code statute by augmenting it
with the Blair rule, which the Montana Supreme Court later
followed in Kemp." Although a recent California case indicates
in dicta that the Field Code statute entirely controls the conflict
of laws in California, 92 what this recent case espouses has not
been historically practiced by the court.93
A large exception to the application to the Field Code statute
was created by the California Appellate Court in Henderson v.
Superior Court.9' In Henderson, the court stated that "where
the application of [the Field Code statute] is obscure, California
courts are guided by the factors set out in Restatement, Conflict
of Laws 2d, section 188, in determining what law to apply to the
contract."95 The courts in several cases since Henderson have
employed this exception to use the Restatement Second for the
conflict of law analysis instead of relying upon the Field Code
statute.8 Consequently, Henderson provides an easy escape
from the application of the Field Code statute.
88. The Field Code statute in California is CAL. CV. CODE § 1646 (West 1993).
89. E.g., In re Grace's Estate, 200 P.2d 189, 193 (Cal. Ct. App. 1949) (-The law
of the place determines the manner and method as well as the legality of the acts
required for performance.").
90. E.g., California Casualty Indem. Exch. v. Pettis, 239 Cal. Rptr. 205, 208-14
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (ignoring the Field Code statute and applying the Restatement
Second test of most significant relationship).
91. Blair v. New York Life Ins. Co., 104 P.2d 1075, 1078 (Cal. Ct. App. 1940).
92. Gitano Group, Inc. v. Kemper Group, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 271, 275, n.4 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1994) (ruling that no true conflict was presented between the laws of the
alternate jurisdictions, so the determination of which law controlled was moot).
93. See Shippers Dev. Co. v. General Ins. Co. of America, 79 Cal. Rptr. 388,
396 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969) (finding that the Blair rule should be followed "unless the
terms of the contract provide otherwise or the circumstances indicate a different
intention").
94. 142 Cal. Rptr. 478 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) (ruling on a contract similar to a
common law marriage).
95. Henderson, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 483.
96. See, e.g., American Re-Ins. Co. v. Insurance Comm. of State of Cal., 527 F.
Supp. 444, 450-51 (C.D. Cal. 1981); Kracht v. Perrin, Gartland & Doyle, 268 Cal.
Rptr. 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).
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The federal courts have also noted the progression of the
California's conflict of law rules and the general supplementation
of the Field Code statute. Even before Henderson, the Ninth
Circuit noted that "[ulnder the leadership of former Chief Justice
Roger Traynor, the California law moved away from a mechani-
cal choice of law process to employ the 'governmental interest
analysis' approach.9 7 Although California does not rely solely
upon the Field Code statute, its case law on the subject is some-
what unclear. The court has incorporated the conflict of law
rules from the Restatement Second, but has failed as yet to dis-
entangle itself from a confused history of precedent. This is quite
similar to the current situation in Montana. The Field Code
statute still looms in the background of California case law,
permitting continued confusion and threatening to raise its head
without warning again in the future.
B. North Dakota'8
In the early 1970s, the North Dakota Supreme Court heard
a case which questioned the interest charges on a payable note
in a sister state (Montana) as usurious and therefore unenforce-
able. 9 The court recognized that the interest charges were ille-
gal according to the law of North Dakota. However, because of
the constraints of the Field Code statute, the court was com-
pelled to find that the laws of Montana controlled the ques-
tion."° The opinion of Judge Paulson made the court's disdain
for the statutory limitations on its conflict of laws choice clear,
yet the court nevertheless followed the Field Code statute to
determine that Montana law should control. 10 1
In the following year, responding to the court's candid deci-
sion, the North Dakota Legislature repealed its Field Code
statute.10 2 In two cases decided since the statute has been re-
97. Strassberg v. New England Mut. Life Ins. Co., 575 F.2d 1262, 1263-64 (9th
Cir. 1978). The "governmental interest analysis" considers the stake that the con-
cerned states have in the litigation to determine which law should be applied. Al-
though originally designed for application in the tort area of conflict of laws, the
federal court in Strassberg claims that the rule is "applied to contracts cases as well
as the more familiar tort context.' Id. at 1264.
98. The North Dakota Field Code statute was at N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-07-11
(1993) (repealed).
99. First Nat'l Bank v. Dreher, 202 N.W.2d 670 (N.D. 1972).
100. Dreher, 202 N.W.2d at 671-72.
101. Id. at 672.
102. See Apollo Sprinkler Co., Inc. v. Fire Sprinkler Suppliers & Design, Inc.,
382 N.W.2d 386, 389, n.2 (N.D. 1986).
572 [Vol. 56
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pealed, the parties agreed to employ the "most significant con-
tacts" test as described by Professor Leflar. °3 This test pro-
vides for "choice-influencing considerations" in a process some-
what similar to that adopted by the Restatement Second.'"
The North Dakota Supreme Court has now clearly adopted this
test, and has applied it in several recent cases. ' °"
C. South Dakota"°
Unlike its sister state to the North, South Dakota retains its
Field Code statute on the conflict of laws. The state has recently
undergone a drastic revision of its conflict of law rules in tort,
but a corresponding revision is lacking in contracts. 10 7 Although
in the past, the South Dakota court has ignored the Field Code
statute and applied the general doctrine of lex loci contrac-
tus,'0 5 the statute has regained its full import.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota's correction of a lower
court ruling in Anderson v. Taurus Financial Corporation"°
makes this very clear. In Anderson, the trial court applied the
"most significant contacts" test to determine which law applied
in an action claiming usury interests and deceptive advertis-
ing. ° However, on appeal the Supreme Court of North Dakota
relied entirely upon the Field Code statute, determining that
since the contract provided for payments to be made in Califor-
nia, it was the place of performance of the contract and therefore
the governing law."' The court specifically noted that the lower
court had "erred in using the theory of significant contacts to
103. Vigen Constr. Co. v. Millers Natl Ins. Co., 436 N.W.2d 254 (N.D. 1989);
Apollo, 382 N.W.2d 386 (N.D. 1986).
104. Robert A Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41
N.Y.U. L. REV. 267 (1966). The main factors that Professor Leflar focuses on are: 1)
predictability of results; 2) maintenance of interstate and international order; 3) sim-
plification of the judicial task; 4) advancement of the forum's general interests; and
5) application of the better rule of law. Id. at 282.
105. American Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 504 N.W.2d 307
(N.D. 1993); Plante v. Columbia Paints, 494 N.W.2d 140 (N.D. 1992).
106. South Dakota's Field Code statute is located at S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §
53-1-4 (1994).
107. See Owen v. Owen, 444 N.W.2d 710 (S.D. 1989); see also, Charles M.
Thatcher, Choice of Law in Multi-State Tort Actions After Owen v. Owen: The Less
Things Change. . . , 35 S.D. L. REv. 372 (1990).
108. E.g., Briggs v. United Serv. Life Ins. Co., 117 N.W.2d 804, 806-07 (S.D.
1962).
109. 268 N.W.2d 486 (S.D. 1978).
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determine what law should apply." " Furthermore, the higher
court applied the Field Code statute as written and refused to
apply public policy considerations to invalidate the allegedly
usurious interest.1
3
Despite the revision regarding tort rules for conflicts previ-
ously noted, South Dakota has not had revisited the conflict of
laws in contracts since the time of Anderson. However, a federal
court sitting in South Dakota applied a provision in the state's
Uniform Commercial Code to determine which law would apply
to the breach of a contract for the sale of sugar beet pulp. " "
Because the Uniform Commercial Code has limited application,
the Field Code statute presumably retains its preeminence under
South Dakota law as declared in Anderson.
In contrast to the application of the Field Code statute in
Montana, South Dakota courts apply the statute in a straightfor-
ward method, without the assistance of the Blair rule, or other
interpretive devices." 5 The location of performance is often de-
termined by the last act or place of payment of a contract."6
Although the Federal Court of Appeals in the Eighth Circuit has
criticized South Dakota's reliance upon this analysis, these rules
nearly always ensure that the place of performance of a contract
is discoverable." 7
Thus, the Field Code statute is alive and well in South Da-
kota. The court in Anderson resolutely applied the rule. The
court created no additional flexibility through public policy con-
siderations. Although South Dakota may be criticized as operat-
ing under an antiquated or unfair conflict of laws rule, its rule is
relatively straightforward and does not suffer from the lack of
clarity that attends Montana case law.
112. Id. at 488.
113. Id. at 488-89.
114. Golden Plains Feedlot, Inc. v. Great W. Sugar Co., 588 F. Supp. 985, 987-
89 (W.D.S.D. 1984). The UCC provision recognizes the parties may agree to apply
any state or nation's law so long as that jurisdiction bears a reasonable relation to
the transaction. Although there was no election by the parties to choose any
jurisdiction's law, the court held that because of the Field Code statute's preference
for place of performance, Nebraska, as the place of delivery, satisfied the "appropri-
ate relation" test. The court applied Nebraska law. Id. at 990-91.
115. See Anderson, 268 N.W.2d at 488.
116. Id.
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D. Oklahoma"'
The Oklahoma legislature adopted the Field Code statute in
1890. Although the Oklahoma court has used the Field Code
statute to aid in determining the content of terms in an ambigu-
ous contract, 9 the statute has more recently been the center of
discussion involving conflict of laws in contracts. In 1990, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Panama Processes v. Cities Service
Co.120 acknowledged that the Field Code statute controls con-
flict of laws for contracts in Oklahoma. 2 ' The court determined
that "the contract was to be performed in major part in Brazil"
and therefore applied Brazilian law.'22 The court clearly was
not comfortable in its reliance upon the Field Code statute and
in support of its conclusion supplemented its analysis by apply-
ing the Restatement Second's test to reach the same result.'
Only a year after Panama Processes, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court was again confronted with a conflict of laws issue and
moved further from its reliance upon the Field Code statute. In
Bohannan v. Allstate Insurance Co.," the court acknowledged
that the reasons previously enunciated for abandoning lex loci
delictus for tort conflicts in favor of the Restatement Second test
were "equally compelling for abandoning and rejecting the lex
loci contractus rule in contract law."2 The court elaborated up-
118. The Oklahoma statute is located at OKLA- STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 162 (West
1993).
119. See Samson Resources Co. v. Quarles Drilling Co., 783 P.2d 974 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1989). In Montana, see MONT. CODE ANN. § 1-4-106 (1993) for a statute that is
designed to limit the interpretation of the language in the contract to its colloquial
meaning. Although the wording of this statute is somewhat similar to the Field Code
statute, it has never been relied upon by the Montana courts for either any limita-
tion of a word or any issue of interpretation. The use of the term "language" in the
statute indicates that it was not designed as a conflict of laws provision, but as a
rule of contracts in general.
120. 796 P.2d 276 (Okla. 1990).
121. Panama Processes, 796 P.2d at 287. The court correctly noted that the Field
Code statute states the rule of lex loci solutionis and not lex loci contractus. "It is
only when there is no indication in the contract where performance is to occur that
the interpretation would apply the lex loci contractus rule." Id. Although correctly de-
scribing the internal function of the statute, the Oklahoma Supreme Court failed to
emphasize that the statute is applicable only in disputes over interpretation. This is
precisely the same error the Montana Supreme Court has made.
122. Id. at 288.
123. Id. The court notes that it already applies the Restatement Second test
with regards to conflict of laws in torts. Id. at 288, n.50.
124. 820 P.2d 787 (Okla. 1991).
125. Bohannan, 820 P.2d at 795 (relying upon their reasoning in Brickner v.
Gooden, 525 P.2d 632 (Okla. 1974)). One should note how frequently the courts have
mischaracterized the Field Code statute as stating the rule of lex loci contractus. 227
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on the inadequacy of the Field Code statute, declaring, "[N]either
the lex loci contractus rule, nor the lex loci solutionis rule allows
full consideration of the statutes and public policies of the sever-
al states in motor vehicle insurance disputes.""26 The court ap-
plied the test of the Restatement Second to determine the appli-
cable law in the case.
127
The Oklahoma Supreme Court is clearly moving away from
the application of the Field Code statute as a conflict of laws
rule. The court in Bohannan has effectively removed the Field
Code statute from application when there is an insurance dis-
pute with competing state statutes and public policies. As noted
above, this is one of the areas in which conflict of laws most
frequently arises. 128 The Oklahoma court has indicated its dis-
satisfaction with the Field Code statute, and in the future it will
probably apply the test of the Restatement Second in all contrac-
tual conflict of law cases.
In contrasting these other Field Code jurisdictions with
Montana, we find some similarities as well as some differences
in the manner that the courts have applied the statute. In Cali-
fornia, the courts have used the statute in the past, but are now
largely freed from its constraints. North Dakota has repealed the
statute, and the court now uses a test similar to the Restatement
Second. The courts of South Dakota strictly apply the statute,
with no augmentation. Finally, in Oklahoma, the court has
moved away from the application of the Field Code statute, and
has indicated a strong preference for the rules of the Restate-
ment Second. To complete the picture on how these jurisdictions
differ from Montana, this Comment must now turn to the most
recent conflict of laws case in Montana, and the Montana Su-
preme Court's apparent acceptance of the Restatement Second.
VI. BEYOND THE FIELD CODE: CASARoTO V. LOMBARDI
A. Determining the Law
In the most recent Montana case involving the conflict of
laws, the Montana Supreme Court has ventured into new
grounds, without attempting to resolve the confusion created in
the not so distant past. In Casarotto v. Lombardi,"2 the plain-
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. See cases cited supra footnote 44.
129. 268 Mont. 369, 886 P.2d 931 (1994).
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tiffs entered into a franchise agreement to open a Subway sand-
wich shop in Great Falls, Montana; the store later failed when
another franchise opened in a more desirable location in the
town. 3 ' The Casarottos claimed a breach of a verbal agreement
providing that they could move their store to an alternate loca-
tion if one became available. 3' Yet, the contract included a
choice of law provision selecting the application of Connecticut
law and an arbitration clause requiring the Montana plaintiff to
submit to arbitration in Connecticut.'32 The District Court
stayed further judicial proceedings in Montana pending the arbi-
tration in Connecticut."3
On appeal, the plaintiff subsequently argued that the arbi-
tration clause was invalid because Montana law requires that
the clause be conspicuously displayed on the first page of the
contract.'3" The defendant contended that the choice of law
provision in the contract, indicating that Connecticut law con-
trolled the validity of the agreement, resolved any such dispute.
The court identified the first issue as whether, "[b]ased on con-
flict of law principles, is the franchise agreement entered into
between the Casarottos and [the defendants] governed by Con-
necticut law or Montana law?"1"
To determine the governing conflict of law rules, the court
looked neither to Kemp and the Field Code statute, nor to
Youngblood for guidance. The court unpredictably relied on Em-
erson v. Boyd.'36 In Emerson, the issue was whether an Indian
tribe's exercise of jurisdiction preempted the district court's juris-
diction.'37 The court in Emerson relied on the Restatement Sec-
ond to determine if a contract had sufficient connection to the
reservation for the tribal court to assume jurisdiction over the
case.' The court weighed the different factors from section
188(2) of the Restatement Second and determined that a suffi-
cient connection existed between the contract and the tribal
130. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 371, 886 P.2d at 932-33.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 372, 886 P.2d at 933.
133. Id.
134. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 372, 886 P.2d at 933 (relying on MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-5-114(4) (1993)). The arbitration clause was on page nine of the agreement.
135. Casarotto, 268 Mont. at 373, 886 P.2d at 933.
136. 247 Mont. 241, 805 P.2d 587 (1991) (relying on R.J. Williams Co. v. Fort
Belknap Hous. Auth., 719 F.2d 979 (9th Cir. 1983)).
137. Emerson, 247 Mont. at 242, 805 P.2d at 588.
138. Id. at 242-43, 805 P.2d at 588.
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reservation so as to preempt the district court's jurisdiction. 9
The main problem with the court's reliance upon Emerson in
Casarotto stems from the fact that jurisdictional questions differ
from questions involving the substantive law determination
under conflict of law rules in contracts."4 The conflicts issue in
Casarotto involved a contract dispute and, therefore, logically
followed Kemp and its progeny. Even in the Restatement Second,
jurisdictional matters are treated under entirely different rules
than contractual conflict of laws.' As Justice Gray pointed out
in her dissent to Casarotto, the court's encapsulation of Emerson
was correct, yet the application of the conflict of law rules from
the analogy resulted in an "inapplicability of that decision to the
case before [the court]." 4  Regardless of any incompatibility be-
tween the cases, the results of the analogy to Emerson are clear:
the court in Casarotto did not rely on the Field Code statute or
the Blair rule, but instead applied the rules of the Restatement
Second to decide the conflict of laws issue.
B. Applying the Law
Casarotto is factually difficult to discuss without creating
confusion. As noted above, the contract between the parties had
both a choice of law provision and an arbitration clause." If
the choice of law provision was valid and Connecticut law ap-
plied, the court would have enforced the arbitration clause. How-
ever, if the choice of law provision were invalidated, then the
court must determine which jurisdiction's laws would apply; the
court would have decided this by employing the conflict of law
rules for Montana. Then, in applying that substantive law, the
court could have discovered whether the arbitration clause was
valid.
The Montana Supreme Court in Casarotto tested the validity
of the choice of law provision by employing a two step process:
first, the court made a determination whether Montana law
would apply "absent an 'effective' choice of law by the parties;"
second, upon determining Montana law applied, the court inves-
tigated whether the "application of Connecticut law was contrary
139. Id.
140. See supra text accompanying note 3.
141. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS (1971).
142. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 268 Mont. 369, 392, 886 P.2d 931, 945 (1994) (Gray,
J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 372, 886 P.2d at 933.
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to a fundamental policy" of Montana.'" In essence, the first
part ensured that the court's application of conflict of law rules
did not already indicate Connecticut law, thus rendering reliance
upon the choice of law provision in the contract moot. The second
part of the court's test ensured if the choice of law provision was
recognized and yet Montana had a materially greater interest,
that this recognition of Connecticut law did not offend the public
policies of Montana."
This two step process was taken from the Restatement Sec-
ond, section 187(2). The court properly ignored part (1) of section
187, because it only arises when the parties have no connection
to the chosen forum or the choice is arbitrary.1" The comments
to the Restatement Second indicate that as the materiality of the
local forum's interest increases, the fundamental character of the
public policy required to trump the choice of law lessens. ' 7 Ac-
cordingly, the analysis in Casarotto, which determined that Mon-
tana had the most significant relationship to the contract, re-
duced the weight required of the public policy needed to override
the choice of law. As a result, upon a finding that Montana had
the most significant relationship, the entire choice of law provi-
sion may be invalidated if the recognition of Connecticut law
would offend any Montana law or policy.'" Thus, once a suffi-
cient connection to Montana was established, public policy was
again the trump.
To bolster its heavy reliance upon public policy consider-
ations in conflict of law determinations, the Montana Supreme
Court relied upon Youngblood: "[T]his state's public policy will
ultimately determine whether choice of law provisions in con-
144. Id. at 375, 886 P.2d at 935.
145. See id. .
146. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. f (1971).
147. Id. at § 187 cmt. g.
148. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. g,
stating:
The forum will not refrain from applying the chosen law merely because
this would lead to a different result than would be obtained under the local
law of the state of the otherwise applicable law. Application of the chosen
law will be refused only (1) to protect a fundamental policy of the state
which, under the rule of § 188, would be the state of the otherwise applica-
ble law, provided (2) that this state has a materially greater interest than
the state of the chosen law in the determination of the particular issue.
This is basically the test that the court used in Casarotto. The only departure of the
court from this analysis is found in the court's historical deference to discover in any
Montana law a fundamental public policy. See, e.g., Trammel v. Brotherhood of Loco-
motive Firemen and Enginemen, 126 Mont. 400, 253 P.2d 329 (1953) (holding that a
public policy of the state is created by legislative enactment).
1995] 579
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tracts are 'effective'."149 The court quoted extensively from
Youngblood and included a recitation of that case's reliance upon
Kemp and the Field Code statute. Although it relied on
Youngblood for the imposition of public policy, ironically, all
available legal authority concerning the conflict of law rules from
the past fifteen years of Montana precedent was presented in the
quote, with no clear direction on how it all applied. The court
relied upon public policy from Youngblood and its analysis under
the Restatement Second to invalidate the choice of law provision
in the contract.
C. Casarotto as Precedent for Conflict of Law Rules
In light of the difficulties present in conflict of law rules in
Montana during the Kemp era, the court's decision in Casarotto
to use the Restatement Second is somewhat understandable. In
attempting to discard the rigidity of the Field Code statute and
the Blair rule, the Montana Supreme Court is trying to remove
these historical restraints on its conflict of law rules. However,
the court's reliance upon the Restatement Second in Casarotto to
resolve the conflict of laws issue leaves many questions unan-
swered. Most importantly, what is the current state of the law?
In this context, a hypothetical evaluation of the facts from
Casarotto without the choice of law provision is instructive.
Turning to Kemp and the Field Code statute as precedent, one
would first determine whether the issue was one of interpreta-
tion. Because the validity of the arbitration clause was the main
issue, no interpretation of the contract was at stake, and there-
fore, the Field Code statute would not apply. If the Blair rule
was applied-as extracted from the dictum in Kemp-again one
initially would determine whether the dispute involved a ques-
tion of validity or interpretation. Because the issue concerned
validity, under the Blair rule, the law of the place where the
contract was formed would control. Ironically in this case, nei-
ther Montana nor Connecticut law would govern, for the contract
was entered into in New York.1" Thus, under the Blair rule,
the courtwould apply New York law to determine if the arbitra-
tion clause was valid. This is another example of how rigid and
sometimes arbitrary these older conflict of law rules can be.
Yet, the Montana Supreme Court did not follow the rules
149. Casarotto v. Lombardi, 268 Mont. 369, 374, 886 P.2d 931, 934 (1994).
150. Id. at 375, 886 P.2d at 935.
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from Kemp and its progeny. Instead, the court turned to the
Restatement Second for guidance in the conflict of laws. In the
court's reliance upon Emerson for its acceptance of the Restate-
ment Second, the court has left an entire line of cases hanging in
a void.
Kemp and its progeny are still good law in Montana. The
Youngblood decision, which the court relied upon for imposing
Montana public policy in Casarotto, was also the most recent
reiteration of the court's continued reliance upon the Field Code
statute and the Blair rule. The court in Casarotto appears to
have extracted part of the fruits from Youngblood, but has re-
frained from importing the remainder of the tree, threatening to
cut it off at the roots.
Ultimately, the Montana Supreme Court must resolve the
inconsistent precedent by chopping this tree down in a more
effective and comprehensive manner.151 The present status of
the conflict of laws in Montana is far too confused to continue
effectively without further clarification from the authoritative ju-
dicial body of the state. The ruling in Casarotto, although help-
ing to extract Montana jurisprudence from historically antiquat-
ed rules, unfortunately also added to the confusion. The Montana
rules for conflict of laws currently appear to include the Field
Code statute, the Blair rule, the Restatement Second and the
public policy trump as enunciated in Youngblood. It is unclear
which of these rules, or combination thereof, the Montana Su-
preme Court will apply in the future.
The minimum repair required of the court is to clarify which
rule will be used. The present panoply of applicable rules is not
consistent with the predictability that practitioners require to
determine the law prior to trial. During the past several decades,
many aspects of the judicial system have undergone revision to
encourage the parties in litigation to settle before trial. Yet,
when basic determinations cannot be accurately predicted, such
as which law will be applied to a case, it becomes difficult to
narrow the settlement range to a mutually agreeable compro-
mise. The current confusion in the law actually encourages a
trial, for it increases the difficulty of the practitioner to realisti-
cally predict an outcome to the litigation and thereby discourages
settlement by the parties.
151. For a fine example of the Montana Supreme Court cutting off inconsistent
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VII. CONCLUSION
In Kemp, the Montana Supreme Court acknowledged the
applicability of the Field Code statute to decide conflict of law
issues. The court's augmentation of the statute through reliance
upon the Blair rule has failed to clarify the important distinction
between validity and interpretation. The federal court in Crosby,
citing Kemp, did not use the Field Code statute, but relied on the
Blair rule. Later, in Youngblood, the Montana Supreme Court
recognized that regardless of which law applied to a contract, a
contract or parts of it could be invalidated if it conflicted with
the public policies of Montana. Finally, in Casarotto, the court
largely ignored Kemp and its progeny, and employed the rules
from the Restatement Second-while reasserting public policy
considerations-to decide a conflict of laws issue.
One may claim that the Field Code statute binds the court
to certain rules.152 Ideally, the legislature should repeal the
Field Code statute, recognizing it as an outdated and incomplete
rule that leads to arbitrary results inconsistent with the inten-
tion of the contracting parties. The court could serve as a cata-
lyst to achieve this goal by announcing its objections to the Field
Code statute in its next opinion, as recently accomplished by the
North Dakota Supreme Court. With the statute repealed, the
court could adopt the Restatement Second as its guide with no
possible friction from a statutory directive.
As noted above, the conflict of law rules are largely proce-
dural in character, and the court should enjoy the freedom to
choose its rules of operation. The Restatement Second provides
an excellent source of authority in this area. It offers both the
practitioner and judge a flexible doctrine, based on modern prin-
ciples, which is clearly documented with comments and annota-
tions. Numerous jurisdictions have adopted the Restatement
Second and the Montana Supreme Court looks upon it with fa-
vor. An announcement by the court that the Restatement Second
is the authoritative guide for the resolution of conflict of law
issues in Montana would solve the confusion that now exists. If
the court in Casarotto intended to accomplish this, it has not
fully achieved its goal.
The Montana Supreme Court should resolve the present
uncertainty and confusion in the conflict of laws for contracts.
The combination of inconsistent precedent and conflicting reli-
152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. a (claiming that
a state must apply its local statutory provisions directed to conflict of laws).
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ance upon statutory law creates a situation which fosters confu-
sion in an important area. It is a problem that can be easily
fixed: the court simply needs to recognize the problem and state
clearly which rule will apply in the future.
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NOTES
TONACK V. MONTANA BANK: PREEMPTION,
INTERPRETATION, AND OLDER EMPLOYEES




In 1987, the Montana Legislature enacted the Wrongful
Discharge From Employment Act (WDFEA) primarily as a re-
sponse to two forces: First, employers and insurance companies
sought to "reduce the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow" in
order to eliminate unreasonably large wrongful discharge awards
and marginal wrongful discharge claims.' Second, due to the
Montana Supreme Court's unpredictable interpretation of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the drafters of
WDFEA sought to provide certainty to employment discharge
law in Montana.2
To effectuate its objective of reducing wrongful discharge
claims and awards, the legislature made the WDFEA the exclu-
1. Summary of H.B. 241, 50th Mont. Leg. (Mar. 10, 1987); Statement of Leg-
islative Intent Concerning the Damage Limitation Contained in Section (5) of H.B.
241, Senate Judiciary Comm., 50th Mont. Leg. (Mar. 10, 1987) [hereinafter Legisla-
tive Intent]; Montana State Senate Judiciary Comm. Minutes of the Meeting, 50th
Mont. Leg. (Mar. 10, 1987) (statement of Rep. Spaeth); LeRoy H. Schramm, Montana
Employment Law and the 1987 Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act: A New
Order Begins, 51 MoNT. L. REV. 94, 108-09 (1990); Telephone Interview with LeRoy
Schramm, Chief Legal Counsel for the Montana University System (Oct. 13, 1994).
2. See Leonard Bierman & Stuart A. Youngblood, Interpreting Montana's
Pathbreaking Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 53
MONT. L. REV. 53, 56 (1992); Schramm, supra note 1, at 106-09.
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sive remedy for wrongful discharge3 and capped the amount
recoverable for a wrongful discharge at four years of lost wages
and fringe benefits.4 The drafters of the WDFEA intended the
four-year damage limitation to represent a reasonable compro-
mise between the competing interests of the employer and the
discharged employee.5 That compromise was to protect employ-
ers from unreasonably large damage awards and adequately
compensate discharged employees during their search for new
employment. Further, in order to ensure that the WDFEA pro-
vides the exclusive remedy for wrongful discharge, the legisla-
ture created a preemption provision. The preemption provision
prevents discharge claimants from pursuing a WDFEA remedy
when another state or federal statute provides a remedy or pro-
cedure for contesting the dispute.6
Prior to the recent case of Tonack v. Montana Bank,7 Mon-
tana courts inconsistently applied the preemption provision,8
and employers and employees did not yet know how the four-
year damage limitation would affect wrongfully discharged em-
ployees.9 In Tonack, the Montana Supreme Court provided a
procedure for courts to follow when plaintiffs file concurrent
claims under the WDFEA and another state or federal statute.
Moreover, the holding in Tonack illustrated a fear shared by
many drafters of the WDFEA-that the four-year damage limita-
tion of the WDFEA does not represent a reasonable compromise
between the competing interests of the employer and the
wrongfully discharged older employee.
This Note discusses the Tonack court's interpretation of the
preemption provision and how that decision and the four-year
damage limitation affect wrongfully discharged older employees.
Part II of this Note discusses the historical and legislative back-
ground of the WDFEA and preemption provision. Part III de-
scribes Tonack's facts, procedure, and holding. Part IV analyzes
the holding of Tonack and how the preemption provision of the
WDFEA might be interpreted in the future. Lastly, Part V con-
cludes by suggesting that the WDFEA does not provide a reason-
3. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-902 (1993).
4. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(1) (1993).
5. See Legislative Intent, supra note 1.
6. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912(1) (1993).
7. 258 Mont. 247, 854 P.2d 326 (1993).
8. Compare Vance v. ANR Freight Systems, Inc., 9 Mont. Fed. Rpts. 36 (D.
Mont. 1991); Higgins v. Food Servs. of Am., 9 Mont. Fed. Rpts. 529 (D. Mont. 1991)
with Deeds v. Decker Coal Co., 246 Mont. 220, 805 P.2d 1270 (1990).
9. See infra part V.
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able compromise for wrongfully discharged older employees and
calls for legislative reform.
II. HISTORY
A. Enactment of the WDFEA
The Montana Legislature enacted the WDFEA partially in
response to the Montana Supreme Court's unpredictable inter-
pretation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing.'0 The WDFEA was enacted to provide certainty to employ-
ers and employees by specifically delineating the elements of a
wrongful discharge.11
The WDFEA provides that a discharge is wrongful if it was
not for good cause or in retaliation for an employee's refusal to
violate public policy."2 The WDFEA also codified the principle
that a discharge is wrongful if it violates the express provisions
of the employer's written personnel policies. 3 In adopting the
written personnel policy provision, the Montana Legislature
sought to discourage wrongful termination suits "by establishing
clear policies and guidelines for employment and discharge." 4
Employee actions for wrongful discharge based on an employer's
violation of written personnel policies were carried over from the
common law in Nye v. Department of Livestock.15 In Nye, the
Montana Supreme Court held that an employer's violation of
written personnel policies may provide a basis for a wrongful
termination claim. 6 Prior to the enactment of the WDFEA,
the court in Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Co. 7 allowed a
plaintiff to recover for an employment termination in violation of
the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.'" In Gates,
the Montana Supreme Court applied the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing to written personnel policies and stated:
10. See Schramm, supra note 1, at 95, 108.
11. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905(1) (1993); Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc., 238
Mont. 21, 51, 776 P.2d 488, 506 (1989); Bierman & Youngblood, supra note 2, at 56.
12. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(1)-(2) (1993).
13. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(3) (1993).
14. Rationale of Proposed Amends. to H.B. 241, Senate Judiciary Comm., Pro-
posed Amend. No. 7, First Reading, 50th Mont. Leg., at 3 (Mar. 10, 1987). This was
the purpose of the provision, at least according to the ad hoc committee.
15. 196 Mont. 222, 639 P.2d 498 (1982); see also Schramm, supra note 1, at
109-10.
16. Nye, 196 Mont. at 228, 639 P.2d at 502.
17. 196 Mont. 178, 638 P.2d 1063 (1982).
18. Id. at 184, 638 P.2d at 1067.
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The employer later promulgated a handbook of personnel poli-
cies establishing certain procedures with regard to termina-
tions.... The employee, having faith she would be treated
fairly, then developed a peace of mind associated with job secu-
rity. If the employer has failed to follow its own policies, the
peace of mind of its employee is shattered and injustice is
done. "9
The court applied the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
"upon objective manifestations by the employer giving rise to the
employee's reasonable belief that he or she has job security and
will be treated fairly."20 Therefore, an employee had a cause of
action when her reasonable expectations of job security or fair
treatment were violated. Often, the employee's expectations were
based on the employer's written personnel policies.
After Gates, the Montana Supreme Court expanded the
scope of remedies and persons protected under the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.2 Then, beginning in 1985, the court
began to "refine" and "moderate" its former decisions premised
on the holding in Gates. The court's expansion and contraction of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing created unpredictabil-
ity in the employment discharge law in Montana.22 This unpre-
dictability, coupled with what employers perceived as unreason-
ably large awards to wrongful discharge claimants, led Montana
employers and insurance companies (who paid the employment
discharge awards) to seek legislative reform.' The Montana
Legislature responded with the WDFEA. By enacting the
WDFEA, the legislature was able to significantly limit the scope
of remedies previously available under the covenant of good faith
and fair dealing.24
B. The Section 912(1) Preemption Provision
Section 912(1) of the WDFEA preemption provision provides
that the WDFEA will not apply when a discharge is subject to
any state or federal statute that provides a procedure or remedy
19. Id.
20. Dare v. Montana Petroleum Mktg., 212 Mont. 274, 282, 687 P.2d 1015,
1020 (1984).
21. Schramm, supra note 1, at 95.
22. Schramm, supra note 1, at 95.
23. Schramm, supra note 1, at 108; Legislative Intent, supra note 1.
24. Schramm, supra note 1, at 95.
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for contesting the dispute." The WDFEA was designed to give
statutory protection to those wrongfully discharged employees
who otherwise would not have protection under a contract or
other statutory scheme.26 The legislature did not intend to pro-
vide a discharged employee with a WDFEA cause of action when
the employee had a remedy under another federal or state stat-
ute.27 Similarly, the WDFEA will not apply when a discharged
employee is covered by a collective bargaining agreement or a
written contract for a specific term.2" Thus, in addition to limit-
ing the amount recoverable for a wrongful discharge, the legis-
lature also limited the scope of persons protected by the WDFEA.
Despite the language of the preemption provision, in 1991,
two federal district courts in Vance v. ANR Freight Systems,
Inc.2' and Higgins v. Food Services of America, Inc.,3 held that
when the facts of a discrimination claim were separate and dis-
tinct from those of a wrongful discharge claim, the WDFEA pre-
emption provision would not apply. Thus, under Vance and
Higgins, discharged employees were not foreclosed from pursuing
a remedy under both a federal discrimination statute and the
WDFEA.3 ' However, two years later in Tonack v. Montana
Bank, the Montana Supreme Court declined to follow Vance and
Higgins and held that the section 912(1) preemption provision
prevented the plaintiff from maintaining a concurrent age dis-
crimination and wrongful discharge claim.32 The holding in
Tonack resumed a course true to the language of the section
912(1) preemption provision, and demonstrated the WDFEA's
impact upon wrongfully discharged older employees.
25. MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912(1) (1993).
26. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912(1)-(2) (1993).
27. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-912 (1993); see also Meech v. Hillhaven W.,
Inc., 238 Mont. 21, 776 P.2d 488 (1989). The court in Meech stated:
The Act exempts from its provisions causes of action for discharge governed
by other state or federal statutory procedures for contesting discharge dis-
putes. For example, the Act exempts from its provisions, discriminatory dis-
charges, and actions for wrongful discharge from employment covered by
written collective bargaining agreements or controlled by a written contract
for a specific term.
Id. at 25, 776 P.2d at 490.
28. See Irving v. Sch. Dist. No. 1-1A, 248 Mont. 460, 813 P.2d 417 (1991); Fel-
lows v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 244 Mont. 7, 795 P.2d 484 (1990).
29. 9 Mont. Fed. Rpts. 36 (D. Mont. 1991).
30. 9 Mont. Fed. Rpts. 529 (D. Mont. 1991).
31. See Vance, 9 Mont. Fed. Rpts. at 39-40; Higgins, 9 Mont. Fed. Rpts. at 530.
32. Tonack, 258 Mont. at 254-55, 854 P.2d at 331.
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III. TONACK V. MONTANA BANK
A. The Facts
The Montana Bank of Sidney hired Betty Tonack (Tonack)
as a bank teller in 1981." The Sidney bank promoted Tonack to
teller supervisor' and, in 1988, Tonack learned of an opening
with an affiliated bank in Billings-the Montana Bank of Bill-
ings (Bank)."5 The Bank interviewed Tonack and offered her the
position of Financial Services Representative (FSR).5 Tonack
accepted the position with the Bank as FSR,37 moved to Bill-
ings, and began work in October of 1988.38
In January 1990, Tonack's supervisors evaluated Tonack's
performance as FSR "as fully satisfactory [and] 'more toward the
excellent side.'"39 Due to Tonack's favorable evaluation for her
performance as FSR, the Bank gave her a pay raise and the
additional responsibilities of "Customer Service Representative"
and "Teller Supervisor" (CSR/Teller Supervisor). °
On May 1, 1990, Lynette Kiedrowski became president of
the Bank and Tonack's direct supervisor.4' Ten days later,
Kiedrowski evaluated Tonack's performance and concluded that
Tonack was an "Employee Progressing at Standard."42 Soon
however, a series of events compromised Tonack's assent at the
Bank' and eventually lead to her termination. Tonack's trou-
33. Id. at 250, 854 P.2d at 328.
34. Id.
35. Respondent's Brief at 5, Tonack v. Montana Bank, 258 Mont. 247, 854 P.2d
326 (1993) (No. 92-343).
36. Id.
37. In district court, Judge Filner concluded that "Tonack was given a job de-
scription for her position as FSR which specifically set forth her duties and responsi-
bilities, as well as the performance expectations of Defendant Bank." Tonack v. Mon-
tana Bank, No. DV 91-070, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (June 3, 1992),
Finding of Fact No. 7, at 3 [hereinafter Findings of Fact].
38. Tonack, 258 Mont. at 250, 854 P.2d at 326.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 250, 854 P.2d at 328. See also Findings of Fact, supra note 37,
No. 10, at 4. Incidentally, the Bank did not give Tonack "a job description outlining
her new job duties and responsibilities or the performance expectations of the De-
fendant Bank (as was done when Tonack began her job in 1988 as FSR)." Findings
of Fact, supra note 37, No. 10, at 4.
41. Tonack, 258 Mont. at 250, 854 P.2d at 328; see also Findings of Fact, supra
note 37, No. 16, at 6.
42. Findings of Fact, supra note 37, No. 17, at 6.
43. During Kiedrowski's review of Tonack on May 10, 1990, Kiedrowski noted:
"[Tonack's] next opportunity is to Financial Services Executive. Once CSR and FSR
are consistently at satisfactory levels that option can be explored." Respondent's Brief
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bles began in August of 1990 when the Bank conducted an inter-
nal audit and discovered two discrepancies: Someone within the
Bank had embezzled five hundred dollars in travelers checks and
improperly issued a certificate of deposit without obtaining pay-
ment from the customer." Despite the fact that Tonack was not
responsible for auditing travelers checks and was away on vaca-
tion when the thefts occurred,' Kiedrowski blamed Tonack for
the discrepancies." As a result, Kiedrowski, in violation of the
Bank's written personnel policies, placed Tonack on thirty days
probation and stripped Tonack of all her duties except those of
FSR.47
During Tonack's probationary period, Kiedrowski instructed
Tonack to cross-train Rhonda Kreamer, a substantially younger
Bank employee, as a "backup" FSR." Tonack discovered that
the Bank had ordered business cards bearing the name Rhonda
Kreamer with the title of FSR, despite the fact that the Bank
only had one FSR position-that occupied by Tonack.4' During
at 8, Tonack (No. 92-343).
44. Appellant's Brief at 5, Tonack v. Montana Bank, 258 Mont. 247, 854 P.2d
326 (1994) (No. 92-343).
45. Judge Filner found that the "defalcation" discovered during the audit was
not Tonack's fault because of the lack of an "approved job description" that would
sufficiently hold a CSR/Teller Supervisor responsible for deficiencies in the "Travelers
Check area." Findings of Fact, supra note 37, No. 22, at 7-8. The position of
CSR/Teller Supervisor had not existed for an extended period of time before Tonack
was given the position. Findings of Fact, supra note 37, No. 12, at 4-5. After the
Bank gave Tonack the job, Kiedrowski requested Tonack to draft her own job de-
scription. Tonack drafted the job description (which excluded auditing responsibilities
in general and in the traveler checks area) and delivered it to Kiedrowski;
Kiedrowski apparently did not find any deficiencies with the job description because
she indicated no intent to alter the document as drafted by Tonack. See Findings of
Fact, supra note 37, No. 19, at 6-7.
46. The Bank maintained that the discrepancies occurred in areas under the su-
pervision of Tonack and "the embezzlement was made possible because tellers super-
vised by Tonack did not keep an accurate inventory of travelers checks." Appellant's
Brief at 5, Tonack (No. 92-343). However, the district court found that the discrepan-
cy was not Tonack's responsibility because of the absence of a job description for
CSR/Teller Supervisor and the fact that the Bank had specifically retained auditing
responsibilities in the operations department of the Bank. Findings of Fact, supra
note 37, No. 22, at 7-8.
47. Tonack, 258 P.2d at 250, 854 P.2d at 328. The Bank's written personnel
manual explicitly stated: "[p]robation is usually for a period of [90] days and the em-
ployee should be carefully observed for improvement during this period." Findings of
Fact, supra note 37, No. 23, at 8. During Tonack's 30 day probationary period, an
employee in the operations area of the Bank confessed to the "theft" of the travelers
checks, and yet, Tonack still remained on probation. Findings of Fact, supra note 37,
No. 25, at 8-9.
48. Tonack, 258 Mont. at 251, 854 P.2d at 328.
49. Id.
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the week Tonack was supposed to cross-train Kreamer, the indi-
vidual who was scheduled to replace Kreamer during the train-
ing failed to show up for work.5" Kiedrowski was out of town for
the week and, because the replacement had not shown up,
Tonack decided to postpone the cross-training of Kreamer.51
Kiedrowski returned from vacation and promptly fired Tonack
"as a result of her failure to correct deficiencies in the CSR/Teller
Supervision area and her inability to work with others."" At
the time of her termination, Tonack was forty-nine years old and
had worked for the Bank for almost ten years.53
B. Procedure & Holding
Tonack filed a wrongful discharge action against the Bank
under the WDFEA. Shortly after filing the complaint in district
court, Tonack's counsel contacted Gary Nichols, Tonack's super-
visor before Kiedrowski and vice president of the Bank. Tonack's
counsel discovered age discrimination to be the underlying rea-
son for Tonack's termination.' Nichols told Tonack's counsel
that George Balback, president of the holding company for the
Bank, "wanted Ms. Tonack terminated because of her age and
background."55 Balback expressed discontent that the former
and current presidents of the bank could not manage to termi-
nate Tonack, but was confident Kiedrowski could "get it han-
dled."5
6
As a result of Nichols' information, Tonack filed an age dis-
crimination claim with the Montana Human Rights Commission
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. She also
amended her district court action to include violations under the
ADEA.5" At trial, the court found that the Bank violated both
the ADEA and the WDFEA in terminating Tonack.5" The court
awarded Tonack four years of future lost wages and bene-
fits-the maximum allowed under the WDFEA-and also award-
ed damages under the ADEA (calculated from the last date of
50. Id. at 251, 854 P.2d at 329.
51. Id.
52. Findings of Fact, supra note 37, No. 29, at 10; see also Tonack, 258 Mont.
at 251, 854 P.2d at 329.
53. Tonack, 258 Mont. at 250-51, 854 P.2d at 328-29.
54. Respondent's Brief at 14, Tonack (No. 92-342).
55. Findings of Fact, supra note 37, No. 14, at 5.
56. Tonack, 258 Mont. at 252, 854 P.2d at 329-30.
57. Respondent's Brief at 15-16, Tonack (No. 92-343).
58. Tonack, 258 Mont. at 251, 854 P.2d at 329.
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damages under the WDFEA until Tonack's expected date of
retirement).59
On appeal, the Bank claimed that the district court incor-
rectly interpreted or misapplied the provisions of the WDFEA.60
The Bank contended that the WDFEA preemption provision
prevented Tonack from pursuing both the ADEA and WDFEA
claim. The Montana Supreme Court, with one dissent,6 agreed
with the Bank and held that the WDFEA preemption provision
precluded Tonack from recovering damages under the
WDFEA.62
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Tonack & Concurrent Claims Under the WDFEA
The issues raised by Tonack's complaint created a quandary
for the Montana Supreme Court. On one hand, the district court
found that Tonack's employer violated the WDFEA by breaching
its personnel policies and terminating Tonack without good
cause. 63 On the other hand, the district court concluded that
Tonack's employer also engaged in age discrimination.6 4 Howev-
er, despite the discharge without good cause and the importance
of the personnel policy provision of the WDFEA,"5 the preemp-
59. Id.
60. Id. at 250, 854 P.2d at 328.
61. Justice Trieweiler agreed with the holdings in Vance and Higgins, arguing
that the preemption provision should not apply to Tonack because she alleged
"separate and independent reasons why her termination from employment was un-
lawful." Id. at 256, 854 P.2d at 332 (Trieweiler, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part). Justice Trieweiler also argued that the preemption provision should not
apply because no other statute provided a remedy for Tonack's written personnel
policy claim. Id.
62. Tonack, 258 Mont. at 254-55, 854 P.2d at 331.
63. The Bank violated its written personnel policy by failing to give Tonack a
warning prior to being on placed on probation; furthermore, the written policy stated
that the usual probationary period was 90 days. Kiedrowski placed Tonack on a 30
day probationary period. Findings of Fact, supra note 37, No. 23, at 8. The Bank
terminated Tonack without good cause by failing to provide evidence of Tonack's
deficient performance. Findings of Fact, supra note 37, No. 36, at 11.
64. Findings of Fact, supra note 37, No. 38, at 12.
65. See supra part II.A. Two recent decisions by the Montana Supreme Court
illustrate the importance of the written personnel policy provision of the WDFEA:
Miller v. Citizens State Bank, 252 Mont. 472, 830 P.2d 550 (1992), and Kearney v.
KXLF Communications, Inc., 263 Mont. 407, 869 P.2d 772 (1994). In Kearney (decid-
ed after Tonack), the court held that an express written personnel policy may exist
despite its absence from an employee handbook. In Kearney, the plaintiff argued that
his employer's express written personnel policy existed in the form of pre-printed
evaluation forms used to evaluate all employees and a memo from a supervisor stat-
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tion provision prevented Tonack from maintaining concurrent
claims under the ADEA and WDFEA. 5
The Montana Supreme Court reversed the district court's
award to Tonack under both the ADEA and WDFEA and out-
lined the following procedure to be utilized when a plaintiff files
concurrent claims under the WDFEA and another state or feder-
al statute:
Whether a discharge will ultimately be "subject to any other
state or federal statute that provides a procedure or remedy for
contesting the dispute" is not immediately known when a claim
is filed. This must be determined before it is known whether
the Wrongful Discharge Act may be applied. It is established
only when a finder of fact has made that determination or
when judgment on the claim has otherwise been entered.
Therefore, we conclude that claims may be filed concurrently
under the Wrongful Discharge Act... but if an affirmative
ing that "[e]ach person should get an evaluation of their performance at least one
time per year." 263 Mont. at 418, 869 P.2d at 778. By allowing express written per-
sonnel policies to exist in forms other than the employer's handbook, the Kearney
court seems to be broadly interpreting the scope of the written personnel policy pro-
vision. This broad interpretation of the provision is consistent with prior Montana
Supreme Court decisions on the issue. See, e.g., Buck v. Billings Mont. Chevrolet,
Inc., 248 Mont. 276, 284-85, 811 P.2d 537, 542 (1991) (holding that a termination in
light of a written personnel policy that "assured [the plaintiffs] continued employ-
ment if his job performance and economic circumstances remained satisfactory" may
be actionable when the plaintiff continued to produce for his financially stable em-
ployer); see also Bierman & Youngblood, supra note 2, at 71-73 ("The Montana Su-
preme Court in Buck appears to be giving a fairly wide range of latitude to the
language contained in section 904(3) of the WDFEA.").
In Miller, the plaintiff sued under the WDFEA, alleging her employer termi-
nated her without "good cause" and in violation of its written personnel policies. The
plaintiff alleged that her employer violated its personnel policies by failing to provide
her with a "formal" warning that "her continued substandard performance would
result in dismissal." Miller, 252 Mont. at 475, 830 P.2d at 552. In a rather brief
opinion, the Montana Supreme Court held that in addition to an unfavorable written
evaluation, the employer warned the plaintiff on at least three occasions that her
poor performance would result in termination. Id. at 475, 830 P.2d at 551-52. The
court held that the plaintiff was unable to prove a wrongful discharge because the
employer carefully followed its own written personnel policies. Id. at 475, 830 P.2d at
552. The court did not, however, state whether an unwritten oral warning would
constitute a "formal" warning consistent with the employer's written personnel poli-
cies. The decision in Miller nonetheless demonstrates the court's dedication to the
legislative and historical directive to encourage employers to follow their own express
written personnel policies. Therefore, as demonstrated by Kearney and Miller, the
Montana Supreme Court broadly determines what constitutes an employer's express
written personnel policies; however, once it finds those policies, the court-consistent
with the legislative intent and pre-WDFEA case law-is stringently holding both the
employer and the employee to the terms of those policies.
66. Tonack, 258 Mont. at 254-55, 854 P.2d at 331. 246
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determination of the claim is obtained under such other stat-
utes, the Wrongful Discharge Act may no longer be applied.67
B. Modification of Deeds v. Decker Coal Co.
The Tonack court held that since the district court made the
factual determination that the ADEA "applied" to Tonack's dis-
charge, Tonack was not able to recover under the WDFEA.6"
The court departed from its previous interpretation of the pre-
emption provision in Deeds v. Decker Coal Co. 9
In Deeds, the Montana Supreme Court held that the Nation-
al Labor Relations Act (NLRA), a federal statute, did not pre-
empt the WDFEA because the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) had not yet filed a formal complaint under the NLRA.70
In Deeds, employees working for the Decker Coal Company
(Decker) went on strike after their collective bargaining
agreement had expired.71 Decker allowed 80 employees to re-
turn to work, but discharged the remaining 152 due to allega-
tions of "serious strike misconduct."72 As a result, the dis-
charged employees filed unfair labor charges with the NLRB,
alleging that they were terminated in retaliation for protected
union activities.73
The discharged employees then filed a claim under the
WDFEA. The district court granted Decker's motion for summary
judgment, holding that the preemption provision of the WDFEA
preempted the plaintiffs state claim.7 4 The Montana Supreme
Court reversed, holding "[sihould the NLRB eventually decide to
enter into the dispute by filing a complaint on behalf of the dis-
charged employees, a 'procedure or remedy for contesting the
dispute' would be set in motion, and the statutory [preemption
provision] would apply."75 Thus, if the NLRB had filed a formal
67. Id. at 255, 854 P.2d at 331.
68. Id.; see Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc., 238 Mont. 21, 25, 776 P.2d 488, 490
(1989) (stating that the WDFEA "exempts from its provisions causes of actions
for . ..discriminatory discharges").
69. 246 Mont. 220, 805 P.2d 1270 (1990). The court in Tonack stated: "To the
extent that this conclusion modifies our holding in Deeds, that opinion is so modi-
fied." Tonack, 258 Mont. at 255, 854 P.2d at 331.
70. Deeds, 246 Mont. at 223, 805 P.2d at 1271-72.
71. Id. at 222, 805 P.2d at 1271.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 222, 805 P.2d at 1271.
75. Deeds, 246 Mont. at 223, 805 P.2d at 1271.
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complaint on behalf of the employees, the federal law would have
preempted the WDFEA claim. However, since the NLRB had not
filed a formal complaint, the Deeds court determined that, in
order to ensure the plaintiffs a forum, proceedings had to be
stayed at the district court level pending NLRB action.
The readily distinguishable facts of the two cases raise ques-
tions as to how Tonack actually modified Deeds. Deeds involved
potential conflicting statutes: the plaintiffs filed a wrongful dis-
charge claim while the NLRB investigated the unfair labor prac-
tices charge.7" In Tonack, however, the plaintiff filed two ac-
tions-one federal, one state-which, although allegedly distinct
in nature, related to the same discharge.77 The Tonack decision
suggests that a court78 will be charged with the responsibility of
determining whether another state or federal statute applies
(and thus whether that statute preempts the WDFEA) only when
a plaintiff files concurrent claims under the WDFEA and another
state or federal statute.79 The holding in Deeds complicates the
issues and permits alternative conclusions based on two
plausible interpretations of Tonack.
Under the first interpretation of Tonack, a court would ig-
nore the number of formal claims filed; it would apply the literal
language of Tonack by factually determining in every WDFEA
claim if the discharge is subject to any other state or federal
statute providing a remedy or procedure for contesting the dis-
pute. The WDFEA would no longer apply if a wrongfully dis-
charged employee filed only a WDFEA claim, but a court none-
theless determined that the discharge applied to another state or
federal statute. Therefore, if the holding in Tonack was applied
76. Id. at 222, 805 P.2d at 1271.
77. Tonack, 258 P.2d at 247, 854 P.2d at 331.
78. The use of the word "court" in this context means the finder of fact or the
trial judge. The Tonack court held that a plaintiff will be entitled to a WDFEA rem-
edy "only when a finder of fact has made that determination or when judgement on
the claim has otherwise been entered." Id. at 255, 854 P.2d at 331. Thus, the court
seems to be inviting motions for summary judgment and jury instructions to deter-
mine whether the WDFEA will apply when a plaintiff files concurrent claims.
79. This conclusion is supported by the facts of Tonack and the language of the
decision: "[The court] conclude[s] that claims may be filed concurrently under the
Wrongful Discharge Act and other state or federal statutes described in § 39-2-912,
MCA, but if an affirmative determination of the claim is obtained under such other
statutes, the Wrongful Discharge Act may no longer be applied." Tonack, 258 Mont.
at 255, 854 P.2d at 331 (emphasis added). The court's use of the word "may" is trou-
bling. By definition, "may" means permissive, although the court does not seem to be
permitting a choice when another statute applies to the WDFEA. Certainly, the ulti-
mate holding in Tonack or the plain language of the § 912(1) preemption provision
does not suggest a choice.
596 [Vol. 56
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to the factual situation in Deeds, the result in Deeds would be
different, the NLRA would preempt the state wrongful discharge
claim, and the plaintiffs would not be guaranteed a forum.
Under the second interpretation, Tonack would modify
Deeds, the result in Deeds would not change, and the plaintiffs
would still be guaranteed a forum. A court utilizing this inter-
pretation would determine if another state or federal statute
applied to the discharge only when a plaintiff filed concurrent
claims under the WDFEA and another state or federal statute."
Then, if a court determined that the federal or state statute ap-
plied to the plaintiffs discharge, the WDFEA claim would be
preempted.
The facts of Tonack illustrate why the second interpretation
is the more logical of the two. If Nichols, the former vice presi-
dent of the Bank, had not told Tonack's attorney that the Bank's
termination of Tonack was based on considerations of age,
Tonack would never have filed an ADEA claim. If Tonack had no
knowledge that her termination was age-motivated, her ADEA
claim would exist only in theory. However, under the first inter-
pretation, the Bank could assert that the ADEA preempted
Tonack's WDFEA claim, even if she did not file an ADEA claim.
Certainly, the drafters of the WDFEA did not envision such a
narrow interpretation of the preemption provision.8
The second interpretation would modify Deeds only to the
extent that Tonack established a procedure to be followed when
a plaintiff files concurrent claims under the WDFEA and another
state or federal statute. If the Montana Supreme Court applied
the second interpretation of Tonack to the factual situation in
Deeds, the result in Deeds would not change and the proceedings
would be stayed at the district court level pending NLRB action.
Future Interpretation of the Preemption Provision
80. See supra text accompanying note 67.
81. If, however, the wrongfully discharged employee's complaint clearly suggests
that the proper remedy was under another state or federal statute, then the WDFEA
would no longer apply. See, e.g., Harrison v. Chance, 244 Mont. 215, 797 P.2d 200
(1990). In Harrison, after the plaintiffs employer made several unwanted sexual
advances and demanded that the plaintiff either "put out or get out," the plaintiff
resigned and filed a claim alleging tortious battery, intentional infliction of emotional
distress, wrongful discharge, the tort of outrage, and breach of the implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. Id. at 218, 223, 797 P.2d at 202, 205. The defendant
employer asserted that the plaintiffs proper remedy was the Human Rights Act,
which provided the exclusive remedy for sexual harassment. Id. at 219, 797 P.2d at
202. The Montana Supreme Court agreed, holding that since the plaintiffs tort theo-
ries were "based" upon and "ar[olse" from sexual harassment, her tort claims were
preempted by the Human Rights Act. Id. at 223, 797 P.2d at 205.
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Arguments over the two interpretations of Tonack may be
less important than how the Montana Supreme Court will inter-
pret the preemption provision in the future. Since the facts be-
fore the Tonack court involved concurrent claims-and not the
dilemma raised in Deeds-the proper question may be how the
court will interpret the preemption provision when plaintiffs file
concurrent claims. The holding in Tonack will make it extremely
difficult, if not impossible, for wrongful discharge claimants to
maintain concurrent WDFEA and discrimination claims.
The Tonack court declined to "completely follow" the deci-
sions in Vance v. ANR Freight Systems, Inc.82 and Higgins v.
Food Services of America, Inc.," holding that Tonack's wrongful
discharge and age discrimination claims "relate[d] to one dis-
charge from employment at the bank."' The court held that the
ADEA preempted Tonack's wrongful discharge claim because the
district court found that the ADEA "applied" to Tonack's dis-
charge from employment.85 Apparently, the Montana Supreme
Court presumed that because the district court found that the
Bank had a discriminatory motive for discharging Tonack, the
ADEA "applied" to Tonack's discharge." Thus, the court sug-
gests that any time a trial court determines that an employer
had a discriminatory motive for discharging an employee, the
discrimination statute will "apply." As a result, Tonack will
make it very difficult for future wrongful discharge claimants to
establish a separate and distinct factual predicate for a wrongful
discharge and discrimination claim. In other words, wrongful
discharge claimants will likely be unable to successfully make
future Vance and Higgins arguments.
The Montana Supreme Court's refusal to follow Vance and
Higgins is consistent with the legislature's attempt to provide
discharged employees with only one statutory remedy.87 More-
over, the court's holding may have the practical effect of compel-
ling wrongful discharge claimants to choose between the WDFEA
and the applicable discrimination statute when faced with multi-
ple claims. Those claimants who do choose to file concurrent
claims under the WDFEA and another state or federal statute
risk losing their WDFEA claim. Consequently, if a wrongfully
82. 9 Mont. Fed. Rpts. 36 (D. Mont. 1991).
83. 9 Mont. Fed. Rpts. 529 (D. Mont. 1991).
84. See Tonack, 258 Mont. at 254, 854 P.2d at 331.
85. Id. at 255, 854 P.2d at 330.
86. See Findings of Fact, supra note 37, Nos. 37-38, at 12.
87. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 56598
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discharged employee does choose to pursue only a WDFEA
claim,88 the employee will be able only to recover four years of
lost wages and fringe benefits-a limitation particularly signifi-
cant for the wrongfully discharged older employee. 9
V. WRONGFULLY DISCHARGED OLDER EMPLOYEES AND THE
FOUR-YEAR DAMAGE LIMITATION
The drafters of the WDFEA recognized that the four-year
damage limitation might be insufficient for wrongfully dis-
charged older employees and attempted to exempt them from the
limitation.9" The legislature adopted the exemption in the Com-
mittee of the Whole but killed it late in the amendment process
in Conference Committee.9 The failure of the legislature to ex-
empt wrongfully discharged employees from the four-year dam-
age limitation illustrates that the legislature disregarded the fact
that, for wrongfully discharged older employees, the WDFEA
does not represent a reasonable compromise between the compet-
ing interests of the employer and employee.92
The four-year damage limitation within the WDFEA seems
logical when applied to most employees, but the limitation does
not properly account for the significant barriers faced by older
workers in the job market. When the drafters of the WDFEA
created the four-year limitation for lost wages and fringe bene-
fits, they rationalized that the limitation was a "reasonable peri-
od of time for a discharged employee to become resituated in the
labor market."93 The legislature further stated that the four-
year limitation "will act as an incentive for a discharged employ-
ee to find alternate employment that puts the employee's talents
88. A wrongfully discharged older employee may choose not to sue under a
discrimination statute because the employee may not be aware of or have sufficient
evidence to pursue such claim. Recall that Tonack did not know of her ADEA claim
until after she filed her WDFEA claim when the former vice-president of the Bank
told her she was terminated because of her age.
89. See discussion infra part V.
90. See infra pp. 16-17 and note 103.
91. See Committee of the Whole Amend., 50th Mont. Leg. (Mar. 27, 1987); Con-
ference Committee Report, 50th Mont. Leg. (Mar. 20, 1987).
92. See Legislative Intent, supra note 1; see also Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc.,
238 Mont. 21, 50, 776 P.2d 488, 506 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of the
WDFEA, and holding that classifications created by WDFEA are rationally related to
a legitimate state interest because the statute creates greater certainty to both em-
ployers and employees and "provide[s] 'a reasonably just substitute for the common
law causes it abrogate[s]').
93. Legislative Intent, supra note 1.
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to best use."94 The reasoning used to support the limitation
makes sense for most younger discharged employees who are
able to re-train and find other employment; however, the same
reasoning is not persuasive when applied to older workers sim-
ply because older workers, once unemployed, remain unemployed
longer than any other age group. 5 Furthermore, wrongfully dis-
charged older employees generally have very little time to be-
come "resituated in the labor market."
Older workers are unable to re-enter the work-force as
quickly as younger workers; they are often unprepared for per-
sonnel interviews, employment tests, and competition with youn-
ger workers. 6 Additionally, older individuals are often unable
to work at a pay level equal to that of their former employ-
ment. 7 "Once out of work, [the] older worker will confront
greater difficulties than younger counterparts in finding new
employment."' In a recent congressional hearing entitled "Age
Discrimination in the Workplace: A Continuing Problem for
Older Workers," Congress found that despite the ADEA, employ-
ers still turn away older workers in favor of younger workers due
to incorrect assumptions about age and job performance.99
During legislative consideration of the WDFEA, an ad hoc
committee, comprised of attorneys who practiced in employment
termination law,"° recognized the potential inadequacy of the
four-year damage limitation as applied to wrongfully discharged
older employees. The committee proposed an amendment to the
statute that excluded from the damage limitation persons within
the protected age class"' who had been employed for ten or
more years with their employer." 2 The committee gave the fol-
lowing rationale for the exclusion:
This amendment, while recognizing the [four year] limitation
94. Legislative Intent, supra note 1.
95. Age Discrimination in the Workplace: A Continuing Problem for Older Work-
ers: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on Aging, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1991) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of The Honorable William J. Hughes).
96. ANDREW W. RuzICHO & LOUIS A. JACOBS, LITIGATING AGE DISCRIMINATION
CASES 41 (1991).
97. RuzICHO & JACOBS, supra note 96, at 41; Hearing, supra note 95, at 66-70.
98. Hearing, supra note 95, at 69.
99. Hearing, supra note 95, at 68.
100. Proposed Amends. to H.B. 241, Senate Judiciary Comm., Proposed Amend.
No. 8, First Reading, 50th Mont. Leg. (Mar. 10, 1987).
101. The ADEA sets the protected age class at 40. 29 U.S.C § 631 (Supp. IV
1992).
102. Proposed Amends. to H.B. 241, Senate Judiciary Comm., Proposed Amend.
No. 8, First Reading, 50th Mont. Leg. (Mar. 10, 1987).
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on back-pay for younger employees who have better ability to
become re-employed following a wrongful discharge, allows for
recognition of employees who are [forty] years or more of age
and who have been employed for more than [ten] years. The
example situation is an employee [fifty-seven] years of age who
has worked for the employer for [thirty] years. An employee
who has reached that age, and has limited his employment to
the specialized needs of his employer, should be allowed to
show that is unlikely that he can become re-employed at age
[fifty-seven] in a similar job, if that is the evidence presented.
The amendment would still allow the jury to consider whether
that is a legitimate claim, and to offset other earnings. Howev-
er, the legislation as written is patently unfair to older and
more vulnerable employees who frequently are unable to re-
enter the job force on the pay level previously earned. They
should at least have the opportunity to present a legitimate
claim for economic losses that extend beyond the [three]-year
period.' O3
The Committee of the Whole adopted the exemption for older
employees but, without explanation in the legislative history,
killed it in Conference Committee.' °4 One possible reason the
Conference Committee killed the amendment is the same reason
employers, insurance companies, and legislators desired the
WDFEA in the first place: to eliminate high damage awards and
marginal wrongful discharge claims.0 5 In the eyes of the insur-
ance companies and employers who sought statutory protection
from increasing wrongful discharge actions and large monetary
awards, the older person amendment was merely a back door to
the undesired and unpredictable status of the Montana employ-
ment discharge climate that existed prior to enactment of the
WDFEA.' °  Nevertheless, by refusing to adopt the older
person amendment, the legislature did not follow its own legisla-
tive commitment to balance the competing interests of the em-
ployer and the discharged employee. The legislature ultimately
chose to disregard the fact that older workers face greater diffi-
culties in finding new employment than younger workers.0 7 To
103. Rationale of Proposed Amends. to H.B. 241, Senate Judiciary Comm., Pro-
posed Amend. No. 8, First Reading, 50th Mont. Leg. (Mar. 10, 1987).
104. The legislative history does not reveal what compelled the legislature to
adopt the amendment so late in the process and what compelled the Conference
Committee to kill the amendment.
105. See supra part II.A.
106. See supra part II.A
107. See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text.
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remedy the situation, the Montana Legislature should do as the
ad hoc committee recommended and pass legislation relieving
wrongfully discharged older employees from the four-year dam-
age limitation of the WDFEA.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Montana Supreme Court's holding in Tonack v. Mon-
tana Bank raises questions of exactly how the court modified
Deeds and how the preemption provision might be interpreted in
the future. The court should adopt the second interpretation of
Tonack and determine that the section 912(1) preemption provi-
sion applies only when a wrongfully discharged employee files
concurrent claims under the WDFEA and another state or feder-
al statute.
The potentially adverse impact the WDFEA damage limita-
tion has upon wrongfully discharged older employees was first
recognized by the drafters of the WDFEA and was recently illu-
minated by the Tonack court's refusal to follow the reasoning in
Vance and Higgins. If the WDFEA is truly a balancing of inter-
ests, as it has been suggested to be, then the Montana Legisla-
ture should, as a matter of public policy, enact legislation that
recognizes the unique difficulties faced by wrongfully discharged
older employees in the labor market.
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PERSONAL INJURY SETTLEMENTS: TAX-




Following a jury verdict in an employment dispute, an attor-
ney negotiates a large settlement award for a client. The
pleadings alleged theories grounded in both tort and contract.
The settlement agreement and jury award did not specify which
claims were satisfied by the payment-only that the payment
satisfied all claims against the defendant. The client now wants
to know whether the proceeds from the settlement award are
subject to federal income tax and should be included in gross
income on the client's tax return for that year. In these circum-
stances the answer will depend largely on whether express lan-
guage found in the settlement agreement is supported by the
facts and circumstances surrounding the agreement. Under the
recent Tax Court decision in McKay v. Commissioner,1 and deci-
sions preceding it, the answer could well be that the settlement
award is taxable. However, awareness of the relevant case law
and proper planning by the practitioner throughout the litigation
process could change that answer.
McKay v. Commissioner, together with other decisions dis-
cussed in this Note, demonstrate the broad interpretation given
by courts to section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code ex-
cluding damages received "on account of personal injuries."2
Analysis of these decisions also reveals traps that can be avoided
through proper planning, thereby leading to favorable tax treat-
ment of a client's damage award.
This Note identifies the factors the Tax Court has examined
to determine whether the section 104(a)(2) exclusion will apply
to certain allocations of damages made in settlement. Part II of
1. 102 T.C. 465 (1994).
2. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1988 & Supp. I 1989). For a thorough analysis of the
broad reach of the § 104(a)(2) exclusion, particularly with regard to non-physical,
employment-related personal injuries, see J. Martin Burke & Michael K Friel, Tax
Treatment of Employment-Related Personal Injury Awards: The Need For Limits, 50
MoNT. L. REv. 13 (1989) [hereinafter Limits]. The author gratefully acknowledges the
analytical assistance and insights of University of Montana School of Law Professor
and former Dean J. Martin Burke.
255
Leaphart: The Honorable William D. Murray
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1995
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
this Note examines McKay, recounting the facts and comparing
the Tax Court's reasoning in that case with Robinson v. Commis-
sioner,3 another pivotal case dealing with settlement agreement
allocations. Part III provides historical background and analysis
of the decisions that established the factors applied in McKay
and a critique of the McKay decision. Finally, Part IV summariz-
es McKay's significant effect on tax consequences of damages
received on account of personal injury.
II. MCKAY V. COMMISSIONER
A. The Facts
In 1976, Ashland Oil, Incorporated (the Company), recruited
taxpayer Bill E. McKay (McKay)" because of his experience in
and specialized knowledge of the petroleum industry. When the
Company first approached McKay, he was reluctant to accept a
position based on his awareness that the Company allegedly had
made questionable payments to domestic and foreign officials to
secure oil during the 1960s and 1970s and had also made several
illegal political contributions during the Watergate era. Never-
theless, he accepted employment, eventually handling all of the
Company's crude oil supply acquisitions.5
In December of 1980, Orin Atkins (Atkins), the Company's
Chief Operating Officer and McKay's superior, made arrange-
ments for payment, of a $1.35 million bribe to Yehia Omar
(Omar), an official of the Sultanate of Oman, for the purchase of
his government's crude oil. Atkins insisted that McKay arrange
the transfer of funds, but McKay refused as it was his belief that
such a payment would violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA) as well as a 1975 consent decree that the Company had
made with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Despite McKay's persistent efforts to prevent it, the payment
was made. Subsequently McKay learned of the Company's at-
tempt to retrieve the bribe from Omar, but only by making an-
other payment to Omar as an incentive to rescind the earlier
deal. McKay also objected to this payment and attempted to
3. 102 T.C. 116 (1994).
4. McKay filed a 1988 joint income tax return with his wife Lana S. McKay.
102 T.C. at 465. Their joint return was the subject of the deficiency action brought
by the Service and which is the subject of this Note. However, for the purposes of
this Note, only McKay will be referred to as the taxpayer.
5. Id. at 468.
[Vol. 56604
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prevent it as well.'
In September of 1981, Atkins was replaced by John Hall
(Hall). Hall assured McKay that the Company's disguised pay-
ments and bribes would stop. Despite Mr. Hall's assurances, the
Company continued to make such payments
McKay's opposition to the payments to Omar tainted his
employment relationship with the Company. As a result, McKay
retained legal counsel to represent him in negotiating a satisfac-
tory termination of his employment with the Company. McKay
and the Company, however, were unable to reach a mutually
acceptable termination agreement."
During October and November of 1982, the Internal Revenue
Service (the Service) contacted McKay and requested his re-
sponse to inquiries known as the "Five Questions." These ques-
tions all pertained to the Company's questionable business trans-
actions. The Company pressured McKay to sign responses favor-
able to its position, and similar to responses already submitted
by Hall to the Service. McKay refused to sign the responses since
he believed the statements contained therein to be false. McKay
instead gave answers which were significantly different than the
Company's predetermined responses.'
In May of 1983, the SEC subpoenaed McKay to testify re-
garding the Company's disguised payments and his responses to
the Service's Five Questions. Shortly thereafter, the Company
officially terminated McKay's employment.' °
B. The Legal Proceedings
One year after his termination, McKay initiated a civil ac-
tion against the Company in a United States district court as-
serting claims for wrongful discharge, breach of employment
agreement, violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations (RICO) statutes, and for punitive damages. The
jury found that the Company breached its employment
agreement with McKay and wrongfully discharged him in viola-
tion of public policy."
6. Id.




11. Id at 470. The case was entitled McKay v. Ashland Oil, Inc., 120 F.R.D. 43
(E.D. Ky. 1988Xthe wrongful discharge action). McKay's wrongful discharge action
was consolidated for discovery and trial with a suit brought against Ashland by an-
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On the basis of it findings at trial, the jury awarded McKay
$1,602,103 as damages for lost compensation. The jury also
awarded McKay "future" damages of $12,846,209. Due to the
Company's RICO violations the damages were trebled to more
than $43 million. Finally, the jury awarded McKay punitive
damages for wrongful, malicious, and oppressive acts in the
amount of $500,000 from the Company, and $750,000 from Hall.
Following the jury award and judgment, counsel for both
sides met to negotiate a settlement. While the negotiations were
hostile, the parties were nonetheless able to reach a settlement
agreement whereby the Company agreed to pay McKay
$16,744,300.12 The settlement agreement allocated $12,250,215
of that amount to payment of the wrongful discharge tort claim,
and $2,044,085 to payment of the breach of contract claim."3
The remaining $2,450,000 were allocated as partial reim-
bursement by the Company of McKay's legal expenses.
14
Throughout the negotiations, the Company refused to agree
on the allocation of any part of the settlement to either the RICO
claim or punitive damages. By contrast, McKay desired that a
portion of the settlement proceeds be allocated to the RICO claim
in order to publicize the Company's unlawful activity. McKay
reluctantly agreed to settle without such allocations because of
both the risks he would face on appeal and the fact that the
Company threatened to prolong the litigation for fifteen to twen-
ty years. The settlement agreement therefore expressly stated
that none of the settlement proceeds were being paid pursuant to
other former employee of the Company named Harry D. Williams (Williams).
Williams' case was entitled Williams v. Hall, 683 F. Supp. 639 (E.D. Ky. 1988Xthe
Williams case).
12. McKay, 102 T.C. at 471.
13. Id. at 472.
14. Id. at 473. With regard to the parties' allocations, the settlement agreement
provided:
G. Based upon the nature and origin of each Claim, Ashland and McKay
have agreed that:
(1) The sums allocable to the Wrongful Discharge Tort Claim, repre-
senting compensatory damages payable on account of an alleged tort-type
invasion of rights that McKay is granted by virtue of being a person in the
sight of the law, are properly excludable from McKay's gross income under
[§1 104(a)(2) .... and
(2) The sums allocable to the Contract Breach Claim, representing
compensatory damages payable on account of Ashland's alleged breach of
McKay's employment contract, constitute gross income to McKay within the
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RICO or for punitive damages. 5
The United States district court judge presiding over
McKay's wrongful discharge action concluded that the allocations
in the settlement agreement were reasonable and fairly reflected
the relative value of McKay's claims. McKay included the
amount of the settlement proceeds he and the Company allocat-
ed to the breach of contract claim ($2,044,085) in gross income
on his 1988 federal income tax return. 8 However, he excluded
the entire amount of settlement proceeds allocated to the wrong-
ful discharge tort claim ($12,250,215). The Service determined
that the entire amount of settlement proceeds McKay received
from the Company constituted compensation to him during 1988,
and therefore should have been included in his gross income for
that year.17
C. The Holding
The United States Tax Court held that McKay could exclude
from gross income the amount of settlement proceeds he and the
Company allocated to the wrongful discharge claim in their set-
tlement agreement. 8 The court based this holding on its find-
ings that the settlement agreement resulted from bona fide,
arm's length negotiations between adversarial parties'9 and
that the allocations accurately reflected the substance of the
claims settled by McKay and the Company." Accordingly, the
$12,250,215 payment allocated to the wrongful discharge claim
represented a payment for compensation of a tort-type personal
injury excludable under section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue
Code.2
15. McKay, 102 T.C. at 473.
16. McKay also included the settlement proceeds allocated as partial reimburse-
ment of legal expenses from Ashland ($2,450,000). McKay's inclusion of this amount
in gross income is not, however, germane to the analysis in this Note.
17. Id. at 474.
18. Id. at 487.
19. Id. at 483-84.
20. McKay, 102 T.C. at 484.
21. Id at 487. The tax court ruled on several other issues that are not appli-
cable to the analysis in this Note. First, the tax court held that McKay could deduct
legal expenses that the settlement agreement with Ashland allocated to his expenses
in a shareholder's derivative suit against him, but could deduct his remaining legal
expenses (which were allocated to the wrongful discharge action) only to the extent
of wrongful discharge settlement proceeds. Id. at 487-94.
Second, the Tax Court held that McKay could not deduct payments made to
the law firm representing him, amounts claimed as "other legal expenses," mainte-
nance and storage expenses for business records, or expenses incurred as a consul-
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D. The Court's Analysis
The starting point for the court's reasoning in McKay was
the relationship of the relevant sections of the Internal Revenue
Code.22 Section 61 states that "all income from whatever source
derived" must be included in gross income.23 Section 104(a)(2)
adds that "the amount of any damages received (whether by suit
or agreement and whether as lump sums or periodic payments)
on account of personal injuries" may be excluded from gross in-
come. 24 The court noted that the Treasury Regulations broadly
interpret the language of section 104(a)(2) to include damages
received "through prosecution of a legal suit or action based on
tort or tort-type rights, or through a settlement agreement en-
tered into in lieu of such prosecution."2' The court noted that
the section 104(a)(2) exclusion encompasses damages received for
both physical and non-physical (i.e., mental or emotional) inju-
ries.26
The court explained that in personal injury cases, it must
make a factual inquiry to determine the true substance or nature
of the settled claim. The court will therefore examine all the
facts and circumstances surrounding the settlement in the fol-
lowing ways:
(a) if no lawsuit was initiated the court must consider rele-
vant documents, letters, and testimony;
(b) in a case where a lawsuit was filed but not settled, or if
settled but no express allocations were made among the various
claims in the settlement agreement, then the court must consid-
er the pleadings, jury awards, or any court orders or judgments;
tant for a corporation because such claims were not substantiated. Id. at 494.
Third, McKay was denied a deduction for interest that accrued on money he
borrowed to pay legal expenses for the action against Ashland. The Tax Court found
that this was personal interest even though it related to McKay's trade or business
since he was in the trade or business of being an employee. McKay could, however,
deduct 40% of his interest for the taxable year 1988 because of a four-year phase-in
of a disallowance of his personal interest deduction. McKay, 102 T.C. at 494-95.
Finally, the court held that McKay was liable for a failure-to-file penalty. Id.
at 496-98. In support of its holding on this issue, the Tax Court found that McKay's
intentional delay in filing, designed to prevent the Company from gaining access to
his tax returns in order to determine whether he could withstand protracted litiga-
tion, did not constitute reasonable cause for failure to file.
22. Id. at 481.
23. I.R.C. § 61(a) (1988).
24. I.R.C. § 104(aX2) (1988 & Supp. I 1989).
25. McKay, 102 T.C. at 481 (citing Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in
1970)).
26. Id. at 481 (citing United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867 (1992)).
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and
(c) if (like McKay), the taxpayer's claims were settled and
express allocations among the various claims are contained in
the settlement agreement, the court must carefully consider the
various claims."
The Service argued that, contrary to the express statements
in the settlement agreement, the entire amount of settlement
proceeds was attributable to McKay's breach of contract claim.
Thus, the proceeds were not excludable under section 104(a)(2)
but rather constituted gross income.
28
The Service supported its overall position with three specific
arguments. First, the Service argued that since the Company
could claim a section 162 business expense deduction on any
payments for damages, the Company was not actually adverse to
any particular allocation scheme. Section 162 provides that tax-
payers may deduct the cost of "ordinary and necessary expenses
paid or incurred... in carrying on any trade or business."29
The section 162 deduction encompasses civil damages. Therefore
the Company's settlement payments to McKay could indeed be
deducted.
Second, the Service argued that the character of the claims
in the settlement agreement must be based on the character of
the claims litigated against the Company. McKay plead four
claims at trial: wrongful discharge, breach of contract, RICO
violations, and punitive damages. However, the settlement
agreement included only two claims: tort and contract.
Third, the Service argued that all of the settlement proceeds
should be included in gross income because the jury awarded
treble damages derived from McKay's RICO claim, which was
based on injury to McKay's business or property. Since business
and property damages are outside the scope of the 104(a)(2)
exclusion, the proceeds from those claims would be properly
includable in gross income.3"
By arguing that the Company could deduct any payments
made to McKay, the Service attempted to dispel the notion that
27. Id. at 482-83.
28. Id. at 481.
29. I.R.C. § 162 (1988).
30. The Service also advanced two alternative arguments in the McKay case:
First, that all of the settlement proceeds should be included in McKay's gross income
because they represented an accession to wealth-not a return of capital. Second,
since the claims in the Williams case were based on a contract theory and were
litigated contemporaneously with McKay's case, the two cases should reflect similar
claims. McKay, 102 T.C. at 484-487.
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the Company and McKay were adverse with respect to the tax
consequences of the settlement.31 The court disposed of that ar-
gument noting that while deductibility of the payor's payment
might be one factor to be considered in a determination of
whether the parties were adverse to their allocation, it is not
controlling.32
In making the argument that the character of settled claims
must reflect litigated claims, the Service focused on the jury's
award of back and future pay in its contention that McKay's
claims were purely contractual under Kentucky law. The court
rejected those assertions, thereby refusing to disregard the ex-
press language of the settlement agreement since the agreement
was consistent with Kentucky law, which recognizes both con-
tract and tort claims in employment dispute litigation.33
The court quickly dismissed the Service's third argument
that since the jury awarded treble damages for McKay's RICO
claim, which was based on injury to McKay's business or proper-
ty, all of the settlement proceeds should have been included in
gross income. The court stated that since the parties had not
expressly allocated any damages to RICO, the settlement agree-
ment would control.34
The McKay court further dismissed the Service's first alter-
native argument-that the entire settlement proceeds should be
included in McKay's gross income because such proceeds repre-
sented an accession to wealth. 3' The court explained that the
31. Id. at 485; Concord Control, Inc. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 742, 745 (1982);
Black Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1979-61. The Service cited these two
cases in support of its argument. The court distinguished these cases on their facts
by pointing out that both cases involved allocations made in the purchase price of a
business, while the instant case dealt with hostile litigation-two sets of circum-
stances that were altogether different.
32. McKay, 102 T.C. at 485.
33. Id. at 486.
34. Id. at 486-87.
35. Id. Two theories have emerged with regard to the taxability of damages
awarded for personal injury: the return of capital theory and the accession to wealth
theory. Under the return of capital theory, damages awarded are intended to
compensate the injured party for injuries to one's personal rights and attributes
(although this theory is difficult to support given that under ordinary tax principles,
to apply the return of capital theory, one must establish an investment of capital in
the asset in question-a basis). The accession to wealth theory posits that taxpayers
who receive damages with no discernible basis realize gain to the extent of the dam-
age award. Taxpayers who receive punitive damages are generally regarded as hav-
ing acceded to wealth since punitive damages are not meant to compensate the in-
jured party. For an extensive discussion of the history and underlying tax policy of
those two theories and the § 104(a)(2) exclusion generally, see Douglas A. Kahn,
Compensatory and Punitive Damages for a Personal Injury: To Tax or Not to Tax?, 2
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Service had failed to recognize Burke for the proposition that
damages received on account of a tort or tort-like personal injury
are excludable under section 104(a)(2).36 The court also dis-
pelled the Service's second alternative argument, that the court
should compare McKay's claims with those of McKay's co-plain-
tiff, Williams. The court stated that it failed to see why Williams'
claims, which were based upon a different legal theory than
McKay's claims, should affect the instant case.37
Taking the opposite position, McKay argued that the alloca-
tions in the settlement agreement should be respected and that
the settlement proceeds expressly allocated to his wrongful dis-
charge tort claim should be excludable under section 104(a)(2).
The court accepted McKay's argument that the settlement agree-
ment was entered into by adverse parties at arm's length. The
court noted that, similar to previous decisions, the most impor-
tant factor bearing on the question of whether a payment was
made on account of tortious injury for purposes of exclusion
under section 104(a)(2) is the express language in the settlement
agreement itself." The McKay court, relying heavily on Robin-
son v. Commissioner,9 stated that it would not be bound by any
"factor or factors that are inconsistent with the true substance of
the taxpayer's claim" nor by express allocations in the document
itself if the parties did not "engage in bona fide, arm's length, ad-
versarial negotiations."'
In Robinson, the Tax Court considered the circumstances
under which it would disregard specific allocations of settlement
proceeds made in a written agreement. Robinson involved an
action initiated by the taxpayers (the Robinsons) in state court
against a Texas bank (the Bank) for failure to release a lien on
the Robinsons' property. Following a jury verdict of approximate-
ly sixty million dollars in the Robinsons' favor-including six
million dollars for lost profits, $1.5 million for mental anguish,
and fifty million dollars in punitive damages-the parties set-
FiA. TAx REV. 327 (1995).
36. McKay, 102 T.C. at 485 (citing United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. 1867,
1870 (1992)).
37. Id. at 487.
38. Id. at 482 (citing Byrne v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 1000 (1988), rev'd and re-
manded, 883 F.2d 211, 89-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (P-H) 9500, 64 A.F.T.R.2d 89-5430 (3d
Cir. 1989); Bent v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 236 (1986), affd, 835 F.2d 67, 88-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (P-H) $ 9101, 61 A.F.T.R.2d 88-301 (3d Cir. 1987); Glynn v. Commissioner,
76 T.C. 116 (1981), affd without published opinion, 676 F.2d 682 (1st Cir. 1982)).
39. 102 T.C. 116 (1994).
40. McKay, 102 T.C. at 482.
263
Leaphart: The Honorable William D. Murray
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1995
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
tled. The settlement agreement provided that the Bank pay the
Robinsons ten million dollars in consideration for the release of
the Bank from further liability. A final judgment was entered
allocating ninety-five percent of the ten million dollar settlement
payment to mental anguish and five percent to lost profits."
The Robinsons reported $246,758 on their 1987 Form 1040
as miscellaneous income.42 The Service brought a deficiency ac-
tion against the Robinsons arguing that only five percent of the
settlement proceeds was excludable from gross income.' The
Tax Court rejected the allocation in the final judgment because it
was uncontested, nonadversarial and entirely tax-motivated and
therefore did not accurately reflect the underlying claims."
Since the allocations in the Robinson settlement agreement
were so disproportionate to the jury's damage award and because
the settlement agreement did not provide adequate evidence of
the Bank's intent in making its payments, the court looked to
other facts and circumstances to determine the Bank's intent.
Specifically the court analyzed the Bank's interests in character-
izing the proceeds as either tort or contract damages and wheth-
er the Bank intended that the settlement proceeds be allocated
to the tort and contract claims in the proportions that they were.
Regarding these questions the court noted that the Bank's inter-
ests were adverse to those of the Robinsons only to the extent of
the negotiations regarding the amount of the settlement and that
the Bank did not intend to "settle one claim to the exclusion of
another."' Since the Bank evidently was indifferent to the allo-
cation of the settlement between the contract and tort claims,
the court further found that the Bank did not intend the alloca-
tions as they appeared in the settlement agreement. The Robin-
son court therefore concluded that the settlement negotiations
between the Robinsons and the Bank could in no way be charac-
terized as arm's length or adversarial with regard to the charac-
terization of the settlement proceeds."
41. Robinson, 102 T.C. at 118-24.
42. Of the $10 million in settlement proceeds the Bank paid out, the Robinsons
received $4,935,151.72. The balance of $5,064,848.28 went to the Robinsons' attor-
neys. The $246,758 the Robinsons reported was five percent of the total of the
$4,935,151.72. Id. at 124.
43. Id. at 117.
44. Id. at 133-34.
45. Id. Although it is not stated, the Tax Court presumably took note of the
fact that the bank could deduct its payment as a § 162 trade or business expense.
I.R.C. § 162 (1988).
46. Robinson, 102 T.C. at 129.
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The McKay court distinguished the Robinson decision on the
grounds that the parties in McKay were "hostile adversaries with
respect to the allocations made in the settlement agreement,"47
while the payor Bank in Robinson "was not concerned with the
allocation among the taxpayers' various claims."" The court
characterized McKay's interests in the negotiations as "want[ing]
the settlement award to be as high an amount as possible to
compensate him for his losses and want[ing] [the Company] to be
punished for its behavior."49 The Company's interests in the
negotiations, on the other hand, were "to minimize the amount it
needed to pay petitioner as well as avoid making any payment
on account of petitioner's RICO claim."0 The court further
pointed out that the Company adamantly refused to settle if any
of the damages were to be allocated to RICO claims." Because
the parties expressly memorialized this understanding in the
settlement agreement, the McKay court found that evidence
bearing on the questions of hostile or adverse negotiations and
on the intent of the payor could be found in the settlement
agreement itself.52
Ultimately the court accepted the parties' express allocations
in the settlement agreement and held that the $12,250,215 pay-
ment allocated to the wrongful discharge tort claim represented
a payment for a tort-type personal injury. The court therefore




Prior to initiating lawsuits involving a personal injury, prac-
titioners should carefully analyze the potential tax consequences
of a jury or settlement award in their clients' cases. Robinson
and McKay apply a number of principles developed in previous
cases dealing with the section 104(a)(2) exclusion,53 and identify
47. McKay, 102 T.C. at 484.
48. Id. at 483.
49. Id. at 484.
50. Id.
51. McKay, 102 T.C. at 484.
52. Id, at 483-84.
53. The author relies substantially on analysis of the relevant case law decided
prior to Robinson and McKay as developed in Limits, supra note 2, at 38-40. In
Limits the authors concluded that the proceeds of most employment disputes are
derived from non-physical personal injuries and should logically be taxable. Id. If
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distinct factors that courts will consider when determining
whether to respect the allocation of damages or settlement
awards tax purposes. As the case law interpreting section
104(a)(2) reveals, taxpayers have met both success and failure in
their efforts to characterize payments as "damages on account of
personal injury." The results of those efforts provide a helpful
map to practitioners who seek the safe harbor of section
104(a)(2) exclusion for damages awards.
Only damages or compensation received on account of per-
sonal injury or sickness are excludable from gross income under
section 104(a)(2). The Service and the courts have allowed tax-
payers to exclude damages for both physical personal injuries,
and non-physical personal injuries." Because most of the recent
case law in the area of non-physical personal injury has emanat-
ed from the employment arena, the issue that frequently arises
in tax litigation is whether the action was based on tort or tort-
like rights, or, instead, was contractual in nature.
In employment cases, the Service has regularly focused on
the nature of damages claimed rather than on the nature of the
injury. The United States Supreme Court settled that issue in
Burke, concluding that the proper inquiry into the character of
jury or settlement awards for damages focuses on the nature of
the injury.55 The Service nonetheless persists in arguing that
damages awarded by a jury or agreed upon in a settlement
agreement are based on contractual rather than tort or tort-like
rights, as it did in McKay. 6
When courts decide whether to respect a settlement based
on tort or tort-like rights for purposes of section 104(a)(2), the
most important determination is whether the payor intended the
award to satisfy tort or tort-like claims. The court will therefore
analyze evidentiary factors found both inside and outside the
settlement agreement to determine the payor's intent. The most
important factor bearing on the question of the payor's intent is
the express language contained in the settlement agreement.57
In the absence of an express allocation in the settlement agree-
that were the state of the law, McKay would not have been litigated, since the com-
pensatory damages from McKay's settlement with the Company were derived from
non-physical personal injuries and would be includable in gross income.
54. Threlkeld v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 1294 (1986), affd, 848 F.2d 81, 88-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (P-H) T 9370, 61 A.F.T.R.2d 88-1285 (6th Cir. 1988).
55. United States v. Burke, 112 S. Ct. at 1871 n.6 (1992).
56. McKay v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 465, 485 (1994).
57. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
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ment, the court will analyze the surrounding facts and circum-
stances to determine the payor's intent. However, the McKay
decision indicates that even if express allocation language ap-
pears in the agreement, the court will analyze the underlying
facts and circumstances to determine if the settlement alloca-
tions are meaningful. Evidentiary factors that courts have exam-
ined in such a determination include pleadings and other court
documents,58 correspondence between parties,59 insurance con-
tracts, ° and a payor's issuance of a Form 1099 to a taxpayer.6
If a settlement agreement lacks express allocation language
and the underlying facts and circumstances do not convincingly
indicate the payor's intent to extinguish tort or tort-like claims,
the result will be fatal to a taxpayer's case. In Agar v. Commis-
sioner,2 the Second Circuit held that the plaintiff-taxpayer
could not exclude amounts received from his employer upon the
employee's resignation from the company. In that case, the court
concluded the evidence did not indicate that the company intend-
ed its payments to satisfy tort or tort-like claims. Some evidence
indicated that the taxpayer had resigned because of accusations
and criticisms leveled against him, but the settlement agreement
was devoid of any reference to those matters.6 The settlement
agreement only indicated that the taxpayer was leaving his em-
ployment because of a desire to return to public accounting."
The record further showed the employer intended its payments
to be a form of severance pay rather than compensation for any
possible defamation claims that the taxpayer may have had. 5
The Agar court thus emphasized that the taxpayer failed to
demonstrate that the company intended to compensate the tax-
payer for tort or tort-like claims. The court noted the lack of any
express language in the settlement agreement allocating pro-
ceeds to compensation for specific types of injury.6
58. Knuckles v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1964-33, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 182
(1964), affd, 349 F.2d 610, 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (P-H) 9629, 65 A.F.T.R.2d 5515
(10th Cir. 1965).
59. Seay v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 32 (1972).
60. Madson v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 1988-325, 57 T.C.M. (P-H) 1615
(1988).
61. Ray v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 535, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (P-H) %1 50,187, 69
A.F.T.R.2d 92-953 (1992), aff"d, 989 F.2d 1204 (1993).
62. 290 F.2d 283, 61-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (P-H) 9457, 7 A.F.T.R.2d 61-1423 (2nd
Cir. 1961), affg, T.C. Memo. 1960-21, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) 116 (1960).
63. 290 F.2d at 284.
64. T.C. Memo. 1960-21, 19 T.C.M. (CCH) at 118.
65. 290 F.2d at 284.
66. Id.
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As it became clear to the taxpayers in McKay and Robinson,
a court's findings of fact on the payor's intent is crucial. Because
the McKay court respected the express language in the settle-
ment agreement in its findings, McKay won his case on the issue
of allocation. If, like Robinson, the court refuses to respect the
allocations in the settlement agreement, the taxpayer will lose
the case. Therefore, an ideal settlement agreement would con-
tain, among other provisions, specific allocations of damages in
compensation for tort or tort-like injuries alleged and a specific
statement indicating that the payor intends to compensate the
plaintiff for the injuries alleged.
The importance of initiating a lawsuit with pleadings that
raise tort or tort-like causes of action was made clear in Knuck-
les v. Commissioner.67 In that case, a life insurance company
fired an employee for allegedly mismanaging the company. The
taxpayer sued the company for breach of contract.6 The taxpay-
er and his counsel apparently overlooked the importance of sec-
tion 104(a)(2) from the outset, since they did not plead a person-
al injury. Only after a settlement was reached, allocating com-
pensation to the contract claim, did the taxpayer introduce such
a theory.69 Not surprisingly, after securing a settlement without
admitting liability for a tort or tort-type act, the company re-
fused to later acknowledge liability for the benefit of the taxpay-
er.7° Since the settlement agreement did not require the compa-
ny to admit liability for a tortious act, the company had no rea-
son to admit liability later simply to allow the taxpayer to avoid
tax on his damages award. On the basis of the content of the
settlement agreement and the company's refusal to acknowledge
liability for any wrongdoing, both the Tax Court and the Tenth
Circuit determined that the company intended the settlement
proceeds only as compensation for breach of contract.71
The McKay court analyzed McKay's pleadings and other
court documents and found that they supported McKay's claim
that the action primarily raised the tort claim of wrongful dis-
charge, although breach of contract violations were alleged as
well.72 Because it found that the pleadings reflected the sub-
67. T.C. Memo. 1964-33, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 182 (1964), affd, 349 F.2d 610, 65-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (P-H) $9629, 65 A.F.T.R.2d 5515 (10th Cir. 1965).
68. T.C. Memo. 1964-33, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) at 182.
69. Id. at 184.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See supra notes 21, 27-28 and accompanying text.
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stance of. the allocations in the settlement agreement, the court
respected the allocations.73 The jury did not specify the propor-
tion of damages it allocated to either theory of. recovery.74 In
assessing the allocations in the settlement agreement, the court
relied on McKay's pleadings at trial. Absent guidance from the
jury, the court had no precise way of independently analyzing
the parties' allocations. Since McKay allocated a reasonable por-
tion of settlement proceeds to the contract theory, the court will-
ingly accepted his allocations.
The presence of tort or tort-like theories of recovery in
McKay's pleadings proved to be one of the factors that legiti-
mized the parties' allocations. In the Robinson decision, however,
the court ignored the causes of action in the Robinsons'
pleadings, finding that the claims were unsupported by the sur-
rounding facts and circumstances. The Robinson court, in con-
trast to the McKay court, focused its analysis on the proportion
of damages allocated to the various claims in the jury verdict at
trial.75 That court concluded that the allocations in the settle-
ment agreement should reflect the allocations made by the jury
in its verdict.76 Thus, the Robinson decision stands for the prop-
osition that taxpayers who are too greedy in their allocations to
tort or tort-like claims in a settlement document will not succeed
in the Tax Court when challenged. The allocations in the docu-
ment should be reasonably proportionate to the litigated claims,
particularly when the jury specifies its allocations. The Robinson
court, based on the proportions in the jury verdict, allowed an
exclusion of 37.331% of the settlement amount.77 The Robinsons
claimed that ninety-five percent of their settlement attributable
to tort or tort-like theories. 7' By making such a disproportionate
claim, the Robinsons invited a challenge from the Service.
Practitioners initiating lawsuits on behalf of injured clients
should carefully consider the initial theories they will plead. This
is particularly important in cases where damages such as lost
73. McKay, 102 T.C. at 484.
74. Id. at 471.
75. Robinson, 102 T.C. at 134.
76. Id. at 134. The percentages of the allocations in the jury verdict are listed
infra note 106. The McKay court likely gave the parties more discretion with respect
to the proportion of allocations in the agreement since the jury's damages verdict did
not allocate with specificity between the tort and contract claims. Thus it follows
that a verdict which does not specifically allocate damages to claims should give tax-
payers more leeway than one with specific allocations.
77. Robinson, 102 T.C. at 135.
78. Id. at 123.
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wages can be characterized either as tort or contract damages. A
successful recovery raising claims only in contract will yield a
taxable damage award to the plaintiff. Thus, practitioners should
think expansively when selecting theories. However, when the
claims are drafted into pleadings, the cases indicate that
pleadings which contain a clear tort component accompanied by
a clear contract component generate more credibility for the
taxpayer.
In this regard, practitioners should not ignore their ethical
obligations to accurately and honestly portray the nature of the
claim. Nonetheless, the scope of the term "personal injury" is
quite broad, allowing ample opportunity for counsel to character-
ize injuries as "personal" in appropriate cases. Thorough and
thoughtful lawyering, combined with prudent strategy and dili-
gent research, may yield both a tort and a contract claim appli-
cable to the factual circumstances.
In Seay v. Commissioner,79 the taxpayer successfully con-
vinced the Tax Court that part of a settlement he received from
his former employer constituted compensation for injury to his
personal reputation. The Seay decision reveals the importance of
securing a meaningful statement that the tortfeasor-payor in-
tended to pay damages on account of personal injury. In Seay,
the taxpayer's position as a corporate president was terminated
when a dispute arose between the taxpayer and the owners of
the corporation.0 The taxpayer refused to vacate his position;
consequently, the owners brought a highly-publicized trespass
action against him.8 The taxpayer felt his personal reputation
was damaged by the publicity.82 The settlement agreement
reached between the owners and the taxpayer provided for pay-
ment of one year's salary plus $45,000 for any damages caused
by the newspaper publicity.' An agreement in a letter specifi-
cally stated that the $45,000 was intended as "compensation for
such personal embarrassment, mental and physical strain and
injury to health and personal reputation in the community" that
the taxpayer suffered." The court in Seay found the evidence
indicated that the owners made the $45,000 payment to the
taxpayer to compensate him for any personal injuries suffered-a
79. 58 T.C. 32 (1972).
80. Id. at 33.
81. Id. at 33-34.
82. Id. at 34.
83. Id. at 34-35.
84. Id. at 33-35.
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tort or tort-like claim.85 The taxpayer therefore qualified for the
benefits of the 104(a)(2) exclusion." Even if, as in Seay, the
statement appears in a letter or document outside the settlement
agreement, the statement itself could provide significant evi-
dence that allocations made in a settlement agreement truly
reflected the payor's intent.
In contrast to the taxpayer in Seay, the taxpayers in Robin-
son failed to convince the court that their settlement agreement
contained a meaningful statement of the payor's intent." The
Bank knew that the Robinsons wanted to allocate any settlement
proceeds in a manner that would minimize their taxes, that the
Bank did not care about the manner of allocation, and that the
Bank allowed the Robinsons to allocate the settlement proceeds
in any manner they desired. Thus, the Robinson court found no
facts or circumstances that rendered the taxpayers' allocation of
damages in the final judgment meaningful.88 None of the evi-
dence indicated that the allocations were reached as a result of
arm's length negotiations. Instead, the court found:
Petitioners ... were given . . . the unfettered discretion to allo-
cate the settlement proceeds in any manner they desired in
order to minimize their Federal income tax liability. We find
that petitioners deliberately and unilaterally arrived at the
allocations contained in the final judgment solely with a view to
Federal income taxes, and not to reflect the realities of their
settlement. 9
On the other hand, the McKay court found that "the settle-
ment agreement provides the clearest embodiment of the payor's
intent .... 'o The court made that determination based on the
surrounding facts and circumstances, which supported the
parties' statements in the settlement agreement. Those facts and
circumstances included the hostile nature of the parties' negotia-
tions regarding the RICO claim, the nature of the claims in the
initial pleadings, the entire court record, and the trial judge's
involvement in the negotiations.9 The McKay court's finding on
the Company's intent shows that even a somewhat vague state-
ment92 explaining why the parties allocated settlement proceeds
85. Id. at 40.
86. Id.
87. Robinson v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 116 (1994).
88. Id. at 128-29.
89. Id. at 129.
90. McKay v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 465, 484 (1994).
91. Id.
92. In its determination of the Company's intent, the McKay court focused on
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as they did may lead a court to find the payor's intent sufficient-
ly demonstrated, provided the other facts and circumstances
surrounding the allocations render that statement meaningful.
In Madson v. Commissioner," the Tax Court considered
evidence of a tortfeasor's intent found in an insurance contract to
allow the taxpayer's exclusion of his settlement award. There,
the taxpayer argued for the exclusion of his entire settlement in
an action against the City of Green Bay, Wisconsin, for forcing
him to retire at age sixty from his position as police chief. 4 Fol-
lowing a trial, the state court found that Green Bay had violated
the taxpayer's right to equal protection and had also breached its
employment contract with the taxpayer. The court awarded dam-
ages on the basis of lost earnings, loss of state retirement, and
loss of social security benefits. The court also determined that
the amount of damages would have been equal under both the
contract or equal protection causes of action. 5 During an appeal
by Green Bay, the parties agreed to settle the dispute for
$41,000.96 The Tax Court found that the payment compensated
for the taxpayer's equal protection claim. 7 The court reasoned
that because Green Bay's insurer paid the $41,000 and because
the insurance contract specifically excluded payments for breach
of contract, Green Bay must have intended to pay the taxpayer
for violation of the taxpayer's equal protection rights, a tort-type
injury. 8 Therefore, the 104(a)(2) exclusion was appropriate.
One might argue that determining a tortfeasor/payor's in-
tent, based on the language in an insurance contract, is some-
what artificial. Provided that other facts and circumstances ren-
der the statement or language meaningful, however, the McKay
and Madson decisions together indicate that the court will find
the payor's intent sufficiently demonstrated even with a less
than direct statement from the parties. The McKay court accept-
ed the vague reference to estimates of appellate success in much
the following language in the settlement agreement: 'Ashland and McKay have both
relied upon their appellate counsel[s'] consensus estimate of McKay's probability
of appellate success with respect to [the wrongful discharge tort claim and the
breach of contract claim]." Id. at 484. Therefore, in similar situations, if taxpayers
memorialize their estimates of appellate success and if the facts and. circumstances
surrounding the allocation to the various claims render that statement meaningful,
those precautions should be sufficient to determine the intent of the payor.
93. T.C. Memo. 1988-325, 57 T.C.M. (P-H) 1615 (1988).
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the same way that the Madson court accepted the payor's intent
as discerned from the terms of the insurance contract. In other
words, both courts stretched to find that the payors intended
their payments to compensate for personal injuries.
Regardless of the language employed or whether the state-
ment of the payor's intent is found in a settlement document,
letter, or elsewhere, both the Robinson and McKay decisions
show that a court will analyze the underlying facts to determine
if the statement is meaningful. Therefore, such a statement
should be a concise explanation of the tort or tort-like injury for
which the taxpayer is being compensated. Again, the statement
must be meaningful because it could cause a court to deny the
payor's intent." Practitioners should demand that a settlement
document contain both express allocation language specifying
that payments will extinguish tort or tort-like claims and a spe-
cific statement of the payor's intent in doing so. Leaving one or
the other out of an agreement could expose settlements to unnec-
essary judicial scrutiny.
The importance of express language in the settlement agree-
ment and careful attention to the consequences of bargaining
was highlighted in Ray v. United States." In Ray, the Singer
Company settled a labor dispute arising from the closure of one
of its manufacturing plants. The union filed a complaint against
Singer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement and
sought injunctive relief, based on the allegation that Singer had
engaged in misrepresentation and fraud. 1' The federal district
court refused to enjoin Singer, but found that Singer had
breached its collective bargaining agreement and indicated that
it would award monetary damages. The parties ultimately
agreed to a monetary settlement and the documents indicated
that all claims of the union were released and discharged." 2
After paying them, Singer issued each of the settlement
distributees a Form 1099.103 Finding no express language in
the settlement agreement allocating settlement proceeds to per-
sonal injury and considering Singer's intent as indicated by the
issuance of Form 1099, the Claims Court held section 104(a)(2)
99. It is worth noting that the taxpayer carries the burden of proving that the
settlement allocations were made in good faith. See Robinson, 102 T.C. at 128 n.19.
100. 25 Cl. Ct. 535, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (P-H) 50,187, 69 A.F.T.R.2d 92-953
(1992), affd, 989 F.2d 1204 (1993).
101. 25 Cl. Ct. at 536-37.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 541.
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inapplicable." Based on its holding on the collective bargain-
ing agreement, the court never had to reach the issues of fraud
and misrepresentation." 5
Ray suggests the importance of drafting settlement agree-
ments carefully. Because the complaint alleged tortious actions
(fraud and misrepresentation) on Singer's part, it would appear
that the union gave up an excellent opportunity to negotiate for
the allocation of at least part of the settlement proceeds to per-
sonal injury. No such effort was made, however. Unlike the
McKay court,'° the Ray court found no evidence of negotiation
or discussion between the parties regarding the tax implications
of the awards made to the employees. '°7 Ray also suggests that
the issuance of a Form 1099 by a payor will, almost without
exception, demonstrate to the court that the payor intended that
the payment constitute income to the taxpayer. Practitioners
should therefore negotiate, as part of the settlement, that either
no Form 1099 be issued, or that it be issued with the qualifica-
tion that the settlement compensates for tort-like injuries.
B. The McKay Court's Liberal Application of Section 104(a)(2)
The Robinson and McKay decisions were decided within one
month of each other and reflect the application of the principles
established in earlier 104(a)(2) cases. However, the McKay deci-
sion appears to be more generous to the taxpayer. The McKay
court, like the Robinson court, applied the standard that express
allocations in settlement agreements will be respected for tax
purposes if they are entered into in an adversarial context, at
arm's length, and in good faith.
Unlike the Robinson court, the McKay court found that the
parties involved negotiated adversarially in allocating damages
between tort and contract theories. However, the court relied on
vague language in the settlement agreement to support that
finding and to demonstrate the intent of the Company. The
McKay settlement agreement referred to the wrongful discharge
104. Id.
105. Id. at 540.
106. McKay, 102 T.C. at 472. The McKay finding is arguably suspect if one
closely examines the primary focus of the Company-McKay negotiations, which ap-
pear to have been on the RICO claims, and the overall amount of the settlement as
opposed to the characterization of the proceeds as derived from either tort or con-
tract claims.
107. 25 Cl. Ct. at 541.
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and breach of contract claims only as "the two other claims.""°8
With the exception of the following statement: "[The Company]
and McKay have both relied upon their appellate counsel[s']
consensus estimate of McKay's probability of appellate success
with respect to the two other claims,""° the court referred to no
other express allocation language that might explain how the
parties arrived at the allocation of damages to tort or contract
theories.
The opinion contains few facts that would clearly support a
finding that the tort and contract allocation negotiations were
adversarial. Instead, the court seemed to apply the adversarial
negotiation context of the RICO claim to the negotiations on tort
and contract allocations. The court noted that "Ashland wanted
to minimize the amount it needed to pay [McKay] as well as
avoid making any payments on account of [McKay's] RICO
claim.""' Regardless of the amount, the Company would not
have benefitted by allocating damages to the contract claim in-
stead of the tort claim. Under either allocation scenario, the
Company could have claimed a section 162 ordinary and neces-
sary business expense deduction for its payment of tort or con-
tract damages. The McKay court responded to the Service's same
argument, noting that the Bank in Robinson "was not concerned
with the allocation among the taxpayers' various claims.""'
The court concluded that "[a]lthough the deductibility of the
payor's payment might be [one] factor to consider in deciding
whether the parties are adverse to their allocations, it is not
controlling. " "
The Company resisted any mention of RICO violations in
the settlement document because it wished to avoid negative
publicity. A wrongful discharge tort claim or a breach of contract
claim would have generated little, if any, negative publicity to
the Company. Therefore publicity considerations probably had
little impact on the Company's negotiation posture with regard
to tort and contract allocations.
It is reasonable to conclude that once the Company and
McKay had agreed to exclude any mention of RICO violations in
the settlement agreement, the only issue remaining was the
amount of damages the Company would pay for the wrongful
108. McKay, 102 T.C. at 484.
109. McKay, 102 T.C. at 484; see also supra note 88.
110. McKay, 102 T.C. at 484.
111. Id. at 483.
112. Id. at 485.
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discharge and breach of contract claims. In footnote nineteen, the
McKay court noted that although the court did not decide the
issue, if the Company had in fact made a settlement payment on
account of RICO, "the deductibility of such a payment to [the
Company] could be uncertain, ""' an assertion that seems alto-
gether irrelevant to the issue properly before the court: whether
the tort and contract allocation negotiations were actually ad-
verse or not.
Although the statements in the settlement agreement were
somewhat indirect as to the Company's intent, other persuasive
facts and circumstances clearly affected the McKay court's deci-
sion. First, the court noted that, unlike Judge Evins in Robinson,
the presiding trial judge in McKay played a primary role in the
negotiations process between the Company and McKay."4 In
fact, the trial judge encouraged the settlement figure upon which
the parties eventually agreed."1 Although the court did not ex-
plicitly state it, presumably the trial judge would have had an
opportunity to independently review the allocations in the
McKay settlement agreement.
Second, the McKay court noted that "the allocations in the
settlement agreement are consistent with the entire record in
that petitioner's pleadings and jury verdict reflect a lawsuit
sounding primarily in tort.""6 Similarly, a comparison of the
proportions of the jury verdicts in Robinson and McKay reveals
that the McKay allocations were far closer to the proportions
allocated by the jury than those in Robinson. In Robinson, the
jury awarded 2.76 percent of damages to the tort claim of mental
anguish,"7 yet the parties allocated ninety-five percent to men-
tal anguish in the settlement agreement. In McKay the jury did
not clearly allocate between the tort or contract theories of recov-
ery, but the aggregate amount of the verdict derived from the
tort and contract theories closely paralleled that in the McKay
settlement agreement." 8 The court specifically stated that the
pleadings and other court documents reflected a case sounding
primarily in tort with a contract component."9 Also, the trial
113. Id.
114. McKay, 102 T.C. at 484.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. The Robinsons' jury awarded $1,500,000 of a total verdict of $54,260,000 for
past and future mental anguish. Robinson, 102 T.C. at 121, 123. The author calcu-
lated the percentage as follows:1,500,000/54,260,00 = 2.76%.
118. McKay, 102 T.C. at 471-72.
119. Id. at 484.
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judge would presumably have noted an inappropriate allocation
to one theory over another.
Third, the language McKay's counsel used in the pleadings
and settlement agreement indicates that they clearly understood
the relevant case law under section 104(a)(2). Although there
may be some question as to how adversarial the settlement nego-
tiations on allocation of damages to tort or contract theories
actually were, McKay's counsel presented the court with a finely
tailored settlement agreement and set of facts that supported a
favorable ruling.
C. A Well Concealed Punitive Damage Award
The McKay ruling was quite favorable to McKay from anoth-
er perspective. While the court respected the damage allocations,
the size of the total damages award seemed directly connected to
the treble punitive damages the jury assigned to the RICO
claim." ° According to the court, McKay's slim chance of pre-
serving his entire jury award on appeal influenced the settle-
ment agreement. Since the parties' allocation of damages
closely paralleled the jury allocation to tort and contract claims,
the parties appeared to project that the appellate court would
reverse the punitive damage award and leave the entire compen-
satory award untouched. The Robinson court reasoned that "the
jury verdict.., should be taken into account in our apportion-
ment of th[e] settlement."" Following this rationale, the
McKay court should have made a similar comparison of the pro-
portion of damages in the settlement agreement to original theo-
ries alleged at trial. Under other circumstances, the estimate
may have been reasonable, but the evidence of the Company's
RICO violations and the jury's findings on the RICO claim indi-
cate that an appellate award would have allocated some damag-
es based on the Company's blatant RICO violations. The esti-
mate of the proportion of appellate damages found in the settle-
ment agreement, and the court's subsequent acceptance of those
estimates, therefore appears contrived.
The importance of this issue lies in the fact that punitive
damages do not generally qualify for the section 104(a)(2) exclu-
sion from gross income. Only punitive damages derived from
120. Id. at 471.
121. See supra note 88.
122. Robinson, 102 T.C. at 134.
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physical injury qualify for the exclusion.'23 If the parties had
allocated the settlement proceeds in proportion to reduced appel-
late damages on tort, contract, RICO, and punitive theories of
recovery, only damages allocated to the tort theory would have
been excluded. If damages had been allocated in the settlement
agreement in proportion to the jury award allocations on the four
theories of tort, contract, RICO and punitive damages, and the
court had held such a RICO/punitive component includable in
gross income, approximately 67.6 percent of the settlement pro-
ceeds would have been taxable income to the McKays. Under the
court's holding, however, approximately 14.3 percent of the ag-
gregate amount of proceeds allocated to the tort and contract
claims in the settlement agreement were included in gross in-
come. 2' Ultimately, the entire amount of the compensatory
component of the jury award was preserved in the settlement
agreement. Clearly one could not overstate the significant tax
benefit which accrued to McKay as a result.
IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, any case involving the issue of exclusion of set-
tlement awards under section 104(a)(2) will be a fact-specific
inquiry into the circumstances surrounding litigation and settle-
ment negotiations. McKay demonstrates that the court will re-
spect express language in settlement documents if the evidence
shows that the parties negotiated in an adversarial context and
at arm's length with regard to allocation of damages to personal
injury claims. McKay shows that the prime hurdle of the
104(a)(2) exclusion-intent of the payor--can be overcome if the
facts show that the express allocation language of settlement
123. For settlements taking place after July 10, 1989, § 104(a) excepts punitive
damage awards in cases not involving physical injury or physical sickness from the
exclusion provisions of § 104(a)(2). I.R.C. § 104(a) (1988 & Supp. I 1989). Prior to
July 10, 1989, the issue of whether any punitive damages were deductible was very
much in doubt. For an excellent example of the arguments in favor and against the
exclusion of punitive damages, compare the majority opinion and Judge Trott's dis-
senting opinion in Hawkins v. Commissioner, 30 F.3d 1077 (1994) with the majority
opinion and Judge Trott's concurring
opinion in Schmitz v. Commissioner, 34 F.3d 790 (1994). For an in-depth discussion
of the case law background and an analysis of the effect of the 1989 amendment on
punitive damage recoveries, see Margaret Henning, Recent Developments in the Tax
Treatment of Personal Injury and Punitive Damage Recoveries, 45 TAX LAW. 783
(1992). See also James D. Ghiardi, The Federal Taxation of Punitive Damage Awards,
11 J.L. & COM. 1 (1991).
124. These percentages were calculated by the author using the figures found in
McKay, 102 T.C. at 471-74.
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agreements is bona fide.
Taxpayers can rest assured that in light of decisions like
Robinson and McKay, the Service will continue to contest the
exclusion of settlement proceeds under section 104(a)(2) in simi-
lar circumstances. Therefore, a practitioner wishing to avail an
injured client of the benefits of 104(a)(2) should be fully informed
of the factors courts focus on in allowing the exclusion. The les-
sons provided by previous taxpayer efforts provide a useful reci-
pe to practitioners. Those lessons should be carefully studied and
applied from the opening of a case file, through the litigation
stage, and into the settlement phase if necessary. Properly ap-
plied, the principles elicited from McKay and prior personal
injury exclusion cases could well lead a taxpayer to the safe har-
bor of the section 104(a)(2) exclusion.
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of ................... 31:241; 47:495




Tort liability for serving ......





See Dissolution of Marriage
ANIMALS
1961 legislative summary .....
Animal behavior evidence .....











Trespass on unpatented mining calm






and intra-corporate ......... 23:160
H istory ...................... 11:25
Oil and gas pools, unit
operations and ............. 23:258
Patent licenses, conditions .... 3:5
Price fixing ............... 3:25; 11:27
Restraint of trade, agreement
in .........................
Restraint of trade, cotton law
prohibition ................
Sherman Act .................
Survey of recent developments
Union loses antitrust
exemption upon combination







See also Administrative Law
and Procedure
Cost of appeal ............... 29:49
Court appointed counsel,
failure to timely file appeal.. 23:116
Equity decrees, scope of
review ......... 12:36; 20:123; 21:227
Frivolous appeal .............. 38:377
Indigent appeals by .......... 18:103
Partial judgment for appeal ... 44:326
Parts of judgments, appeal
from ...................... 7:40
Rules of appellate procedure,
mechanics of appeal ........ 27:49
Scope of appellate review in
criminal cases .............. 53:223
Supreme courts in a federal
system .................... 20:171
Suppression of evidence, appeal
from denial of motion ...... 20:233
Survey of recent
developments.. 40:125; 44:326; 45:350
ARBITRATION
Advantages of use ............ 46:199
Contract clause, not
enforceable ................ 24:77
Public employees ............. 40:282
Used car claims .............. 47:322
ARREST
See also Search and Seizure
Arrest bond certificates,
authorization ............... 18:122
Custodial arrest, limitation of
use ........................ 45:355
Implied consent statute ....... 36:347
Justices of the peace, arrest ... 23:74
Merchant detentions .......... 42:377
Probable cause ......... 40:145; 42:374
Records ..................... 37:55
Roadblocks, arrest at ......... 24:132
Search incident to ....... 36:350; 38:41
Uniform Arrest Act ........... 11:18
ASSIGNMENTS
See also Bankruptcy
Assignee for collection under
real party in interest statutes
ASSUMPSIT, ACTION OF
History of misfeasance or
nonfeasance ...............
ATTORNEY FEES
American rule exceptions ......





Custody modification, award to
w ife ...................... . 20:248
Probate of estate ....... 41:144; 43:299
Statutorily provided .......... 46:119









11 sanctions .... ....... . 48:130
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comparison of Montana anc
other states ..............
Continuing legal education ..
Continuing legal education an
malpractice ..............
County attorneys, discretion.
Court appointed, DUI, no rigi
Court appointed, failure to
timely file appeal .........
Court appointed, generally ..
Disbarment and suspension ir
M ontana ................
Disciplinary practices ... 28:2
Frivolous actions ...........
Frivolous appeals ...........
Good faith and fair dealing..
Interprofessional relationships
doctors and attorneys .....
Involuntary commitment, role
in .......................
Labor union hired attorney..
Legal aid plans for labor
unions, no conflict with legs
eth ics ...................
License tax ................






Chapter 13 (farmers) ......... 49:46
Chapter 13 overview .......... 43:35
20:195 Confirmation differences in
51:13 Chapters 11 and 12 ......... 50:318
d Discharge of guarantors'
37:301 obligations in Chapters 11
28:41 and 12 .................... 50:319
ht 46:349 Effect of Chapters 11 and 12
confirmation on existing
23:116 judgments ................. 50:320
26:1; Exemption statutes, effect of
35:151 bankruptcy act on .......... 9:69
Expert testimony ............. 51:155
25:243 Hardship discharges under
35; 37:308 Chapter 12 ................ 50:328
47:87 Injunction in Chapters 11 and
38:377 12 ....................... 50:315
48:198 Miller Act, bond surety's rights
in bankruptcy .............. 24:161
23:94 Postconfirmation dismissal in
Chapters 11 and 12 ........ 50:322
38:322 Postconfirmation modification
29:220 in Chapter 11 .............. 50:325
Postconfirmation modification
al in Chapter 12 .............. 50:327







Professionalism ..... 50:1; 51:1, 13; 54:1
Right to counsel .............. 27:84
Specialization .......... 40:287; 43:131
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
Uninsured motorist
coverage ............. 26:123; 29:183
BAILMENT




receivable as preferences ....
Automatic stay and Montana's
One Action Rule in Chapters
11 an d 12 ............... ..
Automatic stay in Chapters 11
and 12 ....................
Bankruptcy Tax Act of 1980 ..
Chapter 7 (farmers) .........
Chapter 11 (farmers) .........
Chapter 11 primer ..........












Valuation of assets ...........
BANKS AND BANKING
Branch banking in Montana...
Credit cards .................
Deposit, creation of trust or
d eb t .... ........ .... .....
Good faith and fair dealing,
to rt ..................... .
Uniform Commercial Code ...
BAR ASSOCIATION
See also Attorneys
Activities, 1939, Montana ...
Activities, 1940, Montana ...
Activities, 1942, Montana ..
Activities, 1944, Montana ....
Activities, 1945, Montana ..
Activities, 1946, Montana ..
Activities, 1947, Montana ...
Activities, 1949, Montana ..
Activities, 1950, Montana ..
Activities, 1951, Montana ..
Activities, 1952, Montana ..
Activities, 1953, Montana ..
Activities, 1954, Montana ..
Activities, 1955, Montana .....
Activities, 1956, Montana .....
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Activities, 1960, Montana .....
Admission to practice law .....
Alternative dispute resolution
Dues, compulsory ............








Set-off against one who is not
a holder in due course of a
negotiable instrument .......



















See Documents of Title
BOUNDARIES
Accretion along navigable
stream s .................... 38:192
Crow Reservation, fishing
rights on .................. 37:276
Indian reservation, territorial
extent when bordering on
navigable water ............ 27:55
BULK SALES
Uniform Commercial Code .... 21:51
BUSINESS REGULATION
Architects ................... 22:103





Federal intrastate exemption .. 34:1
Fireworks, sale of ............ 22:111
Food additives ............... 37:199
Grain dealers ................ 22:110
Green River ordinances in




M edicine .................... 22:106
Motor carriers ............... 37:175
Physical therapy ............. 22:105
Plum bing .................... 22:105
Racing, betting on ............ 22:111
Seeds, sale of ................ 22:107
Survey of recent developments 39:53
Television translator stations .. 22:126
Trading stamps .............. 22:106
CITY-COUNTY PLANNING
See also Master Plan Zoning,
Subdivisions, Zoning
Annexation in Montana .. 35:71; 38:135
County zoning ............... 33:63
In M ontana .................. 25:185
Local government study
commissions .......... . 36:155
Montana Economic Land
Development Act ........... 38:125
Property taxation, effect on
land use ................... 38:122
CIVIL JUSTICE
Adoption of Reform Act in
M ontana ..................





Civil Justice Reform Act of
1990 ...................... 55:449
Federal .............. 56:307, 539, 547
Planning in Montana Federal











Additur, not recognized in
Montana ............. 26:104; 41:126
Advisory jury ................ 24:58
Attendance of witnesses, 1959
Montana legislation ......... 20:135
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CUMULATIVE INDEX
Court reporters .............. 22:106
Disqualification of judges 27:79; 44:327
Federal Civil Procedure
Rule 1 ................... 55:440-43
Federal district court
rules .................. 40:128; 53:91
Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure ................. 55:416
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
1993 Proposed
Revision of .............. 55:415, 435
Findings of fact and
conclusions of law .......... 44:325
Foreign corporations, right to
sue on contracts in Montana 26:218
Im pleader ................... 34:320
Intervention, failure to file .... 45:344
Intervention of heirs .......... 42:348
Intervention of insurer,
uninsured motorist policy ... 26:123
Juror affidavits to impeach
verdict .................... 28:137






approval of school by
Montana Board of
Chiropractic Examiners .....
Montana Rules of Civil
39:295
22:92
Procedure ................. 55:4, 416
Motion in limine ............. 35:362
Motions, post-trial ...... 40:122; 42:352
Post seizure hearing on
prejudgment attachment ....
Post trial motions ............




Pretrial procedure ............ 23:44
Prohibition, ministerial acts ... 21:139
Proper party in action for
wrongful death of a minor... 11:81
Real party in interest, right of
third party beneficiary to
bring suit .................. 3:97
Real party in interest, status of
assignee for collection ....... 2:120
Representative suit by a
stockholder against officers of
a corporation .............. 8:105
Rem ittitur ................... 26:101
Right of citizen to sue a
county .................... 3:129
Rule 11 governing sanctions ... 51:11;
52:308; 55:416
Rule 26 requiring mandatory
pre-discovery or automatic
disclosure ..................
Rules of Civil Procedure ......
Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961
legislation .................
Rules of Civil Procedure,







Stare decisis in prejudgment
attachment ................ 37:34
Stay bond on appeal, 1959
amendment to statute ...... 29:134
Substitution of counsel ....... 10:180
Supervisory control,
writ of ................. 8:11; 12:363
Survey of recent
developments ........ 11:293; 42:344;
44:315; 45:335
W aiver of jury ............... 24:47
CIVIL RIGHTS
Affirmative action ............ 32:249
Assigned counsel In Montana.. 26:1
Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Title VII ............. 32:229; 56:126
Discrimination, tenants with
children ................... 47:139
Dissent, right to .............. 32:215
Effective trial counsel ......... 37:387
Employment practices,
unlawful ................... 32:320
Fair criminal trial, publicity
may prevent ............... 27:205
Federal Fair Housing Act ..... 47:147
Federal loyalty security
program ................... 18:235
First amendment right of
nontenured teachers ........ 37:216
Freedom of the press ......... 26:110
Indians and Title II of 1968










Private clubs, discrimination ..
Public employees .............
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Right to counsel .............. 27:84;
28:1
School grooming regulations 32:249, 301
Sex discrimination ............ 35:325;
37:194; 38:413; 39:238
Treaties in regard. to .......... 15:5
Youths, representation in




General choice of law
provision, UCC .............
Letters of credit ..............
Mobile home financing under
U C C ......................
Survey of recent developments







Holder in due course ..... 39:61; 44:113
Negotiable instruments,
presumptions concerning .... 37:104







See Criminal Law and
Procedure, Evidence
CONFLICTS OF LAW
Annulment of marriage .......
Contracts ....................
Corporate stock, validity of
nonvoting provisions ........
Dissolution of marriage .......
Domicile, as affection taxation
of intangibles ..............
Federal oil and gas lease,
principles which govern .....
Field Code Statute ...........
Foreign decrees for alimony,
enforcem ent ...............
Foreign divorces, full faith and
cred it .....................
Forum non conveniens,
availability in Montana .....
H istory ......................
Illegitim acy ..................
















Jurisdiction and Indian credit
Jurisdiction, by statute .....




Place of performance as
governing the essential








A rticle 9 ...................
















Survival statutes ............. 5:69
Taxation of tangibles by state
of situs .................... 1:89
Traditional process procedures 24:99
Uniform Commercial Code,
emphasizes contractual
aspect of transactions ....... 26:214
Uniform Reciprocal Support
A ct ....................... 15:63
Water rights ........... 27:112; 42:267
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
See also Censorship, Due






Advertising and the First Amendment
...................... 52:184-185
Antidiscrimination section ..... 36:155
Apportionment ..... ....... 30:35
Arrest without a warrant ...... 11:1
Article II, section 16 .......... 48:64
Article III, section 6 .......... 48:55
Bar Association dues,
compulsory ................ 39:268
Civil disobedience ............ 32:215
Civil inspection for fire, health
and sanitation .............. 21:195
Classification clause of the
Montana Constitution ...... 33:131
Coal severance tax,
constitutional .............. 43:165








Commerce clause and taxation
of regulated motor carriers 37:175
Commercial Speech Doctrine 52:181
Computerized criminal records 36:65
Confidential informants, due
process questions raised by
their use ................... 19:129
Constitution as a pattern for a





stockholders of right to vote 22:185
Counsel, right to court
appointed attorney ...... 23:116; 26:1;
35:151; 46:349
Credit for time served,
conviction ................. 25:58
Cruel and unusual
punishment .......... 29:242; 38:209
Death penalty ................
Delegation of legislative power,
constitutionality ............
Delegation of powers .........
Delegation of power to define
adjusted gross income .......
Discovery, constitutionality in
criminal cases ..............







Divorces, full faith and credit
for foreign decrees ..........
Double jeopardy ..............
Double jeopardy, appeal by the
state as subjecting defendant
to . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Due process, parole ...........
DUI, defenses ................
Education ...................
Effect on Uniform Rule of
Evidence ..................
Effective trial counsel in
criminal prosecution ........
Environment as a public trust

























Equal protection ............. 48:165
Equal protection, juveniles .... 32:317
Equal protection, out of state
hunting licenses ............ 38:387
Equal protection, suits against
the sovereign ............... 37:211
Equal protection, taxation of
regulated motor carriers ..... 37:177
Equal protection, voluntary
draft ...................... 37:193
Equal Rights Amendment ..... 35:330
Equality and uniformity clause
of the Montana Constitution 33:127
Establishment Clause ..... 56:5, 39, 95,
119, 145, 171, 227, 249, 295, 325, 451
Evidence, exclusion ........... 38:29
Executive branch
reorganization, Montana .... 22:118
Federal criminal system,
discovery in ................ 36:184
Federalism and due process ... 42:183
Federalism and independent
and adequate state grounds
Federalism and natural
resources ..................
Fifth Amendment: drugs and
real property forfeiture .....




nontenured teachers ........ 37:217
Free exercise of religion .... 54:19; 56:5,
39, 95, 119, 145, 171,
227, 249, 295, 325, 451
Free press, access to trials ..... 45:323
Free press, contempt by
publication ................ 18:88
Free press, defamation ........ 28:110
Free press, obscenity ......... 36:285
Free speech .................. 53:157
Free speech, right to appeal to
public not to patronize
certain firm ................ 11:71




Montana Code Annotated ... 41:97
Full faith and credit clause,
foreign divorces ............ 31:107
Full faith and credit clause,
validity of compelled deed .. 12:59
Full legal redress .... 48:55, 271; 50:215
General assistance (welfare) ... 48:163
Governor, inherent powers .... 15:99
Governor, office of ............ 33:1
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protection of right to
determine ............ 32:294, 32:303














m entally ill ................
Joint and several liability ....
Judiciary ........... . ......
Jury trial, civil cases ..........




Labor union hired attorney ....
Land use planning under
Montana Constitution ......
Landlord and tenant, adverse
possession, constitutionality
of special statute ...........
Laws of another jurisdiction,




Legislature, provisions in the
Montana Constitution ......
Local government ............












federalism, special issue .....
Oleomargarine legislation, due
process and the police power
Picketing as a means of
exercising free speech .......


































Political beliefs ............... 38:365
Political questions,
reapportionment ........... 33:104




knowing and reckless falsity 28:243
Privacy, right to know conflict 39:249





issue unconstitutional ....... 21:139
Property tax assessment,
40% rule ................ 34:305, 314
Property tax, reform .. 50:244, 252, 270
Proposed constitutional
amendment, form, submitted
to Governor ................ 22:195
Proposed constitutional
amendment, justices' court .. 23:90
Proposed constitutional
amendment, Modernization
of Montana's judicial system 29:9
Public employees, First
Amendment rights .......... 38:365
Public trust as a constitutional
provision in Montana ....... 33:175
Real property forfeiture under
the Montana Constitution... 54:69
Reapportionment ............. 33:101
Revenue and taxation in the
Montana Constitution ...... 33:126
Right to counsel in involuntary
commitment ............... 38:315
Right to dissent .............. 32:215
Right to know ............... 39:249
School, funding equalization... 50:272
School, grooming
regulations .............. 32:294, 303
Searches, by private persons... 47:189
Self-executing treaty .......... 15:6




Sovereign immunity .......... 51:529
Sovereign immunity abolished by the
state constitution ..... 34:283; 37:209
Speedy trial ................. 38:54
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State debt limit under
Montana Constitution ...... 20:117
States' rights ........... 19:150; 42:183
Statutes, recodification when
unconstitutional ............ 40:13
Statutory presumption of guilt
from presence at illegal
distillery ................... 27:216
Supreme court in constitutional
revision .................... 35:227
Supreme Court of the US,
history and role ............ 20:171
Survival statutes,
constitutionality ............ 24:123
Takings and the Fifth
Amendment ................ 55:455
Taxation and regulation by
state ...................... 43:181
Taxation of mineral interests under
Montana Constitution.. 32:47, 43:165
Title II of the 1968 Civil
Rights Act ................. 33:255
Tort reform, Constitutional
Initiative 30 ............... 48:53
Treaty making power ......... 15:1
Trial by jury, remittitur ....... 3:112
Trials, press access ........... 45:323
Uniform Arrests Act .......... 11:18
University system, constitutional
control ................ 33:76; 35:189
Use of drug-detection dogs,
Fourth Amendment ......... 48:101




Waiver of Fourth Amendment
rights ..................... 31:57
Water rights taken without
compensation .............. 13:102
Welfare (general assistance) ... 48:165
Workers' compensation and
heightened scrutiny analysis 55:537
Workers' compensation and
rational basis test .......... 55:535
Youths, representation in
juvenile court .............. 36:225
Zoning in Montana ........... 33:70
CONSUMER PROTECTION










A ct ....................... 39:70
Door to Door Sales Act ....... 39:66
Equal Credit Opportunity Act 39:67
Fair Credit Reporting Act ..... 39:55
Federal Odometer Act ........ 47:313
Finance rates in consumer
installment credit sales:
time-price doctrine ......... 34:150
Holder in due course ..... 39:61; 44:113





A ct ....................... 39:55
Mobile home financing under
U C C ...................... 36:213
Prejudgment attachment .. 36:118, 174;
37:27; 38:421
Product safety ............... 50:237
Safety standards ............. 50:237
Supreme Court's changing
attitude ............... 36:118; 37:27
Survey of recent developments 37:371
Unfair Trade Practices and




Used car sales, claim against
manufacturer ..............
Used car sales, common law ...
Used car sales, UCC ..........





See also Arbitration, Damages,
Forfeiture, Frauds, Statute
of, Labor Law
Accord and satisfaction .......
Commercial, good faith and
fair dealing ................
Conflict of laws ..............
Consent theory ...............
Consideration, promise to
perform that which is due a
third party ................
"Contract marriage" is invalid
Corporate bylaw depriving

















Leaphart: The Honorable William D. Murray
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1995
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Employment, covenant not to
compete ................... 49:353
Equitable conversion,
application to contracts for
the sale of land ............ 4:88
Expectancy damages .......... 44:1




Gift transfers, consideration ... 35:132
Good faith and fair dealing,
tort ....................... 48:202
Implied warranty, used car
claim ...................... 47:286
Installment land sale
contracts ............. 36:110; 42:110
Interest rates ................ 39:72
Joint interest doctrine in
prejudgment attachments ... 37:28
Modification of written
contracts .................. 10:63
Option to purchase as an
interest in land ............ 10:70
Performance ................. 56:417
Premarital agreements ........ 49:56
Presumptions concerning ... 37:101, 111
Product liability and privity... 28:221
Punitive damages ............ 42:93
Real estate contracts to sell,
memo to realtor satisfying
the Statute of Frauds ....... 20:240
Reliance damages ............ 45:1
Restitution damages .......... 45:1
Restrictive covenants in deeds,
construction ............... 37:268
Sales contract modified by the
U C C ...................... 21:11
Sales contracts, awarded to
Montana bidders, when ..... 22:125
Security agreements under
Article Nine ............... 34:233
Settling within the insurance
policy limits ............... 29:90
Third party beneficiary
contracts in Montana ....... 3:97
Uniform Commercial Code,
new Article Nine ........... 34:28
Uninsured motorist coverage .. 29:183
Used car contracts, fraud ..... 47:279
Used car contracts, negligence 47:280
Used car contracts, parole
evidence ................... 47:276
U sury ....................... 39:72
Vendor's representations ...... 38:419
Venue, contract provisions
stipulating ................. 19:166
Venue of actions on contracts ... 16:68;
20:120
War bonds, contact theories
applied to ................. 4:70
Warranty, relation to
tort law ................. 38:238, 270
Warranty under UCC as
applicable to products
liability .................. . . 38:243
CONVICTIONS
Evidence of prior conviction...












See also Antitrust Law
Closed corporations
characteristics of ........... 25:213
Close corporations, cost
analysis ....... 52:80-82, 84-85, 86-87
Close corporations,
distribution ... 52:82-84, 85-86, 87-88
Close corporations, primer ..... 49:66
Close corporations,
shareholders' agreements .... 25:213
Close corporations, tax
consequences ............... 49:105
Contract to issue stock for
future services, validity of ... 2:91
Corporate control and the
corporate asset theory ...... 27:153
Corporate dissolution as
stockholder's remedy ....... 38:135
Corporate distributions,
taxation ................... 24:195
Corporate governance ......... 53:6
Cost analysis ................. 52:76-78
Covenant not to compete ..... 49:353
Cumulative voting, bylaw
dispensing with valid ....... 22:185
Cumulative voting of stock .... 18:107
De facto corporation doctrine.. 39:305
Directors, classification ........ 18:107




Distribution analysis .......... 52:78-80








Duties and conduct ........... 55:69
Duties of directors, officers,
and controlling shareholders 53:6
Family farm ................. 35:88
Financial statement ........... 22:108
Foreign contacts, right to sue
in Montana courts .......... 26:218
Foreign, failure to qualify in
M ontana .................. 26:218
Foundations ................. 35:53
Improvement of capital
resulting from repurchase of




Intrastate exemption, effect of
the Securities Act
Amendment of 1964 ........ 27:19
Intrastate exemption, federal .. 34:1
License tax .................. 22:128
License tax, 1959 changes in
M ontana .................. 20:139
License tax, "business income"
defined .................... 39:313
Limitations upon a stockholder
bringing a representative suit
against the directors ........ 3:105
Limited liability .............. 55:54
Limited liability companies .... 55:387
Limited liability companies,
members of as employees ... 55:393
Limited liability companies,
tax treatment of ............ 55:390
Limited liability companies,
workers' and unemployment
compensation acts .......... 55:392
Long arm jurisdiction ......... 28:260




Act .............. 29:163; 49:66; 53:4
Montana Close Corporation
A ct ...... ..... ..... ..... ..
Montana Securities Act,




Piercing the corporate veil ....
Presumptions concerning ......
Public accounting firms .......
Securities, Uniform Act
adopted ...................




















See also Consumer Protection
Credit cards, liability if lost ... 31:29
Future advances under Article
N ine ...................... 34:232
Jurisdiction and Indian
Credit .................. 33:307, 317
Mobile home financing under
U CC ...................... 36:213
Prejudgment attachments ..... 36:118,
174; 37:28
Probate, claims in ............ 16:88
Probate, contingent claims .... 8:30
Remedies for creditors .. 34:178; 37:184
Replevin .......... ........... 34:178
Time-price doctrine .......... 34:150
Uniform Commercial Code, the
new Article Nine ........... 34:28
Wage garnishment, remedy for
discharge of ................ 36:352
Workers' compensation, suit by
claimant or claimants'
creditor ................... 1:47
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE






Search and Seizure, Trials
Abortion ............... 35:103; 36:159
Accomplice, conviction on
testimony of .......... 21:134; 41:312
Aggravated assault ........... 38:414
Amendment of charging
docum ent ..................
Animals, actions of as evidence













Montana ........ 23:116; 26:1; 35:151
Bail .................... 38:53; 40:154
Bail of youth ................ 36:230
Betting on racing ............. 22:111
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Burglary, larceny committed
w ith ....................... 28:254
Burglary, second degree ....... 18:86
Chain of custody requirements
in admissibility of evidence. . 37:144
Child sexual abuse, victim
witnesses .................. 46:229
City ordinances, penalties ..... 36:160
Codefendants' right to counsel 40:157
Complaint, Information, or
Indictment may charge more
than one offense ............ 22:112





Confessions, voluntariness ..... 23:233;
41:332
Confrontation right ........... 42:399
Consent, coerced ............. 38:331
Contem pt .................... 32:183
Coram nobis ........... 17:160; 21:226
Coroner system .............. 36:1
Criminal code, exclusive
character of ................ 21:225
Criminal justice data banks 36:60; 37:55
Criminal negligence, basis for
involuntary manslaughter
conviction ................. 18:218
Criminal responsibility law in
M ontana .................. 55:509
Cruel and unusual punishment 38:209
Cruel and unusual punishment,
solitary confinement ........ 29:242
Custodial interrogation ........ 45:357
Custody of youth by law
enforcement officer ......... 36:228
Dangerous drugs ............. 35:318
Death penalty .......... 38:209, 216-17
Default ...................... 55:343
Deferred imposition of
sentence, credit for jail
time ................. 36:345; 38:357
Detention hearing of juvenile .. 36:229
Discovery .................... 40:174
Discovery, depositions ........ 38:48
Discovery, federal criminal
system .................... 36:189
Discovery, pretrial ............ 21:189
Discovery, prosecutorial duty
to disclose ................. 45:361
Discretion exercised by County
Attorney ................... 28:41
Disqualification of judge for
imputed bias, not timely
after verdict ............... 26:128
Disqualification of judges in
criminal proceeding allowed
by 1959 legislation .......... 20:147
Double jeopardy .... 37:238; 38:56, 426;
40:161; 42:394; 43:291; 45:366
Driving under the influence
of alcohol or drugs .......... 18:209;
22:109; 45:359
Effective assistance of counsel 37:390;
40:157; 42:408
Electronic surveillance .. 32:265; 42:378
Entrapment .................. 36:344
Evidence, amount of alcohol in
blood ............. ........ 22:113
Exclusionary rule in
Montana . .......... 34:187; 38:29;
40:132; 41:281; 43:281; 46:289
Fair trial, publicity may
prevent .................... 27:205
Federal decisions, impact ...... 38:27
Federal officer, unreasonable
search and seizure .......... 18:229
Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, discovery under.. 36:196
Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, Rule 42 ......... 32:189
Federal writ of habeas corpus 55:341
Felony-Murder rule ........... 19:63
Guilty plea colloquies,
standards and uniformity ... 45:295
Guilty pleas ..... 40:165; 42:384; 45:362
Guilty pleas, withdrawal 43:311; 45:362
Habitual Traffic Offenders Act 36:159
Identification of suspect 42:380; 43:285
Immunity from prosecution ... 38:48
Imprisonment as tolling statute
of limitations .............. 31:269
Indigent defendants, right to
counsel at preliminary
hearing .................... 25:174
Indigent's right to counsel ..... 35:151
Informations, as initiation
of prosecution 25:135; 42:392; 43:288
Initial appearance ............ 40:148
Insanity as a defense ......... 1:69; 8:2;
40:155; 45:133
Insanity defense, abolition of 55:503
Insanity defense, historical
background ................ 55:505
Insanity Defense Reform Act
test ....................... 55:509
Insanity, determination of ..... 25:151
Intent ........... 50:371, 380, 384, 393
Insanity, irresistable impulse
test of ..................... 55:507









Jail time, credit upon revocation
of deferred imposition or suspended
sentence ............. 36:345; 38:357
Jurisdiction .................. 38:52
Jurisdiction in county where
crime committed ........... 18:225
Justices' court, procedure 23:77; 42:391
Larceny by bailee ............ 20:246
Larceny by trick ............. 35:161
Law Enforcement Academy ... 20:145
Leave of court, initiation of
prosecution by information .. 25:135
Lesser included offense ....... 43:291
Liquor, sale to minors ........ 19:67
Livestock, removal from state
without inspection .......... 22:110
Manslaughter, involuntary ..... 18:218
Marijuana, cultivation as sale.. 37:271
McNabb-Mallory rule ......... 44:137
Mens rea, requirement of ..... 26:133
M ental state ................. 37:401
M istrial ..................... 21:224
Montana Post-Conviction
Hearing Act ............... 55:335
Obtaining property by false
pretenses .................. 35:161
Omnibus Crime Control Act... 32:269
Other crimes evidence 53:133
Parole, due process ........... 48:379
Perjury, signing a false
affidavit ................... 18:225
Plea bargaining .............. 42:387
Police interrogation, right to
counsel during ............. 27:84




Post-investigative concerns .... 38:52
Preliminary examination,
initiation of prosecution of
information ................ 25:135
Preliminary hearing, critical
stage of proceedings ........ 25:174
Presumptions concerning .. 37:101, 112;
41:21, 355
Prison ............. 20:148; 56:325, 451
Prisoners, sentence for felony
in prison .................. 22:113
Privacy, electronic surveillance 27:173
Probable cause ....... 38:33, 39; 40:145
Proposed changes in criminal
procedure .................. 29:35
Prosecutorial discretion ....... 28:41
Psychiatry, use of in criminal
case ....................... 25:181
Publicity .................... 41:355
Rape and assault .......... 52:135-142
Rape and Past Conduct .... 52:129-133
Rape and the judiciary ..... 52:142-146
Rape and the Sixth
Amendment ............. 52:133-135
Receipt of stolen property ..... 35:172
Res judicata ................. 55:343
Reversed sentence or
conviction, resentence or new
trial ....................... 25:51
Reversed sentence or
conviction, time served ...... 25:3
Sale of liquor to minors ....... 19:67
Sanctions against county
attorney ................... 28:69
Scope of appellate review in
criminal cases .............. 53:223
Searches, by private persons... 47:189
Searches, drug-detecting dogs.. 48:101





Sentencing, credit for time
spent prior to revocation of
order deferring imposition of
sentence ................... 36:345
Sentence Review ............. 49:372
Serious bodily injury, defined.. 48:181
Sodomy, age of incapacity to
com m it .................... 18:124
Speedy trial ............. 38:54; 40:151;
41:403; 42:388
Statutory presumption of guilt 27:216
Statutory rape, mistake as to
age of prosecutrix as an
affirmative defense ......... 26:133
Survey of recent
developments .... 40:132, 151; 41:329;
42:371; 43:279; 45:353




Procedure Act (UPCPA) ....
Vagrancy, statutes void for
vagueness ..................
W aiver ......................
Waiver of Fourth Amendment
righ ts .....................
Wild animals, right to kill in
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Eminent domain, valuation in




Extent of injury, proof of
damages required ...........








Insurance coverage of punitive
dam ages ...................
Libel and slander ............




Measure of, under survival
statute ....................
Notice of claim in suits against
the sovereign ...............
Oil and gas leases, breach of
implied covenant ...........
Once-released irrigation waters:
























Presumptions concerning ... 37:102, 113
Punitive damages, actual




procurement of release ......
Punitive damages, insurance
coverage ...................
Recovery for emotional distress
43:335
Reliance and restitution
dam ages ................... 45:1
Remittitur in Montana... 3:111; 26:104
Review of award ............. 15:120
Tax issues in personal injury
litigation .............. 46:59; 56:603
Tort claims against state,
lim itation .................. 45:151
Wrongful death actions,




Application of, in Montana ....
Original jurisdiction in the
Montana Supreme Court ....
Uniform Declaratory Judgment
Act, application of ..........
DEEDS




validity of deeds given under
Manual delivery of ...........
Mineral deeds, construction of





T ax deeds ...................
Validation of, 1961 legislation
Vendor's representation .......
DEFAMATION
See Libel and Slander
DESCENT AND DISTRIBUTION
1981 legislative changes .......
Adopted child, inheritance
rights .................
Afterborn children, effect of no
provision in will for ........
Conflict of laws ..............





43:335 Montana statutes ...........
Stepchild, intestate succession
24:71 Survey of recent developments
Survivorship rights in murder-
46:77 suicide joint tenancy case ...






























See also Criminal Law and
Procedure









Medical discovery in negligence
actions .................... 30:105
Montana Rules of Civil
Procedure, 1961 revision .... 23:46
Private exclusive interviews ... 34:260
Rule 35(a) independent
medical examinations ....... 45:345
Rule 35(b) and the doctor ..... 30:105;
Rule 37 sanctions ..
34:257
46:95
Sanctions ........ 42:350; 44:320; 46:95
W itnesses .................... 35:144
DISMISSAL AND NONSUIT
Affirmative defenses, pleading




Plaintiff request, upon ........
Summary judgment, conversion
of m otion ..................
Verdict set aside as being
against the evidence ........











See also Uniform State Laws
Alimony, lien on real property
of husband ................ 14:14




Conflict of laws .............. 39:165
Court findings ............... 43:325
Custody ..... 9:47; 31:112; 37:127, 411;
39:2; 40:86; 41:139; 42:442;
44:336; 46:433; 48:135
Decree, a judgment creating
automatic lien for alimony .. 14:142
Equitable power of divorce
courts to adjust property
rights ..................... 21:230
Foreign decrees ...... 4:77; 31:107, 39:8
Foreign decrees for alimony,
enforcement ...............
Grounds under UMDA ........
Joint custody ................
Lien for alimony, extent of ....
Marital status .......... ..
Military pensions, distribution
Modification of decree ........











Professional degree or license. . 47:449
Property division ........ 40:75; 41:135;
42:413; 43:317; 44:329
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
.................... 15:40; 37:272
Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act, need for
adoption of the 1968
amendment to ............. 20:40
Recrimination, no longer an
absolute defense ............ 26:254
Retirement benefits,
distribution .......... 42:413; 44:329
Support and maintenance ..... 31:110;
37:125; 40:83; 41:135; 44:334
Support of wife .............. 15:42
Support, retroactive
modification ............... 48:151
Survey of recent developments... 39:1;
40:75; 41:135; 42:413; 44:329
Tax consequences ....... 43:319; 44:175
Temporary alimony, in suit for 5:71
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act ....




review of ................. 38:17, 417
Montana's judicial system ..... 29:1
Prohibition applied to
ministerial acts ............. 21:139
Proposed changes ............ 29:1
State courts, jurisdiction in
relation to tribal courts ..... 33:277
Terms of court, 1959 legislation 20:135
DIVORCE
See Dissolution of Marriage
DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
Uniform Commercial Code .... 21:59
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
See also Adoption, Dissolution
of Marriage, Marriage
1959 legislation ............... 20:149
Abused, neglected, and dependent
children-custody ............ 40:96;
41:141; 44:338





Domestic Abuse Act ..........
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Joint custody ................ 48:135
Paternity .................... 43:323
Premarital agreements ........ 49:56
Presumptions concerning ...... 37:102
Support ..................... 22:114
Survey of recent developments ... 39:1;
40:75; 41:135; 42:413; 43:317; 44:329
Temporary Restraining Order 47:412
Tort immunity, interspousal ... 36:251
Uniform Marriage and
Divorce Act ............ 37:119; 39:1
Uniform Parentage Act ....... 36:143
Uniform Premarital Agreement
A ct ....................... 49:59
Unwed parents, child custody
rights ................... 36:137
Welfare payments,
reimbursement for .......... 37:272
Youth in need of care ..... 39:9; 41:141
DOWER
Affecting intestate succession
to w ife ....................
Dower rights .................
DUE PROCESS OF LAW
















Juvenile criminal proceedings ..
Land use decisions ...........





















Public employees, dismissal ...
Search of bodily cavities ......
Suspensions from high school..
Unwed parents, child custody
rights .....................








See also Eminent Domain
Conservation easements .. 38:161; 42:21
Creation' by promise .......... 34:211
Equitable servitude ........... 34:209
Flowage easements,
condemnation of ........... 23:212
Implied by necessity .......... 19:73
Negative easement ........... 34:209
Reciprocal negative easement,
implied from contract, deed
and general building plan ... 27:91
Taxation of rights of entry .... 32:58
EAVESDROPPING
Electronic surveillance ... 32:265; 37:45
Electronic surveillance and
privacy .................... 27:173
Omnibus Crime Control Act... 32:269
Telephone monitoring ........ 37:58
EDUCATION
Federal aid petitioned for in




Education Act (IDEA) ......









Suspension from high school,
due process rights ..........















































History of, in Montana .......
Interest acquired by ..........







Public use, invoked by private
persons ....................
Route selections, review .......
Subsurface easements,
valuation standards of






Valuation in Montana ........

















Agency authority ............. 41:177























Strip Mine Siting Act....






See also Appeal and Error,
Injunction
Enforcement of easements .....
Equitable conversion,
application to contracts for






Community property ......... 35:126
Death taxes .................. 31:133
Farmers and ranchers ... 40:189; 42:209
Future interests .............. 39:141
G ifts ........................ 35:132
Joint tenancies ............... 42:214
Joint tenancies, exclusion from
federal estate tax marital
deduction .................. 37:131
Marital deduction ............ 34:17
Postmortem elections .... 30:19; 42:199
Survey of recent
developments ......... 40:102; 41:144
Termination of trusts, effect on
contingent interests ......... 31:83
Undue influence .............. 37:250
EVIDENCE
..... 38:111 See also Civil Procedure,
..... 55:425 Criminal Law and
Procedure, Discovery, Search
..... 54:105 and Seizure, Witnesses
Admission of physician
.... 38:417 sufficient to show negligence 21:131
Agent's statements against the
... 38:97, 182 interest of his principal ..... 3:81
Anim als ..................... 31:257
t 35:220 Attorney-client privilege,accountants ................ 23:238
l Blood alcohol, indirect proof .. 22:113
..... 55:430 Blood alcohol test 18:209; 43:302; 45:359
olicy 38:108; Blood alcohol test, implied
... 41:177
consent ............ 36:347; 46:349
olicy Blood alcohol test, procedures 46:365
..... 41:177 Blood, search and seizure of... 38:45
..... 38:157, Chain of custody requirements 37:144
187 Child sexual abuse, child
..... 36:311 victim witnesses ............ 46:229
..... 55:427 Circumstantial evidence, words
0, 162; 38:109 constituting ................ 34:276
..... 36:156 Completeness doctrine ........ 43:301
,ct .. 36:157 Constructive notice ........... 31:224
Contradictory statements by
..... 34:211 party as a witness .......... 23:120
Custodial interrogation ........ 45:357
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Dead Man's Statute .......... 41:305
D eath ....................... 37:102
Declaration against interest ... 2:97
Exclusionary rule ........ 34:187; 38:29;
40:132; 41:281; 43:281; 46:289
Expert opinion ............... 37:267
Generally ................ . 39:79
Guilty plea, withdrawn ........ 43:311
Hearsay ......... 29:137; 41:324; 42:363
Highway patrol officer as
expert ..................... 44:251
Impeachment of witnesses 8:39; 42:358
Insurance coverage of the
defendant ...........
McNabb-Mallory rule .......
Medical Malpractice Panel ....
Medical testimony, preparation
o f .........................
Medical witnesses, waiver of
physician-patient privilege







Official records, proof in
federal cases ............... 22:137
Opinion testimony ............ 41:308;
42:360; 43:313
Opinion testimony, medical
witnesses ............. 17:128; 41:308
Other crimes evidence ......... 41:320;
42:356; 43:308; 45:364; 53:133
Physical conditions, expressions
of as exception to hearsay
rule ...................... 34:274
Plain view ................... 38:44
Pleading as part of res gestae 34:277
Polygraph evidence ........... 41:309
Presumption of delivery of
deed ...................... 1:79
Presumption of guilt from
presence at illegal distillery. . 27:216
Presumptions ............ 31:97; 37:91
Prior convictions, evidence of.. 25:250
Prior inconsistent statement... 43:314
Psychiatric testimony ......... 25:181
Psychologist-client privilege . . 43:305
Radar evidence of speed
adm issible ................. 20:145
Relevance 29:137; 34:275; 42:354; 43:302
Res gestae rule ............ 34:269, 277
Rule of Evidence, survey ...... 39:79
Scope of transaction .......... 34:278
Searches, by private persons... 47:189
Spontaneous declarations ...... 34:270
State of mind, exception to
hearsay rule ............




Subsequent repair rule ........
Survey of Montana Rules of
Evidence ..................
Survey of recent developments
Uniform Rules, adoption in
K ansas ....................
Uniform Rules as affected by
the federal Constitution .....

















Federal aid highway system,
review of route selection ....




















limited powers ............. 37:7
Indian lands ........... 33:291; 35:212
Indian tribal court, habeas
corpus is appropriate ....... 26:235
Lease of tribal land to non-
Indian, lack of jurisdiction .. 27:198
Reapportionment ............. 28:9
FISH AND GAME




Fishing rights on Crow
Reservation .............
Nonresident hunting licenses
Preservation of fish, state









Montana Law Review, Vol. 56 [1995], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol56/iss2/1
CUMULATIVE INDEX
Wild animals, killing in defense
of person or property .......
FORFEITURE
Land purchase contracts.









Civil RICO, pleading and
dam ages ................... 45:87
Duty to disclose in
constructive fraud ....... 52:157-162
Fiduciary duty in
constructive fraud ....... 52:166-169
Generally ................. 52:155-157
Litigating constructive fraud 52:171-175
Notice in constructive fraud 52:157-162
Releases, fraudulent
procurement of and punitive
dam ages ................... 24:71
Vendor/vendee relationship in
constructive fraud ....... 52:162-164
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF
See also Brokers
Agency agreement given to
realtor constitutes sufficient
memorandum .............. 20:240
Oral contract to dispose of
property at death .......... 6:65
Realty gratuitously conveyed
upon an oral trust .......... 9:113
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES
Uniform Act .................
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
See Conflicts of Law,
Judgments
GIFTS
See also Minors, Securities,
Taxation
Transfers in contemplation of
death, Montana inheritance
ta x . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Written instruments ..........
11:60
Federal review of fact




Indians, review of tribal court
decision in federal court ....
In M ontana ..................
Involuntarily committed ......
Youths in custody ............
HEALTH AND WELFARE
See also Business Regulation,
Workers' Compensation
Food additives, regulation of
G arbage .....................
Natural Death Act, proposal...
Parks and recreational facilities
Pollution Control Act .........




State Welfare Board, no power
to discriminate .............
Sterilization petitions .........
Term inally ill ................
Vocational rehabilitation ......
Water ditches, open ..........
HIGHWAYS AND STREETS
Driver's license ...............
Federal aid highway system,
review of route selection ....
Habitual Traffic Offenders Act
Motor vehicle registration .....































Bankruptcy, relationship to ... 15:102
Exemptions .............. 9:71; 15:102




Defenses of sureties and
guarantors ................. 2:155
HABEAS CORPUS
Due process, expansion .......
Exhaustion of state remedies ..
HOMICIDE




as requisites of first degree
m urder ....................
Unborn child, recognized as
human being in prosecution
for its murder ..............
26:57 INDIANS








Leaphart: The Honorable William D. Murray




Cohen's 1982 Handbook of
Federal Indian Law, review
and commentary ........... 44:147
Crow Reservation ............ 35:276
Damages for injury to strip-
mined lands ............... 35:222
First Amendment ............ 52:35-43
Fishing rights on Crow
Reservation ................ 37:276
Ghost dance ................. 52:26-27
History of tribal courts ....... 5:216
Hunting, off-reservation rights 39:323
Indian Child Welfare Act ..... 52:286
Indian Law program at the
University of Montana ...... 33:187
Indian legislation ............. 35:210
Jurisdiction, credit ......... 33:307, 317
Jurisdiction, criminal ... 22:165; 33:236;
38:92, 339; 47:513
Jurisdiction, federal .... 26:235; 27:198;
33:255; 35:212; 52:252
Jurisdiction, federal review of
tribal court decision ........ 26:235
Jurisdiction, state civil .... 33:277, 291;
35:340; 38:63
Jurisdiction, tribal civil.. 33:277; 52:239
Jurisdiction, tribal criminal
over non-Indians ........... 38:339
Juveniles, tribal court
procedure .................. 33:239
Lakota culture ............... 52:24-25
Lease of tribal lands, application
of National Environmental Policy
Act ..................... 35:214, 220
Lease of tribal lands, to non-






program s .................. 33:191
Peyote ...................... 52:36-38
Post conviction remedies ...... 22:165
Religion ......... 52:17-34; 56:295, 451
Reservation, territorial extent
when bordering on navigable
w aters ..................... 27:55





State regulation in Indian
Country, generally .......... 50:53
State regulation, limits ........ 50:131
State regulation of Indian
Reservations ............... 50:61
Strip mining on Indian
reservation lands ........... 35:209
Taxation ................. 36:93; 38:87
Taxation of on-reservation
natural resource development 43:217
Tort claims, resolution in
Indian courts .............. 45:265
Treaties, construction ......... 38:68
Tribal court practice .......... 52:298
Tribal sovereignty ............. 38:89,
348; 50:54; 52:228
Water rights, adjudication .... 41:39, 73
Water rights, on reservations .. 26:149
Water rights, regulation in the
Ninth Circuit .............. 43:247
Water rights, reservation 41:39; 43:247
Water rights, riparian rights
within the reservation ....... 38:424
Water rights, sale and lease ... 38:266
Wounded Knee .............. 52:33-34
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION
See also Criminal Law and
Procedure
Amendment of charging
docum ent .................. 38:53
Charging offense in language of





Federal officer in state court as
to evidence illegally obtained
Temporary restraining order...
Trespass actions when title is
in dispute .................
W ater rights .................
INSANE PERSONS
See Mentally Ill Persons
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
Comparative negligence .......
G enerally ....................

















1981 legislation ............... 22:116
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CUMULATIVE INDEX
Bad faith, tort liability.
Conflict of laws .............. 56:553
Consequential and punitive
dam ages ................... 41:127
Contracts .................... 56:553
Environmental liability ....... 54:105
Exemption from creditors'
claim s ..................... 9:62
Good faith and fair dealing,
tort ....................... 48:206
Identification cards, authorized 18:122
Insurance Code, 1959 ..... 20:158; 22:1
Insurer as "related party in
interest" . ................. 16:101
Joint and several liability ..... 50:201
Liability of company for failure
to settle within the policy
lim its ..................... 20:90
Medical malpractice claims .... 36:322
Montana inheritance tax ...... 31:153
Presumptions concerning ...... 37:113
Punitive damages, coverage .... 46:77
Uninsured motorist ........... 29:138






Trade practices regulation .....
Uniform Commercial Code ....




See also Decent and
Distribution, Taxation
Creation of ................. 19:69
Federal estate tax ............ 37:131
Marital deduction under
federal estate tax ........... 37:131
Montana inheritance tax ...... 31:150
Partition, right extended to
joint owners of personal
property ................... 20:157
Tenancy by the entirety
abolished .................. 25:257
JUDGES
Civil justice reform ...........
Disqualification by affidavit ...
Disqualification for imputed
bias not timely after verdict
District court, 1959 legislation
concerning .................
Early Supreme Court justices..
E lection .....................









Judicial standards ............ 12:1
Justice court reform, legislation
concerning ............. ... 34:122
Salaries ............... . 22:117
Selection and tenure ..... 33:52; 54:126
Selection and tenure of federal
judges ..................... 54:57
Territorial judges in Montana 4:5; 5:34
Transferee judges ............ 35:16
Sentence Review Division ..... 49:371
Water court, proposed changes 49:244
JUDGMENT
See also Appeal and Error,
Declaratory Judgment, Liens
Collateral attack for lack of
jurisdiction ................ 16:54
Default ................ 40:119; 45:343
Divorce decree, judgment to
create an automatic lien for
alim ony ................... 14:142
Foreclosure deficiency relief,
fair market value appraisal.. 53:256
Foreclosure deficiency relief,
permissibility ...... 53:256; 55:548-49
Founded on unconstitutional
statutes, effect ............. 16:61
Frivolous appeals ............. 38:377
Partial judgment for appeal 44:326
Prejudgment attachment ....... 37:27;
38:421; 40:128
Relief from .................. 44:323
Res judicata ................. 44:319
Rule 54(b) requirements ...... 42:351
State, collateral attack on by
sister state ................. 16:64
Survey of recent
developments ......... 40:119; 42:351
Uniform Commercial Code, the
new Article Nine ........... 34:28
JURISDICTION
See also Indians
Administrative agency ........ 38:16
Annul marriage, to ........... 1:56
Collateral attack on judgment
for lack of ................. 16:54
Conflict of laws ............. 56:553
Contempt order, collateral
attack on for lack of ........ 16:56
Criminal ................ 18:225; 38:52
Divorce court, power to
adjudicate property rights ... 21:230
Error in, distinguished from
lack of .................... 16:57
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Justices' court ............... 23:67, 77
Legislative interests in conflicts
of laws, cases under the full
faith and credit clause ...... 26:80
Long arm jurisdiction .. 28:260; 37:420;
40:111; 42:344; 44:315, 336






Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961
revision .................... 23:12
Subject matter, lack of ........ 16:54
Timely notice of appeal, failure 23:116
Youth court ................. 36:227
JURY INSTRUCTIONS




Civil proceedings ............. 23:67
Criminal proceedings ......... 23:77;
42:391
Justice court reform .......... 34:122
Justices' court, presumptions
concerning ................. 37:114
Miscellaneous provisions ...... 23:63
Montana's judicial system ..... 29:1
Proposed changes ............ 29:1
Proposed constitutional
amendment ................ 23:90
Qualifications of justices of the
peace ........ ............. 23:62
Search warrants, authority to
issue ...................... 37:274




transfer from youth court ... 36:245
Custody of youth by law
enforcement officer ......... 36:228
Delinquency charge,
adjudication of ............. 36:235
Detention hearing ............ 36:229
Habeas corpus, remedy for
youth in custody ........... 31:231
High school, suspension from.. 36:334
Indian juveniles .............. 33:238
Juvenile criminal proceedings
and the constitution ........ 32:307





co u rt .. ...... .......... .. ..
Traffic offenses, district court
jurisdiction ................
Venue, transfer of criminal
actions against juvenile .....
LABOR LAW

























breach of ................. 24:176
Collective bargaining in good
faith under NLRA .......... 21:102
Collective bargaining in public
sector ........ 36:80; 39:39-40; 40:231
Covenant of good faith ........ 51:96
Discrimination in hiring .... 32:230, 242
Discrimination, sex (federal) ... 49:150
Discrimination, sex (Montana) 49:170
Disparate impact ............. 47:237
Disparate treatment .......... 47:219
Duration of employment ...... 56:434-
35
Employee covered by Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ................. 32:232; 56:126
Employee status under NLRA 22:176
Employment at-will .......... 46:1;
56:428, 430, 432-34
Employment compensation .... 56:432
Employment discrimination ... 56:95
Employment discrimination,
prima facie case ............ 47:220
Employment tort actions .... 51:96, 106
Firefighters .................. 39:50
Independent contractor, third
party liability .............. 35:119
Interaction with federal ....... 21:111
Labor organizations covered by
Title VII .................. 32:233
Legal aid plans of labor unions
are first amendment rights .. 26:117
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Maternity leave .............. 39:75
McDonnell-Douglas formula ... 47:227
Minimum wage .............. 39:73
Nontenured teachers, wrongful
dism issal .................. 37:223
Nurses' Employment Practices
A ct ....................... 39:35
P olice ....................... 39:50
Professional Negotiations Act
for Teachers ............... 39:39
Public contracts, favored
treatment of Montana labor 22:117
Public employees .............. 36:80;
38:365; 39:40; 40:231
Public Employees Collective
Bargaining Act .. 36:80; 39:40; 40:231
Public employee strike
injunction ................. 53:317





Sex discrimination ...... 32:242; 38:413
State labor legislation in
general .................... 21:112
Strikebreakers, Professional ... 39:77
Subcontractors' bonds ........ 39:76
Survey of recent developments 39:33
Wage payments .............. 39:74
Wrongful discharge ........... 46:1;
53:53; 56:585
Wrongful Discharge From Employment
Act.. 51:94; 53:53; 56:585, 433-41, 585
LANDLORD AND TENANT
Adverse possession by tenant
under special statute ........
Breach of covenant to repair,
landlord's liability in tort ...
Business invitee duties owed to
Discrimination, tenants with
children ...................
Implied covenant not to make





















Security deposits ....... 36:162; 39:178
Warranty of habitability 36:129; 39:182
Waste, cutting door in side of
building ................... 19:167
LAND USE







Development Act ........... 38:125
Montana Environmental Policy
A ct ....................... 38:108
Natural areas ................ 38:157
Realty Transfer Act .......... 38:133
Recent development, survey 38:97, 182







Constitutional Initiative 30 ....
Legislative Council, creation...




to study fiscal procedures ...










Montana's law of water rights 27:1
Reapportionment, charts ...... 28:14
Reapportionment in
Montana ............ 28:7; 33:28, 101
Sovereign immunity doctrine,
case law following
amendment of MCA § 2-9-
111 .......... ............ 54:127
Sovereign immunity doctrine,
revised .................... 48:270
Welfare reform ............... 48:283
LIBEL AND SLANDER
Common law development ....
Conditional privilege, based on
first amendment ............
Crim inal libel ................
D am ages ....................
Defamation, the Montana law
Gertz negligence rule .........
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lim its of ..........
Libel per quod, pleadi
special damages ....
Libel per se .........












Slander and libel disti
Slander per quod....
LIBRARIES
Law library service in
LIENS
See also Deeds, Suret
Alimony as lien on pr
husband ..........
Certificate of assignme




































uod .... 20:18 Education, no cause of action. 49:140
ion of.. . 20:15 Legal ........................ 37:279
18:135 Legal, Code of Professional
vilege ... 43:338 Responsibility, standard of
ing ...... 37:114 liability ........... .. 47:368
rslander
sld 3:75 Legal, Model Rules of
.in... :0 Professional Conduct,
standard of liability ........ 47:374
.... 20:25; 36:120 Legal, statute of limitations ... 45:342
44:344 M edical ..................... 37:293
)r .. . . 9:17e ....... 36:122 Medical, accrual of cause of
n e d 3 2 action .................... 38:399
nguished 20:7 Medical, admission ofphysician sufficient to show
negligence ............... 21:131
Montana 20:67 Medical, discovery ............ 34:257
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Annexation ................. 35:71
Bonds and obligations ........ 22:127
Contracts to be awarded
Montana bidders ........... 22:125
Elections .................... 22:125
Governor, office of ............ 33:1
Judicial administration ........ 33:52
Land use planning ........ 35:38; 38:97
Legislature, constitutional
provisions for .............. 33:14
Lobbying .................... 20:161
Local government under the
1972 Montana Constitution.. 33:154
Municipal government,
presumptions concerning .... 37:115
Public employees, dismissal for
political beliefs ........... 38:365
Reapportionment of local
government ....... 30:35; 33:28, 101
Salaries of officials ........... 22:125
W ater districts ............... 22:127
Waterworks, purchased by












Conflict of laws ..............
Disabilities tolling the statute







Generally ....... 40:114; 44:317; 45:343
M alpractice .................. 28:121
Malpractice, legal ............ 45:342
Medical malpractice, accrual of
action ..................... 38:399
M ortgage lien ................ 5:4





















Recent developments ..... 36:157; 38:98
SUBROGATION
Conflict of laws .............. 56:553
Insurer subrogated to rights of
insured, as a real party in
interest .................... 16:101
Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act, state's right to
subrogation under .......... 37:272
Tax lien of county, right of
subrogation where one pays
taxes of another by mistake 1:88
SUCCESSION




Burden of proof .............. 40:116
Dismissal, conversion of motion 45:340
Inferences in favor of opposing
party ...................... 45:346
Nonmoving party, grant to .... 41:303;
42:158
Partial summary judgment .... 44:326
SUPERVISORY CONTROL
W rit of ............. .. 8:14; 42:353
SUPREME COURT
See also Appeal and Error,
Rules of Court
Early history and early judges
Reports of decisions ..........
Stare Decisis ................
Stare Decisis in consumer
cases ...... ................
United States, history and role
coupled with highest court of
other federal states .........
SURETY
Defenses of sureties and
guarantors .................
Miller Act, laborers, and
materialmen's liens and .....
Surety bond given to state, for
whose benefit ..............
SURVIVAL ACTIONS
Damages, proposal for just
compensation ..............
History in Montana ..........
Wrongful death ........... 5:67;
Wrongful death and the statute
of lim itations ..............




















1969 legislation ............... 18:132
Adjusted gross income,
definition .................. 17:203
Agricultural lands.. 34:47; 35:88; 47:421
Alimony payments ............ 55:359
Alimony trusts .... .......... 55:372
Assessment of land ..... 34:303; 50:247
Automobile tax on new cars ... 20:162
Barter-equation method to
value stock ................ 28:268
Basis, partner's, of assets
received on distribution ..... 18:163
Blockage rule in valuation of
stock ...................... 28:270
Business corporations .... 34:163; 36:56
Business loans, below market
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taxation aparr from domicile 1:91
Cancellation of indebtedness,
qualified farm exceptions .... 50:284
Capital gains and losses,
interpretation of ............ 14:67
Capital gains tax, proposed .... 38:132
Charities, 1969 Tax Reform





Child support ........... . 55:364
Claim of right doctrine ....... 14:70
Close corporations ............ 49:105
Coal severance tax ............ 43:165
Conservation easements, gift or
sale ................. ...... 42:31
Constitutional provisions for... 33:126
Contingent liability from
capital transaction, capital or
ordinary loss ............... 14:64
Contributions to partnership, tax
treatment of .......... 16:44; 18:160
Control, defined .............. 47:428
Cooperatives .............. 21:145, 155
Corporation, family farm ...... 47:421
Corporation license tax ....... 22:129
Corporation license tax,
"business income" ......... 39:313
Corporation License tax
changes in Montana in 1969 20:139
Corporations ............ 34:163; 36:56
Damage awards .......... 50:13; 56:603
Damages in personal injury
litigation .............. 46:59; 56:603
Death taxes .................. 31:133
Declaratory judgments ........ 51:201
Deductibility of legal expenses 55:383
Deductions from gross income,
charitable .................. 18:112
Deductions from gross income,
contributions to lobbies ..... 18:112
Demand loans ................ 47:349
Dependency exemptions ....... 55:378
Depreciation, computing from
salvage value and useful life 22:94
Depreciation, purchase of
leased property with building
built by lessee and ......... 24:61
Determination of stock
valuation .................. 28:268
Discounts, loans and pledges .. 29:46
Disposition of installment
obligations ................. 29:43
Dissolution of marriage, tax
consequences ......... 43:319; 44:175
Distribution of partnership
property to partner, tax
consequences of ............ 18:159
Divorce, tax consequences of .. 55:359
Economic Land Development
A ct ....................... 38:125
Estate tax, federal ............ 37:131
Estate tax marital deduction .. 29:106





Family farm, incorporation .... 47:421
Farms and ranches ........... 35:88;
Federalism and severance taxes
Filing status after divorce
55:381
Foundations ................
Gains on debt cancellation
after 1986 TRA .........
Gift, defined .................
Gift loans .............. 47:41;
Gift of incom e ...............
Gifts to minors, tax
consequences ...............











motor carriers .............. 37:175
Homestead, basis of .......... 22:60
Income, cancellation of
indebtedness .......... 14:72; 50:280
Income, definitions, federal and
M ontana .................. 23:105
Income, incorporated
professional group .......... 29:229
Income of partnership ........ 18:144
Incom e tax .................. 51:191
Income tax, Montana, 1959
legislation affecting ......... 20:162
Income, taxation when going to
one other than one who
generated it ................ 24:183
Indians, state taxation of ....... 36:93;
38:87; 43:217
Inheritance tax ............... 22:127
Inheritance tax, farmers and
ranchers ...................
Inheritance tax, jointly owned
property ...................
Inheritance tax, new












disposition by gift ..........
Installment obligations, fair
market value as measure ....
Interlocutory adjudication .....
Land use, impact on . .. 38:122;
Leasebacks, tax advantages ....











Local government funding .. 50:250, 274
Loss of local control .......... 50:261
Losses, contingent liability .... 14:64
Losses in illegal businesses,
deductibility ............... 19:143
Marital deduction ....... 34:17; 37:131
Meals and lodging, exclusion .. 47:465
M ill levies ................... 50:249
Mineral interests ............. 32:47
Montana Income Tax Act ..... 23:113
Motor carriers, gross receipts
tax ........................ 37:175
Multiple taxation of same
economic interest ........... 1:89
Mutual irrigation company,
taxability of property ....... 1:94
Oil and gas interests .......... 32:57
Ordinary and necessary
expenses, payment made to
protect attorney's reputation 23:248
Partnerships generally .......... 13:30;
16:44; 18:142
Personal injury awards ........ 50:13
Postmortem elections .... 30:19; 42:199
Presumptions concerning ...... 37:117
Private foundations ........... 35:55
Property acquired from
decedent, basis of .......... 19:33
Property settlements 55:375
Property tax, assessment ...... 50:247
Property tax, California ....... 50:257
Property tax, history ......... 50:247
Property tax, reform .. 50:244, 252, 270
Property Taxpayers
Information Act ............ 36:157
Qualified farm indebtedness
test ...................... 50:285
Race betting, tax on proceeds 22:111
Reacquiring property sold ..... 29:51
"Realization" of gains or losses 14:68
Real property assessment ..... 34:300
Recapture, farm and ranch
property ................... 47:433
Refunds ..................... 51:203
Restitution for taxes paid by
mistake. .......... 1:84
Salaries And interest paid to
partners ................... 18:153
Sale or exchange ............. 14:68
School funding ............ 50:249, 271
Settlement agreements ........ 56:603
Taxable year of partners and
partnership ................ 18:155
Tax appeals ................. 51:190
Term loans ................. 47:357
Theatrical productions, tax
consequences ...............
Trading stamp license tax .....
Trailers ..............
Trust with monthly payments
to w idow ..................








TENANCY BY THE ENTIRETIES
See Joint Tenancy
TITLE
Model Marketable Title Act...








Airport noise pollution ........
Alcohol, liability for serving ...
Assumption of risk ..... 51:161;
Attractive nuisance ...........












Bystander recovery ........... 35:348
Child's services, loss of ........ 50:349
Child's society, loss of ........ 50:349
Commercial contracts, bad
faith ................... 48:349
Comparative negligence ....... 51:221
Conflict of laws .............. 56:553
Consortium, action for
the wife .......... .... 34:75, 50:349
Consortium, loss of ..... 29:111, 50:349








valuation ............. 35:354; 38:297
1995]
379
Leaphart: The Honorable William D. Murray
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1995
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
Good faith and fair dealing,
generally .................. 48:193
Independent contractors ...... 31:117
Indian courts, in ............. 45:265
Interspousal immunity ... 36:251; 47:23
Irrigation waters, liability after
release .... ...... ......... 36:14
Joint tortfeasor
contribution .......... 29:235; 41:131
Joint tortfeasor contribution,
comparative negligence ......
Joint tortfeasor, indemnity for
breach of contract ..........
Landowner liability ..........










broker ............... 50:331, 335-38
Negligent infliction of
emotional distress .......... 47:479
Parental Consortium, loss of... 54:149
Parent's society, loss of ....... 50:349
Real estate broker, duty to
inspect ................. 50:339, 341
Real estate broker, liability .... 50:331
Release of defendant, mistaken 42:440
Right of privacy .............. 28:243
Strict liability .... 38:274; 40:64; 44:342
Substantial factor test ........ 48:391
Survey of recent developments. . 40:61;
41:121; 42:425; 43:327; 44:339
Tax issues in personal injury litigation
.................... 46:59; 56:603
Wrongful discharge ........... 46:1
Wrongful geophysical
exploration ................. 44:53
Wrongful life recognized ...... 44:291
TRESPASS
See also Animals, Injunction
Ab initio, misfeasance or
nonfeasance ................ 3:133
Attractive nuisance ... ...... 30:61
Trespass ab initio ............ 6:61
TRIALS
See also Civil Procedure,
Constitutional Law,
Evidence, Instructions to the
Jury, Jurisdiction
Advisory jury ................ 24:58
Contem pt .................... 32:196
Generally .................... 19:117
Juror affidavits to impeach
verdict .................... 28:137
Justices' court ............... 23:73.
82
Juvenile court ................ 36:240
Modern Trials, book review ... 17:225
Newspaper accounts of, adverse
publicity when read by the
jury ....................... 25:156
New trial, time served for
reversed sentence or
conviction and ............. 25:9
Press access ................. 45:323
Publicity, effect on fair trial... 27:205
Selection of jury .............. 41:297;
44:322; 45:347
Speedy trial ................. 38:54
Survey of recent developments 40:118;
41:297; 44:322; 45:347
Voir dire questions dealing
with juror relationships with
insurance company ......... 29:96
W aiver ...................... 24:47
TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
See also Frauds, Statute of
Accumulations, 1957 Montana
legislation affecting .........
Charitable trusts in Montana..
Construction of trust
instrument, parol evidence to
determine intent ...........
Creation of .. ...............
Debt distinguished from a trust
Development of charitable





by reference in will .........
Nonmarital trusts, drafting
considerations in appointing
surviving spouse as trustee
Pension and profit sharing
plan, rule against
perpetuities not applicable to
trust which is a part of .....
Perpetuities, rule against, as
applied to revocable trust ...
Personal property trusts ......
Real property trusts ..........
Survey of recent developments
Tentative trust ...............
Termination of trust, effect of
contingent interest .........
Testamentary trusts ..........
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beneficiaries of a trust ...... 11:129
Use of as substitutes for a Will 2:19
War Bonds, trust theories
applied to ................. 4:73
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
Labor union hired attorney.... 29:220




1961 legislation ............... 22:117
UNIFORM STATE LAWS
Adopted in Montana ......... 19:158
Choice of laws provision
emphasizes contractual
aspect of transaction, UCC .. 26:241
In Montana ................. 19:21
Model Business Corporations
A ct ....................... 36:29
Model Marketable Title Act,
proposal of ................ 22:26
Model Rule Against
Perpetuities Act adopted in
Montana in 1959 ........... 20:166
Model State Administrative
Procedure Act .......... 20:168; 38:4
National Conference on ....... 7:11;
19:151
Product liability under the UCC 31:51
Rules of Evidence ............ 29:137
State adopting ............... 15:16
Table of ..................... 15:17
Uniform Acts in Montana in
1959 ...................... 25:165
Uniform Adoption Act ........ 22:114
Uniform Authorized Insurers
A ct ....................... 20:166
Uniform Commercial Code .... 15:36
Uniform Commercial Code, a
symposium ................ 21:1
Uniform Commercial Code,
mobile home financing under 36:213
Uniform Commercial Code,
requirement of filing in
M ontana .................. 26:228
Uniform Commercial Code, the
new Article Nine ......... 34:28, 218
Uniform Consumer Credit Code and
finance rates in Montana 34:150, 160
Uniform construction of ....... 25:97
Uniform Facsimile Signatures
of Public Officials Act ...... 20:165
Uniform Gift to Minors Act. . 19:109
Uniform Insurers Liquidation
A ct ....................... 20:165
Uhiform Marriage and Divorce Act ....
...................... 37:119, 414
Uniform Principal and Income
A ct ....................... 20:165
Uniform Probate Code .......... 35:1;
36:161; 46:179
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
Support Act .......... 22:114; 37:272
Uniform Reciprocal Support
A ct ....................... 15:40
Uniform Rules of Evidence .... 31:100
Uniform Securities Act ........ 22:123
Uniform Securities Act,
adoption in Montana ....... 25:205
UNIONS
Antitrust exception lost by
combination with nonunion
groups ..................... 27:107
Attorneys hired by ...... 26:117; 29:220
Conduct prohibited by 1964
Civil Rights Act ............ 32:243
Labor organizations covered by
1964 Civil Rights Act ....... 32:233
Public Employee Bargaining
A ct ....................... 36:80




Conflict between priority and
preference in the Federal
Power Act resolved ......... 26:246






sales and the time-price
doctrine ...................
Consumer Loan Act ..........








Electric power, "preference" of
public bodies as to federal power ....
......................... 18:3 , 17
Facility siting ................ 38:177;
45:113
Federal Power Commission,
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power over nonnavigable
rivers flowing through federal












State utility regulation ....... 37:11, 19
VENDOR AND PURCHASER




canned food, retail dealer's
liability .................... 2:133
Installment land sale contract 36:110
Prejudgment attachment 37:27; 38:421
Small Tract Financing Act .... 36:116;
55:547
Vendor's representations ...... 38:419
Warranty liability ............ 38:238
VENUE
Administrative actions ........ 38:19
Attorney fees, action to collect 45:341
Class actions ................. 42:347
Contract actions ......... 16:68; 19:166;
20:120; 40:112
Contract and tort actions. . 10:83; 16:68
Criminal cases .... 18:225; 38:52; 43:289
G enerally ....................














WAR AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
Military draft, constitutionality 37:191
United States Constitution as a
pattern for a world charter
to outlaw war .............. 7:1














Uniform Commercial Code ....
Warranties under UCC .......






WATER AND WATER COURSES
See also Indians
Abandonment ..... 20:61; 27:15; 45:167
Acquisition of a water
right .................... 27:1; 28:96
Adjudication of water rights .... 20:63;
27:9, 112; 28:1; 49:215
Adjudication streams,
appropriations from ........ 18:135
Adjudicated streams in
M ontana .................. 19:19
Appropriation doctrine ..... 10:24; 27:1
Appropriation of natural
streams for the preservation
of fish ..................... 27:211
Appropriation system ......... 19:20
Boat regulation .............. 22:110
Canadian treaty ratification
urged ..................... 22:134
Columbia Interstate Compact.. 22:133
Conflicts of law ......... 27:112; 42:267
Conservation and full use of
water, salvaged water ....... 54:99
Constitutionality of water court 49:235
Constitutional provisions ...... 34:57
County water district ......... 18:136
Determination of existing water
rights ..................... 28:101
Drainage district ............. 18:136
Export ...................... 42:309
Federal encroachment on water
rights ..................... 13:102
Federal rights, conflict of law. . 42:267
Federal rights, effect of reservation
on appropriations ...... 26:149; 27:27
Filing for water rights ........ 20:60
Fish conservation, influence of
federal government ......... 18:118
Flowage easement,
compensation for taking of.. 23:215
Ground water, appropriation 22:48
Ground water, generally ........ 20:62;
22:42; 27:17
Ground water, special problems 28:107
Housing subdivision water ..... 22:131
Instream flows ............... 55:303
International agreement ....... 18:136
Interstate compact ........... 42:274
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CUMULATIVE INDEX
Irrigation water, liability whe
released .................
Lakeshore preservation .....
Lands and streams .........
Legislation of water resources
goals ....................
Legislative control, trend in
western states ............




Open ditch protection ......






Percolating waters, trend in






Proposed changes in water la
Public use for recreation ....
Public water rights .........
Recreational use ............
Relation back doctrine ......
Reservation doctrine ........
Reservation process .........
Reservation theory, need for





may purchase existing wate
w orks ...................
Salvaged water and the right
to .......................
State water plan ...........
Stream access law 52:117-118
Streambed preservation .....
Stream s ...................
Survey of recent developmen
Taxation of irrigation system
of mutual irrigation
corporation ..............
Transferability of water right
Water commissioner, propose
Water court, proposed change
Water district commissioners
nS Water planning .............. 55:324
Water power, "preference" of public
bodies as to federal power ... 18:8, 17
W ater quality ................ 55:303
Water resource management. . 49:211
Water Rights Settlement Act,
need for .................. 26:199
Water Use Act ............... 38:179
Water well contractors ........ 22:134
W ells ....................... 18:139
Winters rights doctrine.. 26:149; 42:291
18:116 WILLS
22:126 See also Trusts and Trustees
After-born children, effect of
19:21 no provision in will for .... 14:98, 130
27:27 Animus Testandi ............. 7:76
Antenuptial agreement,
incorporation by reference... 35:376
24:169 Antilapse statute, substituted
beneficiaries ............... 6:71
Antilapse statute, void gifts ... 14:93
22:50 Antilapse statute.
32:81 interpretation .............. 9:120
3:135; 27:1 Attesting witnesses,
37:106 requirement that
55:303 subscription of testator be
w 28:95 made in their presence ...... 1:103
32:6 Cancelled will, presumption ... 43:295
..28:249 Death taxes .................. 31:133328: Deceased beneficiary at time
.. 32:1
12:87 bequest made, effect ........ 14:96
38:189 Dependent relative revocation 40:887
42:311 G ift ......................... 35:132
Holographic .. 5:82; 7:76; 24:148; 41:146
\ct 26:199 Incorporation by reference in
18:137 holographic wills ........... 7:76
10:14 Inter-vivos trust, incorporated
56:400 by reference ............... 20:167
Intestate succession ........... 12:27
Joint tenancies, curative
22:127 bequests ................... 37:142
Mortmain statute ............ 41:147
54:99 Omission of children .......... 11:96
42:267 Partially written and partially
printed holographic wills .... 5:85
38:165 Presumptions concerning ...... 37:118
52:111- Pretermitted heirs ... ........ 14:96
112 Succession under the Model
ts 38:179 Probate Code .............. 18:18
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Testate succession...
Testator's signature, effect on
probate when witnesses do
not see ....................
Unborn child, included in
disposition to a class ........
Undelivered deed, not effective
as will .....................
Undue influence ........ 37:250;
Uniform Probate Code .... 35:2;
War bonds, application of the





Adverse witnesses statute ...
Attendance of witnesses .......
Attesting to will, requirement
that will be acknowledged in
their presence ..............
Child sexual abuse, victim
w itnesses ..................




Discovery of, in the federal
criminal system ............
Discovery of, Rule 26(b) ......
Expert medical, preparation
and use of .................






waiver of in deposition ......










Benefits, 1957 increases in ....
Benefits, generally ............
Coemployee immunity ........









G enerally .................... 1:5
Heart injuries ................ 43:86
Hernia cases ................. 20:167
Independent contractors and
third party liability suits
against general contractor ... 35:119
Industrial Administration Fund 18:140
Industrial injuries ............ 22:135
Injury arising in course of ..... 43:75
Injury, defined ......... 49:341; 55:527
Insurers, assessment of under
Plan 2 ..................... 20:168
Intentional torts exclusion ..... 50:371,
380
44:251 Intoxication, injuries caused by 46:419
29:137 Limitation of claims, time ..... 19:170
Lump-sum conversion,
8:89 checklist for drafting petition 47:177
Lump-sum payment, 1987
34:258 changes .................... 50:122
29:137 Medical problem involving
choice of physician ......... 2:38
Mental-mental injuries ........ 55:541
18:110 Notice, construction when
22:136 injury is latent ............. 22:199
55:527 Notice of industrial accident
55:528 given to apparent agent ..... 22:199
46:419 Occupational diseases ..... 1:27; 20:168
50:95 Overview .................... 1:5
27:193 Permanent partial disability,
22:135 benefits .................... 50:90
18:139 Permanent partial disability,
50:111 theory of lost earning
46:217 capacity ................... 47:207
Post injury wages ............ 19:173
Power of the court to try ..... 2:53
Presumptions concerning ...... 37:106
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12:20 physician .................. 2:39
Constitutional remedy ........ 35:119
Constitutionality, heightened
1:103 scrutiny analysis ........... 55:537
Constitutionality, rational basis
14:130 test ....................... 55:535
Contributions under plan 3 .... 18:140
1:79 Death of a minor, recovery for 7:82
43:297 Disability, defined ............ 50:86
36:161 Dispute resolution ............ 50:116
Dual capacity doctrine ........ 47:161
4:61 Earning capacity as a test of
loss suffered .............. 19:171
Employer liability, intentional
torts or willful conduct ..... 47:167
Evidence, uncorroborated
testimony of claimant ....... 22:83










Right of employee and
employer, against a tortious
third party ................
Scope of appeal ..............
Silicosis welfare Program ......
Street accident ...............
Survey of recent developments












1987 amendments ......... 50:83, 103
Workers' Compensation Act
and Occupational Disease
Act, relationship between ... 49:348
Workers' Compensation Court,
status report ............... 41:1
YOUTH COURT
Predetention hearing ......... 40:100
ZONING
See also Master Plan Zoning,
Subdivisions
Agricultural exemption and ....
City-county planning in
M ontana ..................




"Family," definition in single-
fam ily zoning ..............
Initiative, zoning by ..........
L itigation ....................
Master Plan Zoning Statute,
unconstitutional ............
Planning boards ..............
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